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Abstract 
The Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) implementation has been marked by deep political 
division.  Health insurance exchanges were a provision expected to elude controversy given their 
history of Republican support and since states choosing not to create an exchange would cede 
control to the federal government.  Yet, only 17 states chose to create their own exchange, 
including only one led entirely by Republicans. Why did so few states opt for maintaining 
control?  
Partisanship, the notion that Republicans refused to support an idea endorsed by 
President Obama and other Democrats, is one of the most common explanations given for 
opposition. However, I argue that focusing on partisanship obscures important aspects of the 
policymaking process.  No one variable explains each state’s decision. Instead, I develop a 
framework to integrate lessons from multiple theoretical perspectives. The framework includes a 
focus on the strategic actors attempting to influence policy. It also acknowledges that these 
strategic interactions take place within a specific state context that is shaped by institutional 
design, prior policy decisions, and partisanship.  Each state’s context is also nested within the 
broader national context. 
I use a grounded theory approach to conduct comparative case studies.  I focus on the two 
states that came the closest to setting up an exchange (Michigan and Mississippi) and two of the 
last states to opt for state control (Idaho and New Mexico). I conducted 154 interviews with 
policymakers in 24 states and at the federal level between June 2011 and March 2014, including 
approximately 18 interviews per case study state. 
I find that gubernatorial support was a necessary, but not sufficient condition for a state to 
decide to create an exchange. In many states the key division was not between Democrats and 
Republicans, but was within the Republican Party. Tea Party opposition could be overcome if the 
legislature contained “pockets of expertise,” particularly influential legislators with deep policy 
and institutional knowledge.  Term limits and the timing of the legislative calendar affected who 
was empowered to make decisions, as did state-specific path dependent forces. Flexibility by the 
Obama administration helped some states but ironically emboldened opponents in others. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (PPACA or ACA) is arguably 
the most significant health reform law enacted in generations.  Its passage was a major policy 
and political achievement for President Barack Obama and his congressional allies.  Nearly a 
century’s worth of leaders had tried and failed to pass health reform (Starr 2011).  It is widely 
seen as one of the cornerstones of President Obama’s legacy (Shear 2013).   
The ACA is ambitious legislation.  The act consists of 10 titles, with 487 separate 
subsections, with a major focus on expanding insurance coverage (McDonough 2011).  The 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that by 2019, the ACA would reduce the number 
of nonelderly people who are uninsured by 32 million, increasing the proportion of legal 
residents under age 65 with insurance from 83% to 94% (CBO 2010).  Coverage is expanded 
through a combination of mandates, incentives, and program expansions.  The law requires 
everyone to obtain coverage, as well as companies with over 50 full-time employees to provide 
insurance.  Insurance companies are prevented from denying coverage based on pre-existing 
conditions.  Children are allowed to stay on their parents’ plan until age 26.  Medicaid is 
expanded to include everyone below 138% of the federal poverty level,1 eliminating the previous 
categories of eligibility.  Small businesses and individuals with incomes between 100% and 
                                                           
1
 The statutory threshold is 133% FPL, but 5% of an individual’s income is disregarded, making 138% the practical 
threshold (KFF 2012a).  
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400% of the federal poverty level can receive subsidies to purchase private insurance in on 
online marketplace called an exchange.   
President Obama celebrated the ACA’s passage on March 23, 2010 with two signing 
ceremonies.  In the East Room of the White House he declared that “Today, after almost a 
century of trying; today, after over a year of debate; today, after all the votes have been tallied – 
health insurance reform becomes the law of the land in the United States of America.”  He later 
told a group at the Department of Interior that “health care reform is no longer an unmet promise.  
It is the law of the land.  It is the law of the land,” (White House 2010).   
As supporters of the ACA would subsequently learn, what a law actually accomplishes is 
determined as much by how it is implemented as by what is included in the statute (Pressman 
and Wildavsky 1979, Bardach 1977, Thompson 1981, Jacobson and Wasserman 1999, Patashnik 
2008).  Opponents such as Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives John Boehner (R-OH) 
eventually conceded that the ACA is indeed “the law of the land,” (Nather 2012), but only after 
more than 30 congressional attempts at repeal, a 5-4 decision by the U.S. Supreme Court on a 
lawsuit signed by 26 states, and President Obama’s re-election in 2012.   
Even then, opponents continued to work to undermine the law’s existence and reach.  
Disagreement over whether to fund major elements of the law played a major role in the federal 
government shutdown in October 2013.  As most elements of the law went into effect in January 
2014, key elements of the law were still being adjudicated in the courts, approximately half the 
states were not participating in the Medicaid expansion, and the daily negative coverage of the 
reform’s implementation was undermining President Obama’s second term agenda and 
Democrats’ chances in the 2014 and 2016 elections. 
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The law’s implementation would have been an enormous challenge under ideal political 
conditions.  Countless decisions needed to be made and billions of dollars spent before major 
elements of the law would fully go into effect.  An implementation period spanning three 
election cycles left the reform vulnerable to political opposition and shifts in partisan control 
over key institutions.   
Further complicating the law’s implementation is the high level of involvement given to 
states (Skocpol and Jacobs 2010, Greer 2011, McDonough 2011, Sparer 2011, Jones 2012, 
Weissert and Weissert 2012, Doonan 2013, Weil 2013).  States an important in role in expanding 
Medicaid, developing health insurance exchanges, reviewing health insurance premium 
increases, and enforcing new market regulations.  Jacobs and Skocpol presciently argued that 
“what seemed like an obscure decision during the debate in Congress to assign extensive 
responsibility to states may turn out to be one of the most consequential in the future,” (2010).  
Before federal and state agencies could do the technocratic work of developing programs and 
writing regulations to implement major elements of the law, another round of legislative battles 
was needed as states decided whether and how they would participate.  The most comprehensive 
federal health reform enacted in generations was therefore to a large extent placed in the hands of 
state-level leaders who fervently opposed the law’s very existence (Starr 2011).   
The division of responsibility between levels of government has been contentious, with 
states resisting flexibility in some cases and resenting perceived federal overreach in others.  
State-driven opposition nearly led to the unraveling of the entire law, as more than half the states 
joined a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the Medicaid expansion and the individual 
mandate.  The U.S. Supreme Court ruled 7-2 in June 2012 that the ACA’s Medicaid expansion is 
unconstitutionally coercive and 5-4 to give states the option of implementing this key element of 
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the law.  The Court also ruled 5-4 to keep the mandate, but through Congress’ power to tax 
rather than as an issue affecting inter-state commerce (NFIB et al. v. Sebelius 2012).  This was a 
mixed result for the plaintiff states in that the commerce clause ruling gave “conservatives new 
doctrine to limit congressional power, which they have been seeking since the New Deal,” (Von 
Drehle 2012).  Even still, the ACA was left mostly intact, including the option that states create 
their own health insurance exchange or face federal preemption. 
 
Health Insurance Exchanges 
Health insurance exchanges were one part of the ACA that was expected to elude 
controversy and attract bipartisan support. As I describe in chapter three, purchasing pools of this 
sort had been proposed for decades and supported by conservative groups such as the Heritage 
Foundation.  Exchanges were expected to draw political strength from a flexible identity as a 
“conservative means to a liberal end,” (Jones, Bradley, and Oberlander 2014).  Progressives 
would like the expansion of coverage and conservatives would like that the expansion comes 
through a state-based marketplace mechanism in which private insurers compete.  Although the 
final version of the ACA passed Congress without a single Republican vote, the idea of state-
level exchanges was not a particularly controversial part of the debate (Rigby et al.2014).  In 
fact, the only two exchanges in operation when the ACA was passed were created by Republican 
governors.  A major Republican alternative to the ACA sponsored by Senator Tom Coburn (R-
OK) and Congressman Paul Ryan (R-WI) called for creating state-based exchanges (Ryan 2009, 
Coburn 2011).   
The law required that an exchange be ready for open enrollment in every state by October 
2013, but states first needed to decide whether to create the exchange themselves or default to a 
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federally facilitated exchange.  Carrots and sticks were included to encourage states to take 
control of creating an exchange.  States choosing to do so received multi-million dollar planning 
grants and flexibility over major design issues, whereas states choosing not to create their own 
exchange were threatened with loss of control to the federal government (see chapter three for 
more details).  An alternative model was developed in which states could partner with the federal 
government, retaining responsibility over plan management and consumer assistance, while 
allowing the federal government to develop the IT infrastructure and run other aspects of the 
exchange.   
Conlan and Posner (2011) describe the ACA’s approach to creating exchanges as a 
“hybrid model of federal policy innovation and leadership which mixes money, mandates, and 
flexibility in new and distinctive ways.”   Rigby and Haselswerdt (2013) further elaborate that 
whereas this blending of cooperative and coercive federalism allows liberal states to adopt more 
progressive policies, it may heighten conflict between the federal government and conservative 
states.  The dilemma for Republicans is that by supporting a state-based exchange they risk being 
seen as supporting a law they campaigned against and that is deeply opposed by conservative 
activists.  On the other hand, by blocking creation of a state-based exchange they ironically pave 
the way for greater federal control over a policy they support in principle.  Complying with the 
Obama administration would also potentially undermine their judicial and legislative challenges 
(Jones, Bradley, and Oberlander 2014).  Democrats in Republican-led states also faced a 
dilemma of whether to advocate for their state to run the exchange and accept that it may be a 
less regulated clearinghouse type marketplace, or prefer defaulting to a federally facilitated 
exchange likely to be a more-regulated active purchaser model.   
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The Obama administration expected most states to opt for maintaining control of their 
exchange (Interviews 2011-2013).  Virtually every state took initial steps in 2010 towards 
creating an exchange by applying for a federal planning grant to begin the exploration process, 
even as many were in the midst of lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of the law.  
Republican leaders described opposing the ACA in general, but supporting the creation of an 
exchange for one of two reasons: 1) they wanted to maintain state control, and 2) insurance 
exchanges were originally a conservative idea they wanted to do anyway (Interviews 2011-
2013).  However, state opposition to the exchanges increased in early 2011 as a result of the 
2010 elections, with Governors Rick Scott (R) of Florida and Bobby Jindal (R) of Louisiana 
refused the $1 million planning grants their predecessors had been awarded.  Opposition gained 
further momentum when Governors Mary Fallin (R) of Oklahoma and Sam Brownback (R) of 
Kansas returned exchange innovator grants of $54.6 and $31.5 million dollars, despite having 
recently advocated for creating an exchange.   
  By the time the Supreme Court announced in November 2011 that it would hear the 
ACA cases, only 12 state legislatures had passed a bill creating an exchange and one governor 
had done so by executive order.  More than half of these early adopters were led entirely by 
Democrats, with Arnold Schwarzenegger (CA) and Brian Sandoval (NV) being the only 
Republican governors to have signed legislation creating an exchange since the ACA’s 
enactment.  At the same time, 14 states had already committed to not create an exchange.  
Republicans controlled 25 of these 28 legislative chambers and all but three of these states were 
led by Republican governors.  
This left 23 states as still undecided about whether to create an exchange.  The majority 
were led by Republicans, including 16 with Republican governors, and 19 with Republican 
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control of at least one chamber of the legislature (Table 1).  Nine were led entirely by 
Republicans.  Only two of these states were led entirely by Democrats.  The states were split in 
how they would vote in the 2012 election, with nine voting for Barack Obama and 14 for Mitt 
Romney.   
These 23 states originally had until November 16, 2012 to decide whether to create an 
exchange.  However, after President Obama won re-election and Democrats retained control of 
the Senate on November 6th, it became clear that the ACA would not be repealed.  Given this 
political reality, state leaders asked for more time to decide.  Hoping more states would opt to 
retain control of their exchange, HHS pushed back the deadline by which states would have to 
declare their intentions from November 16 to December 14, 2012 (Sebelius 2012a), as well as 
moved the deadline by which states would need to submit plans to create a partnership exchange 
to February 15, 2013 (Sebelius 2012b).   
Each of these 23 states had already taken important steps towards creating an exchange.  
By January 2012, HHS gave an average of $24.1 million in planning, early innovator, and level 1 
establishment grants to all but one of these states (Table 2).  The other state, Virginia, had passed 
a bill declaring its intention to create a state-based exchange.  Three of these states had 
legislation or executive orders authorizing state officials to study creating for an exchange.  
However, by the December 2012 deadline, only six of these 23 states declared their intention to 
create an exchange.  Of these, Mississippi’s application was denied after the Governor made it 
clear that he would actively block the insurance commissioner in this process.  Similarly, by the 
February 2013 deadline, only six of these states had submitted plans to create a partnership 
exchange.   
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Table 1- State Decision-Making and Partisan Control, as of November 2011 
 
Unified  
R Control 
Mixed Control,  
R Governor 
Unified 
D Control 
Mixed Control, 
D Governor 
Exchange UT NV 
CAa, CA, HI, 
MA, MD, RIb, 
VT, WA, WV CO, OR 
Undecided 
AL, AZ, ID, IN, 
NEc, PA, SD, 
TN, WI 
IA, ME, MI, MS, 
NJ, NM, VA DE, IL 
KY, MN, MO, 
NY, NC 
No 
Exchange 
AR, FL, GA, KS, 
LA, ND, OH, 
OK, SC, TX, 
WY AK   MT, NH 
 
a Legislation creating an exchange was signed into law in 2010 by Republican Arnold 
Schwarzenegger, though by November 2011 the state was led by Democrat Jerry Brown. 
 
b Governor Lincoln Chaffee had been a Republican while in the U.S. Senate, was independent 
when elected governor, but subsequently joined the Democratic Party. 
 
c Nebraska's legislature is officially non-partisan 
 
In total, only 17 chose to operate their own exchange by the beginning of open 
enrollment on October 1, 2013, with 28 states defaulting to a federally run exchange, and six 
choosing a partnership (see Figure 1).  The Obama administration was eager to give states as 
much control as possible, and so approved a variety of alternative arrangements in states that had 
rejected full control.  As states and the federal government struggled with the complexities of 
implementation, the lines between these categories became blurred and represented more of a 
continuum than three distinct models.  Two states that decided to create their own exchange ran 
out of time and so relied on the federal website for the first year (Idaho and New Mexico).  Of 
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these, New Mexico retained control of its small business exchange.  Mississippi rejected control 
of its individual exchange but also opted to run its small business exchange.  In addition to the 
six that chose a formal partnership, seven were allowed to do a de facto partnership in which 
they conducted plan management activities within the context of the federally facilitated 
exchange. 
Table 2- State Decision-Making and Exchange Grants Received (in millions) as of November 
2011 
Exchange Undecided No Exchange 
1 CA ($40) AL ($10) AK ($0) 
2 CO($19) AZ ($31) AR ($9) 
3 CT ($8) DE ($4) FL ($1)a 
4 HI ($15) ID  ($21) GA ($1) 
5 MA($13) IL  ($6) KS ($33)a 
6 MD ($28) IN  ($8) LA ($1)a 
7 NV ($20) IA  ($9) MT ($1) 
8 OR ($10) KY ($71) NH ($1) 
9 RI ($65) ME ($7) ND ($1) 
10 UT ($1) MI ($11) OH ($1) 
11 VT ($19) MN ($31) OK ($56)a 
12 WA ($24) MS ($21) SC ($1) 
13 WV ($11) MO ($22) TX ($1) 
14 NE ($7) WY ($1) 
15 NJ ($9) 
16 NM ($35) 
17 NY ($61) 
18 NC ($13) 
19 PA ($35) 
20 SD ($1) 
21 TN ($5) 
22 VA ($1) 
23 WI ($39)a 
Total $273 $459 $108 
Average $21 $20 $8 
Source: CMS 2014.  
a State returned all or portions of this grant money 
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Figure 1 – State Decisions for Creating Health Insurance Exchanges, as of October 1, 2013 
 
Source: Interviews and KFF (2014a) 
 
Research Questions 
The Obama administration made a number of strategic choices to convince as many 
states as possible to create their own exchange, offering money and flexibility.  Federal deadlines 
were pushed back repeatedly in the hopes of enticing more states to take control.  Yet only 17 
states chose to create their own exchange, including only one led entirely by Republicans.  Why 
did so few states opt for maintaining control?  In other words, why would so many states reject 
control of a policy that previously attracted bi-partisan support and that was specifically designed 
with state flexibility in mind?  What are the implications of these battles for the success of the 
Responsibilities shared, though not 
officially a partnership*
Federal Partnership State
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
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exchanges? What more, if anything, could the Obama administration have done to increase the 
number of these states that created an exchange?   
Partisanship, the notion that Republicans refused to support an idea endorsed by 
President Obama and other Democrats, is one of the most common explanations given for why 
states chose to oppose or create a state-based exchange (Young 2012, Burke and Kamarck 2013, 
Purdum 2013, Rigby and Haselwerdt 2013).  The final breakdown of state decision-making 
supports this argument.  Of the 30 Republican governors in office when open enrollment began 
in October 2013, only three (10%) presided over the creation of a state-based exchange, 
compared to 13 of the 20 Democratic governors (65%). Partisanship is a particularly compelling 
explanation for decision-making as of November 2011 when the U.S. Supreme Court announced 
it would hear the ACA case.  The 13 states that had already decided to create an exchange were 
led almost entirely by Democrats, whereas the 14 states that had already decided to reject an 
exchange were led almost entirely by Republicans. 
However, partisanship is an incomplete explanation obscuring important aspects of how 
states made their decisions, particularly for the 23 states that were undecided as of November 
2011.  In many cases, the most important division was among Republicans, not between 
Republicans and Democrats.  Republicans in most of these supported exchange planning, partly 
as a way of hedging their bets so that they would preserve the option of maintaining state control 
in case the law survived its judicial and electoral challenges.  Ultimately, only five of these states 
decided to create a state-based exchange, with only two of the 16 of these states led by 
Republican governors opting for state control.   
Rather than a satisfying explanation of state decision-making, the partisan breakdown of 
state choices is itself a puzzle requiring explanation. Why did some Republicans support creating 
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an exchange while others opposed?  Why did some change their stance over time?  What 
changed between the initial months after the ACA was enacted when each received planning 
grants, November 2011 when each was still undecided but accepting federal exchange grants, 
and February 2013 when only five of these had conditional approval from HHS to create their 
own exchange?   
 
Methods 
I address these questions in two stages.  The first is a 50-state analysis using a wide 
variety of data to identify patterns of decision-making (chapter three).  I describe the history of 
insurance exchanges and then examine state responses to this portion of the ACA, arguing that 
state responses evolved across four time periods.   
The second is case studies of four states in which I explore these patterns in more depth 
(chapters 4-7).  My approach is rooted in the logic of the comparative method as articulated by 
Ragin (1987).  The goal is to look for “configurations of conditions,” or “the different 
combinations of conditions associated with specific outcomes.”  I organize each case study 
chapter around the same four time periods as chapter three. 
A number of scholars emphasize the benefits of thick description in policy analysis 
(Brown 2010).  For example, Stonecash (1996) argues that the state politics literature needs to 
move towards a focus on explaining political processes and outcomes, and that the best way to 
do this is a methodological shift to comparative case study.  McGrath (2009) warns that 
“measuring a process like implementation across states using a static set of criteria is not usually 
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possible unless those criteria are so general as to be of only limited utility,” and that a better 
approach is to examine factors affecting implementation within specific states.   
The comparative case study method has a number of advantages over multivariate 
regression models for the questions I ask.  First, inherent in this approach is a flexibility to use all 
pertinent data and to present it in a variety of ways, including qualitatively and quantitatively.  
Second, statistical power is significantly limited with only 50 cases.  Instead, the comparative 
method accounts for every instance of a particular phenomenon.  Some scholars attempt to solve 
this problem using pooled time series data.  This approach increases statistical power but runs the 
risk of incorrectly treating the observation at time one for a given state as independent from the 
observations at times two and three.  Doing so obscures the nuances across time periods that are 
the very thing I am trying to explain.   
Finally, “the comparative method forces the investigator to become familiar with the 
cases relevant to the analysis.  To make meaningful comparisons of cases as wholes, the 
investigator must examine each case directly and compare each case with all other relevant 
cases.”  Ragin (1987) describes this as distinct from the statistical method which involves 
disaggregating cases into variables and then examining relationships among variables; that is, 
making comparisons not as meaningful wholes. 
My approach is also rooted in the tradition of grounded theory in that the theoretical 
substance emerges directly from the data rather than being imposed a priori (Charmaz 2006).  
This is backwards from the traditional scientific approach in which individual hypotheses are 
developed and tested.  Grounded theory is consistent with Ragin’s comparative method in that all 
data are seen as important and relevant.  Unlike a purely grounded theory study, I use a review of 
the literature (chapter two) to guide my data collection and analysis. Even so, I follow a “ground 
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up” process in which the theoretical arguments of each chapter, and of the entire dissertation, are 
developed from the analysis.   
 
Data 
I conducted 154 semi-structured interviews with leaders in 24 states between July 2011 
and March 2014, including an average of 18 people in four case study states.  These interviews 
informed the 50-state analysis in chapter three and were the primary source of data for the case 
study chapters.  Most interviews lasted 30-60 minutes and dealt with a variety of issues relevant 
to that person’s role in the ACA’s implementation.  In each of the case study states I attempted to 
speak with an advisor to the governor, legislative leaders from each chamber, Republican and 
Democratic legislators on the relevant committees, legislative staff, bureaucrats in the state’s 
department of insurance and department of health, and leaders of interest groups that lobbied on 
the exchange, including business groups, insurers, brokers and agents, hospital and provider 
associations, consumer advocates and the Tea Party. I also spoke with leaders at the national 
level, including in the White House, the Department of Health and Human Services, and staffers 
to relevant congressional committees.    
In exchange for their candor, I do not include any identity-revealing information without 
an interviewee’s permission.  Approximately 40% of the interviews took place over the phone.  
The rest were conducted in person, either in the participant’s office or at a policy conference 
such as those run by AcademyHealth, the National Academy for State Health Policy (NASHP), 
the National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA), and the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC).  I also approached these meetings as an ethnographer, taking 
extensive notes on the presentations, comments, and interactions among state and federal leaders.  
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I attended, watched, or read the minutes of every legislative hearing on an exchange in my four 
case study states, and took a similar ethnographic approach at these meetings.   
I rely on a variety of secondary sources such as detailed analysis of media coverage, as 
well as statistics and polling information from organizations such as the Commonwealth Fund, 
the Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF), and the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL).  
I use roll call data for every vote on the floor of a state senate or state house on a bill authorizing 
the creation of a health insurance exchanges, with information compiled from the official 
legislative web site of each state.  The State Refor(u)m document library developed by NASHP 
was helpful for obtaining copies of primary documents used by state policymakers and interest 
groups.2  In one case I filed a freedom of information request under the Kansas Open Records 
Act to obtain a copy of a letter written by Gov. Sam Brownback. 
 
Case Selection 
I focus my examination on the process by which four states decided what type of 
exchange to establish: Idaho, Michigan, Mississippi, and New Mexico.  The decision-making 
process in each state took many twists, including governors vetoing authorizing legislation 
before eventually supporting an exchange, Republicans disagreeing strongly with each other, and 
Democrats unsure of how to react.  Legislation to create an exchange passed in seven of the eight 
legislative chambers, yet only Idaho and New Mexico decided to take control.  Even then, they 
decided so late in the process that they had to ultimately rely on the federal website for at least 
the first year. 
                                                           
2
 State Refor(u)m is a project funded by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and led by the National Academy for 
State Health Policy (NASHP). The document library can be found at www.statereforum.org  
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These states were chosen for four reasons.  First, each was among the 23 states that were 
undecided as of November 2011.  Idaho and New Mexico were two of the very last states that 
chose to create an exchange, whereas Michigan and Mississippi were two of the states that came 
closest but did not.  Examining the similarities and differences between these four states can help 
identify the factors that affected how the other 23 states reacted.   
Second, all are led by Republican governors, with the legislature controlled by 
Republicans in two cases (Idaho and Michigan), Democrats in one case (New Mexico), and 
switched from mixed control to Republican control during the period of analysis in the other case 
(Mississippi).  The states also varied in terms of presidential vote.  Two of the states under 
examination voted for Barack Obama in 2008 and 2012 (Michigan and New Mexico), whereas 
two of the states voted for John McCain and Mitt Romney (Idaho and Mississippi).  Table 3 
shows the relationship between these two sets of variables – legislative control and the 
presidential vote.  At least one state from this analysis is in each cell.   
Third, the policy context in these states varies in interesting ways (see Table 4).  Holding 
partisan control constant (i.e. comparing down the left column and within the bottom-left cell in 
Table 3), I will explore whether there were differences resulting from Idaho’s relatively 
competitive insurance market compared to Michigan and Mississippi in which the largest insurer 
has greater market share.  These differences may affect the position and intensity of lobbying 
activities by the insurance industry and/or consumer groups, as well as the strength of the 
arguments for a private insurance marketplace.   
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Table 3 – 2008/2012 Vote vs. Partisan Control of States Led by a Republican Governor and 
Undecided as of Nov 2011 
Partisan Control 
Unified Govt (R Gov/R 
Leg) 
Divided Govt (R Gov/D 
Leg) 
20
12
 
V
o
te
 
Obama ME, MI, PA, WI NM, NJ, IA 
McCain/Romney 
AL, AZ, ID, IN, MS*, 
NE, SD, TN MS*, VA 
*Mississippi's legislature switched from divided to unified Republican control in the 2011 election 
Note: States in bold are included in comparative case studies 
 
Table 4 - Summary of Four Case Study States 
  Idaho Michigan Mississippi New Mexico 
Governor R R R R 
House R R R D 
Senate R R R D 
2012 Election Romney Obama Romney Obama 
Exchange State Federal Federal State 
Joined lawsuit Yes Yes Yes No 
Bureaucratic 
capacity 16th 1st 40th 30th 
Term limits No Yes No No 
Year-round 
legislature No Yes No No 
Planning grant $1m $1m $1m $1m 
Early innovator 
grant - - - - 
Level 1 est. grant $20.4  $40.6  $20.1  $34.3  
Elected ins. 
comm. No No Yes No 
# Insurers >5% 
market 4 4 4 2 
Market share of 
largest insurer 38% 59% 54% 59% 
Uninsured rate 18% 13% 19% 21% 
Source: Burke and Wright (2002) and KFF (2014a) 
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The institutions of these states also differ in interesting ways.  First, Mississippi is the 
only of these four states to have an independently elected insurance commissioner.  Whereas the 
other insurance commissioners worked in concert with their governors, Commissioner Chaney in 
Mississippi worked against his governor’s stated preferences.  Second, Idaho, Mississippi, and 
New Mexico have relatively short legislative sessions, typically lasting 60-125 calendar days, 
whereas the Michigan legislature meets year-round.  Third, Michigan has legislative term limits, 
whereas, Idaho, Mississippi, and New Mexico do not.  Fourth, the states vary in terms of 
bureaucratic capacity.   
  
Summary of Findings 
 My central theoretical argument is that no one variable explains each state’s decision on 
an exchange (see Appendix A for a brief summary of findings).  Instead, it is important to focus 
on a combination of variables and apply multiple theoretical perspectives.  In chapter two I 
develop a framework to integrate lessons from these perspectives.  The framework includes a 
focus on the strategic actors attempting to influence policymaking, such as governors, legislators, 
bureaucrats, and interest groups.  The framework also acknowledges that these strategic 
interactions take place within a state context that is shaped by institutional design, prior policy 
decisions, and partisanship.  Each state’s context is also nested within the broader national 
context. 
 Applying this framework to the debate over whether a state should create a health 
insurance exchange, I argue that governors are the most important actor.  A governor’s support 
was a necessary condition for creating an exchange.  No exchange was created without a 
governor’s endorsement.  Mississippi came the closest, with an independently elected insurance 
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commissioner trying to do so on his own.  At the same, a governor’s support was not a sufficient 
condition; it did not ensure an exchange would be created.  In many cases, governors engaged in 
a lengthy and intense negotiation with the legislature.  Rick Snyder of Michigan is an example of 
a governor unable to win enough support from legislators. 
   Interest groups played an important role in creating a political environment that made it 
easier or more difficult for policymakers to support state control of an exchange.  A fascinating 
dynamic developed with most state-level groups such as insurers, brokers, hospitals, providers, 
small businesses, and consumer advocates supporting an exchange, with the Tea Party, 
conservative think tanks, and a handful of industry groups in opposition.  The Tea Party was an 
amazingly successful counter-weight to traditionally powerful groups, particularly given that it is 
relatively new and is decentralized without a clear leadership structure.  A small number of 
citizens, many of whom had no prior involvement in politics, were able to influence the outcome 
in their state through grassroots opposition.  Conservative think tanks filled a leadership void by 
supplying data and reports for activists to use. 
 It was very hard for Republicans to support an exchange if the Tea Party was strong in 
their state.  Michigan and Mississippi are examples of Tea Party opposition playing a major role 
in convincing Republicans to block an exchange.  A weak Tea Party in New Mexico made it 
easier for Republican Governor Susana Martinez to support an exchange.  The Idaho case shows 
that it was possible for Tea Party opposition to be overcome if industry groups lobbied 
aggressively and if the legislature contained “pockets of expertise,” (Burns et al. 2008).  These 
are influential legislators who have amassed a particularly high level of clout and knowledge of 
health policy.   
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 Pockets of expertise were ironically more common in the states with short legislative 
sessions and limited staff support.  Legislators in Idaho and New Mexico maintained professions, 
including people in key positions who were doctors, insurance agents, and former insurance 
executives.  Term limits and long legislative sessions in Michigan meant that legislators had little 
experience making policy, but were full-time politicians with limited expertise in a particular 
subject. 
 Prior policy decisions shaped the terms of each state’s debate.  Alternative paths to 
creating an exchange were possible if a state had already established a similar type of exchange, 
such as the Health Insurance Alliance in New Mexico and the High Risk Pool in Mississippi.  
The attractiveness and viability of these alternative paths were affected by partisanship and 
institutional design. 
 The primary in many states was within the Republican Party, not between Republicans 
and Democrats.  This partisan dynamic increased the importance of Republican pockets of 
expertise since legislators with the most experience and interest in expanding insurance coverage 
tend to be Democrats.  Idaho is one of the most conservative states in the country but became the 
only state led entirely by Republicans to create an exchange.  Democrats also mostly preferred 
supporting a state-based exchange, even if it would be run by Republicans and a less regulated 
model than they would prefer. 
The balance of power between actors was also influenced by the national context.  
Federal implementers were in regular contact with officials in each state’s executive branch, but 
were limited in their ability to negotiate with legislators and interest groups.  Deadlines set by the 
Obama administration conflicted with many states’ legislative calendar, making it difficult for 
states to make decisions according to the federal timeline.  Extending deadlines made it possible 
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for Idaho to choose to create an exchange, but weakened leverage with conservative 
policymakers and interest groups.  Opponents used this flexibility to argue that the Obama 
administration lacked the will and the capacity to follow through with its threats to take control.   
 
Plan for the Dissertation 
 The next chapter outlines the theoretical framework that serves as the foundation for this 
analysis.  Chapter three contains a 50-state analysis of events during four time periods between 
the law’s enactment in March 2010 and October 2013 by which point every state had decided 
which exchange path to pursue.  Chapters four and five contain an in-depth analysis of two states 
that chose not to create an exchange: Michigan and Mississippi.  This is followed by case studies 
of two states that chose to create an exchange: Idaho and New Mexico.  Each chapter follows the 
same outline as the 50-state analysis in chapter three in that it will trace the evolution of 
decision-making across the same four time periods.  Chapters conclude by applying the 
integrated framework from chapter two to draw out the theoretical insights gleaned from that 
state.  Chapter eight will bring these case studies together, identifying the patterns and 
explanations across these four states.   
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Chapter 2 - Integrated Theoretical Framework 
 
Writing about the history of Medicare, Jonathan Oberlander suggests that “Some readers 
will look to this book for a single, overarching theory of Medicare politics.  They will be 
disappointed – and they should be...Given the size, complexity, and diversity of a program like 
Medicare, it would be surprising indeed to discover a single theory that explained everything.  I 
have not found such a theory, nor do I believe one exists.”  Instead, Oberlander calls for a poly-
theoretical approach to understanding the history of Medicare, arguing that “multiple theoretical 
lenses are necessary if Medicare’s political picture is to be properly developed,” (2003). 
 The same is true for the creation of health insurance exchanges as part of the Affordable 
Care Act.  As described in chapter one, partisanship is the most common explanation offered by 
scholars and pundits to explain the ACA’s implementation (Burkey and Kamarck 2013, Rigby 
and Haselswerdt 2013).  Other perspectives are considered, but still with a focus on a single 
dominant explanation, including ideology (Shor 2013), federalism and institutional design 
(Béland, Rocco, and Waddan 2014), and pressure from interest groups (Cauthon 2011; Stiles 
2013; Gray, Lowery, and Benz 2013).  Each of these studies offers important contributions by 
identifying factors affecting state decision-making.  However, limitations of quantitative analysis 
require holding constant variables that do not remain constant in real life and using variables that 
are inter-related to a greater degree than can be captured in a regression equation.  A case-based 
approach is particularly well suited for this question, allowing me to explore complex 
relationships between multiple variables and apply lessons from multiple theoretical 
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perspectives.  As Oberlander writes about Medicare (2003), it is important to present the policy 
as it really is rather than to artificially fit the policy to a model.   
This poly-theoretical approach has a strong foundation in the implementation literature.  
Writing in 1981, Thompson expressed skepticism that we will ever have a unifying theory of 
implementation.  Similarly, Bardach (1977) writes that “The political and institutional 
relationships in an implementation process on any but the smallest scale are simply too numerous 
and diverse to admit of our asserting law-like propositions about them.  It is the fragmentary and 
disjunctive nature of the real world that makes a general theory of the implementation process 
unattainable, and indeed, unrealistic.”  But there is little guidance in the literature on how to do 
poly-theoretical policy analysis. 
I propose an integrated framework to incorporate these theoretical perspectives into a 
general explanation of state implementation of federal law.  This is not the same as trying to 
develop a unified theory of implementation, but rather a way to structure analysis of the complex 
interplay between types of variables.  This framework draws on the following theoretical 
perspectives: 1) federalism, 2) path dependence resulting from prior policy decisions, 3) 
differences in institutional design, 4) partisanship, and 5) interest group influence.  I also add a 
sixth potential explanation, that individuals are important.  In other words, it is possible that 
holding all else constant, people may come to different conclusions and make different decisions 
(see Appendix B for a summary of the key points from each perspective).   
Figure 2 is a schematic representation of this framework, highlighting the overlapping 
contexts in which strategic actors such as elected officials, bureaucrats, and interest groups 
attempt to influence the outcome of policy debates.  The state context in which actors operate is 
affects the process by which decisions are made, including which groups are empowered and 
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which are disadvantaged.  Each state operates within a broader context of federalism, with the 
federal government providing carrots and sticks to incentivize states to make certain choices 
such as operating an insurance exchange.  Each state is at a different starting point in its 
negotiation with the federal government as a result of prior policy decisions, institutional design, 
and partisanship.   
 
Figure 2 – Integrated Framework of State Policymaking 
 
 
It is not necessary to review the entire literature devoted to each theoretical framework.  
Nor is it my goal to generate a list of testable hypotheses.  This would be inconsistent with the 
grounded theory approach articulated in chapter one.  It would result in more than 40 separate 
hypotheses, making it infeasible to test each one directly.  Instead, my goal is to examine the 
relationships between theoretical perspectives using the rich details of case study analysis.   
The dynamics within each state and between levels of government affect the relative 
power of strategic actors, but also evolve depending on the results of elections and other policy 
Federalism Context
State context
Path Dependence
Institutional 
Design
Partisanship
Strategic Actors
Policymakers Interest Groups
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debates.  In other words, these contexts are regularly evolving.  Policymakers and interest groups 
work to influence the context in which they operate, seeking an advantage by altering path 
dependence, institutional design, and partisanship.  This chapter discusses each theoretical 
perspective in detail, highlighting insights which help explain state decision-making around the 
creation of an insurance exchange.   
 
Federalism 
A central question of the federalism literature is how authority should be distributed 
between levels of government. In the abstract, higher levels of government are thought to be 
better situated to handle broader redistributive policies, whereas more local levels of government 
better address local development and infrastructure (Peterson 1995, Oates 1999).  National 
governments have access to greater resources and can take advantage of economies of scale in 
developing and carrying out policies (Greer and Jacobson 2010).  The case for state-level control 
over policymaking, more frequently raised by conservatives, is that states are more attentive and 
responsive to regional differences in political ideology, economics, culture, and health systems 
than “one-size-fits-all” solutions imposed by Washington (Peterson 1995; Sparer and Brown 
1996; Leichter 1996, 1997; Conlan 1998; Grogan 1998; Thompson and Diulio 1998; Jones, 
Bradley, and Oberlander 2014).   
These arguments were frequently invoked in the congressional debate over the ACA.  
Supporters of the House bill argued that a national exchange would be more effective, having 
greater bargaining power and lower administrative costs (Jost 2009).  Rather than require that 50 
states do the work of developing essentially identical IT software and then spend the resources to 
manage an exchange, they believed it would more efficient to have a single exchange developed 
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by the national government.  Supporters of the Senate bill argued that by running their own 
exchange, states could determine how it interacts with their state’s Medicaid program, define the 
role of brokers and agents, and tailor outreach efforts to local conditions (Interviews 2011-2013).   
As I describe in chapter three, the Senate version was ultimately adopted not because this 
vision of federalism was more convincing, but because of shifts in the political dynamics 
resulting from Democrats losing their filibuster-proof majority in the Senate.  This is consistent 
with Morgan and Campbell’s observation that “The motivation for delegated governance has 
rarely been technical feasibility or efficiency, even when those are the publicly stated 
justifications, but rather political factors,” (Morgan and Campbell 2011).  Béland et al. (2014) 
add that “the law’s intergovernmental structure has amplified political conflict over its 
implementation by distributing authority to political actors at both levels of the American federal 
system.” 
In this section, I draw on four insights from the federalism literature to lay the foundation 
to examine intergovernmental dynamics in my case studies.  First, the balance of power between 
levels of government is dynamic rather than static.  The appropriate analogy is not a layer cake in 
which all the boundaries are clear, but rather a marble cake in which the roles of each level 
overlap.  Sometimes this overlap is cooperative, though other times it is coercive, contested, and 
competitive (Volden 2005, Posner 2007, Bulman-Pozen and Gerken 2009, Fox 2010, Rabe 
2011).  Rather than delineating a clear division of power between levels of government, the ACA 
is “a virtual tapestry of federalism in federal statutory design,” (Gluck 2011), with at least five 
distinct intergovernmental approaches: 1) some parts are implemented directly by the federal 
government, 2) others are implemented entirely by the states (within the constraints of federal 
law and rulemaking), 3) in some cases states have the option of taking the lead but with the 
 27 
 
threat of federal preemption, 4) the federal government is stepping into some areas historically 
governed by the states, and 5) some elements are implemented through a federal-state 
partnership (Conlan and Posner 2011, Gluck 2011, Morgan and Campbell 2011, Rabe 2011, 
Haeder and Weimer 2013, Rigby and Haselwerdt 2013, Weil 2013).   
Second, the federal government can use a variety of carrots and sticks to define a 
favorable relationship with states (Stoker 1991).  For example, it can threaten do a complete 
takeover of an issue, bargained preemption, partial preemption, or collaboration (Rabe 2011; 
Weissert and Weissert 2012).  The federal government regularly incentivizes state participation 
in federal programs by attaching large amounts of money (Nicholson-Crotty 2012).  The federal 
executive branch has increased its use of waivers and rule-making to pursue policies and 
intergovernmental arrangements through means other than by statute (Bolton 2003; Gais and 
Fossett 2005; Thompson and Burke 2007; Thompson and Burke 2009; Gluck 2011; Weissert and 
Weissert 2012).  The ACA included a variety of incentives to convince as many states as 
possible to create their own exchange, including autonomy, flexibility, and the promise of 
money, as well as threat of deadlines and a federal takeover.   
The third insight is that in some cases the federal government may overstep its bounds, 
infringing on a state’s role in policymaking.  Bednar (2009) describes four ways states are 
protected from encroachment by the national government: 1) constitutional division of powers, 
2) judicial maintenance of these boundaries, 3) electoral punishment, and 4) party allegiance 
between officials at each level.  Each of these intergovernmental tensions has been on full 
display during the implementation of the Affordable Care Act.  Gluck (2011) calls the ACA “the 
most recent, high-visibility example of the stunningly complex and varied ways that federalism 
manifests itself from the inside of federal statutes.”  All of the four safeguards of federalism 
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described by Bednar (2009) have been triggered, with the focus on state flexibility written into 
the law a function of the Senate’s institutional design (structural safeguard), party leaders at each 
level of government working together to oppose the law (partisan safeguard), the courts being 
called on to verify the reform’s constitutionality (judicial safeguard), and the 2012 presidential 
and congressional elections largely being fought over whether the ACA should remain intact or 
be repealed (electoral safeguard).  A fascinating element of the debate over health insurance 
exchanges is that many Republicans advocated for a fifth approach to challenging what they 
perceived as federal encroachment: abdicating control over the exchange to the federal 
government.  They expected that the federal government was either bluffing or incapable of 
following through with its threat to take over exchanges in so many states.  If enough states 
resisted, they believed the federal government would have no choice but to relent.   
Direct state challenges have become more common in recent years, with resistance to No 
Child Left Behind being a prominent example (Shelly 2008; Manna 2010).  States can challenge 
the legality of a federal law, pass legislation of their own, or pursue a ballot initiative to 
undermine elements of the reform (Shelly 2008; Provost 2010; Weissert and Weissert 2012; 
Rigby 2012).  For example, seven states filed a lawsuit against the enforcement of the Motor 
Voter Act of 1993 (Shelly 2008).  Twenty-seven states passed a law or resolution challenging the 
2005 REAL ID law, ultimately leading the federal government to extend deadlines and delay 
enforcement (Regan and Deering 2009).  Nicholson-Crotty (2012) chronicles a history of states 
“leaving money on the table” by returning grants or refusing to apply for available funds.  
Opponents of state-based insurance exchanges regularly cite these episodes as examples of the 
potential power of state resistance. 
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The fourth insight from the federalism literature is that although the terms of the 
intergovernmental negotiation are set by Congress in statute, the negotiation continues 
throughout a law’s implementation as a result of interactions between the bureaucracies of each 
level of government.  Doonan (2013) observes that “no single model was useful in clarifying 
how and why federalism plays out in particular ways for specific programs,” in part because 
traditional studies focus only on the legislative process while neglecting rulemaking and 
implementation.  A handful of scholars have addressed this gap, describing this relationship as 
executive, administrative, or intrastatutory federalism (Gais and Fossett 2005; Metzger 2008; 
Gluck 2011; Weissert and Weissert 2012; Doonan 2013).  Gluck (2011) describes it as 
“informal, non-constitutional federalism” that it is “messy, varied, and dynamic.”  Executive 
federalism added another layer of complexity to the negotiations between states and the federal 
government over whether states would create an insurance exchange.  The White House and 
HHS invested considerable energy in negotiating with governors and bureaucrats, but did not 
have established channels through which to communicate with state legislators.   
 These three insights from the federalism literature help explain the intergovernmental 
dynamics between states and the federal government during the ACA’s implementation, and the 
role of federalism within my integrated framework.  In order to address Doonan’s (2013) 
criticism that federalism studies need to explain variations in intergovernmental dynamics, it is 
necessary to appreciate each stage of the policymaking process.  Similarly, it is important to 
recognize that states are not single entities and do not necessarily make rational choices as states.  
Decisions are the cumulative effect of strategic choices made by multiple individual actors.  To 
make sense of the choices states make in intergovernmental negotiations, it is necessary to 
understand who these actors are and the factors shaping their state context.  The next three 
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sections focus on important elements of this context: path dependence, institutional design, and 
partisanship.   
 
State Context: Path Dependence 
 One of the major streams in the political science literature to explain policymaking is 
built around the concept of path dependence.  This body of work is rooted in the observation by 
Schattschneider (1935) that “new policies create a new politics.”  Andrea Campbell (2012) 
explains that “Public policies do not arise in a vacuum but are shaped in profound ways by 
earlier policies.  Existing policies define the political environment, shaping the capacities, 
interests, and beliefs of political elites and states and therefore the outcomes of subsequent 
rounds of policymaking.” Skocpol (1992) describes that “Policies not only flow from prior 
institutions and politics; they also reshape institutions and politics, making some future 
developments more likely, and hindering the possibilities for others.”  Paul Pierson (2000) writes 
that “Specific patterns of timing and sequence matter” and that “particular courses of actions, 
once introduced, can be almost impossible to reverse.”  He relates path dependence to the 
economic concept of increasing returns, highlighting that timing and sequence matter and that 
the cost of switching directions increases markedly over time.   
 This argument is compelling both from a practical and political point of view.  Jacobs and 
Callaghan (2013) explain that “once established, policies generate both identities and groups that 
equate their interests with programmatic continuation and expansion and generate resources to 
mobilize beneficiaries.”  Having already paid the start-up costs, policymakers generally find it 
easier to continue on their current path.  Similarly, new political forces develop to support the 
evolution of new policies in particular directions. 
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Campbell’s (2012) review of this literature finds that path dependence and policy 
feedback processes have been studied within a wide variety of policy domains, including social 
security, the GI Bill, AFDC/TANF, Head Start, Social Security Disability Insurance, food 
stamps, public housing assistance, tax expenditures, criminal justice, education, military 
conscription, and the women’s rights movement.  For example, Shelly (2008) found that state-
level resistance to the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 was affected by contextual factors such 
as poverty rates and the size of the Hispanic population, as well as the number of highly qualified 
teachers in the state and the type of accountability system already in place.  Similarly, seniors 
became one of the most politically engaged age groups upon the creation of Social Security 
(Campbell 2003).   
 A number of scholars have applied the concept of path dependence to explain health 
reform – or the lack of health reform.  For example, Hacker (1998) uses path dependence to 
explain why national health care systems have evolved in difference directions in Britain, 
Canada, and the United States.  Chen and Weir (2009) find that the regulatory strategies adopted 
by states to contain health care costs were significantly shaped by characteristics of their private 
insurance markets and dominant health care systems.  Finally, the politics surrounding the 
reauthorization of the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) were significantly 
shaped by how the program was implemented and developed (Grogan and Rigby 2009, McGrath 
2009). 
 Path dependence theorists would argue that each state’s decisions about a health 
insurance exchange is a function of its unique history and prior policy choices.  For example, 
policymakers in states that have received Section 1115 Medicaid waivers may be more likely to 
support creating an exchange based on their prior history in negotiating with the federal 
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government and because they potentially have an interest in maintaining good relations 
(Thompson and Burke 2007; Thompson and Burke 2009).  Similarly, policymakers in states that 
have already enacted many of the elements of the ACA or that have been particularly pro-active 
on developing health policy may find it easier to create an exchange, both in terms of the 
programmatic challenges and winning enough support in the legislature.  Alternative paths to 
creating an exchange were available in Mississippi (chapter four) and New Mexico (chapter six) 
because of unique institutions that had been established earlier.    
Another useful insight from this literature is that the policy itself is an important element 
of the political debate (Pierson 2000).  As Hacker (2010) writes, political science mostly treats 
policy as an afterthought or as a means of testing theories on electoral influence and legislative 
politics.  Instead, “On a range of key matters at the core of the discipline – the role and influence 
of interest groups; the nature of partisan policy competition; the sources of elite polarization; the 
relationship between voters, activists, and elected officials; and more – the substance of public 
policy makes a big difference.”  In the case of health insurance exchanges, every state was not 
voting on a single model of legislation written by the federal government.  Among other things, 
the major proposals in each state differed on the level of regulation and openness of the 
marketplace, whether insurance companies would be allowed to sit on the exchange’s governing 
board, and whether the exchange would be established as a governmental entity or as a non-
profit organization.  Understanding the roots of these differences, as well as the effect they had 
on each state’s debate, is key to understanding why a state chose to create an exchange or not. 
Critics of the path dependence literature warn that the concept “is too shallow to be false” 
but too ambiguous to explain much (Brown 2010).  For example, Haeder and Weimer (2013) 
argue that the possibilities for comprehensive health reform have been too narrowly confined by 
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the limitations of path dependence.  Béland (2010) writes that path dependent arguments often 
describe concrete episodes of incremental change without really explaining them.  Oberlander 
(2003) finds that in the development of Medicare policy, path dependence theories cannot 
properly account for changes that take a policy off its predetermined path.  Yes there are policy 
feedbacks with Medicare, but without knowing the denominator of potential feedbacks, it is 
difficult to know the explanatory power of the numerator of relevant feedbacks.  Patashnik and 
Zelizer (2010) highlight a number of conditions under which policy feedback does not occur.  
My integrated model includes a place for path dependence while also acknowledging its 
limitations.  Prior policy decisions must be recognized as an important part of the context 
shaping state decision-making, largely because they affect the range of options available to 
policymakers.  Even if it is too shallow to be a complete explanation on its own, it plays an 
important role in shaping the strategic environment in which policymakers and interest groups 
operate. 
 
State Context: Institutional Design 
The battle over which policy should be adopted often manifests itself as a debate over 
who is empowered to make decisions.  As a result, it is important to focus on the role that 
political institutions themselves play in shaping policy.  This can be thought of as a sub-set of the 
path dependence literature, though with more of a focus on institutional design than on prior 
policy decisions.  Steinmo and Watts (1995) argue that scholars and pundits are missing the big 
picture in their analysis of why certain policies are adopted and others are not.  Echoing the 
phrase used by Bill Clinton’s strategists in 1992, they write that “it’s the institutions, stupid.”  
Similarly, Immergut (1992) writes that the analysis of policy making should focus more 
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explicitly on institutions and procedures since “they select the groups whose views will be 
represented and they shape demands by changing the strategic environment in which the 
demands of groups are formulated.”   
Applied to the state-level implementation of the ACA, it may be that the institutional 
context of states differs in ways that would make it easier or harder to create an exchange.  
Interest groups and policymakers are still important.  The influence of interest groups and 
policymakers is shaped by key differences in how states make decisions.  Political scientists have 
developed measures for comparing legislative professionalism (Squire 2007), bureaucratic 
capacity (Huber and McCarty 2006), and gubernatorial power (Kousser and Phillips 2012).  
However, these concepts are too broad to adequately explain differences in states’ decisions on 
the exchange.  In other words, simply comparing states according to their ranking on a measure 
of overall professionalism or capacity obscures why any observed differences are meaningful.  
Instead, it is useful to examine the impact of individual components of institutional differences 
(Grossback and Peterson 2004).  In this section, I highlight six major institutional issues political 
scientists focus on when comparing states.  The first four relate to the legislative branch, with the 
last two dealing with the executive branch. 
 First, the size and composition of each state legislature varies dramatically, including by 
how many legislators are elected, how many constituents they represent, and the size of their 
districts (Table 5).  Boundaries are roughly proportional within states since the landmark 
Supreme Court rulings of Baker v. Carr (1962) and Reynolds v. Simms (1964) established the 
principle of one person one vote for both chambers of each state legislature. However, there is 
significant variation between states.  The average number of constituents represented by each 
state representative in the nation is 59,677, with a range of 3,291 in New Hampshire to 465,674 
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in California.3  Similarly, the average number of constituents represented by each state senator is 
154,499, with a range of 18,788 in Wyoming to 931,349 in California.  Other than the Nebraska 
legislature which only has one chamber, Alaska has the fewest number of legislators with only 
20 senators and 40 representatives.  New Hampshire is on the other end of the spectrum, with 24 
senators but 400 representatives.  In fact, with 424 legislators, the New Hampshire General Court 
is described as the fourth largest legislature in the world (nh.gov 2013).  These differences 
theoretically affect the ability of legislators to be responsive to their constituents.  
Second, the amount of time each legislature stays in session varies from state to state 
(McDonough and McGrath 2001).  Unlike Congress which meets year-round, most state 
legislatures only meet for part of the year.  Thirty-nine states specify a limit on the length of their 
session, with 17 of these having different limits in alternating years (NCSL 2013).   
With the exception of Kentucky, Louisiana, and Virginia, states with different session 
lengths have the longer session in odd numbered years, resulting in shorter sessions during 
election years.  Since Louisiana and Virginia hold their legislative elections in odd numbered 
years, the effect is the same.  In states such as New Mexico, the legislature is restricted in 
alternating years to only considering bills amending the budget and is not allowed to consider 
bills on new policy such as creating a health insurance exchange. 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
3
 These numbers are derived using population data from census.gov and data on legislatures from ncsl.org. 
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Table 5 - Distribution of Number of Legislators per State 
# of States 
Legislators in Upper Chamber   
20-30 10 
30-40 24 
40-60 14 
60+ 2 
Number of Residents per Legislator in Upper Chamber 
50-100,000 23 
100,000-300,000 22 
300,000-500,000 3 
500,000-700,000 0 
>700,000 2 
Legislators in Lower Chamber   
40-70 8 
70-100 13 
100-130 17 
130-160 9 
160-190 1 
190+ 2 
Number of Residents per Legislator in Lower Chamber 
3,000-10,000 6 
10,000-50,000 24 
50,000-100,000 12 
100,000-150,000 5 
150,000< 3 
Source: NCSL 2013 and United States Census 2010 
 
Differences in length of session are important because they affect the degree of policy 
and procedural expertise legislators develop (Squire 2007, Burns et al 2008).  The length of 
session, along with the salary given to legislators, affects who can serve.  Some legislatures are 
comprised of citizens who return to day jobs when the session is over, whereas others are 
inhabited by career politicians (Kousser 2004).   
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Also, states experience the implementation of a federal law differently depending on 
when their legislature is in session.  For example, few states were in session much longer in 2010 
after the ACA was signed into law on March 23rd.  This amplified the importance of the 2010 
elections and limited the ability of outgoing Democratic governors to entrench elements of the 
law before their departure.  Similarly, many Republican state leaders wanted to delay making 
decisions on an insurance exchange until after the Supreme Court ruled on the ACA’s 
constitutionality.  Because the Supreme Court’s decision did not come out until June 28, 2012, 
this meant that only the nine states with sessions extending into July could consider exchange 
legislation that year (Jones 2012) (Figure 3).  States have the option of holding a special session 
in which legislators are called back to consider specific bills, however states vary dramatically in terms of 
how often they hold special sessions. 
 
Figure 3 - Length of State Legislative Sessions in 2012 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
Alabama                         
Alaska                         
Arizona                         
Arkansas                         
California                         
Colorado                         
Connecticut                         
Delaware                         
Florida                         
Georgia                         
Hawaii                         
Idaho                         
Illinois                         
Indiana                         
Iowa                         
Kansas                         
Kentucky                         
Louisiana                         
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Maine                         
Maryland                         
Massachusetts                         
Michigan                         
Minnesota                         
Mississippi                         
Missouri                         
Montana                         
Nebraskaa                         
Nevada                         
New Hampshire                         
New Jersey                         
New Mexico                         
New York                         
North Carolina                         
North Dakota                         
Ohio                         
Oklahoma                         
Oregon                         
Pennsylvania                         
Rhode Island                         
South Carolina                         
South Dakota                         
Tennessee                         
Texas                         
Utah                         
Vermont                         
Virginia                         
Washington                         
West Virginia                         
Wisconsin                         
Wyoming                         
 
Note: States coded by partisan control: Blue = Fully Democratic, Red = Fully Republican, Purple = Mixed 
Vertical lines depict the Supreme Court decision announced June 28th and the election on November 6th 
 
a Nebraska's legislature is officially non-partisan, but the state is led by a Republican governor 
Source: NCSL 2012.  
 
Third, 15 states place limits on how many terms their legislators are allowed to serve, 
generally restricting them to 6-12 years (Table 6).  In some states, the clock resets if the 
legislator changes chambers or is out of power for a certain period.  In other states, there are 
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lifetime limits preventing the legislators from ever serving again (NCSL 2013).  The term limit 
movement took off in the early 1990s, passing by directive initiative in 20 of the 22 states that 
voted for them, and being instituted by statute in two other states.  Between 1997 and 2004, the 
state supreme courts in Massachusetts, Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming overturned their 
state’s term limits, while the Idaho and Utah legislatures repealed theirs (Mooney 2009).   
 
Table 6- Term Limits in State Legislatures 
 
 
 
 
House Senate 
State Year Enacted Limit 
Year of 
Impact Limit 
Year of 
Impact 
Maine 1993 8 1996 8 1996 
California 1990 12a 1996 12a 1998 
Colorado 1990 8 1998 8 1998 
Arkansas 1992 6 1998 8 2000 
Michigan 1992 6 1998 8 2002 
Florida 1992 8 2000 8 2000 
Ohio 1992 8 2000 8 2000 
South Dakota 1992 8 2000 8 2000 
Montana 1992 8 2000 8 2000 
Arizona 1992 8 2000 8 2000 
Missouri  1992 8 2002 8 2002 
Oklahoma 1990 12a 2004 12a 2004 
Nebraska 2000 n/a n/a 8 2006 
Louisiana 1995 12 2007 12 2007 
Nevada 1996 12 2010 12 2010 
      
a In California and Oklahoma, a legislator may serve a total of 12 years in the  
legislature during his or her lifetime. The total time may be split  
between the two chambers, or spent in its entirely in a single  
chamber. Before 2012, California's limits were identical to those 
in Arkansas: six years in the assembly and eight years in the 
senate.  
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures, 2013. 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/chart-of-term-limits-
states.aspx 
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Advocates argued that term limits would make legislators more responsive to their 
constituents, non-traditional candidates better situated to run, the seniority system weaker, the 
relationship between legislators and special interests weaker, and that state spending would 
decreases as a result (Greenberg 1994, Masket and Lewis 2007, Basham 2011).  The evidence 
supporting these arguments is mixed at best.  Instead, studies show that under term limits, 
legislators are less beholden to constituents in their districts (Caery et al. 2006), in part because 
they are more likely to run for higher office (Powell 2000, Lazarus 2006).  The number of bills 
introduced has spiked as legislators have less time to make their mark (Kousser 2004), resulting 
in increased state spending (Erler 2007).  Under term limits, there are more lobbyists and they 
exert more influence in the legislative process (Mooney 2005).  The power of legislative leaders 
has diminished (Apollonio and La Raja 2006), putting the executive branch in a stronger position 
relative to the legislature (Carey et al. 2006).  Given all these consequences of legislative term 
limits, bipartisan negotiation and consensus building has been more difficult (Sarbaugh-
Thompson et al. 2006). 
Each of these consequences of term limits has important implications for the debate over 
an insurance exchange.  The 2010 elections gave Republicans control of at least one legislative 
chamber in 12 of the 15 of the states with term limits, including one of the states in my sample: 
Michigan.  This meant that supporters of an exchange would have to win support from legislators 
that had less policy and legislative experience, were less willing to compromise, and that were 
more easily influenced by interest groups.  Of these 12 states, only Colorado decided to create an 
exchange. 
Fourth, states vary dramatically in the amount of staff support provided to each legislator, 
either compounding or limiting the effects of term limits and the length of session.  Legislators 
 41 
 
with greater staff support are more likely to be well informed on policy issues and are better able 
to provide constituent services (Squire 2007, Bowen 2010).  As a result, they are also better able 
to negotiate with the governor and his or her staff (Grossback and Peterson 2004).  In seventeen 
states there is one staff member assigned to each legislator.  Fifteen states give their legislator 
more staff, whereas 14 states offer less.  Nine states allocate money to legislators to directly hire 
their own staff.  Some legislative aides work year-round whereas others only work when the 
legislature is in session (NCSL 2010a).   
The amount of staff support for legislators in a given state does not lead to clear 
predictions about whether that state will decide to create an exchange.  When staff support is 
minimal, legislators with particular expertise in health policy or insurance may be looked to for 
information to a greater extent.  Similarly, lobbyists may play a greater role in supporting their 
legislative allies (Hall and Deardorff 2006).  This could push the debate in either direction 
depending on the strength and preferences of these interest groups and legislative pockets of 
expertise. 
 Another reason each of these four differences between legislatures is potentially 
significant is that they affect the likelihood that policy entrepreneurs (Oliver and Paul-Shaheen 
1997) or pockets of expertise (Burns et al 2008) will emerge.  These are influential legislators 
who are regularly looked to by others for guidance on particular policy issues.  Applying the 
concept from organizational theory that “every change needs a champion,” (Bingham 2007), 
these policy entrepreneurs and pockets of expertise often play a prominent role in shepherding 
proposals through the legislative process.   
 Turning from the legislative to the executive branch, the fifth insight from this literature 
is that governors vary in their ability to advance an agenda (Berch 1992, Dukakis 2001, Beyle 
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2004).  Governors differ in their capacity to shape the state budget, appoint cabinet members, 
and reorganize state agencies (Weissert and Weissert 2012).  Although governors are largely 
held accountable by the public for state policies, legislators generally hold a monopoly on the 
power to introduce, amend, and pass laws.  The only formal legislative power many governors 
hold is reactive - the ability to veto or sign bills passed by the legislature (Kousser and Phillips 
2012).  Even this authority varies by state, with 43 having line item veto powers and 37 being 
able to reduce the budget without legislative approval (Weissert and Weissert 2012).  As a result, 
governors supporting the creation of an exchange were severely limited in their formal powers to 
advance enabling legislation. 
 Governors possess significant informal powers which they use to leverage their limited 
formal capacity (Sigelman and Dometrius 1988).  For example, although they cannot formally 
author legislation or debate in the legislature, in some states bills proposed by the governor are 
referred to as “governor’s bills” and their staff can introduce the bills in committee.  Kousser and 
Phillips (2012) explain that this gives governors very little formal power since the legislative 
sponsors officially control the contents of these bills and the legislative branch maintains 
authority over their fate.  However, governors are in office full time whereas most legislatures 
are part time.  They can take advantage of their position and prestige as chief executive to attract 
attention to an issue and influence the public agenda to a greater extent than can other state 
actors (Bernick 1979).  The importance of these informal powers may vary by state, by person, 
and by issue.  A recent study shows that governors were more successful with advancing their 
proposals in the budget than at passing legislation (Kousser and Phillips 2012).  As the head of 
the executive branch, governors also play an important role in the programmatic implementation 
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of policy.  They have significant ability to sidetrack policies they do not support, as well as to 
prioritize policies they do support.   
Another power that governors have is to sidestep the legislature entirely, creating policy 
by executive order.  Decisions made this way are vulnerable to being superseded by legislation 
or a change in gubernatorial power.  The option of creating an exchange was technically 
available to every governor, though the political feasibility of this approach varied by state.  
Governors in Kentucky, New York, and Rhode Island ultimately created their exchange by 
executive order after their legislatures failed to act.  By contrast, legislators in Idaho (chapter six) 
and New Mexico (chapter seven) threatened to sue if their governor tried to create an exchange 
this way. 
 Sixth, there is significant variation between the capacities of state-level executive branch 
agencies, including variation between states and across agencies within a state.  These 
differences are important given that studies show that bureaucrats are playing an increasingly 
powerful role in shaping policy (Morone 1993, Schneider et al. 1997, Bowling and Wright 1998, 
Sapat 2004).  One way they do this is by leveraging their contacts with lobbyists to influence the 
legislative process (Bradley 2014).     
Some states have large professional bureaucracies with highly educated experts, whereas 
others have small agencies with less policy expertise (Weissert and Weissert 2012).  Similarly, 
states differ in which administrative officials are appointed and are elected, as well as which 
appointed actors need to be confirmed by the legislature (Bowling and Wright 1998; Marshall 
2006; Provost 2010).  Some states allow for legislative review of rules passed by the bureaucracy 
(Woods 2005), and 39 states require federal grants to be specifically approved and appropriated 
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by the legislature before an agency is allowed to spend the money (Gerber et al. 2005, Ball and 
Weeks 2013). 
It is not clear that bureaucratic capacity should directly influence which approach a state 
will choose in the debate over an insurance exchange.  One reason it may not matter is that state 
bureaucracies were able to receive federal grants to hire consultants to do much of the technical 
work.  Low capacity states could use these grants to hire the staff to match the resources of a 
high capacity state.  States also had the opportunity to participate in multi-state technical 
assistance networks, such as the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation State Health Reform 
Resource Network.   
 
State Context: Partisanship  
 Another major aspect of a state’s political context is partisanship.  This literature is built 
on the premise that elected officials are focused on winning elections.  At the extreme, 
politicians are conceptualized as devoid of policy preferences and single-mindedly focused on 
winning elections (Downs 1957, Mayhew 1974).  More recent scholars refine this by 
acknowledging that politicians want the best of both worlds: to be re-elected while enacting their 
preferred policies (Arnold 1990, Jacobs and Shapiro 2000).  In other words, policy debates affect 
elections, just as elections affect policy debates. 
Related to the literature on partisanship, studies of public opinion conclude that there is a 
relationship between public opinion and policy change, though the direction of influence 
between public opinion and policymaking is not always clear.  Page and Shapiro (1992) provide 
evidence that policy tends to move in the same direction as public opinion and that in the 
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aggregate, public opinion does appear to influence policy.  Similarly, Jacobs (1993) 
demonstrates a growing sensitivity among policymakers to public beliefs about health care 
policy in the United States and Britain over the course of the 20th century.  At the same time, 
Converse (1964) and Zaller (1992) argue that a great majority of people do not have a complete 
set of beliefs producing a clear ideology.  Instead, everyone has competing considerations, and a 
person’s position at any given time is a weighted average of these considerations.  Jacobs and 
Shapiro (2000) argue that the conventional wisdom that politicians respond to public opinion 
when making major policy decisions is wrong.  Rather than simply tracking public opinion to 
know which policies to support, politicians craft their presentations to change public opinion to 
align with their policy preferences.  These efforts can succeed because voters rely on partisan 
cues when making decisions on complicated policy issues (Lupia 1994, Lupia and McCubbins 
1998).   
The first insight from these literatures that is useful for understanding the debate over 
insurance exchanges is the observation that sometimes politicians personal policy preferences 
conflict with their goal of winning elections.  As a result, Lee (2009) argues that Republicans and 
Democrats have a tendency to oppose each other even over issues about which they generally 
agree.  This is particularly important given recent evidence that the American electorate, 
Congress, and state legislatures are increasingly polarized (Shor and McCarty 2011).  Partisan 
incentives may therefore lead Republicans to vote against creating a state-based insurance 
exchange simply because it is so closely identified with President Obama and supported by 
Democrats.  
A second insight puts this point in an intergovernmental context.  Although Republicans 
tend to prefer local control, studies show that intergovernmental disputes sometimes have a 
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partisan edge such that leaders at each level support the actions of another level of government if 
it is led by a member of their party, and oppose actions led by a member of a different party 
(Keiser and Soss 1998; Yackee and Yackee 2009; Medoff et al. 2011, Nicholson-Crotty 2012).  
Policymakers on either side of the ideological spectrum and at either level of government will 
argue for a decentralized or centralized approach when it suits their policy and political goals 
(Barrilleaux et al. 2002; Nathan 2005; Conlan 2006; Adelman and Engel 2008; Shelly 2008; 
Doonan 2013).  Both levels of government are involved in nearly all domestic issues (Gais and 
Fossett 2005) and there can be multiple state-federal relationships found within the same law 
(Gluck 2011).   Politicians at both levels can use the ambiguity of federalism to take credit for 
successful policies and avoid blame for bad ones (Volden 2005).   
National Democrats expected that state-level Republicans would support the creation of 
exchanges.  The idea has a long history of support from conservatives and was not a 
controversial element of the congressional debate over the ACA (Rigby et al. 2014).  Republican 
state legislators were expected to like the option of maintaining control.  Since the ACA’s 
enactment, Republican policymakers have been generally unified in their opposition to the whole 
law, but have been split over whether to create an exchange in their state.  Both sides frame their 
argument in terms of federalism.  Opponents argue for resisting what they perceive as federal 
encroachment by refusing to cooperate because they believe the ACA will collapse under its own 
weight (ALEC 2011; Cannon 2013), whereas supporters argue that cooperation is a way to 
minimize federal overreach and maintain the state’s historical role as the primary regulator of 
private insurance (Otter 2013).  These partisan considerations ironically lead some of the law’s 
strongest opponents to support a position potentially likely to bring greater control for the federal 
government.   
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 Similarly ironic is that liberal Democrats around the country faced a dilemma of whether 
to advocate for state control of an exchange – in some cases a weakly regulated clearinghouse 
exchange in which insurers would sit on the board of directors - rather than preferring to default 
to the federal government in the hopes that they would operate a more regulated active purchaser 
exchange.  Prior to the Supreme Court ruling and President Obama’s re-election, the law was 
vulnerable and Democrats may have felt a need to entrench as much of it as possible in case it 
was later struck down or repealed.  Having an exchange signed into law, even if it contained 
fewer consumer protections than some Democrats would have liked, may also have undermined 
the lawsuit and weakened opponents’ attempts at repeal. 
There are a number of limitations to relying on partisanship to explain why states decided 
to create an exchange or not.  Oberlander (2003) argues that in order to demonstrate that 
electoral mandates have a direct impact on public policy, three conditions must be satisfied: 1) 
the electorate must be offered a choice of public policy options, 2) voters must respond to this 
choice in an identifiable way, and 3) elected officials must shape policy to conform with the 
choice of the electorate.  “Under any circumstances, it is difficult to establish that all three 
conditions have been met,” (Oberlander 2003).  Aside from their ability (or inability as the case 
may be) to convince other legislators to support creating an exchange, there is little evidence that 
Republican supporters of an exchange influenced public opinion.   
It is difficult to directly test the impact of changes in public opinion given that so few 
state-wide surveys specifically asked whether respondents favored a state-based or federally 
facilitated exchange.  There is consistent polling about the ACA as a whole, though this is not 
particularly helpful for understanding state decisions about insurance exchanges because the 
expectation was that even those who opposed the overall law would prefer state control of an 
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exchange.  New techniques exist to impute state-level public opinion from national surveys (Lax 
and Phillips 2009), though this approach overlooks an important issue for explaining the 
mechanism through which public opinion influences policy change.  The fact that it is difficult to 
obtain state-level polling on this question for research purposes indicates that it would have been 
difficult for legislators to obtain at key moments in the debate, and thus makes it unlikely that 
they were responding to changes in public opinion.   
One of the best indicators of a state’s attitude towards the ACA may be how it voted in 
the 2012 presidential election.  The political incentives of supporting an exchange may be 
closely linked with the electoral success of President Obama in a particular state.  Given that the 
ACA is so closely linked with President Obama – commonly referred to as “Obamacare” –
Republicans in states that voted for President Obama in 2008 and 2012 might be more likely to 
support an exchange, whereas states that voted for John McCain in 2008 and Mitt Romney in 
2012 more likely to oppose an exchange.  This is particularly true for the states that made their 
decision after the November 2012 elections, including all four states in my sample. 
As the integrated framework in figure 2 shows, partisanship is an important part of the 
intra-state context in which decisions are made about whether or not to create a health insurance 
exchange.  However, one of the lessons I will demonstrate through analysis of my four case 
studies is that partisanship was not by itself a determining factor.  Many Republican leaders 
supported creating an exchange in their state.  Whether they were powerful enough to have their 
preferences adopted largely depended on other aspects of their state’s context, such as path 
dependence and institutional design, and the relative strength of interest groups supporting and 
opposing an exchange. 
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Strategic Actors: Interest Groups 
 With the previous sections as context on the inter-governmental and intra-state 
environment, I now turn to the literature on interest groups.  These scholars presume that the 
development of public policy is a result of influence on policymakers by private interests.  
Rather than reflecting the will of the greater public, policy is portrayed as reflecting the interest 
of narrowly focused groups.  The importance attributed to interest groups relative to other factors 
varies dramatically between studies, with some viewing their influence as the most important 
element affecting how policy is made, and others viewing them as inconsequential and marginal 
(Leech and Baumgartner 1998).  Hall and Deardorff (2006) characterize this literature as 
“noteworthy for the noncumulative and frequently inconsistent nature of its findings.”   
 It is important to identify who has a stake in health insurance exchanges, how they 
attempt to influence the decision-making process, whether they are successful, and why.  With 
these questions in mind, I highlight five points from the literature that will guide the analysis 
contained in subsequent chapters.   
The first is that a large number of groups have an interest in health policy and try to 
influence policymaking at the federal and state levels.  In 2009, when Congress began debating 
the Affordable Care Act, there were 13,789 registered lobbyists in D.C., of which more than a 
quarter were focused specifically on health.  Interest groups are similarly active in health policy 
at the state level.  Of the 47,803 state-level lobbyists registered in 2012, more than one-sixth 
represented an organization with a stake in the debate over an insurance exchange.4  The 
expectation when the ACA passed in 2010 was that the major health and business groups in each 
state would strongly prefer their exchange be run at the state level.  They would lobby their 
                                                           
4
 According to analysis conducted by the author using data found using the Lobbyist Link tool at 
http://www.followthemoney.org/database/graphs/lobbyistlink/index.phtml 
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legislatures accordingly and most states would respond to this pressure by choosing to create an 
exchange (Skocpol and Jacobs 2010, Rigby and Haselswerdt 2013).   
As I describe in more detail in the next chapter, the passage of the ACA coincided with 
the rise of a different type of group – the Tea Party.  The Tea Party is not comprised of lobbyists 
representing private interests, but of citizens believing they are acting for the good of the nation 
and their communities.  In this way, the Tea Party is better thought of as a grassroots social 
movement.  Its influence was made possible and has been amplified by growing partisan 
polarization.  They have pushed the Republican Party further to the right, having a dramatic 
effect on the political climate in many states (Skocpol and Williamson 2012).   
Although the Tea Party as a whole may be better conceptualized as a social movement, 
individual Tea Party groups act very much like interest groups (Nownes 2013).  They visit 
legislators in their offices, testify at hearings, and contribute resources to electoral campaigns.  
As a result, many of the theoretical insights from the interest group literature therefore apply to 
the Tea Party as well.  Skocpol and Williamson (2012) explain that one of the most important 
consequences of the Tea Party movement has been the “populist boost given to professionally 
run and opulently funded right-wing advocacy organizations devoted to pushing ultra-free-
market policies.”  Every state has a conservative think tank that also behaves much like an 
interest group, although they are not registered lobbyists in every case.  These groups are loosely 
connected through a national umbrella organization, the State Policy Network.   
The second insight from this literature is that the role of interest groups at the state level 
differs somewhat from the role of interest groups at the federal level.  Some groups have a strong 
presence at the national level and are able to operate in multiple states.  Most groups, however, 
are either stronger at the national level or at the state level (Salisbury et al. 1987, Heinz et al. 
 51 
 
1990, Weissert and Weissert 2012).  Multiple studies find that although lobbying techniques 
increasingly focus on national strategies, the network of dominant state interest groups is 
predominantly local (Oblak 2000, Wolak et al. 2002).  State-level groups often prefer state 
control of an issue to federal involvement because it gives them greater opportunity to influence 
policy development (Gray, Lowery, and Godwin 2007; Tandberg 2010).  Simultaneously 
tracking and adhering to policy in 50 separate states is burdensome and may ironically inspire 
national interest groups which tend to resist regulation to ultimately advocate for more uniform 
national standards (Skocpol and Jacobs 2010).   
States vary dramatically in the size of their lobbying community (Brasher 1999), in part 
because they vary in the extent to which lobbying is regulated (Newmark 2005, Ozymy 2010).  
In 2012 there was an average of 956 registered lobbyists per state, with as many as 5,759 in New 
York and as few as 81 in Wyoming.  In fact, Wyoming was one of only two states to have more 
legislators than registered lobbyists, with the other being New Hampshire.  The average ratio 
nationally was nearly 7 lobbyists for every state legislator, though the proportion was highest in 
Arizona where there were more than 38 lobbyists for every legislator.5   
Third, to the extent that interest groups exert influence on the development of policy, it is 
because they can mobilize resources in a way that the general public cannot.  These groups 
benefit from a singularity of purpose that can make it easier to form and focus attention on their 
particular cause (Weissert and Weissert 2012).  Approximately 80% of groups are estimated to 
have formed from pre-existing occupational groups, with many of the rest brought together 
through a common ideology (Walker 1991, Leech and Baumgartner 1998).  Interest groups 
provide the policy information, political intelligence, and manpower important for advocating 
                                                           
5
 According to analysis conducted by the author using data found using the Lobbyist Link tool at 
www.followthemoney.org. 
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their cause and building a coalition of supporters (Hall and Deardorff 2006, Weissert and 
Weissert 2012).  In some cases, groups combine resources by forming coalitions around a 
particular issue (Jarman and Greer 2010, Weissert and Weissert 2012).   
Money is one of the most important tools interest groups use.  Groups lobbying Congress 
for health-related causes in 2009 spent more than $3.3 billion (McGrane 2009).  For example, the 
pharmaceutical industry, as represented by PhRMA, spent $100 million of its own money 
promoting the bill after winning important concessions (Weissert and Weissert 2012).  Interest 
groups gave $555 million in campaign contributions to legislators - more than any other sector.6  
A 2009 National Institute on Money in State Politics report found that the health care industry 
gave $394 million to state-level office holders and political committees in 2004–2008.  
Pharmaceutical groups spent nearly half of this money, though other major contributors included 
hospitals, health systems, physicians, and health insurance companies (National Institute on 
Money in State Politics 2009).  Much of an organization’s money comes from membership dues, 
though some tap additional sources of income (Walker 1991, Leech and Baumgartner 1998).  
Money can be used as encouragement for support in an upcoming vote, as a thank you for a 
previous vote, or as a punishment for a previous vote (Stratmann 1988, Weissert and Weissert).  
Money tends to go to incumbents (Romber 1994) and party leadership (Hojnacki et al. 1998, 
Wilkerson and Carrell 1999).   
The Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission 
(2010) has enabled private donors to spend large amounts of money for political purposes.  Two 
of the most prominent spenders in the political debate surrounding the ACA are billionaire 
brothers David and Charles Koch.  They move money through multiple layers of organizations, 
                                                           
6
 According to analysis using data found at http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby 
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making it very difficult to know exactly who they are giving money to and how much they have 
spent (Barker and Meyer 2014).  Multiples states within my sample had conservative 
organizations with explicit or rumored connections to the Koch Brothers.  They are reportedly 
major contributors to the State Policy Network of conservative think tanks that became 
influential in many places (Kopan 2013), including Michigan and Mississippi where 
conservative groups helped defeat an exchange. 
Fourth, the literature on interest groups documents an interesting paradox, that lobbyists 
spend most of their resources on potential allies rather than on likely opponents (Bauer, Pool, 
and Dexter 1963; Grier and Munger 1986; Brownars and Lott 1997).  In part, lobbyists tend to 
give money to whoever is in leadership positions as a way of gaining access (Gutermuth 1999, 
Wilderson and Carrell 1999).  Even so, the evidence suggests that lobbyists devote more energy 
to lobbying those “whose views they least needed to change,” (Hall and Deardorff 2006).  Hall 
and Deardorff (2006) explain that this is because policymakers are working under intense 
constraints and are not able to work on everything they would like to accomplish.  Lobbyists 
contribute support in the form of a legislative subsidy, mobilizing their resources to assist their 
natural allies in achieving mutual goals.   
Fifth, the evidence is not clear that interest groups actually affect policy outcomes 
(Snyder 1992, Hall and Deardorff 2006).  For example, Smith (1995) and Cigler and Loomis 
(2002) find little evidence that PAC funding directly affects a legislator’s vote on a given bill.  
The ability of a group to achieve a desired outcome depends in part on the type of outcome 
desired.  The fragmented nature of the policymaking process at the national and state levels 
means that it is much easier to block a policy proposal than to successfully adopt one (Steinmo 
and Watts 1995, Oberlander 2003b, Weissert and Weissert 2012).  To succeed, proponents of a 
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particular issue need to win in multiple committees, multiple chambers, and multiple branches of 
government, whereas opponents only need to succeed at one of these veto points.  Some types of 
policy changes are also easier for interest groups to advocate for than others.  For example, 
Oberlander (2003a) finds that interest groups have minimal influence over the broad changes to 
the Medicare program, but are very influential over more technical micro-policy changes.   
 In summary, the literature shows that interest groups devote significant resources to 
shaping policy, but are not always successful.  Their level of influence can depend on the amount 
of resources they are able to devote to a cause, be it money, manpower, or political intelligence.  
Their influence can also depend on the type of interest being represented, the type of policy 
being considered, and the relative strength of competing groups given a state’s context. 
 
Strategic Actors: Policymakers 
 Before concluding, it is important to consider the policymakers themselves.  The political 
science literature generally treats policymakers as rational actors guided by a game theoretic 
calculation of incentives and payoffs.  The earlier section on partisanship cited scholars noting 
that policymakers are likely also driven by a desire to see certain policies enacted (Arnold 1990, 
Jacobs and Shapiro 2000).  This observation implicitly acknowledges the possibility that two 
people facing similar environmental constraints and incentives may arrive at different 
conclusions.   
I am unaware of any literature arguing that individual personal judgment is an important 
factor contributing to the development of public policy.  The closest may be the concept of 
bounded rationality used in a wide range of disciplines to account for decision-making that is 
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limited for cognitive or other reasons.  Selten (2002) explains that it is wrong to assume that 
human beings conform to an ideal of rationality.  Bounded rationality is not irrationality or blind 
guessing, but a way to include non-optimizing behaviors in models of decision-making. 
What I am arguing is related, but a bit different.  Rather than saying that policymakers 
make different choices because of differences in how they deal with limited information, I am 
suggesting that they might still make different choices even if they had complete information.  
Even if the former is true, it implies that there are differences at the individual person level 
affecting the choices they make.  In the following chapters I highlight many incidents in which 
individuals made choices that are not entirely explained by context or external incentives.   
 
Summary 
 Just as Oberlander (2003a) writes that there is no single politics of Medicare policy, I 
argue that the politics and dynamics surrounding the implementation of the Affordable Care Act 
are multi-faceted and complex.  Rather than use the exchanges as a case to test a specific aspect 
of a single perspective, I use lessons from multiple theoretical frameworks to understand how 
states decided whether or not to create an exchange.  This is an important distinction which 
shapes how I frame the questions, how I conduct the analysis, and the types of answers I will 
find.   
 As the review of the literature in this chapter has shown, it is impossible to understand 
the implementation of this component of the ACA without understanding how states and the 
federal government interact.  Nor is it possible to understand the debate over exchanges without 
understanding that states are not unitary actors making decisions, but are the culmination of a 
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contentious process that aggregates the decisions of specific actors.  Partisanship is an important 
component of a state’s context, but it is an incomplete explanation for the decisions ultimately 
made at the state-level.  Instead, it is necessary to recognize that state policymaking is a process 
in which differences in institutional design and policy history significantly shape the incentives 
of key groups, as well as how the decision will be made and who will be empowered to influence 
the outcome.  Understanding the institutional and policy context is key to evaluating the strategic 
decisions made by partisan elected officials and interest groups.    
 I bring these theoretical perspectives together in an integrated framework represented 
schematically in figure 2.  I use a grounded theory approach to identify the specific elements 
determining whether a state chose to create an insurance exchange.  My framework can be 
thought of as a broad outline, with the details being filled in through the analysis presented in 
each case study chapter.  For example, although I have identified at the outset that interest groups 
can play a prominent role in shaping policy, and that their relative power can depend on their 
intra-state context, I rely on my data to develop the specific arguments about how this happens 
within each state.  In chapter eight, I bring these insights together to develop broader 
conclusions.    
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Chapter 3 - 50-state overview 
Significant portions of this chapter come from a paper co-authored with Katharine Bradley and 
Jonathan Oberlander entitled “Pascal’s Wager: Health Insurance Exchanges, Obamacare, and the 
Republican Dilemma.”  The paper was published in the February 2014 issue of The Journal of 
Health Politics, Policy, and Law. Both co-authors have given their permission to use our paper 
here. 
 
Introduction 
 The idea that small businesses and the uninsured should buy insurance coverage through 
organized purchasing pools has pervaded American health policy for at least two decades.  The 
insurance exchanges included in the Affordable Care Act have their roots in proposals dating to 
at least the 1990s and in a reform enacted by Massachusetts in 2006.  This chapter begins by 
outlining the history of health insurance exchanges, culminating with the enactment of the ACA.  
I then describe the evolution of state responses to their role in creating exchanges over four 
distinct time periods between the passage of the ACA in March 2010 and the beginning of the 
exchange’s open enrollment in October 2013.   
 
The Origins and Development of Health Insurance Exchanges   
 In the early 1990s, Alain Enthoven (1993) called for creating health insurance purchasing 
cooperatives to promote managed competition.  President Clinton’s Health Security Act, 
influenced by Enthoven’s model, sought to establish health alliances through which most 
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Americans would obtain coverage.  The Clinton Administration struggled to explain the role of 
alliances and benefits of managed competition to the public and nothing was passed.  After the 
Clinton plan’s demise, the idea lived on as policy analysts continued to propose similar 
institutions—albeit without the stigmatized “alliance” label—as a cornerstone of reform (Meyer 
and Wicks 2003).  Meanwhile, small business purchasing pools—commonly known as health 
insurance purchasing cooperatives—emerged in a handful of states during the 1990s, including 
California, Texas, and Florida, though they produced mixed results and in some cases did not 
survive (Long and Marquis 2001; Wicks 2002).  Then, in 2006, as part of its landmark reform 
law, Massachusetts established a health insurance “Connector”—open to the uninsured and 
smaller firms—raising the profile of purchasing pools in the national health care debate 
(McDonough 2011).  In 2009, Utah opened its own health insurance exchange, focused on small 
employers.  
 The precise role and scope proposed for these institutions have changed over time and 
varied considerably by plan.  The Clinton Administration envisioned alliances as the central 
insurance hub for most Americans, whereas the ACA’s exchanges have a more limited role as a 
residual means to cover the uninsured—a scaling down that reflects lessons the Obama 
Administration learned from the Clinton reform misadventure about the political perils of 
alienating insured Americans (Oberlander 2010).   
But the primary rationale for such reforms—leveraging the advantages of broader risk 
pooling—has remained consistent.  The uninsured lack purchasing power in the non-group 
health insurance market, where they face discrimination based on health status and higher 
administrative costs.  Similar problems confront small businesses buying coverage on the small 
group market (Jost 2012; Kingsdale 2012).  If individuals in these groups can be pooled together 
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in larger numbers into a regulated insurance market, then risk can be spread more broadly and 
they should gain access to more affordable coverage.  Administrative costs should also decline as 
larger scales are achieved and the costs of marketing, underwriting, and other expenses drop 
(Blumberg and Pollitz 2009; Kingsdale 2010; Cutler, Davis, and Stremikis 2010).  In other 
words, purchasing pools aim to bring efficiencies of the large group market to small businesses 
and the uninsured.  Advocates also contend that purchasing pools can enhance choice of health 
plans, ensure greater transparency, and save money by promoting cost-conscious consumer 
decisions and price competition among insurers (Enthoven 1993; Kingsdale 2010).   
 Purchasing pools have drawn support from Republican-allied stakeholder groups, 
including small business associations seeking better health care options for their members and 
private insurers enticed by the prospect of expanding markets.  Not surprisingly, given the 
emphasis on choice, competition, and consumerism, as well as the reliance on private insurance, 
such pools have also attracted conservative policy analysts and Republicans seeking market-
friendly policies to expand insurance coverage and control health spending.  For example, the 
Massachusetts Connector derived from a Heritage Foundation proposal (McDonough et al. 
2006).  After the Massachusetts law passed, Heritage research fellow Edmund Haislmaier (2006) 
praised the Connector for advancing “consumer choice of plans and true coverage portability.”  
He argued that “governors and legislators would be well advised to consider this basic model as 
a framework for health care reform in their own states.”   
Even during the intensely partisan debate over the ACA, purchasing pools remained a 
GOP favorite.  A major Republican alternative to the ACA—the 2009 Patients’ Choice Act, co-
sponsored by Senator Tom Coburn (Oklahoma) and Congressman Paul Ryan (Wisconsin), 
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subsequently the 2012 Republican nominee for Vice President—proposed creating state 
exchanges that would provide a “one-stop marketplace for health insurance” (Ryan 2009).   
During the 2000s, liberal analysts and Democratic politicians also increasingly embraced 
purchasing pools as a desirable and politically feasible strategy to cover the uninsured (Meyer 
and Wicks 2003).  Exchanges have remained a crucial component in health reform models since 
the 1990s largely because they offer a way to expand coverage while preserving private 
insurance—widely seen as the only viable path that reform legislation can take through 
Congress.  Exchanges, in fact, draw political strength from a flexible identity: while their 
consumer choice dimension appeals to the right, their promise to regulate health insurers appeals 
to the left.  They also promise to improve coverage for both uninsured individuals and small 
businesses, augmenting their ability to resonate with reformers of different ideological stripes 
and diversifying their political constituency.  Purchasing pools consequently provide a vehicle to 
expand coverage that potentially has broad, bipartisan political appeal.  That potential is evident 
in polling data.  In a June 2010 Kaiser Family Foundation survey, 87% of all respondents—
including 77% of Republicans—said they had a very or somewhat favorable opinion of 
exchanges, the highest level of support for any feature of the ACA (KFF 2010). 
 The 2006 Massachusetts reform law appeared to confirm the political logic of purchasing 
pools.  Health reform legislation in Massachusetts enjoyed strong bipartisan support from 
Democrats, the state’s Republican governor (Mitt Romney), and GOP legislators.  The law—
which strengthened existing insurance market reforms and established income-related subsidies, 
an individual mandate to purchase coverage, penalties for employers not offering coverage, and a 
new insurance purchasing pool—passed the state House and Senate by a nearly unanimous vote 
(McDonough et al. 2006).  Massachusetts thus provided Democrats with both policy and 
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political blueprints for passing health reform, since its enactment suggested that national health 
reform could be realized if Congress and the president emulated the state’s successful formula 
(Oberlander 2010; McDonough 2011; Starr 2011).   
 
The ACA and Health Insurance Exchanges  
 During the 2008 presidential campaign, the three top-tier Democratic candidates—Hillary 
Clinton, John Edwards, and Barack Obama—all offered variants on the Massachusetts model.  
Democrats, though, made one important addition to the purchasing pools: a Medicare-like, 
government health plan for Americans under age 65.  For liberals, the public option provided 
that the uninsured could choose to join a non-profit insurance program that would not 
discriminate against sicker enrollees.  Advocates also viewed the public option as the key to 
controlling spending: its lower administrative costs and greater purchasing power would produce 
savings and force private insurers to lower premiums or lose market share (Hacker 2008, 2009).  
Moreover, the presence of a public plan could promote competition in states where small 
numbers of insurers dominate the non-group market (Holahan and Blumberg 2009). 
After the 2008 elections, exchanges remained a foundation of Democrats’ health reform 
plans.  But while the House passed legislation authorizing the federal government to operate a 
national insurance exchange that contained a public option, the Senate bill gave states 
responsibility for establishing and regulating the new insurance marketplaces, with the federal 
government stepping in only if states chose not to set up an exchange.  It also omitted a new 
government insurance health plan.  The Senate bill reflected the decentralizing preferences of 
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conservative Democrats like Ben Nelson of Nebraska and the need to mobilize all 60 Democrats 
to overcome a Republican filibuster.  
Liberals who favored the House bill argued that states could not be trusted to enforce 
insurance regulation or implement federal law, and that a national exchange would create a more 
efficient and fair system—though the House bill did permit states to establish their own 
exchanges if they satisfied federal requirements (Jost 2010; Abelson 2010).  Conservatives 
countered that the national exchange concentrated too much power in Washington at the expense 
of states.  Ben Nelson warned that “the national exchange is unnecessary and I wouldn’t support 
something that would start us down the road of federal regulation of insurance and a single-payer 
plan” (Budoff Brown 2010).  
Meanwhile, liberals saw a national exchange as an even more important goal after it 
became clear that the law would not include a public option because it could not clear the Senate.  
In negotiations between the two chambers to combine their respective bills, President Obama 
initially supported the House vision of a national exchange (Werner 2010).  However, Ted 
Kennedy’s death and Scott Brown’s surprise victory in the Massachusetts special election cost 
Democrats their filibuster-proof majority in the Senate, upending Democrats’ intraparty 
negotiations and forcing them to fashion a new process to enact the law.  White House Chief of 
Staff Rahm Emanuel was among those calling for Democrats to cut their losses and push for a 
smaller, incremental bill.  Legislative leaders Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) and Harry Reid (D-NV) 
convinced President Obama to follow through with the more comprehensive reform (Budoff 
Brown and Thrush 2010).  To do this, Senate Democrats passed the ACA using a budget 
reconciliation process requiring a simple 51-vote majority and House Democrats had to support 
the Senate’s bill without amendments and without the opportunity to negotiate in a conference 
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committee.  This improvised process built around the Senate’s bill had important consequences 
for the law’s final shape, including a greater reliance on (McDonough 2011).   
Reformers had, then, compelling political reasons to promote federalism by empowering 
state exchanges.  Absent a significant role for the states, the ACA would not have passed 
Congress.  But as Paul Starr (2011, p.2) notes, reformers had won “an uneasy victory” since the 
ACA’s “implementation was left in large measure to governors and legislatures” committed to 
overturning Obamacare.  Tim Jost (2010) presciently warned that adopting the Senate’s version 
of reform would require state legislatures to enact key elements of the law on their own, leading 
to “50 state reenactments of the battle witnessed” in Congress.   
 
The Role of States 
States choosing to create an exchange faced at least five initial policy design decisions.  
First, they could set up a single state-wide exchange, run multiple exchanges for different parts 
of their state, or create a multi-state partnership.  Second, states had to decide how aggressively 
to regulate their exchanges, either choosing a clearinghouse model in which any plan meeting 
minimal requirements is allowed to participate, or an “active purchaser” model in which only 
plans meeting a higher standard are allowed to participate. Third, an exchange could be designed 
as a non-profit corporation, a state entity, or a quasi-governmental organization.  Fourth, states 
had to make decisions about governance, including whether to allow brokers and representatives 
of insurance companies to serve on the boards of directors.  Fifth, states could set up separate 
exchanges for the non-group (individual) and small-group (business) markets, or develop one 
combined exchange.   
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Building on the federalism literature presented in chapter two, there are at least three 
policy reasons a state may want to take control of creating its exchange.  Jones and Greer (2013) 
label these friction, churn, and take-up.  First, each state has unique market characteristics which 
will be better reflected in policy designed at the state level.  A federally created exchange will 
experience “friction” with existing state policies and contexts.  For example, some states are 
dominated by a single insurer whereas others have more competition.  States vary significantly in 
the number and scope of mandated benefits.  Some argue that a federally facilitated exchange 
will not be customized to a state’s unique set of mandates but will apply the broadest set of 
mandates across the country, thereby raising premiums.  In some states pre-existing condition 
exclusions or community rating will be new with the ACA, whereas others made these changes 
years ago.  State-based exchanges can be designed with these variations in mind.   
Second, creating an exchange at the state level will facilitate coordination with Medicaid 
and CHIP.  This is particularly important given the concern that people with incomes fluctuating 
near eligibility thresholds will “churn” between programs, leading to disruptions in coverage and 
care.   
Third, the success of an exchange will depend on whether individuals and small 
businesses participate.  Experience with the early phases of Medicare Part D and CHIP suggest 
that take-up may be slow initially but can improve as policymakers focus on increasing 
enrollment (Jones and Greer 2013).  Consumer outreach and education will likely be best 
directed at the local level.  In addition to understanding their own markets, they can partner with 
local stakeholders who bring credibility and visibility.  For example, the Boston Red Sox (2007) 
played a prominent role in publicizing Massachusetts’ exchange and the state of Oregon is 
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turning to Portland-based folk singers such as Laura Gibson to promote its exchange (Jenkins 
2013).   
Even if it eventually takes over control of its exchange at a later point, a state that inherits 
a federal plan will have lost the opportunity to make decisions which will dramatically affect 
both what the exchange strives to accomplish and whether it succeeds.  This includes shaping 
whether the exchange is run inside government or as a non-profit organization, the role of the 
exchange in determining what plans can be sold, who can act as a “navigator,” the role of 
brokers, how the exchange is financed, and whether interest group representatives are allowed to 
sit on the board. 
States choosing to move forward also need to make decisions about a myriad of technical 
details, particularly with respect to the creation of the complex IT infrastructure required for the 
exchange to succeed.  Each exchange connects state and federal databases from multiple 
agencies in order to determine an applicant’s immigration status and income.  Though the 
exchange is designed to connect people with private insurance plans, some states will also make 
it the primary portal through which people apply for Medicaid, CHIP, and other public programs, 
thereby increasing the technological complexity.   
States have also been tasked with defining the essential health benefits package sold on 
their exchange (Bagley and Levy 2014).  Approximately half the states selected a plan whereas 
half defaulted to the largest small-group product (Cassidy2013).  It is interesting to note that 
more states chose to select their state’s benefit plan than to run an exchange. 
To help states make these decisions and plan for the creation of an exchange, the federal 
government awarded three types of non-competitive grants: 1) a planning grant of approximately 
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$1 million received on September 30, 2010 by every state except Alaska and Minnesota7; 2) an 
innovator grant ranging from $6 million to $54.5 million received by 11 states in February 2011, 
including a consortium of New England states administered by the University of Massachusetts 
(this grant aims to fund the development of IT infrastructure for exchanges and promote the 
sharing of IT models with other states); 3) level 1 establishment grants available on a quarterly 
basis and received by 36 states and the District of Columbia as of February 2013, at an average 
of about $37 million; and 4) a level 2 establishment grant intended to carry exchanges to 2015 
when they are to be self-sustaining.  By April 2014, 15 states had received a total of $2.6 billion 
in level 2 grants, averaging $171 million per state (KFF 2014b).  The final deadline for the level 
2 grant initially was June 29, 2012 though the federal government subsequently extended this 
deadline to October 15, 2014.  As Table 7 shows, many millions of dollars in planning, level 1 
and level 2 grants were awarded to states that ultimately decided not to pursue implementation of 
state-based exchanges, although some of these grants were later returned. 
These data reveal that an exchange was seriously considered by many states that 
ultimately opted for federal control.  All but one received at least a planning grant, and all but 13 
received a larger level 1 establishment grant.  Applying for these grants did not require 
legislative approval, and therefore should not be taken as an indication that a bill could pass.  But 
these grants did require a governor’s signature, suggesting that there was at least some support 
within the executive branch and a belief that legislation could be passed.   
 
 
 
 
                                                           
7
 After Mark Dayton (D-MN) replaced Tim Pawlenty (R-MN) as governor in January 2011, Minnesota applied for 
and received a $1 million planning grant. 
 67 
 
Table 7 - Federal Exchange Grants Awarded by Type of Exchange, as of March 2013 
Exchange 
type 
No 
grant 
Planning but 
no level 1/2 
Planning and 
level 1 
Planning, level 
1 and level 2 
State   CO, HI, ID, MN, NM, UT 
CA, CT, DC, 
KY, MA, MD, 
NV, NY, OR, 
RI, VT, WA 
Partnership   
AR, DE, IL, 
IA, MI, NH, 
WV 
 
Federal AK 
FL, GA, KS, 
LA, MT, ND, 
OH, OK, SC, 
TX, WI, WY 
AL, AZ, IN, 
ME, MS, MO, 
NE, NJ, NC, 
PA, SD, TN, 
VA 
 
 
Source: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (2014) 
 
In the three years after the ACA’s passage in March 2010, floor votes were held on 27 
bills in at least one chamber of 22 states8 (see Table 8).  More than 60 bills to establish an 
exchange were introduced in other states but never received a floor vote (CBPP 2013).  The roll 
call data indicate clear partisan differences, but also that Republicans were hardly unanimous in 
their opposition.  On these bills, 91% of Democratic legislators voted in favor of legislation 
creating an exchange, compared to 42% of Republican legislators.  However, while no 
Republicans voted for exchange legislation in New Jersey, Vermont, and West Virginia, 
approximately 90% of Republican legislators in Nevada and Hawaii voted to establish 
exchanges, as did more than 90% of Republicans in the lower chambers of the Alabama, 
Missouri, and North Carolina legislatures.  Typifying the changing politics of health reform, 
                                                           
8
 Democrats had majorities in 28 of 44 legislative chambers in these states, and shared control of the Oregon House 
with Republicans.  Roll call data was compiled from the legislative website of each state. 
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overwhelming Republican majorities in Massachusetts (2006) and Utah (2009) voted to create 
purchasing pools prior to the ACA’s enactment.  It is important to remember that exchange bills 
were not identical across states, making it difficult to draw definitive conclusions about partisan 
differences by comparing roll call votes.  Still, these votes underscore the lack of unity among 
Republicans and show how the debate over exchanges became more polarized along partisan 
lines following the ACA’s enactment.   
 
Table 8 - Roll Call of Floor Votes on Legislation to Create Exchanges, Pre-and Post-ACA 
 
Pre-ACA       
State Date 
Legislature 
(upper-lower) Bill Status % R % D 
MA April 2006 D-D Ch. 58 Enacted  91.3% 100.0% 
UT 
March 
2009 R-R HB 188 Enacted 93.9% 96.3% 
    Total 92.6% 98.1% 
 
Post-ACA      
State Date 
Legislature 
(upper-lower) Bill Status % R % D 
CAa Sept 2010 D-D SB 900 Enacted 2.4% 94.6% 
CAa Sept 2010 D-D AB 1602 Enacted  4.8% 93.2% 
MSb 
March 
2011 D-R HB 1220 
Passed, not 
law 59.8% 91.1% 
WV April 2011 D-D SB408 Enacted  0.0% 97.8% 
RI April 2011 D-D SB 87 
Passed, not 
law 85.7% 80.0% 
NM April 2011 D-D SB 38 Vetoed 21.3% 92.3% 
MD April 2011 D-D HB166 Enacted  41.1% 94.7% 
MO April 2011 R-R SB 609 Passed House 97.2% 96.4% 
VAc April 2011 D-R HB 2434 Enacted 92.0% 35.6% 
WA May 2011 D-D SB5445 Enacted  33.8% 97.6% 
NC May 2011 R-R HB 115 Passed House 95.6% 34.6% 
VT May 2011 D-D HB202 Enacted  0.0% 90.4% 
CO June 2011 D-R SB11-200 Enacted  27.1% 98.1% 
NJ June 2011 D-D A1930 Passed  0.0% 80.8% 
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Assembly 
NV June 2011 D-D SB440 Enacted  88.9% 97.2% 
OR June 2011 D-S SB99 Enacted  63.6% 95.7% 
CT July 2011 D-D SB 921 Enacted  25.8% 94.2% 
HI July 2011 D-D SB1348 Enacted  89.0% 100.0% 
ND Nov 2011 R-R HB 1474 Failed House 14.5% 87.0% 
MI Nov 2011 R-R SB 693 Passed Senate 50.0% 100.0% 
AL April 2012 R-R HB 245 Passed House 92.4% 79.5% 
NJ May 2012 D-D A2171/ S 1319 Vetoed 0.0% 87.5% 
NJ Dec 2012 D-D A3186/ S2135 Vetoed 0.0% 89.0% 
NM Feb 2013 D-D HB 168 Failed House 0.0% 79.0% 
MN 
March 
2013 D-D HF 5 Enacted 3.0% 96.0% 
NM 
March 
2013 D-D SB 221 Enacted 96.0% 84.0% 
ID 
March 
2013 R-R HB 248 Enacted 53.0% 95.0% 
    
Total 42.1% 87.5% 
Source: Official web site of each state legislature 
Note: Information current as of March 2013 
a
 Two companion bills were enacted the same day  
b
 Bill did not make it through a conference committee 
c
 Bill states intent to create an exchange, but does not authorize any particular action 
 
 
Evolving State Reactions 
The roll call data in Table 8 hints at the evolution of the Republican response to insurance 
exchanges.  If we count only post-ACA votes in states where legislators in at least one chamber 
voted, 42% of Republicans voted for exchanges through February 2013, compared to an average 
of 93% in the two states with votes prior to the ACA.  It is also telling that no state passed 
legislation to create an exchange between July 2011 and March 2013.  The remaining states 
could not move forward until opposition had run its course.   
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The rest of this chapter outlines the changes in state decision-making  over four distinct 
periods between the time that President Obama signed the ACA into law in March 2010 and the 
February 2013 deadline by which states had to declare their intention to pursue a state-run or 
partnership exchange.  Initially, many Republicans pursued legal and legislative challenges to 
Obamacare while also moving ahead with exchange planning (1: March 2010-December 2010).  
But resistance emerged after the rightward shift in state legislatures following the 2010 elections 
(2: January 2011-October 2011) as a number of Republican-led states reversed their previous 
support for exchanges.  Still, other GOP-led states embraced the concept.  State Republican 
leaders had to decide whether to bet on the ACA's survival and pursue state planning for an 
exchange, even if they opposed Obamacare.   
The Supreme Court case on the ACA’s constitutionality and impending exchange 
deadlines dominated the third period (3: November 2011-June 2012) as resistance further 
hardened in some GOP-led states. A large number of Republican leaders tried to stall their state’s 
decision-making, hoping they would be spared from making these choices.  Democrats pushed 
hard to create exchanges, wanting to entrench a major element of the ACA in case the law was 
not upheld.  The final period (4: July 2012-October 2013) encompassed reactions to the Supreme 
Court ruling upholding the ACA and to President Barack Obama’s reelection.  States that had 
waited were finally forced to make decisions regarding exchanges.  Many asked for extensions 
so they could more seriously consider creating an exchange now that their opposition had failed.  
Wanting as many states to take control as possible, the Obama administration continually gave 
states more time to decide. 
 
 71 
 
1) March 2010 – December 2010: Hedging Bets 
Most Republican-led states initially responded to the ACA’s enactment by 
simultaneously opposing it and laying the foundation for its implementation. At first, health 
insurance exchanges were not controversial.  Every state except Alaska and Minnesota applied 
for and received an exchange planning grant of approximately $1 million (Table 6), including all 
20 states that joined the lawsuit in 2010 and the other six states that later joined the lawsuit in 
2011.  California became the first state after the ACA to pass legislation establishing an 
exchange, with Republican governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signing a pair of authorizing bills 
despite the opposition of Anthem Blue Cross and the Chamber of Commerce.  Schwarzenegger 
had previously offered his own, Massachusetts-style health reform plan in 2007 and had 
endorsed the ACA.  Upon signing the California exchange laws, the governor noted that after the 
2007 plan had failed to pass the legislature, “we said, we’ll be back”  (Jewett 2010).     
But as California was moving to implement exchanges and other states were accepting 
planning grants, many were also joining efforts to overturn the ACA.  Republican leaders in 13 
states filed a joint lawsuit challenging the ACA’s constitutionality on the very day that President 
Obama signed the bill into law.  Within two months, seven more states joined the lawsuit 
focused on the constitutionality of the ACA’s individual mandate and Medicaid expansion.  
Ballot initiatives and constitutional amendments prohibiting a state-based exchange or 
“mandatory participation in any health care system” passed in Alabama, Missouri, Montana, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, and Wyoming (NCSL, 2013).  Opposition to the individual mandate, which 
united state Republicans, thus overshadowed support for exchanges. 
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Opposition to the law coincided with the nascent Tea Party movement which had been 
growing nationally with opposition to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
(ARRA) stimulus bill signed by President Obama on February 17, 2009.  Two days after ARRA 
was signed, CNBC on-air editor Rick Santelli “ranted” from the floor of the Chicago Stock 
Exchange in a video that quickly went viral on social media (Santelli 2009).  Among other 
things, he called for a Chicago tea party to dump what he described as useless derivatives into 
the Chicago River.  The next day, a group called the Nationwide Tea Party Coalition was formed 
to mobilize around his call to action.  A conference call was held in which conservative activists 
were challenged to hold protests across the country one week later.   Subsequent conference calls 
for activists across the country were held each day that week.   According to the Coalition, there 
were tea party events in 51 cities on February 27th, attracting more than 30,000 people (NTPC 
2009).   
The growing Tea Party movement played an important role in many state elections.  
Running against Obamacare proved to be a successful strategy for Republicans in 2010, 
contributing to a major shift to the right across the country during the November elections.  
Republicans made extraordinary gains and reclaimed a majority in the U.S. House of 
Representatives, while significantly narrowing the Democrats' margin in the Senate.   
Republicans also performed well at the state level.  The GOP enjoyed a net gain of six 
governors, 12 lower houses, and seven upper houses.  When these leaders took office in January 
2011, 29 states had Republican governors (in addition to a Republican-turned-Independent 
governor in Rhode Island), and 21 had unified governments with the GOP also controlling both 
legislative chambers.  Republicans enjoyed strong majorities in the chambers they controlled, 
with an average margin of 33 in lower houses and 13 in upper houses (NCSL 2011).   
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Outgoing Democratic governors realized that the dramatic shift to the right in their states 
would have important consequences for the ACA’s implementation.  The deadline for major 
grants in late December 2010 gave them an opportunity to attempt to commit incoming 
Republican governors to following through on state exchanges.  For example, outgoing 
Democratic administrations in Kansas, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin each applied for exchange 
innovator grants averaging approximately $30 million.   
 
2) January 2011 – November 2011: Republican Reversals 
Early 2011 was the most active legislative period in the debate over the creation of state-
level insurance exchanges (Table 8).  Eight states passed legislation between January and July 
2011 to create an insurance exchange (MD, WA, VT, CO, NV, OR, CT, and HI).  This 
represents nearly two-thirds (8/14) of the states that ultimately created an exchange legislatively.  
Of these, Nevada was the only state with a Republican governor, though Democrats held 
significant majorities in both the House and Senate.  Authorizing legislation passed at least one 
chamber in five other states (MS, RI, MO, NC, and NJ).  Two more states (VA and WV) passed 
legislation either declaring their intent to create an exchange or to study doing so.  After Hawaii 
in July 2011, legislation creating an exchange would not be enacted in any other state until 
Idaho, Minnesota, New Mexico did so in March 2013. 
Newly elected Republicans faced the choice of whether to halt exchange planning 
altogether or continue laying a foundation in case the law survived. Even as most states followed 
through on their $1 million planning grant, the total number of states suing over the ACA grew 
to 26, with 12 states considering state constitutional amendments prohibiting the individual 
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mandate.  More than 200 bills and resolutions opposing the ACA were filed during this period, 
with bills passing in at least a dozen states (NCSL 2011).  Most of this opposition dealt with the 
mandate or the ACA as a whole, not with the exchanges in particular. 
Amidst the deepening opposition to the ACA and changed political environment, 
Republicans began to target exchanges.  In February 2011, 21 GOP governors sent a letter to 
Secretary of Health and Human Services Kathleen Sebelius arguing that “the system proposed by 
the PPACA . . . will ultimately destroy the private insurance market.”  The governors asked the 
federal government to waive a variety of ACA rules relating to exchanges and provide states 
with “complete flexibility” to operate the purchasing pools.  They warned that if the federal 
government did not accommodate these requests, then “HHS should begin making plans to run 
exchanges under its own auspices” (Kaiser Health News, 2011).  Indiana Governor Mitch 
Daniels, a signatory to the letter, charged that the ACA “expects to conscript the states as its 
agents in its takeover of health care” (Daniels 2011a).   
In February 2011, Republican Governor Rick Scott of Florida made Florida the first state 
to return its $1 million planning grant.  He said he did not “want to waste either federal money or 
state money on something that’s unconstitutional,” (Sack 2011).  On March 23rd, 2011, the one-
year anniversary of the ACA, Louisiana Health and Hospitals Secretary Bruce Greenstein 
announced that the state would not establish an exchange and would instead return its $1 million 
planning grant (NCSL 2011).  These decisions came on the heels of the ruling by Roger Vinson 
on January 31, 2011 that the individual mandate was unconstitutional.  He was the second 
federal judge to find the mandate unconstitutional, but the first to argue that the entire ACA 
should be struck down because the mandate was inextricably linked with the rest of the law.   
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In April 2011, Oklahoma Governor Mary Fallin announced that she was returning the 
$54.6 million innovator grant received two months earlier.  At this point this was by far the 
largest grant received by a state, and as of April 2014 was still the largest grant returned.  One 
year earlier she had argued in favor of creating an exchange.  In March 2010, after accepting the 
grant, Fallin wrote to the legislature that “[u]nlike the federal exchange Washington may try to 
force on us, the exchange we are trying to build offers a positive, free-market alternative to the 
big government, tax-and-spend plan that is the PPACA.”  Republican legislative leaders did not 
agree and pressed her to return the money. Although the Republican-controlled House narrowly 
approved enabling legislation, Senate President Pro Tem Brian Bingman announced he would 
not even hear a bill to authorize an exchange.  Fallin ultimately relented, saying that returning the 
money “accomplishes [her] goal from the very beginning: stopping implementation of the 
president’s health care exchange in Oklahoma.”  Senator Bingman celebrated the governor’s 
subsequent decision to return the money, saying “it will serve as a defensive strategy that 
protects Oklahoma from the federal health care law,” (Kliff 2011).   
The story of exchange planning and resistance in Kansas illustrates political dynamics in 
backpedaling states, including the intraparty divisions that often arose as the exchange debate 
unfolded.  Before the federal Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) would award an 
innovator grant to Kansas, it wanted a statement of commitment from newly elected Republican 
Governor Sam Brownback.  As a U.S. senator the year before, Brownback had been a vocal 
critic of the ACA and had voted against the law.  He continued to speak out against the ACA 
after becoming governor in January 2011 and supported the new Kansas attorney general’s 
participation in the anti-ACA lawsuit. Yet on February 11, 2011, Brownback wrote a letter 
confirming his intention to allow the Kansas Department of Insurance to administer ACA-related 
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grants received from HHS.  He described this as part of his “plan for Kansas to provide efficient 
management, coordination and appropriate oversight consistent with Kansas values of Kansas’s 
implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.”9  Five days later HHS 
announced that $241 million in innovator grants had been awarded to 11 states, including $31.5 
million to Kansas. Brownback praised this decision, saying that leaders in Kansas had been 
talking about creating an exchange for a decade and that he took the grant “not to do Obamacare, 
but to use that to do an exchange that provides a market mechanism, because I think we could 
use more market forces in health care,” (Brownback 2011). 
 Republicans in the Kansas legislature disagreed with the governor’s logic and argued 
that accepting the grant required him to comply with and implement the ACA.  Pressure 
intensified after at least 19 Kansan legislators, as well as Governor Brownback’s chief of staff 
and policy director, attended the American Legislative Exchange Council’s (ALEC) annual 
meeting in early August.  ALEC’s A Legislator’s Guide to Repealing Obamacare urged states to 
not apply for any exchange grants and to return any they had received (ALEC 2011).  At the 
ALEC meeting, participants heard from the Heritage Foundation’s Edmund Haislmaier, who 
emphasized the need for “an unrelenting fight [against Obamacare]” with “house by house, floor 
by floor, room by room combat,” and that “There will be numerous places and lines of attack 
where we can undermine this law,” (Mooney 2011).  Michael Cannon of the Cato Institute 
argued at the meeting that refusing to pass legislation to set up an exchange is “the most 
powerful blow that a state can strike against Obamacare,” (Kaplan 2012) and that officials who 
signed the lawsuit and accepted exchange grants were violating their oath of office by 
implementing a law they believed was unconstitutional (Mooney 2011).   
                                                           
9
 Letter dated February 11, 2011 from Governor Brownback to Insurance Commissioner Sandy Praeger, obtained 
through a freedom of information request under the Kansas Open Records Act. 
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Days after the ALEC conference—perhaps in response to arguments from conservatives, 
as well as pressure from Tea Party groups and some Republican state legislators—Governor 
Brownback announced he was returning the grant money.  Kansas insurance commissioner 
Sandy Praeger, an independently elected Republican, criticized Brownback’s decision.  She 
briefly continued to hold stakeholder engagement meetings to prepare for a state-run exchange 
should political conditions change.  
The status of Kansas and Oklahoma as early innovators—two of only 11 states to receive 
awards to develop special IT systems—made their reversals particularly significant.  However, 
while Republicans in these states were renouncing their original plans to create exchanges, other 
Republicans were moving forward.  Wisconsin, the other Republican-led state to receive an 
innovator grant, was at this point still working to create an exchange.  Some Republican leaders 
made quiet progress or let state agencies continue planning while governors themselves publicly 
disavowed the ACA.  An advisor to a Republican governor in a western state noted that while 
“the lawsuit is basically a lottery ticket by which everything goes away,” the state still needed to 
make progress on the exchange in order to maintain autonomy in case the ACA survived 
(Interview August 2011).  By November 2011, 13 Republican-led states had accepted $194 
million in establishment grants to create exchanges (Healthcare.gov 2012).   
Republican governors such as Mitch Daniels of Indiana used executive powers to 
advance exchange planning. Daniels—mentioned at the time as a potential Republican 
presidential candidate in 2012—signed an executive order in January laying the foundation for 
an exchange.   He noted that while many Republican governors “are hoping for either a judicial 
or legislative rescue from this impending disaster [of the ACA] ... we can’t count on a miracle... 
We have no choice but to prepare for the very real possibility that the law takes effect in 2014 
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(Daniels 2011a).”  The order stated that “Indiana currently believes a State-created exchange 
protects Hoosiers from undue federal regulation,” and ensures that it will be a non-profit 
corporation with minimal regulatory powers (Daniels 2011b).  However, Daniels also 
emphasized that Indiana still had to decide whether it was “appropriate” to proceed with an 
exchange.  Subsequent efforts in 2011 to pass legislation establishing an exchange failed in the 
Indiana state legislature.      
Elsewhere, the effects of the rightward shift after the 2010 elections reverberated even in 
states that voted to create an exchange.  Colorado managed to pass exchange legislation even 
though only 13 out of 33 House Republicans voted for it and none of the 15 Colorado Senate 
Republicans supported the exchange.  The bill had been introduced in 2010 with bipartisan 
support, including from Republican co-sponsor Amy Stephens, who in 2011 became House 
Majority leader.  According to one state official, Stephens “totally under-estimated the 
opposition she would have from her party for being a sponsor on the bill”; opponents 
subsequently derided the bill as “Amycare.”  But an unusual coalition of Democrats and 
Colorado business groups, including the Chamber of Commerce and the state chapter of the 
National Federation of Independent Business, came together to win approval of exchange 
legislation (Goldman 2012).   
Exchange planning activity often occurred relatively quietly. An advisor to a Republican 
Governor in a western state reported that the intense rhetoric surrounding the individual mandate 
and the lawsuit required conservatives who wanted to create an exchange to walk a very fine line 
(Interview June 2011).  In these conflicted states, officials tried to keep planning activities under 
the radar in order to avoid alarming conservatives whose opposition could, ironically, lead to 
imposition of a federal exchange.  For example, Iowa Governor Terry Branstad publicly opposed 
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the ACA, but at the same time took steps to plan for a state exchange.  Insurance Commissioner 
Susan Voss related that in one of their first meetings in 2011 Branstad said something to the 
effect of “I know I’ve signed the lawsuit and am speaking out against Obamacare—but can you 
get me the money Kansas just gave back?”10  The answer to Governor Branstad’s question was 
no, but Iowa was among the 29 states that applied for and received a multi-million dollar level 1 
establishment grant by October 2011.  Nine of these 29 states were plaintiffs in the joint lawsuit, 
12 were led by Republican governors, and seven were entirely under Republican control.  
By November 2011, 12 states had passed a bill creating an exchange and one governor 
had done so by executive order.  Fourteen states had already committed not to create an 
exchange.  This left 23 states as still undecided on the issue.  As described in chapter one, the 
majority were led by Republicans, including 16 with Republican governors, and 19 with 
Republican control of at least one chamber of the legislature.  Nine were led entirely by 
Republicans.  Only two of these states were led entirely by Democrats.  The states were split in 
how they would vote in the 2012 election, with nine voting for Barack Obama and 14 for Mitt 
Romney.   
  
3) November 2011 – June 2012: Supreme Uncertainty  
The Supreme Court’s deliberations on the ACA’s constitutionality loomed over this third 
post-enactment period.  The Court’s November 2011 announcement that it would hear oral 
arguments the following March upped the ante for state policymakers, particularly given the start 
of most state legislative sessions in January/February 2012, impending primary and general 
                                                           
10
 As told by Commissioner Voss in the opening plenary session of the 2012 AcademyHealth National Policy 
Conference. 
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elections throughout 2012, and the November 16, 2012 deadline by which states had to declare 
their intentions (just 10 days after the election) (Jones 2012).  As an insurance official in 
Minnesota put it, “the stakes are higher as the deadlines loom larger.  There is more stealth 
activity by bureaucrats trying to implement as much as they can” in case the law is struck down 
(Interview March 2012). Democrats became more anxious to pass legislation establishing state 
exchanges, while Republicans became emboldened in their attacks and increasingly embraced 
delay tactics.   
The case for delaying exchange implementation gathered additional steam as word spread 
among conservatives that a glitch in the ACA could make it impossible for people to receive 
insurance subsidies in a federal, as opposed to state, exchange.  While the ACA’s text refers to 
premium tax credits available in state exchanges, it does not explicitly do so for federal 
exchanges (Adler and Cannon 2011).  Legal scholars such as Tim Jost (2011) argued that in 
practice this drafting error will not actually prevent uninsured persons from obtaining subsidies 
in federal exchanges.  But some conservatives believed they had discovered another legal 
Achilles' heel in Obamacare.   
The idea (or myth) that states could stop the ACA’s insurance expansion by not creating 
their own exchanges intensified conservative resistance to implementation efforts.  The Cato 
Institute’s Michael Cannon was quoted by citizens in public hearings in at least four states 
(Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania) arguing that “states have the collective 
power to deny the Obama Administration the legal authority to dispense more than a half-trillion 
dollars in new entitlement spending, to expose the full cost of the law’s mandates and 
government price controls, as well as to enforce the law’s employer mandate – simply by not 
creating exchanges” (Cannon 2011a and 2011b).  Cato and ALEC—the aforementioned 
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conservative group that authored the Legislator’s Guide to Repealing Obamacare—sent analysts 
to visit Republican state legislators and persuade them to follow a path of “absolute non-
collaboration” with the ACA, including boycotting the exchanges (Feder and Millman 2012).    
 Conservative resistance to moving ahead with exchanges thus strengthened in many 
states during this period.  Exchange implementation ran into trouble even in states that had 
received federal planning grants. The New Hampshire Executive Council11 blocked the $1 
million planning grant the state had been awarded. Similarly, the Michigan House prevented the 
Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs from spending its $10 million establishment 
grant and the Missouri legislature stopped the Health Insurance Pool from spending its $21 
million establishment grant.  In April 2012, the Missouri House also passed a bill declaring that 
any “official, agent, or employee of the United States government who undertakes any act within 
the borders of this state that enforces or attempts to enforce any aspect of the federal Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor,”  (MO HB 1534 2012).  
This despite voting unanimously one year earlier to create the Show-Me Health Insurance 
Exchange “to comply with the requirements of the federal Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act,” (MO HB 609 2011). 
Scott Walker of Wisconsin remained one of the last hold-outs among the conservative 
governors, keeping large amounts of grant money and maintaining support of the establishment 
of a state exchange.  However, pressure from within his party increased so that by December 
2011 Walker announced that although he was not returning the $38 million grant the state had 
received, he was halting all implementation activities until after the Supreme Court ruling.  
                                                           
11
 The structure of New Hampshire’s state government is unique, including the largest legislative body in the 
country (a 400 member House of Representatives) and an Executive Council (a five-member panel serving as an 
additional check on the Governor’s power). Contracts exceeding $5,000 and money appropriated outside the regular 
budget cycle require approval by the legislature’s Joint Fiscal Committee and the Executive Council. 
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Walker soon backpedaled even further in the face of increased pressure.  Tea Party members sent 
him envelopes full of strings to symbolize the strings they believed were attached to federal 
money, and in January 2012 Senator Frank Lasee (R), Chair of the state Senate Insurance 
Committee, announced that he would not allow exchange legislation to progress (Nocera and 
Millman 2012).  Meanwhile, Walker’s Democratic opponents collected one million petition 
signatures in response to the labor disputes of 2011, surpassing the threshold to trigger a recall 
election. Two days after the signatures were delivered, Governor Walker announced that he was 
giving back the innovator grant to HHS.  The recall efforts may have pushed him further to the 
right on the exchanges.  Given the need to raise large amounts of money, Democrats speculated 
that he wanted to free himself of any baggage that may have troubled Tea Party groups from 
whom he hoped to solicit help in the recall election (an election he went on to win). 
The standoff in Ohio is another good example of the division among Republicans over an 
insurance exchange during this period.  Republican Lieutenant Governor Mary Taylor was an 
outspoken critic of Obamacare who opposed the creation of an insurance exchange.  Although 
fellow Republican Governor John Kasich also opposed the ACA and ensured that the new 
Republican Attorney General signed the lawsuit immediately after he took office, he supported a 
state exchange in order to avoid ceding control to the federal government.  Their difference 
would not have mattered except that in Ohio, the Lieutenant Governor is given control of a state 
agency; Mary Taylor was in charge of the Department of Insurance.  In other words, if Governor 
Kasich went forward with an exchange, that would mean putting a strong critic in charge, giving 
Taylor a new role, or somehow creating a state insurance exchange without involving the 
insurance department.  None of these options was deemed feasible and progress on an exchange 
thus stopped in Ohio before it ever began (Interviews November 2011). 
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Rising opposition to exchanges promoted concern from health care stakeholders.  In fact, 
in some cases, groups opposed to the ACA—such as chambers of commerce and NFIB 
chapters—strongly encouraged states to create their own exchanges.  They feared that moving 
control from state capitals to D.C. would result in stricter regulation and rules unfavorable to 
local market conditions.  Segments of the insurance industry, which could profit from expanding 
markets, also supported the exchanges and in some cases worked to advance their creation.  The 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association hosted a meeting in November 2011 for its member 
plans on how to overcome conservative state opposition to exchanges, including using 
potentially more positive terminology such as “marketplace” (Nocera 2011).   
Other Republican-led states continued to apply for exchange grants.  On February 22, 
2012, HHS announced that it had awarded 10 more level 1 establishment grants, bringing the 
total number of states to 34. Pennsylvania and Tennessee, two of the new grantee states, were led 
entirely by Republicans, and Republicans controlled either the executive branch or at least one 
chamber of the legislative branch in five other grantee states.   
Finally, some governors asserted executive power to circumvent legislatures.  Andrew 
Cuomo (D-NY) and Steve Beshear (D-KY) issued executive orders establishing an exchange, 
thereby surmounting opposition by Republicans in their state’s legislature.  In New Jersey, 
Republican Chris Christie went the other direction, vetoing exchange legislation passed by 
Democratic majorities in the General Assembly and the Senate.  Christie’s rationale for the 
decision epitomized the influence of the Supreme Court case on state Republicans.  He argued 
that the ACA’s constitutionality “is cloaked in uncertainty” and “[b]ecause it is not known 
whether the Affordable Care Act will remain, in whole or in part, it would be imprudent for New 
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Jersey now to create an exchange before these critical threshold issues are decided with finality 
by the court” (Christie 2012).   
In summary, Republicans were still divided over what to do about the exchanges.  
However, the division was not the same in early 2012 as in late 2010.  A number of early 
advocates switched to opposition, while some early opponents switched to implementation.  
Meanwhile, many Republican state leaders remained in a holding pattern, waiting to see if the 
Supreme Court would overturn the ACA or if the 2012 elections would enable the GOP to repeal 
the law.  
 
4) July 2012 – October 2013: Decisions and Deadlines  
On June 28, 2012, the Supreme Court issued its much-anticipated ruling on the 
constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act.  With Chief Justice John Roberts writing for a 5-4 
majority, the Court ruled that the individual mandate was functionally equivalent to a tax, 
making it constitutional under Congress’s power to levy taxes (KFF 2012).  Obamacare had 
narrowly survived.  However, in a surprise move, the Court also found that the ACA’s Medicaid 
expansion coerced states and that the federal government could not take away existing Medicaid 
payments from states that didn’t expand their programs.  The ACA’s Medicaid expansion 
effectively became optional for states, opening up another, unexpected front in state resistance to 
health care reform. 
The Court ruling upholding the ACA meant that one of Republicans’ major hopes for 
overturning Obamacare had evaporated.  Seeking to win over more states, the Obama 
administration announced the day after the ruling that it would extend the deadline for the level 2 
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establishment grant through December 2014—despite the fact that the extension in effect 
rewarded states that resisted the strongest. Yet the administration offered opposing states a new 
way out of their dilemma.  In August, HHS released final rules for Partnership Exchanges in 
which states would operate exchange functions related to insurance plan management and 
consumer assistance while allowing the federal government to take responsibility for other 
functions, such as establishing the necessary IT infrastructure.  The partnership option provided a 
potentially attractive way forward for states that were unable to implement a state-based 
exchange in 2013 yet unwilling to cede all operational responsibility to the federal government.  
Even so, the landmark Court decision had little impact on state exchange activity.  States 
that had enabling legislation or an executive order continued to actively implement their 
exchanges, while states that had delayed making a decision continued to wait.  Even after the 
Court’s decision, many Republican state leaders still hoped that the 2012 elections would lead to 
the ACA’s demise.   
  President Obama’s reelection four months later, along with the Democrats’ expansion of 
their Senate majority, at least momentarily transformed the politics of health reform 
implementation.  The ACA would most likely not be repealed and its major provisions, including 
the exchanges, would go forward (Oberlander 2012).  Since uncertainty over the ACA’s long-
term fate had been essentially had significantly decreased, it was much harder for states to hedge 
their bets.  The GOP would have to live with Obamacare, and state Republicans had little time to 
accommodate that reality—the deadline for submitting a blueprint for a state-based exchange 
came just 10 days after the November 6th election.  
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Republican-led states reacted in different ways to the changed landscape. Republican 
governors such as Terry Branstad (IA), Bill Haslam (TN), and Bob McDonnell (VA) considered 
moving forward, but ultimately decided not to pursue state exchanges.  The Republican 
Governors Association asked for more time to decide, as well as for answers to what they 
considered unresolved questions.  The Obama Administration tried to convince these states to 
build their own exchanges—just as it did immediately after the Supreme Court ruling by 
extending key deadlines shortly after the November elections.  Secretary Sebelius (2012a) 
responded that states were still required to submit a letter of intent by November 16th but could 
wait until December 14th to submit a blueprint for a state-based exchange and until February 15, 
2013 to submit a blueprint for a partnership exchange.  On the eve of the November 16th 
deadline, Secretary Sebelius (2012b) told states that they could also wait until December 14th to 
submit letters of intent.  By mid-January, HHS’s message was that “there is no deadline,” and 
that states could at any point decide to take control of their exchanges (Pear 2013).  
At this point Florida governor Rick Scott, an ardent ACA opponent, expressed a 
willingness to consider creating an exchange.  He told a reporter that “The election is over and 
President Obama won.  I’m responsible for the families of Florida…If I can get to yes, I want to 
get to yes,” (Baker 2012).  Governor Scott met with Secretary Sebelius in early January 2013 but 
ultimately did not submit proposals for either a state-run or partnership exchange.  In fact, only 
three Republican governors newly decided to pursue a state-based exchange following the 2012 
elections: Governors Rick Snyder (MI), Susana Martinez (NM), and Butch Otter (ID).  
Subsequent chapters describe in depth the debates that took place in these states leading to state-
run exchanges in Idaho and New Mexico, but a federally run exchange in Michigan.   
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Finally, in some states Republican opposition to an exchange hardened following the 
elections. In North Carolina, outgoing Governor Beverly Purdue (D) had earlier submitted plans 
to run a partnership exchange and had accepted a level 1 establishment grant to finance planning 
efforts.  North Carolina Republicans, though, won the governorship in the 2012 elections and 
strengthened their majority in the legislature.  In 2013, the state House and Senate quickly passed 
legislation aimed at preventing North Carolina from participating in a partnership exchange, and 
Governor Pat McRory (R) announced his opposition as well.  Mississippi, discussed in chapter 
four, is another example of a Republican governor hardening his position in the period after 
President Obama’s re-election. 
 Even after the Supreme Court ruling and 2012 elections ended Republicans’ dream of 
repealing Obamacare before implementation of major provisions, GOP opposition to exchanges 
remained strong.  Out of 30 states led by Republican governors when open enrollment began in 
2013, only four are creating or working to create their own exchanges.  Other Republican leaders 
are focusing on alternative ways of undermining the exchanges, including limiting Congressional 
appropriations for their operation and challenging the federal government’s legal authority to 
provide subsidies in exchanges not run by states (Cannon 2013).     
 
Conclusion 
Health insurance exchanges started as a relatively uncontroversial part of the ACA.  
While provisions such as the individual mandate and public option attracted considerable 
controversy, the idea of creating state-run, regulated insurance marketplaces for the uninsured 
and small businesses appeared to have broad bipartisan appeal.  States were widely expected to 
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jump at the chance to operate their own exchanges and even states whose leaders opposed the 
ACA were presumed to prefer running exchanges to surrendering control to Washington.  
Ensnared in a broader partisan struggle over the ACA, exchanges became another front in 
the battle over the role of government.  Exchanges became controversial largely because they 
suffered from guilt by association—with President Obama, Democrats, and Obamacare.  Giving 
states control over establishing exchanges was supposed to promote decentralization and dampen 
charges of a federal “takeover” of the health system (Sparer 2011).  But that embrace of 
federalism became a source of tension (Jennings and Hayes 2010).  Exchanges emerged in many 
states as unlikely targets of the fervor against Obamacare; instruments of compromise were 
transformed into objects of conflict.  Opponents took advantage of the legislative process 
required to authorize exchanges to refight the health care debate.  In a polarized political 
environment, even popular, seemingly benign reforms can appear to ACA opponents as serious 
threats and slippery slopes leading to socialized medicine.  
Yet, this chapter hints at the other important factors affecting state decision-making, 
foreshadowing the conclusions of the subsequent case study chapters and reinforcing the need 
for an integrated framework (chapter two).  A governor’s support was a necessary, but not 
sufficient condition for the creation of an exchange.  Legislators and bureaucrats were key voices 
in this debate, as were the many interest groups operating in each state.  The Tea Party played a 
particularly important role in many Republican-led states, with a relatively small number of 
grassroots activists able to influence policymakers through sustained and vocal opposition.  A 
state’s prior policy decisions, as well as its institutional design, affected who was empowered to 
make decisions and the range of options available.  All of these internal state conflicts took place 
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within the same national context, with the federal government struggling to incentivize more 
states to take control. 
With this 50-state overview as a foundation, the next two chapters examine the process 
that led Mississippi and Michigan to reject establishing an exchange.  These two states arguably 
came closer than any in the country to deciding to maintain control.  The following chapters 
explore the debate that led to Idaho and New Mexico deciding to run their own exchange.  These 
were two of the final states that decided to create an exchange.  In depth case studies of these 
four states will allow for a more thorough exploration of the patterns highlighted in this chapter. 
 
  
 90 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 - Michigan 
 
Introduction 
 Michigan appeared poised to be the first state led entirely by Republicans to create its 
own health insurance exchange as part of the Affordable Care Act (ACA).  By the end of 2012, 
legislation to create an exchange had passed the Michigan Senate and was supported by 
Governor Snyder and the Speaker of the House.  A broad coalition of interest groups lobbied in 
favor of a state-based exchange, including insurers, businesses, providers, hospitals, and 
consumer advocates.  Even still, the House Health Policy Committee voted down authorizing 
legislation.  The governor quickly shifted to pursuing a partnership exchange, receiving 
conditional approval for this approach from Secretary Sebelius in March 2013.  Within weeks 
the legislature blocked the Snyder administration from spending federal grants, making it 
impossible to create a partnership exchange.  Ironically, this time it was the House that sided 
with the Governor and the Senate that stood in the way.  Michigan had gone from nearly creating 
its own exchange to entirely defaulting to the federally facilitated exchange. 
Michigan’s role in national politics might have suggested a political environment open to 
implementing the ACA.  Every Democratic nominee since Bill Clinton in 1992 has won 
Michigan, including Barack Obama with 57% of the vote in 2008.  Since 2001, both of 
Michigan’s U.S. Senators have been Democrats.  In 2012, President Obama and Senator  
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Table 9 – Michigan’s Political and Demographic Context 
Political Environment 
• 2012 presidential election: Barack Obama (54%) 
• Governor 
o 2003-2010: Jennifer Granholm (D) 
o 2011-present: Rick Snyder 
o Yes term limits 
• Michigan House of Representatives 
o 2011-2012: Republican majority of 16 
o 2013-present: Republican majority of 8 
o Yes term limits 
• Michigan Senate 
o 2011-2012: Republican majority of 24 
o 2013-present: Republican majority of 24 
o Yes term limits 
Demographics & Health Status 
• Total population: 9,714,000 
• Distribution of Population by Federal Poverty Level 
o Under 100%: 19% 
o 100% - 138%: 7% 
o 139% - 399%: 40% 
o 400%: 34% 
• Distribution of Health Insurance Coverage 
o Employer: 50% 
o Other private: 5% 
o Medicaid: 17% 
o Medicare: 15% 
o Uninsured: 12% 
Health Reform 
• Joined lawsuit against the ACA 
• Federal exchange 
• Expanding Medicaid 
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Stabenow won re-election in Michigan with 54% and 59% of the vote (MI Dept of State 2013), 
respectively, despite severe attacks from opponents about their roles in passing health reform.   
Michigan’s congressional delegation played a particularly prominent role in the national 
debate over health reform.  Rep. John Dingell (D) of Dearborn, who in June 2013 became the 
longest serving member in Congressional history (Spangler 2013), introduced the National 
Health Insurance Act at the start of every session since 1957.  He is also the author of the bill 
that passed the U.S. House in November 2009 (Dingell 2013).  Rep. Dingell was in the chair 
presiding over the passage of Medicare in 1965 and lent the gavel he used on that occasion to 
Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) to use when presiding over the passage of the ACA in March 
2010 (Brusk 2010).   
Similarly, Rep. John Conyers (D) of Detroit has introduced The Expanded and Improved 
Medicare for All Act in every session since 2003, including twice since the passage of the ACA 
(Conyers 2013).  Sander Levin (D) of Detroit was a prominent member of the House Ways and 
Means Committee during the congressional debate over the ACA, including serving as chair 
from March 2010 until Republicans took control of the House in 2011.  Dingell, Conyers, and 
Levin were among the dozen or so people standing on the stage with President Obama at the bill 
signing ceremony in the East Room of the White House on Mach 23, 2010. 
Not all members of the Michigan congressional delegation were as supportive of the 
ACA as were Dingell, Conyers, and Levin, indicating that residents in parts of the state would 
likely not be supportive of its implementation.  Bart Stupak famously led a group of anti-abortion 
Democrats who refused to vote for the final bill until President Obama promised to sign an 
executive order upholding existing prohibitions on federal funding for abortion services.  Dave 
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Camp was the ranking Republican on the House Ways and Means Committee throughout the 
legislative debate over the ACA and took over as Chair when Republicans won control of the 
House in 2011.  He authored the Common Sense Healthcare Reform and Affordability Act, 
which he describes as “the only alternative [to the ACA] analyzed by the non-partisan 
Congressional Budget Office,” (Camp 2013). 
How was it that rather than choose this path and become one of the first Republican-led 
states to create an exchange, Michigan defaulted entirely to the federal government?  Following 
the same outline as chapter three’s 50-state overview, this chapter discusses the evolution of the 
debate over a health insurance exchange in Michigan through four time periods between March 
2010 and October 2013 (see Appendix C for a timeline of key events in Michigan).   
 
1) March 2010 – December 2010  
The reaction in Michigan to the passage of the Affordable Care Act was sharply divided.  
Within 10 minutes of President Obama’s signing ceremony, Michigan’s Attorney General Mike 
Cox (R) joined 13 other states in a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the ACA’s 
individual mandate and Medicaid expansion (Keyes 2010).  Governor Jennifer Granholm (D) 
argued that Cox did not have the authority to join the lawsuit without her approval. There was 
little she could do to stop him, though she did take steps to lay the foundation for the ACA’s 
implementation during the last few months before she was term-limited out of office. 
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Granholm Prepares for Implementation 
 On March 31st, Governor Granholm signed an executive order creating The Health 
Insurance Reform Coordinating Council to oversee the ACA’s implementation (MI Executive 
Order No. 2010 – 4).  Speaking the next day at Sparrow Hospital in Lansing, she said that the 
health reform law would benefit Michigan, and that critics were spreading misinformation for 
political gain (Gaddis 2010).  Janet Olszewski, the cabinet-level official in charge of the 
Department of Community Health (DCH), was charged with leading the council and facilitating 
coordination between state agencies.  DCH was awarded a $999,772 planning grant on Sept 30, 
2010 to do preliminary analysis and involve stakeholders.  Input was solicited from a variety of 
groups, including hospitals, providers, small businesses, insurers, unions, and consumer 
advocates. 
Secretary Olszewski submitted the Council’s report to Governor Granholm on December 
2, 2010.  The report recommended that administering its own exchange would put Michigan in a 
better position to coordinate eligibility with Medicaid and MIChild (the state’s CHIP program), 
“in addition to using the exchange as a tool for achieving its consumer and regulatory 
objectives.”  Having the federal government administer the exchange would mean that 
“Michigan could lose control of its ability to determine its policy priorities.”  The challenge is 
that “there is insufficient information to be able to describe how the federal government would 
operate an exchange for Michigan,” (Olszewski 2010).   
The Council recommended that a decision would need to be reached by February 2011 
over whether the state will choose to operate its own exchange(s) and that if the exchange is to 
be implemented by January 2014, authorizing legislation should be passed by December 2011 
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with the financing structures developed by February 2013.  It also said that funds for exchange 
planning and implementation need to be appropriated each October between 2011 and 2013, and 
that by January 2015 the exchange must have a self-sustaining financing structure since no 
additional federal funds will be available.  As will be shown later in the chapter, the state fell 
well short of this timeline. 
 
Growth of the Tea Party 
While Governor Granholm’s administration laid the foundation for the ACA’s 
implementation in Michigan, political battles over its existence continued in full force.  
Opposition to the law coincided with the growth of the Tea Party in Michigan.  In the days 
immediately after Rick Santelli’s “rant” on the floor of the Chicago Stock Exchange in February 
2009, a small group of Michiganders used Twitter and Facebook to organize themselves and 
hold rallies across the state (Kremer 2009). 
As health reform was making progress in Congress, Tea Party groups began transitioning 
their focus from the stimulus to opposing what they labeled “Obamacare.”  Congress’ inability to 
complete a bill by the August 2009 recess meant that conservative activists had a month to 
mobilize constituents to vent their opposition personally to their Representative.  Congressman 
John Dingell’s town hall meeting in Romulus was a dramatic example of the growing level of 
animosity over health reform in the state.  Audience members yelled out of turn, got in his face, 
and said things like ““your health care plan is going to take healthcare away from my son and 
kill him!”  Anything Rep. Dingell said in response was met with audience members yelling 
“liar!” This month of direct confrontation ultimately did not derail national attempts at reform, 
 96 
 
though it gave the growing Tea Party movement in Michigan an increased sense of purpose and 
confidence. 
When the ACA was enacted the following March, Tea Party leaders began a petition 
drive to put the issue on the November 2010 ballot.  A team of 300 volunteers collected 
approximately 150,000 signatures by July, falling 200,000 short of the state’s requirement to put 
an initiative on the ballot.  Jack McHugh, the senior legislative analyst at the Mackinac Center 
for Public Policy, was part of this effort and responded that “Politicians who read this as public 
acceptance of the new law do so at their peril,” (Gantert 2010).   
Despite this failure, Tea Party groups formed the Mobile Action Patriot Strikeforce 
(MAPS) to try to influence the Republican primaries in August.  MAPS built on “The Tea Party 
Activist Toolbox” published in 2009 by Jack McHugh of the Mackinac Center for Public Policy.  
The tool kit called for an aggressive style, saying that “Tea Party activists aren’t impressed that 
their politician is a nice guy” and that “They’re all nice guys, so get over it and ignore it.  Hold 
them accountable for their deeds rather than their smile,” (Braun and McHugh 2010).   
 
2010 Elections 
The 2010 elections half-way through President Obama’s first term were more than a 
referendum on his agenda and accomplishments – they would determine who would be in power 
at the state-level during the crucial implementation years of 2011 and 2012.  Among the 
candidates for governor was Attorney General Mike Cox who accused others in the race of 
“failing to stand up against Obamacare,” as he had done by signing the lawsuit (Cox 2010).  Rick 
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Snyder was arguably the least conservative Republican in the field, but emerged as an outsider, 
winning the primary and general elections.   
Control over the Senate was never in question.  Republicans held so many safe seats that 
they were unlikely to lose control, particularly in such a favorable election cycle.  In fact, they 
strengthened control of the chamber, increasing their margin to 24 seats.  The switch of party 
control in the House was dramatic and without recent precedent.  Democrats went from a 
majority of 65 to 42 to being the minority by a margin of 47 to 63 (MI Dept. of State 2013). This 
gave Republicans their largest majority in the Michigan House since the early 1950s (MI 
Legislative Directory 2011).  The caucus chose 39 year old Jase Bolger as the new Speaker, 
making him the third straight person to begin their tenure as Michigan’s Speaker with only two 
years of legislative experience (Christoff 2010). 
This rightward shift in the legislature had enormous implications for the debate over 
health insurance exchanges during the next session.  Not only would both chambers be more 
conservative than in recent years, but term limits also meant that a large percentage of members 
would be new to the issue of health policy.  The membership of each chamber’s health policy 
committee experienced nearly 100% turnover.  The only exceptions were two Democrats who 
stayed on the House Health Policy Committee and Jim Marleau who moved from being the 
Minority Vice-Chair (i.e., ranking member of the minority party) on the House Health Policy 
Committee to Chair of the Senate Health Policy Committee.    
Incoming members described it as a big challenge to come into this role at such an 
important time for state health policymaking.  They lacked institutional knowledge of how to 
move legislation, substantive knowledge on the issues before them, and relationships to build 
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consensus and compromise.  Others described the difficulty of having unknown quantities in 
these roles.  For example, an advisor to Governor Snyder said that “before there were term 
limits, I would have known what the health chair was likely to do and what they are concerned 
about. Here I have no idea about any of those.  It’s a little bit foggier. And they probably don’t 
either.”  This environment gives interest groups greater leverage because “nobody knows enough 
to push back,” (Interview June 2011). 
As the new session was set to begin in January 2011, the foundation for political battles 
over an exchange was set.  At the same time that Governor Granholm prepared the way for the 
incoming administration to continue with the ACA’s implementation, opponents were gaining 
strength in their efforts to derail its implementation in Michigan.  Yet to this point, debate over 
the ACA was still focused on the mandate.  Most policymakers were not talking about an 
exchange and those who were would soon be out of power. 
 
2) January 2011 – October 2011 
The first post-enactment period was characterized by supporters and opponents of the 
ACA working in parallel to lay the foundation for either implementation or obstruction.  Both 
sets of actors continued down these paths, though the second period is characterized by a 
developing consensus among a wide variety of policymakers and stakeholders that Michigan 
should take the initiative to create and run its own health insurance exchange.   
Until January 2011, the debate over the ACA and an exchange was largely theoretical as 
the people who would be empowered to make key decisions had not yet assumed office.  As the 
legislative session began, it was unclear which path Governor Snyder and legislative leaders 
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would choose.   By October, Governor Snyder had taken a strong stance in favor of creating a 
state-run exchange and enabling legislation he had helped craft was introduced in the Senate.  
The Governor took two particular steps to prepare the way for this bill: 1) holding stakeholder 
work groups throughout the first half of 2011, and 2) issuing a “special message” focused on 
health issued in September.  In this section I discuss both of these steps, as well as the growing 
attention to blocking an insurance exchange among opponents of the ACA. 
 
Stakeholder Work Groups 
At his inauguration on January 1, 2011, Governor Rick Snyder told state leaders that “we 
have spent too much time fighting among ourselves and have become our own worst enemy,” 
(Snyder 2011a).  He spoke of expanding Michigan’s economy and creating jobs, but did not once 
refer to the ACA or health reform.  Behind the scenes, he was studying his options and 
developing a plan.  Chris Priest, who had been the Director of Governor Granholm’s D.C. office, 
was asked to stay and work in DCH as one of the new administration’s leaders on the ACA’s 
implementation.  Steven Hilfinger, Director of the Department of Licensing and Regulatory 
Affairs (LARA) became another point person on the issue.   
A Lansing-based consultant firm (Public Sector Consultants) was tasked with facilitating 
work groups to develop consensus about a health insurance exchange among a wide range of 
stakeholders.  An advisor to Governor Snyder described this process as a way of finding out 
where everyone stood: “It is always better to bring people, interest groups in from the beginning 
of the process rather than impose something them, because no matter what you do they’re not 
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going to like it. The more buy-in you can get in the beginning of the process the better off you’re 
going to be,” (Interview June 2011).   
A final report was issued on June 17, 2011 detailing recommendations, with more than 50 
receiving unanimous or “near-unanimous” support.  The work groups recommended that 
Michigan develop its own exchange; that it should begin as an independent public authority (i.e., 
quasi-governmental organization) with the option of seeking non-profit status at a later date; the 
exchange should be a clearinghouse instead of an active purchaser, meaning that it would not be 
the exclusive distributor in either the individual or group market; and the exchange should be 
funded through fees charged to carriers.  A handful of participants opposed specific elements of 
these recommendations, though not a single person or group was opposed to Michigan taking 
control of its exchange (PSC 2011).  These recommendations were then presented to the 
legislature. 
The July meeting of the Senate Health Policy Committee was a particularly significant 
moment, as it was the first opportunity for groups to go on record either supporting or opposing 
the exchange.  These groups had been part of the work group process, but the report did not list 
the positions organizations took on individual issues.  The coalition of stakeholders testifying on 
behalf of the exchange was an unusual combination of groups typically aligned with Democrats 
such as the Michigan Consumers for Healthcare Advancement and the Michigan League for 
Human Services, alongside groups typically aligned with Republicans such as the Small 
Business Association of Michigan (SBAM) and the Michigan Chamber of Commerce (MI 
Senate Health Policy Committee, hereafter SHEAL, 2011).  Supporting a state-based exchange 
was a bold step for many of these business organizations given that they had staunchly opposed 
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the ACA during the 2009-2010 congressional debate.  One business leader described support as a 
matter of pragmatism: 
I truly feel we have to be principled and we have to be pragmatic.  Our job is to know 
which is which. Is this a stand on principle issue or this is not?  Medicaid expansion and 
this are two examples of two very specific decisions that are before us.  We weren’t 
fighting about the whole law. We only had the decision about the type of exchange. 
Those who stood against it did so in a belief that they would be doing damage to 
Obamacare.  We just didn’t take that bet. We weren’t willing to take that risk (Interview 
April 2013). 
 
Insurers also emphasized the role that states have traditionally played in regulating insurance 
markets.  An insurance leader described it this way: 
Once it became clear that this law would pass and things shifted to the state-level, we 
knew we wanted the state to run the exchange. We testified to that very early on. Each 
state is different.  They have a different makeup. The population is different. Our 
insurance regulations are inherently different – most states are. We operate in a specific 
kind of way.  Even though there were general guidelines that states would have to follow, 
we wanted as much control as possible to do it the way Michigan should be doing it.  We 
were one of many groups who felt the same way (Interview May 2013). 
 
As important as this show of interest group support was, it was not clear which recommendations 
Governor Snyder would adopt and how the legislature would respond. 
 
Snyder’s Special Message 
By June 2011, the Snyder administration decided to produce a “special message” on 
health and wellness.  The message was released September 14, 2011 and included the governor’s 
position on the health insurance exchange, as well as recommendations on how to address 
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obesity, tobacco, food safety, and a wide variety of other issues.  This would be the third such 
special message of his term, following one in March on local government reforms and one in 
April on education.  Governor Milliken (1969-1983) used a similar approach as a way to set the 
legislative agenda for the following months.  An advisor to Governor Snyder describes three 
components to these messages: 1) what I’m going to do as governor, 2) what I’m asking the 
legislature to do, and 3) what I’m asking the people of Michigan to do (Interview June 2011).  A 
Democratic Senator said that “when they put a special message together, the full resources of the 
governor’s office go behind those goals.  They view these special messages as a checklist and 
focus on getting these things done,” (Interview September 2011).    
Three aspects of the health and welfare special message are particularly noteworthy: 1) 
the specific proposals, 2) the framing, and 3) its roll-out.  First, Governor Snyder came out as 
strongly in favor of a state-based exchange, saying “I do not support a ‘one size fits all’ federal 
approach to health reform, which is where we would be if we were to allow the federal 
government to run a health insurance exchange.”  He went as far as saying that even if the ACA 
had not mandated the creation of an exchange, he would “still be in favor of utilizing technology 
to create a better customer service experience for Michiganders.”  In addition, Snyder advocated 
for the exchange to be established as a non-profit entity, stating that “the legislature should not 
create a duplicative regulatory structure for health insurance in Michigan” and “should 
encourage healthy competition rather than simply add new transaction costs to the expenses that 
individuals and small businesses already face.”  He further added that the exchange should not be 
the only available option for customers to purchase insurance (Snyder 2011b).   
The debate over the content of the health and wellness special message took place mostly 
behind closed doors, with significant input from committee leaders from each chamber.  An 
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advisor to Governor Snyder described this process as trying to facilitate many of the big 
compromises before legislation is even introduced.  “The more you can work out up front, the 
better off you’ll be when you engage in the legislative process.  That’s what we’re trying to do,” 
(Interview June 2011).  Participants of the work group process later expressed frustration over 
not knowing how their recommendations were incorporated, particularly given that Snyder called 
for the exchange to be a non-profit entity after they had recommended it be a quasi-governmental 
organization (Interviews 2011-2013).  Those involved in crafting the special message say that the 
work group recommendations were given serious weight, but that the governor knew from the 
beginning that he wanted a non-profit entity.  As one legislative staffer put it, “A quasi-
governmental organization wasn’t really discussed too closely.  The goal is to remove it further 
from government,” (Interview September 2011).   
Chris Priest described that “Governor Snyder’s focus is on being consumer friendly and 
valuing customer service.  We felt that [a non-profit entity] would be the best way to do this.  We 
wanted to set up a structure that would be flexible and as much outside of government as 
possible, something that would be forced naturally to keep its costs low” (Interview May 2013).  
There was also a political motivation to this approach, with the expectation being that a 
clearinghouse exchange run as a non-profit housed outside of government would be the most 
likely to win support from Republicans in the legislature. 
The second notable aspect of the special message is that it was framed to appeal directly 
to conservatives by emphasizing markets and competition.  In other words, not only were the 
proposals tailored to appeal to the right, but so were the words to describe and sell the proposals.  
In the weeks leading up to its release, a legislative staffer said they would be surprised if the 
message even used the words “Affordable Care Act” or “insurance exchange,” (Interview 
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September 2011).  Those words were in fact used, but mostly as context for introducing the 
governor’s proposal for an exchange called “The MI Health Marketplace,” (pronounced My 
Health Marketplace).   
Finally, the roll out of the message was designed to give momentum to the governor’s 
proposals.  A press conference was held at the Heart of the City Health Center in Grand Rapids, 
with the governor also announcing a goal to lose 10 pounds over the next year.12  These events 
were coordinated with legislative leaders so that the next day, Steven Hilfinger and Shelly 
Edgerton from LARA and Chris Priest from MDCH testified on the MI Health Marketplace 
before a special joint session of the Senate Health Policy and Insurance Committees.  They were 
immediately followed by Olga Dazzo, Director of MDCH, and two of her deputies presenting on 
other elements of the special message (MI SHEAL 2011).  Similar presentations were 
subsequently made in the House (MI HHEAL 2011b). 
The timing of the special message coincided with efforts by the Snyder administration to 
apply for a federal level 1 establishment grant.  The state asked for nearly $10 million from the 
federal government in order to conduct studies and plan for the creation of an exchange.  The 
receipt of this grant would ultimately be a source of controversy, but it was not when the 
application was submitted in the fall of 2011. 
Snyder’s message held to the timeline recommended by the Granholm administration, 
challenging the legislature to have a bill on his desk by Thanksgiving.  A key staff person for the 
House Health Policy Committee (the committee which ultimately defeated the legislation) 
described that “Our goal is to have our legislation on the governor’s desk by Thanksgiving. That 
                                                           
12
 He announced on October 24th that he had so far lost 6 pounds (AP 2011a), though when pushed the following 
year whether he had met the goal, he said “I’ve lost some, but not enough,” (Brush 2012). 
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is the Senate’s goal as well. That gives us two, two and a half months. That is our goal.  We do 
want to meet the deadlines for meeting the qualifications and criteria to receive grants.  We 
would like to receive all the federal money we can,” (Interview September 2011).  A member of 
the Senate Health Policy Committee said they would be surprised if legislation creating a state-
based exchange was not enacted by the end 2011 (Interview September 2011).  
The special message’s roll-out was not entirely smooth, though not because of the 
governor’s position on health insurance exchanges.  In fact, the most controversial elements of 
the message had little to with the ACA.  The media focused most of its attention on proposed 
requirements to mandate insurance coverage for treatments related to autism in children and for 
each child’s BMI to be reported to the state annually (Thoms 2011).  Organizations such as the 
Chamber of Commerce quickly responded to these proposals, saying that “Across the state, 
employers and individuals were angry at the passage of Obamacare and its focus on more 
governmental control and top-down mandates.  Make no mistake: Support for more health care 
mandates is tantamount to adopting the same government control and cost-shifting at the heart of 
Obamacare,” (Michigan Chamber of Commerce 2011). 
This was an auspicious beginning to the debate that was about to take place in the 
legislature over MI Health Marketplace.  The Chamber of Commerce and other business groups 
advocated on behalf of a state-based exchange, but this message was often confused or drowned 
out by their strong opposition to the ACA as a whole and to Snyder’s other health policy 
proposals.  It also became increasingly difficult to convince legislators who were now hearing 
more from groups opposed to creating an exchange.   
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Opposition Continues to Grow 
 As Governor Snyder advanced plans to create an exchange, opposition to the ACA 
continued to grow.  Animosity came most strongly from three sources: 1) national organizations, 
2) the Mackinac Center for Public Policy (pronounced Mack-in-awe), and 3) grassroots 
organizations.  First, Governor Snyder resisted pressure from national groups such as CATO, 
ALEC, and the Republican Governors Association, to return money or otherwise resist 
implementation.  Most notably, he was the only Republican governor not to sign a letter calling 
for the ACA’s repeal and greater flexibility on Medicaid (RGA 2011).  Advisers to Governor 
Snyder described the decision to not return grant money and not sign the letter by saying “It’s a 
simple decision. That’s the way the governor looked at it. We’re not going to get in a state’s 
rights debate. There is no sense in doing that stuff.  First, the odds of this being entirely repealed 
are slim to none, so you do a reality check.  Second, it is federal law. Third, he’s more interested 
in Michigan than he is in the national debates,” (Interviews 2011-2013).  
 Opposition at the state level was most prominently driven by the Mackinac Center for 
Public Policy.  Based in Midland the Mackinac Center has been called the “the largest right-wing 
state-level policy think tank in the nation,” (Steimel 2013).  The Center is part of a broader 
organization called the State Policy Network which describes itself as “made up of free-market 
think tanks fighting to limit government and advance market-friendly public policy at the state 
and local levels,” (SPN 2013).  Mackinac has a reputation as a particularly influential member of 
this network, having trained many of the leaders running sister organizations around the country 
and participating in ALEC task forces focused on health reform (Sourcewatch 2013).   
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 The Center takes a multi-pronged approach to attempting to influence public policy in 
Lansing.  In addition to issuing reports based on independent research, it publishes blog posts, 
runs a news service called Michigan Capitol Confidential (CAPCON), and runs a legislative 
tracking service called Michiganvotes.org.  During the summer and early fall of 2011, Mackinac 
used each of these outlets to publish arguments against the creation of an insurance exchange.  
Senior Legislative Analyst Jack McHugh wrote most these pieces, in many cases disseminating 
information from national organizations such as CATO.   In these reports, McHugh argued that 
creating an exchange would “lend the appearance of legitimacy to the law,” thus undermining 
the judicial challenge (McHugh 2011a).   He also argued that “there is no such thing as a state-
run exchange” since everything needs to be approved by the federal government and because 
interest groups would have too great an influence (McHugh 2011c).  These articles published by 
the Mackinac Center became the basis of the arguments used by the Tea Party and opponents of 
an insurance exchange.   
At the same time that a major piece of his agenda was being challenged from the right, 
the Governor was facing a recall challenge from the left.  The Committee to Recall Rick Snyder 
worked throughout the summer of 2011 to try and collect the 800,000 signatures needed to put a 
recall of Governor Snyder before voters (UPI 2011).  Much of this group’s anger was directed at 
a law signed by Governor Snyder in March which gives broad powers to emergency financial 
appointed by the state, including the ability to supersede elected officials and terminate union 
contracts.  An estimated 3,000 people filled the Capitol Building protesting the law the day 
Snyder signed the bill into law (Mudgett 2011).  The issue attracted national attention, with Jesse 
Jackson visiting the state calling for civil disobedience (Bein 2011) and Rachel Maddow 
criticizing the law on her MSNBC show (Maddow 2011).  The campaign to recall Rick Snyder 
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ultimately fell short, collecting 500,000 by the deadline at the end of September 2011 (Bowers 
2011), however enough signatures were ultimately collected to put a referendum of the new 
emergency manager law on the November 2012 ballot (Hoffman 2012).   
It was against this backdrop of a divided right and an angry left that legislation to create 
MI Health Marketplace was introduced in the Senate on September 22, 2011 by Senator Jim 
Marleau of Oakland County. 
 
3) Nov 2011 – June 2012 
November 2011 was an important turning point in the debate over whether to create an 
insurance exchange.  SB 693 to create MI Health Marketplace passed the Senate on November 
10th.  Days later on November 14th, the U.S. Supreme Court announced it would hear the cases 
challenging the constitutionality of the ACA.  This decision was not a surprise, but cast a shadow 
over deliberations in the House that was difficult for supporters to overcome.  This section 
examines why exchange legislation succeeded in the Senate but stalled in the House. 
 
SB 693 in the Senate 
Jim Marleau, Chair of the Senate Health Policy Committee, took the lead in pushing SB 
693 through the Senate.  As the bill made its way from the Senate Health Policy Committee to 
the Senate floor, supporters had three advantages in their favor.  First, they had the support of 
Governor Snyder who had come out strongly in favor of a state-based exchange and had devoted 
his administration’s resources at LARA and MDCH to planning activities.  It was not 
 109 
 
immediately apparent that his support would be an asset.  Legislative staff members in both 
chambers describe a strained relationship with the governor during the early months of his 
administration, in part due to his campaign promise to change the way business is conducted in 
Lansing.  As one Republican Senate staff member described, there was “an expectation that once 
he arrived they would teach him what is going on and how things really work.  He would be put 
in his place and it would be an adversarial relationship,” (Interview September 2011).  Instead, 
this person described Snyder as “an out of the box thinker who is pro-active in working with 
legislators and in seeking them out.  It hasn’t been adversarial. I have become a fan.”   
 A staff member to a House Republican in leadership echoed these sentiments about the 
governor’s relationship with legislators in early 2011, particularly as Snyder took a strong stand 
on the exchange.  “Keep in mind that the Republican that was elected governor was not the 
establishment candidate everyone thought was going to win. He was not active in Republican 
politics; he had a business background. This attracted Michigan voters. Now he is in office and 
to his credit looks at issues not first from a political bent, but from a CEO perspective. When he 
looked at the exchange, he thought it made sense.”  This person went on to add that “most 
Republicans in the House and Senate thought he lost his marbles” by supporting an exchange.  
“Does he understand politics?  This is perhaps a cornerstone issue in the upcoming election and 
at the very least we should wait to see how this plays out.  To his credit, he didn’t wait,” 
(Interview May 2013).   
Instead, the Governor’s administration engaged in an aggressive legislative strategy.  
Chris Priest and Steven Hilfinger from LARA took the lead in testifying before multiple 
committee hearings, holding numerous meetings with groups of legislators and their staff, and 
meeting one on one with each Senator on the Health Policy Committee, as well as others in the 
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Republican and Democratic caucuses.  Complicating the dynamic between branches of 
government was that the legislature had already taken a number of tough votes by this point in 
the session, including the emergency manager bill already discussed and a bill which paid for the 
elimination of a business tax in part by increasing personal income taxes, including pensions and 
other retirement income (Luke 2011).  He was also trying to enact education reforms and win 
approval for a new bridge between Detroit and Canada.  
The second potential advantage for supporters of an exchange was the broad set of 
interest groups in their corner.  This was not a coalition in the sense that groups coordinated 
every activity, though their efforts were complimentary.  The Small Business Association of 
Michigan (SBAM), which some have called one of the most influential groups in Lansing 
(Interviews 2013), aggressively worked the phones and attended meetings with legislators.  
Other groups such as Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan were similarly engaged in lobbying 
Senators. 
 The third advantage was that Senators would not be up for re-election again until 2014.  
Unlike Idaho where all Senators are up for re-election every two years and Texas where Senators 
serve four years but elections are staggered so that half the body is on the ballot every two years, 
all of Michigan’s 38 Senators serve four year terms on the same electoral cycle.  Legislative 
insiders feel that this gave Senators a little more room in 2011 to examine the policy merits of 
SB 693 compared to the House where members are on the ballot every two years (Interviews 
2011-2013). 
 In early September 2011, Senator Marleau spoke to the Republican caucus about the 
exchange, trying to convince them this is not the equivalent of implementing Obamacare in 
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Michigan.  He did not bring up access, rather trying to sell it as a way to control costs.  Marleau 
was quoted as saying something along the lines of “This is not Obama-style reform.  This is a 
Republican idea.  This is the Michigan solution,” (Interview September 2011).  Interest group 
leaders were frustrated that despite all the policy reasons they felt Michigan should run its own 
exchange, they “had to frame it as being about state’s rights.  You had to find a way for people to 
support this without saying they support Obamacare,” (Interview May 2013). 
At the same time, supporters faced the challenge of finding a way to convince enough 
Republicans to sign on without alienating too many Democrats and liberal groups.  Michigan 
legislators joke about there being a special Lansing zip code of 56-20-1, since this is the number 
of votes needed to pass legislation through the House and Senate, and to be signed by the 
governor.  Republicans held enough seats in both chambers that they could pass legislation 
without needing a single Democratic vote.  However, given the divisions among Republicans, 
the most likely path in each chamber would be to secure support from as many Democrats as 
possible and then as many Republicans as necessary to make up the difference.  In 2011 there 
were 46 Democrats in the House, meaning that if they all supported an exchange, only 10 House 
Republicans would need to vote in favor.  The calculus was similar in the Senate, with only eight 
Republicans needed to join the 12 Democrats.   
An advisor to Governor Snyder expected legislators “to be all over the map in terms of 
how they react to an exchange.  Most Republicans are saying we should do it like Utah.  Most 
Democrats are saying we should do it like Massachusetts.  We’re trying to find the middle 
ground – the Michigan way.  At the end of the day all that matters is 56-20-1. Our job is to get 
the 56, 20, and 1. Well, to get the 56 and 20 - we have the 1!” (Interview June 2011).  Senate 
Democrats supported an exchange, though there were some feelings of discontent under the 
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surface.  As the leader of a liberal organization described, many supported SB 693 even though 
they felt it did not go far enough.   They hoped the Michigan exchange “would evolve from a 
clearinghouse exchange to an active purchaser where the choices are a little more selective…The 
Marleau bill wasn’t perfect, but it was reasonable.  We could have worked with it and improved 
it over time,” (Interview May 2013). 
 After clearing the Health Policy Committee, SB 693 was approved on the floor by a vote 
of 25-12 on November 10, 2011.  All 12 Democrats voted in favor and were joined by 13 
Republicans, exactly half the Senate Republican caucus (MI Senate Roll Call #663 2011).  It was 
not an easy vote for Republicans, with Senators such as Rick Jones of Grand Ledge saying he 
had to “hold his nose” while voting for the bill (AP 2011b).  Senator Patrick Colbeck (R) of 
Canton used a floor speech to remove his name as a co-sponsor of the bill.  He said  
I rise in strong opposition to SB 693.  My original co-sponsorship commitment was 
predicated on the understanding that this bill would provide a free market alternative to 
the Federal ‘Affordable Care Act.’  As a co-sponsor, I had worked hard to ensure that the 
bill would live up to this promise. My concerns have not been addressed in this version of 
the bill and I have read it thoroughly. Rather than serving as a free market alternative, I 
have come to the conclusion that this bill would simply further enable the implementation 
of the Affordable Care Act, commonly known as Obama-care (Colbeck 2011). 
 
Senator Colbeck asked for time to submit “a vetted alternative” which would narrow the scope of 
the MI Health Marketplace from performing “all exchange duties” to focus on determining 
eligibility for government assistance to citizens,” (Colbeck 2011).  His name was removed from 
the bill, but the vote carried on without him. 
 The Tea Party was engaged in the Senate debate but did not fully mobilize.  On her blog 
the next day, Tea Party activist Joan Fabiano said this was because the Senate pushed the bill 
 113 
 
through without normal debate.  Fabiano was one of the original leaders of the Tea Party 
movement in Michigan and was connected online to other activists.  She and other activists 
reacted strongly to the bill’s passage, issuing a call to arms for the Tea Party to act aggressively 
as the bill moved to the House.  Republicans who supported the bill were accused of “putting 
their career over principles,” (Fabiano 2011a).  A political action committee run by the 
RetakeOurGov Tea Party Group used the moment as a fund-raising tool, telling supporters that 
“The passage of SB 693 was a deliberate poke in the eye to the Tea Party.  We cannot just ignore 
this direct assault on our values.  We have worked too hard and too long to fight Obama Care to 
give up now,” (Retakeourgov 2011).  
 Negative attention from the Tea Party was uncomfortable for Republican Senators.  
Senator Judy Emmons tried to deflect criticism for voting for SB 693 by introducing a resolution 
on the same day “to express support for the continued efforts of the Michigan Attorney General 
to oppose the implementation of Obama Care and to memorialize Congress to repeal it” (MI SR-
95 2011).  The resolution narrowly passed 20-17 with support from all 13 Republicans who also 
voted for SB 693 (MI Senate Roll Call #664).  The resolution did little to appease activists who 
called it a “duplicitous move” and wrote “Did they really think we should be fooled by this? 
What an insult to the people of Michigan!” Fabiano predicted the House would act quickly and 
she and others vowed that the Tea Party would be ready (Fabiano 2011a).   
The attacks became personal when Senator Rick Jones reacted to Fabiano’s post by 
writing her directly on Facebook, saying “I hear you are taking head meds.  Is that true?” (Jones 
2011).  She filed an ethics complaint against him for cyber bullying and he subsequently wrote 
an apology letter.  (Fabiano 2011a).   
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With the Senate having moved quickly to pass SB 693, it was now up to Speaker Jase 
Bolger and Rep. Gail Haines, Chair of the House Health Policy Committee Meeting, to decide 
their next move. 
 
SB 693 Stalls in the House 
 As the debate shifted from the Senate to the House in November 2011, it was clear that 
SB 693 would not meet Governor Snyder’s timeline of being enacted by Thanksgiving.  Having 
a bill passed by the time the legislative session closed at the end of the calendar year became the 
new goal for supporters of an exchange (Interviews 2011-2013).  A Republican House staff 
member would later admit that they never intended to bring the bill up for a vote once it became 
clear the Supreme Court would hear the ACA’s case (Interview February 2012).   
 That is not to say that the chamber ignored the exchange.  In fact, one senior staff 
member said in their 15 years in Lansing they had not seen more committee deliberations on an 
issue than were held about the exchange (Interview May 2013).  Between September 8, 2011 and 
January 19, 2012, the House Health Policy Committee held 10 hearings on the exchanges, 
including every Thursday morning between October 6th and November 10th.  Each meeting 
included testimony in support of an exchange by representatives of state agencies, practitioners, 
insurers, businesses, and consultants working in other states.  The meetings also provided an 
opportunity for citizens to offer brief testimony or file a written statement indicating their 
support or opposition of an exchange.  Despite having so many hearings, no vote was ever 
announced during this period.  
 115 
 
 Republican leaders had both policy and political reasons for delaying a vote in the House.  
First, they felt that with so many unknowns about the fate of the law it would not be prudent to 
proceed with the creation of a state-based exchange.  HHS had not yet released final regulations 
on an exchange and policymakers were frustrated about a lack of clarity over their options and 
requirements.  How could they choose whether they preferred a state or federally run exchange if 
they did not know details about the federal model?  Similarly, they worried that once HHS’s 
final regulations were released, the state would be stuck with hidden costs or would have to 
spend resources revising elements of its exchange.  The safer thing, they felt, was to wait and let 
the judicial process play out.   
Richard Murdock, Executive Director of the Michigan Association of Health Plans made 
the case that delaying would be a self-fulfilling prophecy for opponents, leaving the state too 
little time to establish an exchange after the Supreme Court ruling (Murdock 2012).  A 
spokesperson for House Speaker Bolger responded that “there’s plenty of time to get something 
in place” after the Court rules, adding that “If people are dedicated, this can get done,” (AP 
2011c).  LARA Director Steve Hilfinger responded that “If we wait until June to move forward 
on that, the odds of us being able to satisfy HHS that we have an exchange in place…would be 
nonexistent.  We certainly don’t want to lose six months of planning time and seal our fate with a 
federal exchange.  That would be devastating for Michigan,” (AP 2011c). 
Michigan was one of the few states that had the option of delaying its decision with the 
realistic possibility of still taking a vote in 2012 (see Figure 3 in chapter 2).  Only nine states had 
sessions running into July and the Supreme Court’s ruling was expected at the end of June, 
meaning that very few other states could wait for the ruling and still pass legislation creating an 
exchange – at least without calling a special session, an unlikely prospect so close to the election 
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(Jones 2012).  Ironically, the ability in Michigan to make decisions later gave opponents an 
excuse to stall.  Without the tight deadline of a session end date, opponents felt little pressure to 
rush.   
 One interest group leader called this period “the triple dog dare” phase of the exchange 
debate because Republican lawmakers felt HHS was bluffing on its threats.  Another interest 
group leader quoted Chairwoman Haines saying that HHS would never actually come in and set 
up an exchange (Interview April 2013).  A House Republican staff member said that the Obama 
administration wanted red states to do an exchange so badly that they would eventually cave on 
deadlines and would “let us do whatever we want,” (Interview February 2012).  A Tea Party 
leader said that HHS “couldn’t and they wouldn’t” run exchanges for all the states that chose not 
to do one on their own (Interview May 2013).  Opponents admitted that they had little to lose by 
stalling since they did not believe they would gaining much control if they did an exchange 
anyway (Interviews 2011-2013). 
 House Republican leaders were also aware that creating an exchange brought little 
political benefit but potentially significant risk.  2012 was an election year for every member of 
the House, with the filing deadline for the primaries right around the corner in May.  Groups 
such as the Tea Party and Americans for Prosperity were becoming increasingly vocal and 
aggressive on this issue.  A Republican senior staff member said they had verbal support from 
enough people that they were confident SB 693 would pass if it reached the floor (Interview 
December 2011).  However, many Republicans were nervous about the tough votes they had 
already taken and did not want to take a risky vote on Obamacare if they did not need to.  After 
the December 1st meeting of the House Health Policy Committee, House Republican leaders 
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announced that no vote would be held until after the Supreme Court’s ruling (Interviews 2012-
2013). 
House Blocks Federal Grant 
 As it turned out, there was an important vote much sooner, though not on the creation of 
an exchange itself.  On November 29th, the federal government awarded the state a $9.8 million 
level 1 establishment grant.  LARA had applied for this grant two months earlier “to conduct 
additional analysis on the impacts of the Exchange and the Affordable Care Act in Michigan,” 
including market analysis, technology planning, and education and outreach (CMS 2014).  This 
grant was seen as a natural progression from the $1 million planning grant received a year earlier 
and was not expected to be controversial.  Policymakers on both sides of the aisle were asking 
for more detailed information than the state had available, and the Snyder administration said 
they wanted to use the grant to develop answers to these questions.  
 Accepting this grant did not commit the state to create an exchange, though conservative 
leaders such as Jack McHugh at the Mackinac Center warned that “state cooperation and grant-
seeking may further entrench Obamacare, making it harder to eventually invalidate or repeal,” 
(McHugh 2011d).  Joan Fabiano similarly called for the state to reject this grant (Fabiano 
2011b).  Governor Snyder made it clear he would not follow the lead of other Republican 
governors who rejected their federal grants (Interviews 2012-2013).  However, the Michigan 
Constitution also requires the legislature to approve any executive spending, even of money 
received by federal grant (MI Const. art. 14. §5).   
 On the same day in November 2011 that the Senate passed SB 693 to create an exchange 
and Resolution 95 to express support of Michigan’s participation in the lawsuit, the Senate also 
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passed a $366 million supplemental appropriations bill by a vote of 28-8, authorizing LARA  to 
spend the $9.8 million level 1 grant it had just been awarded (MI Senate Roll Call #675 2011).  
The House had approved a version of the bill a few weeks earlier, though its vote took place 
before the state had received the grant and thus did not include this money (MI House Roll Call 
#422 2011).  When the bill came back to the House, leaders removed the $9.8 million federal 
grant.  Rather than block the entire appropriations bill right before the Christmas recess in order 
to save this $9.8 million, House members approved the $352 supplemental by a vote of 101-7 on 
December 13th (MI House Roll Call #570 2011).  Faced with a similar choice the next day, the 
Senate voted 20-17 to approve the most recent House version (MI Senate Roll Call #792).  The 
supplemental appropriations bill passed comfortably, but without any money for the state to 
spend on exchange planning. 
 The blocking of the level 1 establishment grant by the House gave opponents of an 
exchange their first major victory on the issue.  The Snyder administration was frustrated to lose 
access to this planning money.  As one adviser put it, this was a “chicken and the egg sort of 
problem.  If someone asked what our user fee would be in ten years, or something like that, I 
can’t tell them…we needed their approval to get the funding to do this research,” (Interview May 
2013).  Without answers to these questions, House Republicans were wary of voting to create an 
exchange. 
 
January 19th House Health Policy Committee Hearing 
The debate in the House over an insurance exchange – at least until after the Supreme 
Court ruling and November elections - culminated with a dramatic meeting of the House Health 
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Policy Committee on January 19, 2012.  Despite near-blizzard conditions and temperatures 
below 20°F, more than 120 people attended what was billed by Chairwoman Haines as an 
opportunity for public testimony on the issue.  The meeting had to be moved from the regular 
committee room in the House Office Building to the ornate House Appropriations Committee 
Room on the 3rd floor of the Capitol Building in order to accommodate the crowd.  There were 
no presentations, no questions from committee members, and no scheduled vote.  Instead, the 
committee listened for more than three hours as citizens and groups took turns giving 3-5 minute 
testimonies.    
 Tea Party activists were aggressive in mobilizing its members to attend (Gavette 2012; 
Fabiano 2012a).  RightMichigan.com said that “a show of force sends the message that we do 
not want Obama Care (creation of a Health Care Exchange) and your presence also helps to 
support those in the House who oppose it,” (Fabiano 2011b).  Members of the Tea Party 
movement responded.  Members of the Lakes Area Tea Party had a table near the room’s 
entrance containing literature against an exchange.  Of the 31 people who testified, 20 were 
opposed.  Of those, 13 either identified themselves as being members of a Tea Party group or 
have an online presence at a Tea Party web site.13  Another 21 people emailed the committee 
clerk their testimony and 44 submitted cards at the meeting but did not testify.  Nearly half of the 
people sending emails sent a message that was exactly the same or a variation of a Tea Party 
form letter saying “Please enter this email into the record.  I am against any health care exchange 
in Michigan,” (for example, see Iler 2012).  A similar proportion of those submitting cards at the 
meeting identified themselves as being part of the Tea Party.   
                                                           
13
 To determine this number, I searched on Google the name of each person listed in the committee meeting minutes 
along with the search terms “Michigan” and “tea party”. 
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To put these numbers in perspective, a combined total of three people submitted cards 
during the first four meetings the committee held on an exchange the previous September and 
October.  A previous example of Tea Party mobilization occurred two months earlier, on October 
17, 2011.  Fabiano called for the Tea Party movement to engage in “focused activism” directed 
entirely at stopping SB 693.  She wrote that “Attendance at a Committee Meeting is more 
effective than large rallies.  Most groups never achieve a ‘tipping point’ of attendance to 
influence Committee voting.  Those that do create the buzz that puts the members of the 
committee, those testifying and the press on notice, that this is no ordinary meeting,” (emphasis 
in the original, Fabiano 2012b).  Thirteen people submitted cards opposing 693 at the next 
meeting, of which 10 have an online presence on Tea Party web sites (MI HHEAL 2011c).  Only 
one person submitted cards at the next three meetings combined.  In the first meeting after the 
Senate passed SB 693 and Tea Party activists issued another call to arms, 13 people submitted 
cards against an exchange – eight of whom are identified with the Tea Party (MI HHEAL 
2011d).  This meeting was a dramatic example of the Tea Party’s ability to mobilize attendance 
at legislative meetings. 
 It was not just the number of the Tea Party activists in attendance at the January 19th 
meeting that was dramatic, but also the content and tone of their arguments.  Nearly one-third of 
the people who testified quoted articles produced by the Mackinac Center, either in part or in 
their entirety.  They testified that creating an exchange was the same as implementing 
Obamacare.  They argued that anyone who said Michigan did not have a choice or that an 
exchange would be happening anyway was either lying or uninformed.  Multiple people 
compared the ACA to socialism.  At least three people referenced Adolf Hitler and Nazi death 
camps in saying that creating an exchange puts the state on a dangerous path.  One person 
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strangely referred at length to the Alfred Hitchcock movie Psycho. Testimony by Tea Party 
activists was greeted with loud applause, whereas testimony in support of an exchange was 
almost always followed by silence. 
 It is hard to gauge what impact the Tea Party presence at this meeting had on SB 693’s 
prospects in the House.  Republican reactions were mixed, with Tea Party allies feeling 
emboldened and those outside the movement feeling frustrated.  One Republican House staff 
member called the Tea Party activists attending this meeting “a fanatic sub-group of a party that 
has hijacked thinking,” (Interview February 2012).  The decision to delay a vote until after the 
Supreme Court’s ruling had already been made before the January 19th meeting (Interviews 
2012-2013) and House Republicans had already blocked the $9.8 million level 1 establishment 
grant.  However, now that the lines were clearly drawn in the sand, it would be very difficult for 
House Republicans to support an exchange should it come up for a vote. 
 The House Health Policy Committee continued to hold hearings throughout 2012, though 
nobody brought up the issue of a health insurance exchange before June 28th when the Supreme 
Court ruling was announced.  With support by Governor Snyder and passage in the Senate, 
supporters of an exchange now had the 20 and the 1.  They would have to wait until the end of 
November before finding out whether they could also secure 56 votes in the House. 
 
4) July 2012 – October 2013 
The debate over a health insurance exchange during the fourth post-enactment period 
progressed through three stages.  First, state policymakers reacted to the Supreme Court’s ruling, 
ultimately deciding to delay making a decision until after the elections on November 6th.  
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Second, when Barack Obama was re-elected and it became clear that his administration would 
follow through with the law’s implementation, Michigan was among the states that scrambled to 
decide whether to move forward.  Within a month of the election, the House Health Policy 
Committee finally held a vote on the issue, deciding 5-9 to reject a state-run exchange.  Third, as 
the prospects of a state-run exchange faded, Governor Snyder shifted focus to creating a 
partnership exchange.  In March the legislature blocked the appropriation of another federal 
grant, effectively blocking the creation of a partnership.  Ironically, this time it was the House 
that approved and the Senate that blocked the funding.  This section focuses on each of these 
stages. 
 
Reaction to the Supreme Court 
 For nearly a year, opponents of creating a health insurance exchange in Michigan argued 
that it would not be prudent to act before the Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of the 
law.  If the ACA was upheld, they said there would be plenty of time to move forward with plans 
to create an exchange.  As the ruling grew near, an increasing number of opponents argued that if 
the law was upheld the state should actually wait until after the November election to decide.  If 
it was not upheld, then the state could move on and would be spared the work of creating an 
exchange.  Supporters warned that the federal deadline by which states would have to declare 
their intention was November 16th.  This would give Michigan just 10 days to pass authorizing 
legislation and prepare its application.    
Reaction in Michigan to the Court’s ruling was mixed, particularly with respect to what it 
would mean for the debate of an insurance exchange.  Governor Snyder released a statement 
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later that day expressing his dislike of the ACA as a law but argued it was time to pass 
legislation creating the MI Health Marketplace and to unfreeze the federal dollars from the $9.8 
million level 1 grant (Snyder 2012a).  Speaker Bolger wrote that he “could not be more upset” by 
the ruling, but that he would “work with Governor Snyder and the state Senate to see that 
Michiganders have access to health care that is marketplace-driven and provides competition, 
transparency, and common sense options…A health care exchange is not something we wish to 
do, but we cannot stand idly by and hand over citizens’ health care to an overreaching federal 
bureaucracy,” (Thoms 2012).  At least one Republican member of the House Health Policy 
Committee became convinced it was now time to act on SB 693.  Rep. Mike Callton of Nashville 
said that although he had favored waiting, he now fears the Republican party is in danger of 
“focusing too much on ideology,” and that he would support an exchange (Skubick 2012a). 
Attorney General Bill Schuette emerged as the most prominent Republican calling for the 
House to wait until after the election before making a decision (White et al. 2012).  Schuette’s 
position as the state chairman for Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney put Republicans 
who wanted to push for an exchange in a difficult position.  Romney had a history of creating an 
exchange as governor of Massachusetts but opposed the creation of such exchanges under the 
ACA.  Republican leaders worried that it would confuse the party’s national narrative if a swing-
state led by Republicans implemented a key component of Obamacare.   
Shortly after Schuette’s statement on waiting until the election, Speaker Bolger 
moderated his initial statement about an exchange, saying that “Having the state establish a 
healthcare exchange is not something we want to do,” (Skubick 2012b).  Gail Haines, Chair of 
the House Health Policy Committee, responded in kind, saying “We have taken a very prudent 
course up to this point and I see us taking the same course now,” (Thoms 2012).  Her committee 
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did discuss the issue over the summer, though no vote was taken and no action was 
recommended (HHEAL 2012a).  Tea Party leader Joan Fabiano wrote that she had spoken with 
Haines who promised to continue “holding the fort” and not allow the appropriation of the $9.8 
million federal grant (Fabiano 2012c). 
Fabiano also warned that Governor Snyder might “try to be sneaky” and create an 
exchange by executive order (Fabiano 2012c).  Those close to the governor and legislative 
leadership say that this was never seriously considered since he would need legislation to create 
an exchange as a non-profit entity and that he was not interested in other governance structures 
(Interviews 2013).  In any case, the legislature had demonstrated that it would not appropriate the 
money to fund an exchange, so creating an exchange by executive order would be futile.  Given 
this set of circumstances, Snyder and other supporters had no choice but to wait until after the 
election before trying again. 
 
SB 693 Fails in Lame Duck Session  
 Shortly after President Obama won re-election and it became apparent the ACA would be 
implemented, Governor Snyder gave a speech to the House Republican Caucus behind closed 
doors.  According to someone in the room, he compared the ACA to a “speeding train coming at 
you. You can either jump off the tracks and just let it go past you and hope it won’t destroy 
everything you built behind you, or you can jump on the train and do your best to have some 
controls to transform it as best as possible.”  Not everyone agreed.  Some responded that it was 
not their train and they did not set it in motion.  If it crashes, let the federal government be 
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blamed for it, not the states (Interview May 2013).  Yet by this point, Speaker Bolger and 
Chairwoman Haines had evolved and were among those pushing for passage of SB 693.   
With the November 16th deadline ten days away, it seemed that there was not enough 
time to act.  When the Obama administration announced that the deadline had been pushed back 
and that states would now have until December 14th to declare their intention, Speaker Bolger 
published a letter forcefully calling for a state-based exchange.  He wrote: 
The question as to whether there will be an exchange in Michigan is now answered by the 
courts and the voters: there will be an exchange.  The question we need to answer is 
whether the state will have a seat at that table, or if we will cede state control to the 
federal government and allow them to establish the exchange with federal priorities rather 
than Michigan priorities.  Michigan can assert its sovereign rights and responsibilities to 
protect its citizens to minimize federal overreach.  
 
Bolger further argued that a federal exchange would have limited choice, whereas an exchange 
run by Michigan would be open, religious liberties would be protected, and the state could 
ensure that agents and brokers play a role as navigators.  Finally, he warned that a federally run 
exchange would be a slippery slope towards a single-payer system (Bolger 2012).  
 Within a week of Speaker Bolger’s letter, Chairwoman Haines announced that her 
committee would hold a vote on SB 693 during its meeting on November 29th.  Republican staff 
members give conflicting reports about whether leadership was convinced it had enough votes 
on the get bill through committee.  Some say they had verbal commitments from enough people.  
Others say that legislators had been entrenched for so long “that there was no wiggle room,” 
(Interviews 2012-2013).  Even if the votes were not secured ahead of the meeting, Snyder and 
other leaders felt it was time for closure.  Agency bureaucrats at the state and federal levels 
needed to know what the plan would be for preparing for open enrollment beginning in October 
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2013.  As one Republican House staff member put it, “Our thought was to put it up, see what 
happens. If it passes, then we’ll work like the dickens to get the vote on the floor.  If not, then we 
move to plan B,” (Interview May 2013).   
The tension of the January 29th meeting was still in people’s minds as they heard 
presentations from agency officials, as well as testimony from 10 people from the audience and 
received position cards from 26 people.  The public attending the hearing was evenly split, with 
half of the people voicing an opinion in support SB 693 and half opposing.  According to a 
comment on RightMichigan.com, more than 700 emails opposing SB 693 were sent to legislators 
leading up to the meeting (Heine 2012).   
The bill’s defeat at this meeting on November 29th was described by some participants as 
a perfect storm of multiple factors (Interviews 2012-2013).  Exchange politics became entangled 
with political battles over other contentious issues.  Proposals to enact “Right to Work” 
legislation in the lame duck session were gaining momentum, with some Republicans nervously 
remembering the outcry over this issue the year before in Wisconsin.  Democrats threatened to 
vote against all Republican bills as a way to gain leverage in the Right to Work debate, meaning 
Democrats might vote against SB 693 after calling for its passage for a year.   
According to one staff member, Chairwoman Haines made a deal with Republican 
members of the committee that she would tie-bar the exchange to two other bills (HB 4143 and 
HB 4147) which would prohibit qualified health plans from performing elective abortions.  This 
means that even if the House approved SB 693 and it was signed by the governor, an exchange 
would not be authorized until these two abortion-related bills were also passed.  Apparently not 
everyone was aware of this deal and the meeting had to be recessed twice as both sides 
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deliberated how to proceed.  One business leader described this as a “really strange time” in 
which “things got weird,” (Interview May 2013).  Democrats had been freed by leadership to 
vote for an exchange instead of maintain the Right to Work boycott, though some were not sure 
they still wanted to given the abortion connection.  Rep. Marcia Hovey-Wright (D), who was the 
National Organization of Women’s Michigan Chapter Legislator of the Year, proposed 
eliminating the tie-bar.  Her motion failed 12 to 4, with Rep. George Darany (D) abstaining 
(Gautz 2012).   The exchange bill the committee had been considering for more than a year was 
now also a bill about access to abortion, complicating the calculus for Democratic members of 
the committee.  
 The final vote was nine opposed to creating an exchange and five in favor, with two 
abstaining, one not registering a vote, and two being absent (Table 10).  This vote effectively 
killed SB 693 and Michigan’s prospect of running its own exchange.  The bill was much closer 
to passage than this vote makes it appear.  It is quite possible the bill could have passed had it not 
been connected to abortion.  Rep. Mike Callton was the only Republican other than Chairwoman 
Haines to vote in favor of an exchange.  The abortion connection may have made it easier for 
him to cast this vote, but he had already expressed support for an exchange and may well have 
voted for SB 693 in any case (Interviews 2013).  Rep. Hovey-Wright and Rep. Segal both voted 
no but had supported an exchange and likely would have voted in favor of SB 693 had it not 
been tie-barred to abortion.   
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Table 10 - House Health Policy Committee Roll Call on SB 693, November 29, 2012 
Voting Yes (5) 
Gail Haines, R - Committee Chair 
Mike Callton, R - Majority Vice-Chair 
George Darany, D 
Tim Greimel, D 
Thomas Stallworth, D 
Voting No (9) 
Joseph Graves, R 
Tom Hooker, R 
Holly Hughes, R 
Matt Huuki, R 
Ken Kurtz, R 
Paul Muxlow, R 
Paul Opsommer, R 
Mike Shirkey, R 
Ken Yonker, R 
Voting "Pass" (3) 
Wayne Schmidt, 3 
Marcia Hovey-Wright, D 
Kate Segal, D 
Absent (2) 
Lesia Liss, D - Minority Vice-Chair 
Jimmy Womack, D 
Source: Meeting minutes http://house.michigan.gov/SessionDocs/2011-2012/Minutes/MILI112712.pdf 
 
If these two Democrats had voted in favor, and if the two absent Democrats had shown 
up for the meeting and voted with the rest of their party, this would have brought the vote to a 9-
9 tie.  It is not clear why these members were absent – they did not respond to inquiries for a 
comment.  Rep. Jimmy Womack (D) had been robbed at gunpoint near his home in Detroit a few 
months earlier, but was unharmed in the incident (Burns 2012).  Instead, Rep. Womack stopped 
attending meetings after losing his primary race in August.  Rep. Womack was not a regular 
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attendee of his committee meetings anyway, missing 75% of the hearings on a health insurance 
exchange.14  After the electoral loss, he stopped attending hearings altogether, missing every 
meeting of his three committee assignments between August and December 2012.15     
Rep. Lesia Liss (D) was the other Democrat not to show.  This was noteworthy given her 
role as the minority vice-chair on the committee and that this was her first time not attending a 
hearing on the exchange.  Republican staff members speculate that she did not want to join 
Democrats in the blockade they were considering of all Republican bills and expected that SB 
693 would be defeated anyway (Interviews 2012-2013).  Rep. Liss had a troubled relationship 
with her caucus, particularly on abortion issues (Baerren 2012), and had just been defeated in the 
August primaries.  But unlike Rep. Womack, she continued to come to Lansing after her defeat - 
two days earlier she attended a meeting of the Military and Veterans Affairs and Homeland 
Security Committee (HMILI 2012).  It is interesting to note that the November 29th Health 
Policy meeting was the first time someone on the committee did not make a motion to excuse the 
members who were absent.  Ironically, almost half the time it had been Rep. Liss who made that 
motion.   
 Assuming Rep. Callton would have maintained his support for SB 693, and Reps. Segal 
and Hovey-Wright would have voted in favor without the tie-bar, and assuming the two absent 
Democrats showed up and voted with their caucus, Rep. Wayne Schmidt would be the deciding 
vote.  The exchange was not an easy issue for him.  During the Republican primary a few months 
earlier, Americans for Prosperity sent out a flyer with Schmidt’s face alongside pictures of 
                                                           
14
 Calculated using the minutes of the following meetings of the House Health Policy Committee: 9/8/2011, 
9/15/2011, 10/6/2011, 10/13/2011, 10/20/2011, 10/27/2011, 11/3/2011, 11/10/2011, 12/1/2011, 1/19/2011, 
7/25/2012, and 11/29/2012, all available at House.Michigan.gov.  Rep. Womack missed nine of these twelve 
meetings. 
15
 Determined using the minutes for each of the meetings for his three committees during this period. 
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Democratic leaders Nancy Pelosi, Barack Obama, and Harry Reid.  Surrounding these pictures 
were the words “Will your representative Wayne Schmidt be an Obamacare collaborator…or 
will he oppose building its infrastructure in Michigan?” (Gillman 2012)  At a primary debate in 
Traverse City, he refused to sign a pledge against creating an exchange, saying “I’ve opposed 
instituting Obamacare, and I’m still not in favor of it…but the Supreme Court has ruled. It’s my 
job and my fellow legislators’ job to do what is best for the people of the state of Michigan,” 
(McGillivary 2012). If he would have followed through with this tepid support of an exchange, 
than the committee would actually have approved the bill 10-9. 
Had SB 693 reached the floor, House leadership was confident it would have passed.  As 
one senior staff member described, “Normally we don’t try to ignore the Republican majority 
and try to pass things with the Democrats, but on an issue like this we would have.  We would 
have lost some Republicans, but kept enough to add to the Democrats,” (Interview May 2013).   
Opponents of an exchange reacted with excitement to SB 693’s defeat in committee.  
Jason Gillman wrote on RightMichigan.com “Thanks, again conservative warriors.  You are the 
modern day Minutemen!” (Gillman 2012)  Tea Party activist Joan Fabiano wrote that “The 
Michigan Health Care Exchange bill was defeated in Committee!  This is a victory for the 
grassroots, it’s your victory,” (Fabiano 2012d).   
Technically, the bill was not actually dead.  After the 5-9 vote, Rep. Callton moved to 
reconsider the vote at a later date.  The motion passed without objection.  This gave the 
committee the option of revisiting the bill before the end of the year and taking another vote.  
This motion gave supporters of an exchange a sliver of hope, though Speaker Bolger quickly 
announced that although he would have preferred a state-based exchange, the issue would not be 
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brought up again during this session (Gautz 2012).  With that statement from the Speaker, it was 
official that after more than two years of debate, Michigan would not be creating its own 
exchange.  The Snyder administration said they would work to take over control of the state’s 
exchange in its second or third year.  In the meantime, their focus shifted to establishing a 
partnership exchange (Snyder 2012b). 
 
Partnership funds approved by House, blocked by Senate 
 The Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs (LARA) submitted its second level 
1 establishment grant application by November 15th, two weeks before the House Health Policy 
Committee voted to block a state-run exchange.  This time the application was to support the 
creation of a partnership exchange.  At least one legislative staff member felt it sent a mixed 
message to House Republicans that the governor was working so hard on plans for a partnership 
at the same that he was asking them to vote on a state-based exchange (Interview December 
2012).  An adviser to Governor Snyder responded that it was their responsibility to do everything 
possible to be prepared in either case (Interview May 2013).  The new grant was broad so that it 
could be used if the state moved forward with its own exchange, but also specifically addressed 
the planning activities which the Snyder administration would focus on in a partnership, such as 
plan management and consumer assistance (CMS 2014).  When SB 693 died in committee, this 
grant became the basis for the state’s application to run a partnership exchange with CMS. 
 The federal government awarded Michigan it’s $30.7 million level 1 grant on January 17, 
2013 (CMS 2014), giving the state a month before the new February 15th deadline to submit a 
letter of intent and partnership blueprint.  Within a week, Governor Snyder sent a letter to 
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Secretary Sebelius declaring intention to create a partnership exchange (Snyder 2013).  A 
blueprint was submitted shortly after that, with conditional approval given by HHS on March 5th.  
To receive full approval, Michigan would have to: 1) demonstrate the ability to perform the 
exchange functions, 2) comply with regulations and expected progress milestones, 3) sign a 
memorandum of understanding between LARA and the Medicaid agency defining the roles, 
responsibilities, and coordinated work by each agency, and 4) demonstrate legal and spending 
authority for exchange activities (Sebelius 2013).  The first three points were within reach, 
though the fourth proved to be the undoing of the partnership. 
The legislature did not need to approve the governor’s plan for a partnership exchange, 
but it did need to authorize any money that would be spent to create and implement such an 
exchange.  The interest groups supporting an exchange were optimistic the legislature would 
approve the funds for three reasons.  First, they noted that the House was more moderate in 2013 
than in the previous two years, with the Republican margin having been reduced in half by the 
2012 elections (Interviews 2013).  As a result, interest groups felt Republican lawmakers 
responded to lobbying with a greater comfort level to the idea of an exchange, perhaps even 
supporting a transition to state control in future years.  As one person put it, “part of this came 
from a feeling that the deadlines were real this time and that the federal government was not 
going to blink anymore,” (Interview May 2013).  Second, this time Speaker Bolger was pushing 
for passage with rank and file members saying things like “I don’t support Obamacare, but I 
don’t have Obamacare phobia – whereby I think that it’s just going to go away if we do 
nothing,” (Eggert 2013).  Third, some of the opposition to an exchange was softening.  On 
November 27th, the NFIB released the results of a poll which found that although only 46% of its 
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members supported creating a state-based exchange prior to the November election, it was now 
preferred by 73% (NFIB 2012). 
The House Appropriations Committee approved the supplemental funding bill (MI HB 
4111 2013) on February 27th by a vote of 24-3.  The next day, nearly half (29/59) of the 
Republican House caucus voted with all but one Demcorat to pass the bill on the floor 78-31. 
Over the course of the two and a half year debate, the Senate had already voted to create 
a state-based exchange and to appropriate the original $9.8 million level 1 grant, leading 
stakeholders to assume it would do the same with latest grant.  As a result, they did not lobby the 
Senate as aggressively as they had the House (Interviews 2013).  On the other hand, Republican 
staffers describe this period as another awakening for conservative groups, particularly 
Americans for Prosperity, the Mackinac Center, and the Tea Party.  As one House staff member 
put it, “I never saw the likes of the conservative groups come out until we passed the partnership 
money.  It’s like their heads came out of the sand when the issue came to us, but it was an all-out 
war in the Senate once we passed it.”  Enough Senators were sympathetic to their arguments and 
were responsive when these groups pointed out that each Senator would be up for re-election for 
the first time since 2010 and that their support was not guaranteed.   
In some ways opposing the partnership money was not a tough sell.  Senators felt burned 
by the House from the previous session’s debate over SB 693 when they had stuck their neck out 
on a controversial vote only to have it ignored by the other chamber.  They described their initial 
votes as being for state control, not to work side by side with President Obama as his partner.  
Not only did they find this nuance difficult to explain to their constituents, they did not believe it 
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would be a true partnership since the federal government would dictate the terms.  They feared 
this would make Michigan the complaint office for a federally run exchange (Interviews 2013).   
The Senate never took a vote on HB 4111 to appropriate this $31 million level 1 grant. 
By letting federal deadlines pass without authorizing the state to spend this money on planning 
activities, the Senate effectively killed the possibility of a partnership exchange.  House leaders 
expected Governor Snyder might push for approval of this funding during the annual budget 
negotiations later that spring, but he did not (Interview May 2013).  When the Michigan 
exchange began operating on January 1, 2014, it was not run by the state or as a partnership, but 
was part of the federal exchange. 
 
Early Results of Michigan Exchange 
 The writers of the ACA did not anticipate that more than half the states would reject 
maintaining control.  As a result, the law technically only allocates money for outreach and 
enrollment to states creating their own exchange.  HHS had to take money from the Prevention 
Fund and other parts of its budget in order to provide funds for these states (Reichard 2013).  
Whereas nine of the states choosing to operate their own exchange received level 2 establishment 
grants of more than $100 million to fund outreach (KFF 2014b), the 27 states using the federal 
exchange needed to split $67 million (CMS 2014).     
 Four organizations in Michigan received a combined total of $2.5 million for outreach.  
Only one, Michigan Consumers for Healthcare, is working statewide, with the rest operating 
solely in southeast Michigan (CMS 2014).  The state would have had access to more money for 
outreach if the legislature had appropriated the level 1 grants the Snyder administration sought 
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and received.  The Obama administration indirectly provided help for ten states led by 
Republican governors, including Michigan. Enroll America, an organization run by President 
Obama’s former Director of Public Engagement Anne Filipic, sent paid staff and volunteers 
throughout the country to encourage people to sign up for insurance on healthcare.gov. 
 Compared to some states where there is very little competition (such as Mississippi as 
described in the next chapter), Michiganders are able to choose from an average of 43 plans from 
ten insurers.  This varies by part of the state, with some areas having as few as five plans and 
some as many as 55 (Fangmeier et al. 2013). 
 More than 270,000 people in Michigan selected a plan through the exchange during the 
first open enrollment period ending March 31, 2014.  Although this is only 38% of potential 
enrollees, it was the 6th highest percentage in the country, and the second highest of any state not 
running its own exchange.16  Michigan enrolled a higher percentage of potential enrollees than 
twelve states that created their own exchange  (KFF 2014c). 
 
Conclusion 
 Michigan very nearly became the first state led entirely by Republicans to create either a 
state-based or a partnership exchange.  Had SB 693 not been tie-barred to the abortion bills, and 
had every Democrat shown up for the November 29, 2012 committee hearing, the committee 
may have passed the bill.  From there, it may have passed on the floor of the House for Governor 
Snyder to sign.  Similarly, both the Senate and the House approved federal funding for exchange 
planning, though not during the same legislative session.  When the Senate approved the first 
                                                           
16
 Or third highest counting Idaho which is a state-run exchange relying on the federal website. 
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level 1 grant, the House was committed to supporting national efforts to repeal the entire ACA.  
By the time the House approved the second level 1 grant, the Senate was unwilling to take 
another vote on the exchange.  If the chambers had been able to agree at the same time, Michigan 
would have created a partnership exchange.  Instead, it is one of the 34 states that ceded full 
control to the federal government.   
At first glance it may seem that partisanship explains Michgian’s decision: the state is led 
by Republicans and Republicans generally oppose Obamacare, therefore Michigan chose to 
reject a state-based exchange.  However, partisanship is an incomplete explanation which does 
not capture how close Michigan came to passing authorizing legislation.  This answer is also 
inadequate given that a few months later the same Republican governor signed legislation passed 
by the Republican-controlled legislature to expand Medicaid as part of the ACA.  Instead, I rely 
on the integrated framework articulated in chapter two to highlight the multiple facets of this 
decision.   
 
Federalism Context 
 The expectation among national Democrats passing the ACA was that states would 
appreciate the flexibility to implement the law according to local conditions, and therefore nearly 
all would choose to run their own exchange.  This expectation was consistent with regular 
requests from conservative leaders for greater autonomy at the local level.  However, the 
federalism literature suggests that policymakers on each side of the political spectrum may argue 
for a greater or lesser role for states depending on their policy and political goals.  This tension is 
inherently built into the debate over an exchange given that the consequence for opposition by 
 137 
 
Republicans is a greater role for the federal government.  Governor Rick Snyder argued that the 
exchange would be more consumer-friendly and tailored to local market conditions if run at the 
state level.  However, opponents did not frame the debate in these terms.  They argued this was a 
federal overreach either way and that it would make no difference who ran the exchange, the 
state would only have nominal flexibility.  Believing this also meant that they did not have much 
to lose by gambling that the administration was bluffing and not capable of simultaneously 
creating exchanges in dozens of states. 
Feeding their skepticism was the fact that HHS delayed issuing the final regulations until 
after the November 2012 elections.  A Republican staff member described the November 2012 
committee vote saying, “This was not a vote against a state-based exchange or a vote for a 
federal exchange, but a vote against doing something with too many unanswered questions,” 
(Interview December 2012).  An adviser to Governor Snyder feels they could have won approval 
of SB 693 if they had the answer to more of the questions that were asked about how the 
exchange would operate and that they could have had these answers if the federal government 
had been faster at issuing regulations (Interview May 2013).  An insurance leader described that, 
“The more doubt you have, the harder it is.  The longer it took to get the regs out, the more it fed 
people’s doubts,” (Interview May 2013).   
This posed a challenge for the Obama administration, particularly in the context of 
executive or administrative federalism in which negotiations primarily take place between the 
executive branch agencies at each level (Gais and Fossett 2005; Metzger 2008; Gluck 2011; 
Weissert and Weissert 2012).  HHS worked closely with the state agencies of the Snyder 
administration, and even with a handful of legislators who supported creating an exchange, but 
they had a harder time engaging with opponents in the legislative branch.  Who should they 
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negotiate with and what should they offer?  Republican leaders in the Michigan House refused to 
cooperate on an exchange until each of the safeguards against federal encroachment described by 
Bednar (2009) had been exhausted.  They would not even hold a committee vote until the 
Supreme Court ruling and the results of the 2012 presidential election forced the issue.  It is 
unlikely that anything could have convinced them to take a different approach. 
The other dilemma faced by the Obama administration was whether to be firm on 
deadlines and let states deal with the consequence of a federal takeover or to relax deadlines and 
continue to encourage states to take control of their exchange.  At each opportunity, HHS was 
willing to push back deadlines in the hopes getting one or two more states to participate.  The 
debate over whether to create the MI Health Marketplace would have been moot had the Obama 
administration not extended the June 29th deadline for the level 2 establishment grant or the 
November 16th deadline by which states had to declare whether they were creating an exchange.  
These extensions gave states like Michigan a second chance to consider their stance.  However, 
it also created policy and political challenges for those advocating for an exchange.  State 
officials did as much as they could, but worried about having to backtrack to accommodate the 
regulations.  Ironically, federal flexibility on deadlines emboldened opponents to further resist an 
exchange.  Business leaders and consumer advocates say they heard many opponents question 
why they should believe HHS on anything since they continued to give in (Interviews 2012-
2013).  Opponents believed HHS lacked the will and the capacity to create three dozen 
exchanges simultaneously.   
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State Context: Path Dependence 
 An insight from the path dependence literature is that the policy itself is an important 
element of the political debate.  The actual bill put forward by Senator Jim Marleau that passed 
the Senate and nearly passed the House Health Policy Committee was for a very conservative 
model of an exchange.  The MiHealth Marketplace would have been a clearinghouse in which 
any plan meeting basic federal criteria would be allowed to participate.  Stakeholder groups with 
a vested interest in the exchange would be allowed to sit on the board, with the role of brokers 
and agents being protected.  It would be run as a non-profit housed outside of government rather 
than within a state agency or as a quasi-governmental entity.  These specific elements of the 
policy proposal were extremely important for winning the support of Governor Snyder and the 
Republican-controlled Senate.  Even still, it was not enough to win over the support of enough 
House Republicans on the House Health Policy Committee (and potentially in the general House 
Republican Caucus).   
 It is also important to note that the state had not previously decided to operate a high risk 
pool or other insurance program comparable to what existed in Mississippi and New Mexico.  
These prior decisions created alternatives for executive branch leaders in these states that wanted 
to create an exchange.  Governor Snyder had no such backup option when exchange legislation 
failed. 
 
State Context: Institutional Design 
The fragmentation of American policymaking resulting in a large number of veto points 
tends to give opponents of reform the upper hand in legislative debates.  Supporters of an 
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exchange needed to win support in multiple committees in multiple chambers, whereas 
opponents only needed to succeed once to kill legislation.  Three particular aspects of 
Michigan’s institutional design played an important role in the debate over a health insurance 
exchange.  These elements may not have determined the outcome, but they shaped the process, 
affecting what decisions needed to be made, when they needed to be made, and by whom.  First, 
the fact that Michigan is in session year-round gave supporters of an exchange another 
opportunity to push for the passage of SB 693 after the Supreme Court ruled and President 
Obama was re-elected.  In some ways this was an advantage to supporters of an exchange, 
meaning they would have another chance in a way that most other states would not.  However, 
being in session year-round meant that opponents always had the option of stalling.  States with 
firm session deadlines in the spring or summer had to make their decisions for the year with 
whatever information was available at that time.  Opponents in Michigan argued that there were 
still too many unknowns that made it imprudent to move forward, even as nearly two dozen 
other states decided they had enough information to pursue a state-based or a partnership 
exchange.  They frequently pointed to the fact that the Obama administration still had not 
released final regulations or that the whole law could be eliminated by the Supreme Court or as a 
result of the 2012 elections.   
Second, nearly everyone interviewed attributed great significance to Michigan’s term 
limits.  Even the legislators themselves described bewilderment that such important health policy 
decisions were being made by people with so little health policy knowledge.  The year-round 
legislative calendar may compound the program, limiting the amount of real world experience 
legislators bring.  It is difficult for pockets of expertise, or legislators with deep understanding of 
a policy issue, to develop in these conditions.  The issue is not so much a question of knowledge, 
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but of leadership.  There were no clear leaders on health policy that Republicans in the Michigan 
legislature could look to for guidance.  Of the top four Senate leaders, only one had previously 
served in the Senate and had not worked in health policy.  The top four House leaders had an 
average of two years of legislative experience, with none having worked in health policy. 
Senators Marleau took ownership of the exchange as sponsor of SB 693 and was in a 
powerful position as Chair of the Senate Health Policy Committee.  Supported by a highly 
engaged staff, he was able to sort through the complex policy details.  However, he had no 
working experience in health policy and was brand new to the Senate.  He had served six 
previous years in the House, but did not have long-term relationships with many legislators given 
that the vast majority of legislators had less experience than him.  Representative Gail Haines 
had even less clout as Chair of the House Health Policy Committee given that she was only in 
her second term in the legislature, and that she had not sponsored a single piece of health-related 
legislation in her first term other than a bill that did not pass which would have regulated the 
technology used in abortions (Haines 2010).   
Third, institutional capacity was a significant factor, though not necessarily in a way 
easily predicted by this literature.  The Michigan legislature has an average of 6.5 staff members 
per legislator (NCSL 2009), one more than the national average.  Michigan’s bureaucracy ranks 
very high in terms of administrative capacity compared to other states (Burke and Wright 2002).  
This would suggest that the state had the resources to become educated on the issues surrounding 
creating an exchange and then carry out the planning work, thus potentially mitigating the effects 
of a lack of policy knowledge resulting from term limits.  To a large extent this was true.  The 
Snyder administration had multiple people focused almost exclusively on the exchange.  
However, the administration was severely hampered by a particular form of oversight given to 
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the legislature over the bureaucracy.  The requirement that an agency cannot spend money 
received from a federal grant unless specifically approved by the legislature gave opponents 
another lever by which to attack the ACA.  This resulted in an ironic situation in which 
conservative legislators said they needed more information before they would be willing to 
support an exchange, yet the administration was not allowed to use the available resources to 
conduct studies that would provide such information.  Opponents were able to use this oversight 
power to block Governor Snyder from setting up a partnership exchange, something he did not 
otherwise need legislative approval to do. 
 
State Context: Partisanship 
Even though the concept of an exchange has historically been supported by 
conservatives, in the post-ACA political context it was very difficult for supporters of an 
exchange to convince enough Republicans in Michigan that this was a part of Obamacare they 
would like.  As described in chapter two, politicians often find it in their electoral interest to 
oppose the other party, even with respect to issues over which they might generally agree (Lee 
2009).  Even if a conservative Republican could be convinced to support a state-based exchange 
while still opposing Obamacare as a whole, they feared it would be too difficult to convince their 
constituents of this nuance.  This was especially true given the partisan context resulting from the 
2010 election in which Republicans reclaimed the Governorship and the House, and won their 
largest majorities in 60 years largely by campaigning against President Obama and Obamacare. 
The Snyder administration knew they had to reach out to Democrats to get the necessary 
56 votes in the House and 20 votes in the Senate, though this made it more difficult to gain 
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support from conservatives.  The conservative wing of the Republican Party was unsure of 
Governor Snyder given that he won office because of his status as an outsider.  Efforts at bi-
partisanship were met with suspicion by conservatives.  Some said that they did not know very 
much about the issue, but there must be reason to be concerned if Democrats were willing to 
work with Governor Snyder (Interviews 2011-2013).  As one conservative leader put it, “Bi-
partisanship is a fallacy.  It’s impossible when you come from polar opposite philosophies 
without completely abdicating your positions. It’s impossible,” (Interview May 2013).   
Electoral incentives at least in part explain the evolution among Republicans in each 
chamber.  When the Senate passed SB 693 in November 2011, it would be three full years before 
a member of the Senate would be up for re-election.  As a result, Senators had more freedom to 
consider the policy merits of a state-based exchange than did House members whose primary 
challengers would be filing to run in just a few months.  According to interest group leaders who 
lobbied on the issue, many Senators were concerned by how their constituents responded to this 
vote (Interviews 2012-2013).  By March 2013 when the Senate rejected the $31 million 
establishment grant, these same members were only a year away from the beginning of primary 
season and were uncomfortable with the idea of taking another vote on Obamacare.   
The dynamic was different in the House which was even more conservative than the 
Senate during the 2011-2012 sessions.  House leadership pursued all avenues of opposition, 
including supporting the Attorney General’s lawsuit and delaying a vote on SB 693 until after 
the Supreme Court ruling and then until after President Obama was re-elected.  It was only then 
that they were willing to support an exchange.  After two years of opposing all things related to 
President Obama and Obamacare, the November 2012 election reduced the Republican majority 
in the House by half.  Some Republicans worried that they would lose their majority in the 2014 
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election, meaning that the 2013 session could be the last best opportunity to advance their 
agenda.  As such, they were more willing to work with Governor Snyder and approve the level 1 
establishment grant to create a partnership exchange in the hopes that he would be more willing 
to support their proposals.  To be clear, this was not true of every Republican, and maybe not 
even most Republicans who initially opposed an exchange, but it was true of enough 
Republicans to change the outcome of the vote for approving the federal grant. 
 
Strategic Actors: Interest Groups 
 The debate over a health insurance exchange in Michigan was a battle between two 
camps of interest groups.  On one side was what all involved described as an unprecedented 
coalition of supporters of groups typically aligned with Democrats and groups typically aligned 
with Republicans.  These included many of the most powerful groups in Lansing, including 
business groups, insurers, consumers, hospitals, and providers.  These groups historically have a 
close relationship with legislators and bureaucrats.  On the other side of the debate was the 
Michigan chapter of the National Federation of Independent Businesses, the Tea Party, and 
conservative groups such as the Mackinac Center and Americans for Prosperity.   
 Why did the seemingly more powerful interest groups lose to a decentralized network of 
conservative organizations?  First, it is important to recall from the review of the interest group 
literature in chapter two that the evidence is mixed that all the resources devoted to lobbying 
actually affect policy outcomes.  As stated earlier, those trying to block legislation have a strong 
advantage over those trying to create something new.  Supporters need to work their proposal 
through a gauntlet of veto points, whereas opponents need to only succeed once.  As a result, 
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simply comparing the type and amount of resources committed by groups on both sides of the 
debate is misleading.  The burden was on supporters of an exchange, meaning that even a 
decentralized network of Tea Party groups could potentially defeat an exchange. 
 Second, the resources of the traditionally powerful groups may not have mattered as 
much given the nature of the issue.  The Hall and Deardorff (2006) model of legislative subsidy 
suggests that stakeholders lobby their allies to help them achieve mutual goals.  However, they 
indicates that the nature of lobbying changes from supporting allies to trying to convince 
undecided legislators if three criteria are met: 1) a specific matter is to be decided by a public 
vote, 2) enough legislators’ preferences are perceived as weak so that 3) the outcome of the vote 
is thought to be in doubt.  All three conditions were met in the debate over an insurance 
exchange in Michigan, further strengthening the position of opposition groups. 
The broad coalition of stakeholders supporting an exchange was expected to give 
Republican legislators the cover they needed on the issue.  It seemed to have worked in the 
Senate where S.B. 693 passed with 50% of Republicans voting in favor.  The tide turned in the 
fall of 2011 when the Tea Party began practicing “focused activism.”  Armed with reports and 
talking points produced by the Mackinac Center – which itself was spreading the arguments 
made by national groups such as CATO and ALEC – Tea Party leaders used the internet to 
mobilize its members.   
Republican lawmakers were particularly nervous about being on the wrong side of Tea 
Party anger.  The grassroots nature of this movement was unlike anything they had experienced.  
According to a variety of stakeholders, the Tea Party in Michigan did not necessarily have large 
numbers, but was comprised of people who were at every town hall meeting, every coffee hour, 
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and at legislative committee meetings.  They also effectively used the blogs, web sites, and social 
media to communicate and mobilize.  They were the loudest people at these meetings and would 
not relent.  They followed and participated in each step of the legislative process to a far greater 
extent than most constituents and were not easily convinced to change views.  As one insurance 
leader described, “They will question everything you give them.  The traditional things don’t 
work.  You can’t just put out an argument and have them accept it.  They will break it down,” 
(Interview May 2013).  
Tea Party members warned lawmakers that the future of the American republic was at 
stake over the exchange vote.  They felt a responsibility to be loud given what they perceived as 
the high stakes.  When asked whether the Obama or Snyder administrations could have done 
anything that would have won their support of health reform, one prominent Tea Party activist 
responded “No, because it’s really the antithesis of our form of government.”  This person 
further replied that “These types of things need to be addressed on a state and local level.  I 
concur that there needs to be a reform in insurance, but it should be done at the state level and 
open to private market solutions,” (Interview May 2013).    They refused to consider that this 
was the goal of the state-based insurance exchange supported by Governor Snyder. 
The Tea Party successfully created a climate in which it was uncomfortable for 
Republican lawmakers to support an exchange.  This was particularly true in the House.  For 
example, of the nine Republicans on the House Health Policy Committee who voted against SB 
693, all but three had a Tea Party rating greater than 70%.  Two members of the committee were 
in the top 10 in terms of Tea Party rating (Michiganvotes 2012).  It would have been very 
difficult for these legislators to support an exchange given the Tea Party’s large presence on the 
issue.  Interest groups on the other side of the issue could have promised to support Republican 
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legislators who bucked the Tea Party on this issue, but seemed unwilling to do so to a sufficient 
extent.  For example, representatives of Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, the company with 
the largest share of the state’s insurance market, explained that although they preferred state 
control, they were preparing along parallel paths to be ready either way.  They had other 
important issues coming before the legislature soon and did not want to expend all their political 
capital on the exchange.  This gave the Tea Party and conservative groups a greater opening to 
block the exchange bill. 
 
Strategic Actors: Policymakers 
 The judgment and decisions of individual policymakers seem to have mattered in some 
cases, even beyond explanations of interest group influence or partisanship.  For example, many 
Republicans in Rick Snyder’s position likely would have opposed the exchange had they been 
governor.  In that case, legislation would not have come so close and the debate would have been 
decided much earlier.  Similarly, if the Democrats who were absent for the November 2012 
House Health Policy Committee had showed up and voted with their caucus, SB 693 may have 
made it out of committee.  Insiders say there were enough votes for it pass on the House floor, 
meaning it would have gone to Governor Snyder’s desk and become law.   
 
Summary 
 In chapter one I argued that a governor’s support is a necessary, but not sufficient 
condition for a state to choose to create an exchange.  The Michigan case supports this claim.  
An exchange likely would not have happened without Governor Rick Snyder’s backing.  
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However, his support was not enough to win approval from the legislature.  Partisanship was a 
major reason, though the primary division was within the Republican caucus, not between 
Republicans and Democrats.   
A major reason for this split among Republicans was the strength of the Tea Party in 
Michigan.  The Tea Party was largely responsible for Republicans taking control of the House in 
the 2010 elections, creating a climate hostile to Obamacare.  Supporters of an exchange tried to 
convince Republicans that they could support state control of an exchange while still opposing 
the ACA.  The Tea Party mobilized aggressively against this idea, arguing that creating an 
exchange legitimized the ACA undermined the lawsuit.  When Tea Party leaders asked members 
to show up to legislative hearings in large numbers, they did.  This made it difficult for 
Republicans on the House Health Policy Committee to vote for an exchange. 
Unlike Idaho, where strong Tea Party opposition was overcome largely because of 
pockets of expertise in the Republican caucus, Michigan’s lawmakers lacked experience and 
political clout.  Term limits meant that the key leaders in each chamber had only been in office 
for a very short period of time.  The year-round legislative calendar meant that those who had 
been in office longer were full-time politicians and had little recent experience working in health 
care.  In other words, Michigan’s institutional design created a dynamic that made it more 
difficult for natural leaders to emerge who could shepherd exchange legislation through the 
contentious battle. 
The inter-governmental context complicated efforts to create an exchange.  SB 693 
would never have received a vote in the House Health Policy Committee had HHS not extended 
deadlines in November 2012.  However, flexibility on the part of federal officials gave 
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credibility to arguments by Tea Party opponents that the Obama administration lacked the will 
and the capacity to create an exchange in dozens of states, and that the whole effort would fail if 
enough states resisted.   
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Chapter 5 - Mississippi 
 
Introduction 
 Mississippi is the only state to have a proposal for a state-run exchange rejected by HHS.  
This was a fascinating outcome considering how badly the Obama administration wanted 
Republican-led states to run their own exchanges, as well as given that Republican leaders in 
Mississippi such as former Governor Haley Barbour had been trying to create an exchange for 
many years.  In 2011, a bill to create an exchange even passed both chambers of the legislature 
before dying in a conference committee.   
 At first glance it may not seem surprising that Mississippi, a deeply red state, opted not to 
implement a major component of Obamacare.  Barack Obama lost the state by 13 percentage 
points in 2008 and by 12 points in 2012 (MS Secretary of State 2008, MS Secretary of State 
2012).  Both U.S. Senators have been Republican since 1989, and both voted against the ACA. 
In 2010, the four-person congressional delegation was split between Democrats and Republicans, 
though one Democrat joined the two Republicans to vote against the law.  Republicans have won 
five of the last six gubernatorial elections and in 2011 took full control of the legislature for the 
first time since the post-civil war Reconstruction Era.  The Tea Party and the very conservative 
wing of the party is largely credited with this takeover, making it difficult for Governor Bryant 
and legislative leaders to support any component of the ACA. 
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Despite this partisan climate, two unique institutional features opened the door to the 
possibility of a state-based exchange.  First, the Mississippi constitution in 1890 purposely 
created a weak governor out of fear that newly freed and enfranchised former slaves would elect 
one of their own to office (Wright 2006).  The legislature was given strong oversight powers and 
many executive branch officials are independently elected rather than appointed.  Insurance 
commissioner Mike Chaney believed that as an elected official he did not need the governor’s 
approval to lead the Insurance Department’s efforts to create an exchange.  Second, an earlier 
change to the statute governing the state’s high risk pool gave Mike Chaney broad authority over 
any state or federal insurance program in the state.  He tried to use this authority to set up an 
exchange despite protests from Governor Phil Bryant.  
 The Mississippi story is largely one of conflict between two parts of the state’s executive 
branch.  The legislature was not a factor beyond mid-2011.  At some points the major division 
was partisan; but ultimately the major split was between Republicans.  Interest groups also 
played an important role, with Tea Party and conservative leaders opposing an exchange while 
most stakeholders worked with Chaney’s Insurance Department supporting its establishment  
This chapter follows the same chronological outline as chapter three’s 50-state overview to 
examine how all these factors came together to lead to Mississippi defaulting to a federally 
facilitated exchange (see Appendix D for a timeline of key events in Mississippi).  
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Table 11 – Mississippi’s Political and Demographic Context 
Political Environment 
• 2012 presidential election: Republican Mitt Romney (56%) 
• Governor 
o 2003-2011: Haley Barbour (R)   
o 2012-present: Phil Bryant (R)   
o Yes term limits 
• Mississippi House of Representatives  
o 2007-2011: Democrat majority, margin of 22 
o 2011-present: Republican majority, margin of 5 
o No term limits 
• Mississippi Senate  
o 2007-2011: Democrats won a majority in the 2007 election, but enough 
Republicans switched parties to give Republican a majority of 2 seats 
o 2011-present: Republican majority, margin of 9 
o No term limits 
Demographic & Health Status  
• Total population: 2,907,000 
• Distribution of Population by Federal Poverty Level 
o Under 100%: 27% 
o 100% - 138%: 9% 
o 139% - 399%: 43% 
o 400%: 22% 
• Distribution of Health Insurance Coverage 
o Employer: 45% 
o Other private: 4% 
o Medicaid: 20% 
o Medicare: 13% 
o Other public: 2% 
o Uninsured: 16% 
Health Reform  
• Joined lawsuit against the ACA 
• Federal exchange 
• Not expanding Medicaid 
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1) March 2010 – December 2010 
In the initial months after the passage of the Affordable Care Act, leaders in Mississippi 
debated whether the state would join the lawsuit and began exploring the extent to which they 
would participate in the law’s implementation.  Few major decisions were made during this 
period, though the continuation of previous debates and the shifting of political dynamics would 
shape the process going forward. 
 
Haley Barbour Supports an Exchange 
The debate in Mississippi over the creation of an insurance exchange predates the 
passage of the Affordable Care Act.  Governor Haley Barbour’s administration believed that the 
largest group of uninsured Mississippians was employees of small businesses (Interviews 2012-
2014).  As a result, he tried multiple times to create an exchange particularly focused on small 
businesses.  In fact, a conservative pundit later wrote that “No Republican governor has been a 
greater fan of exchanges over the past few years than the most politically powerful of them all – 
Mississippi’s Haley Barbour,” (Donmenech 2011).  Barbour explains that he learned of the idea 
from the Heritage Foundation and began working on it in 2007 after fellow Republican Mitt 
Romney had created an exchange in Massachusetts (Interview January 2014).  Ed Haislmaier 
and other leaders from the Heritage Foundation visited the state and met with leaders to advocate 
for an exchange.  Agents and brokers opposed the concept because they felt it stepped on their 
toes, but a wide variety of stakeholders were open to the idea (Interviews 2013-2014).   
Two bills creating an exchange were introduced in the Senate in 2008, one by Democrat 
Hob Bryan, and one by Republican Eugene Clark.  The Republican bill to create an exchange as 
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a not-for-profit corporation passed the Senate on a unanimous vote though was never brought up 
for a vote in the House.  Democratic leadership in the House did not allow the bill to even come 
up for a hearing (MS SB 2833 2008).  Governor Barbour highlighted this issue in his 2009 state 
of the state speech before a joint session of the legislature:  
Last year I proposed the creation of a Mississippi Health Insurance Exchange to help 
small businesses and their employees get private health insurance. The Senate passed that 
bill fifty-two to nothing. The House did not consider it last year, and I hope you will join 
us this year in an effort to significantly increase the number of Mississippians with 
private health insurance (Barbour 2009). 
 
A bill introduced in 2009 met the same fate, being passed with near unanimous support in 
the Senate but never receiving a vote in the House (MS SB 2668 2009).  Stakeholders do not 
remember the exchange being a controversial topic, but understood the position of the House 
leadership to be simple partisan politics: they opposed it because Republicans introduced it and 
Governor Barbour supported it (Interviews January 2014).  A bill to create a legislative study 
committee to examine the issue passed both chambers the next year in April 2010, just weeks 
after President Obama had signed the ACA into law. 
Governor Barbour’s advocating for an exchange did not mean that he supported the 
ACA.  He argues that the version of an exchange he proposed was very different than an ACA 
exchange.  “I got the bill introduced to create an exchange that was totally voluntary. No 
mandation at all. It was not subsidized. The purpose was to create a vehicle that the state, or a 
state-sponsored non-profit, could set up and manage, and that would create an administrative 
platform for small businesses to not only shop for insurance for their employees, but to get 
purchasing power to create a significant pool,” (Interview January 2014).  He strongly opposed 
the ACA (Shiner 2009) and pushed for the state to join the lawsuit even though Democratic 
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Attorney General Jim Hood refused.  Hood is independently elected and felt he did not have to 
comply with the governor, to which a spokesperson for Governor Barbour responded that “The 
Attorney General is welcome to represent the people of Mississippi or the Governor will do that 
for him,” (Hood 2010).  Governor Barbour joined the suit on May 14th.    
 Even as one arm of the Mississippi government was on the lawsuit to overturn the ACA, 
another was in the early stages of preparing to implement the law.  On September 30, 2010, the 
Insurance Department received a planning grant from CMS of $1 million to conduct market 
analysis and develop a stakeholder engagement process to make decisions about what type of 
exchange would be created in Mississippi.  The efforts were led by Insurance Commissioner 
Mike Chaney, though with general support from Governor Barbour who saw this as an 
opportunity to use federal dollars to build the type of exchange he had been trying to create for 
three years.  As an aide to Governor Barbour described, “We’re going to continue down the path 
of the exchange that we’re doing right now because we’ve been doing it, and if the federal 
government has a problem with it, well, then they can come down here.  And if at that point they 
don’t feel like we need the grant money, then we’ll cross that bridge when we get to it,” 
(Interview March 2012).   
 
Shifting Political Climate 
Mississippi holds elections in the year before presidential elections, making it one of only 
13 states in the country to not hold gubernatorial and legislative elections in 2010 (NGA 2011).  
Even still, the rise of the Tea Party and the rightward shift in other states and in the congressional 
midterm elections had important implications for Mississippi politics, particularly in the state 
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Senate.  Although Democrats won a 28-24 majority in the previous election in 2007, by January 
2011 enough Senators switched parties to give Republicans control of the chamber (Donatelli 
2010).  This change did not matter as much as it might have in other states given the institutional 
design feature that it is the Lieutenant Governor that assigns committee chairmanships, not the 
Senate Pro Tempore as in most other states.  In other words, Democrats held a majority of the 
Senate’s seats after the 2007 election, but Republican Lieutenant Governor Phil Bryant already 
controlled the agenda.  Although the functional composition of the legislature did not change 
much given that the legislators who switched parties tended to vote with Republicans even when 
they were Democrats, these shifts signaled the ascendency of Republicans in Jackson and the 
growing role of the Tea Party in state politics.  Both forces shaped the partisan nature of the 
debate over implementing the ACA that would soon follow. 
 
2) January 2011 – November 2011 
2011 marked an important turning point in the debate over whether or not to create an 
exchange in three ways.  First, differing versions of authorizing legislation passed the House and 
Senate, though leaders from the two chambers failed to reach agreement and the bills died in a 
conference committee.  This would be the last time the legislature would weigh in on the issue.  
Second, Insurance Commissioner Mike Chaney, with the support of Governor Barbour, decided 
to use the high risk pool as the vehicle through which to create an exchange.  Third, the elections 
in November 2011 would determine who would be making decisions during the crucial 
implementation years of 2012 and 2013.   
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2011 Legislative Session 
 Four bills were introduced in the early days of the 2011 legislative session to create an 
exchange – three in the House and one in the Senate.  One exchange bill emerged from each 
chamber in early February, with the House approving HB 1220 by a vote of 82-36 (MS HB 1220 
2011) and the Senate passing SB 2992 44-7 (MS SB 2992).  The Senate passed an amended 
version of HB 1220 one month later by a vote of 49-0,  meaning versions of the same bill had 
passed both chambers and would become law if the chambers and Governor approved the 
compromise reached by a conference committee (MS HB 1220 2011). These votes reveal bi-
partisan support in 2011 for the concept of an exchange, with 91% of Democrats and 60% of 
Republicans voting for their chamber’s version of HB 1220 (Table 8, in chapter 3).  These votes 
also reveal the extent to which exchange politics would shift in subsequent years.  Some of the 
people who would later become the most vocal opponents of creating an exchange are on record 
voting for these bills.  Senator Chris McDaniel, who in 2014 would emerge as a Tea Party 
challenger to U.S. Senator Thad Cochran and would introduce bills to ban the state from creating 
an exchange, is perhaps the most notable example (MS SB 2464 2014).   
 Despite bi-partisan support for the concept of an exchange, HB 1220 failed to make it out 
of conference committee.  The major differences between the two chambers dealt with 
governance.  Democrats in the House preferred creating an exchange as a state agency, whereas 
Republicans in the Senate preferred that the exchange operate as a non-profit entity disconnected 
from state government.  Conference committee proceedings are not open to the public and so it is 
difficult to know exactly what happened.  A leader at the conservative think tank The Mississippi 
Center for Public Policy attributes the decision simply to “Mississippi’s desire to uphold the U.S. 
Constitution,” (MCPP 2012).  Informants explain that Republicans had greater leverage given 
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Governor Barbour’s support for a non-profit exchange but Democrats were unwilling to 
compromise.  Some speculate that Democrats were not entirely convinced that a loosely 
regulated exchange run by Republicans in Jackson would be better than a more tightly regulated 
exchange run by Democrats in D.C., and so were willing to let these negotiations fail (Interviews 
2012-2014).   
 
Mississippi High Risk Pool 
One reason Republicans were willing to let HB 1220 die without a compromise was 
because they believed they could create a non-profit exchange within the state’s high risk pool.  
This backup plan was possible because of an unrelated change to the risk pool statute in 2009 
which gave the Mississippi Comprehensive Health Insurance Risk Pool Association 
(MCHIRPA) broad authority to help “citizens of the state who desire to obtain or continue health 
insurance coverage under any state or federal program designed to enable persons to obtain or 
maintain health insurance coverage,” (MS SB 2842 2009)  This language was added in response 
to the state’s experience with the Trade Adjustment Assistance Reform Act (TAARA) Congress 
passed in 2002.  TAARA provided premium assistance to workers losing their job because their 
company went to another country.  No insurers offered plans to this population in Mississippi, 
and when the high risk pool tried to step in it was prevented by a restrictive statute limiting its 
activity beyond a narrow set of parameters.  An official involved with the High Risk Pool 
explains that the broader authority added in 2009 was “so that if the state came along and asked 
us to do something else we wouldn’t have to keep telling governors that we couldn’t do it…This 
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wasn’t done with an exchange in mind. It was just simply to say that if the state wants something 
done, then this organization has the authority,” (Interview January 2014).  
Some people questioned whether MCHIRPA indeed had the authority to create the state’s 
insurance exchange based on the 2009 legislation.  There was talk of a lawsuit, though no formal 
challenge materialized (Interviews 2012-2014).  Governor Barbour was supportive of using the 
high risk pool, in part because it would ensure the exchange would be operated outside of 
government as a non-profit entity.  He turned exchange planning over to Insurance 
Commissioner Mike Chaney who has rule-making authority and regulatory oversight over the 
risk pool.  A conservative opponent of the exchange believes that “Some people later felt they 
had been duped and hadn’t known they were opening the door to a state-based exchange” when 
they expanded the high risk pool’s authority in 2009 (Interview January 2014). 
  The Insurance Department applied for a level 1 establishment grant within a month of 
being designated in charge of exchange planning.17  On August 12, 2011 HHS announced that 
Mississippi would be awarded $20 million, making it among the first states to receive such a 
grant.  The grant opened the Barbour administration to criticism that it was accepting Obamacare 
money at the same that it was challenging the law in court.  An aide to Governor Barbour 
described that “The Governor’s perspective was that this is grant money, and the taxpayers of 
Mississippi have already paid for it through taxes, and we deserve our share of the pie…We 
shouldn’t reject [the grants] because of some ideology that’s out there with some conservative 
Republicans, or conservatives, or think tanks, or whatever you want to say,” (Interview March 
2012).  Republican U.S. Senator Thad Cochran offered his support, saying “I am proud of 
Governor Barbour’s work to craft an insurance exchange program tailored to improve access to 
                                                           
17
 See Chapter three for an explanation of the grants available to states. 
 160 
 
healthcare in our state,” (Gillette 2011).  Republican Insurance Commissioner Mike Chaney 
explained his view that “There are portions in that act that are good parts, and that happens to be 
the exchange.  It’s not a Republican idea. It’s not a Democratic idea. It is a universal idea and it 
has been around a long time.”  While acknowledging the broader political dynamics, Chaney 
explained “It appears that I am swimming upstream against the trend of other southern states, but 
here is the problem: other southern states did not have the statutory law that I had in place,” 
(Chaney 2012). 
An important question was how much flexibility the Obama administration would 
actually allow Mississippi in establishing its exchange.  Unlike the exchanges described in the 
ACA, the bills Governor Barbour backed in 2008-2011 were focused only on small businesses 
and not the individual market, included no individual or employer mandates, and provided no 
subsidies to consumers.  An aide to Governor Barbour anticipated conflict, explaining that the 
grant application submitted in the summer of 2011 was consistent with the type of exchange he 
had supported in the past.  “You’re never quite sure how it’s going to fall out with HHS. But in 
his mind it was that we’re going to continue down this path. The application that we turned in for 
the money, it was written like we were doing the exchange before – so we got the money based 
on the concept that we were touting all along. It’s not like we changed what we were doing for 
HHS and then resubmitted the grant,” (Interview March 2012).  An official at the Insurance 
Department explained their strategy of being “super nice and cooperative now in the hopes that 
we might have more leverage later,” but at the same time they would “do now, ask for 
forgiveness later,” (Interview October 2012). 
One of the first things the Insurance Department (MID) did with the money was go on an 
outreach tour to connect with stakeholders across the state and educate them on the exchange.  
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An official in the department describes a week in the summer of 2011 in which they met with 
leaders in 13 cities.  “They were well attended generally. We got a lot of good feedback from 
people. People seemed to generally be in favor of the exchange concept.  They were definitely in 
favor of the state operating it rather than the federal government,” (Interview November 2011).  
On October 18th, Commissioner Chaney announced a formal process by which stakeholders 
would participate in developing the state’s exchange.  An advisory board consisting of 11 people 
would meet throughout 2012 to help make the major decisions.  The board would include 
consumers, advocates, small businesses, relevant state government agencies, a federally 
recognized tribe, public health experts, providers, large employers, insurers, agents and brokers.  
An MID press release explained that the number of seats on the board was expanded to 13 due to 
“overwhelming positive response” (MS Insurance Dept 2012a).  The first meeting was scheduled 
for January 2012, meaning it would be after the state’s elections and after the start of the new 
legislative session. 
 
2011 Elections 
 The 2011 gubernatorial and legislative elections were landmark events in Mississippi 
politics for two reasons.  First, Haley Barbour was term-limited from running again and so a new 
governor was elected.   As mentioned earlier, Mississippi’s governor is comparatively weak, 
with limited formal powers to shape policy.  Many people describe Haley Barbour as being more 
successful at using his informal powers of prestige, influence, connections, and money than any 
previous governor in Mississippi history (Interviews 2012-2014).  Before being governor he was 
a founding member of what has been described as the most powerful lobbying firm in 
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Washington D.C., Chairman of the Republican National Committee, and Director of Ronald 
Reagan’s White House Office of Political Affairs (BGR 2012).  Barbour’s popularity and power 
solidified after his handling of the state’s response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 (Dao 2006).   
Lieutenant Governor Phil Bryant won the 2011 Republican primary and general 
gubernatorial elections convincingly, but it remained an open question whether the increased 
clout of the governor’s office would carry-over or recede as Haley Barbour left office.  An 
important new dynamic was Bryant’s relationship with the Tea Party.  The Mississippi Tea Party 
officially endorsed Bryant, with Chairman Roy Nicholson proclaiming that “We are granting 
Phil Bryant full right and title to claim to be America’s first Tea Party governor!” (Hess 2011).  
However, the endorsement did not come until October 31st, long after the more meaningful 
Republican primary, so it was unclear how beholden to this group Bryant would feel and whether 
the Tea Party would influence his stance on controversial policy issues such as an exchange. 
Second, Republicans won control of both chambers of the legislature in November 2011, 
as well as every state-wide office except Attorney General.  Republicans already controlled the 
Senate due to legislators switching parties in 2010, and this was the first time since 
Reconstruction that Republicans took control of the House.  Insurance Commissioner Mike 
Chaney was also re-elected, running unopposed in the Republican primary and winning 62% of 
the vote in the general election (MS Secretary of State 2011).   
The results of these elections were important for shaping who would be making the major 
decisions on implementing the ACA over the next four years, though health reform actually 
played very little part in these elections.  One reason is that Republican candidates for the key 
state-wide offices, Phil Bryant and Mike Chaney, faced weak candidates.  There was very little 
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about Chaney’s approach to the ACA for a Democrat to attack since the state was one of the 
national leaders in working on an exchange.  A former advisor to Haley Barbour also explained 
that “Democrats did not make a big deal out of [the ACA] because they’re anti-abortion as well 
and didn’t want to go down that road.  Honestly, they couldn’t have won an election if they had 
talked too much about it,” (Interview March 2012).   
Bryant regularly criticized Obamacare on the campaign trail, though he gave no 
indication that he opposed the exchange to the point that he would ultimately block the state’s 
application.  Many people remember Bryant saying he would allow the creation of an exchange 
begun under Haley Barbour to continue (Interviews 2012-2014).  Haley Barbour points out that 
Bryant served in the powerful position of Lieutenant Governor and did nothing to stop each of 
the exchange bills advanced during Barbour’s second term.  “When I say the Senate passed my 
exchange legislation at least three consecutive years, that was with him presiding,” (Interview 
January 2014).  Even still, the people working on the creation of an exchange understood that 
elections have consequences.  As one official described, “We have a whole other dynamic that is 
going to go into place in about a month.  It’s impossible to predict what’s going to happen,” 
(Interview November 2011).  
 
3) November 2011 – June 2012 
Writing about Mississippi’s exchange debate in 2012, conservative blogger B. Keith 
Plunkett argued that “it doesn’t matter what positions Barbour had taken in the past, this is 
Bryant’s baby now,” (Plunkett 2012).  With the expectation that Governor Bryant would either 
support his efforts or at least stay out of the way, insurance commissioner Mike Chaney 
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continued the process of setting up the state’s insurance exchange under the authority of the 
state’s high risk pool.  The exchange advisory board did the most important work during this 
period, giving interest groups an opportunity to shape the exchange’s implementation, as well as 
become invested in its development. 
 
Exchange Advisory Board 
 The Insurance Department contracted with the consulting firm Leavitt Partners to 
facilitate the work of the exchange advisory board.  The firm is led by Mike Leavitt, who was the 
governor of Utah before working as the secretary of the Department of Health and Human 
Services under George W. Bush.  News leaked in mid-2012 that Mitt Romney had chosen 
Leavitt to lead the transition team should he win the presidency (Pear 2012).  Leavitt Partners 
also included people who had worked at the conservative organization The Heritage Foundation 
which had supported the concept of an exchange many years earlier.  Mike Leavitt spent much of 
2011 and early 2012 trying to convince state-level Republicans to move forward with an 
exchange.  He explained that “I understand why some of my fellow conservatives oppose the 
formation of insurance exchanges, but continued inaction risks an Obama-style federal exchange 
being foisted upon a state,” (Pear 2013). 
 Members of the advisory board describe the process established by Leavitt Partners as 
orderly and transparent, allowing a wide variety of stakeholders to participate.  The full board 
met monthly throughout 2012, with agenda items following a three-stage process. An issue 
would be introduced in the first month, presented more thoroughly in the second month, and 
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decided in the third month.  In the meantime, each of the ten subcommittees met to study the 
issues and make recommendations to the full board.   
One board member says there was “much more consensus than I expected, largely 
because it was a good process.”  In particular, this person expected controversy around the 
determination of essential health benefits, with insurers pushing for bare-bones plans and 
providers and hospitals wanting everything covered.  Instead, tension was minimal as all sides 
worked to find common ground (Interview January 2014).  Another board member describes a 
similar experience and adds that “it wasn’t for a lack of discussion. Everyone gave input, but it 
was measured. People wanted it to work and so they were trying to be reasonable,” (Interview 
January 2014). 
Not everyone involved was initially convinced that the state should run an exchange.  
Agents and brokers were among those who did not support an exchange but decided that if it was 
going to happen they wanted to be at the table shaping it.  Each of the state’s major insurers took 
the same approach, contributing to the exchange’s development though remaining undecided on 
whether they would offer plans on the exchange.  On the other side of the spectrum were 
consumer advocates who considered opposing a Republican-run state-based exchange in 
Mississippi in favor of a stronger exchange run by the Obama administration.  According to one 
advocate, they ultimately supported Chaney’s efforts because “the Department of Insurance 
walked the talk,” (Interview January 2014).  Stakeholders from a wide variety of perspectives 
say they felt heard and that the final decisions reflected the input they had given (Interviews 
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 Participants of Mississippi’s exchange advisory board hoped that contracting with 
Leavitt’s firm would legitimize the exchange for Republicans opposed to the ACA.  One 
conservative leader thinks this may have worked with establishment Republicans, but not with 
the Tea Party.  “They could care less whether Leavitt was a Republican…It does not play well 
that we are sending lots of money to some consultant in Utah to come set up our exchange here 
in Mississippi,” (Interview January 2014).  National conservative groups fed a suspicion for 
Leavitt Partners.  Michael Cannon of the Cato Institute said “It is strange to see Mr. Leavitt, a 
former Republican governor and former secretary of health and human services, helping and 
encouraging states to carry out this law for which Republicans have so much antipathy.”  Twila 
Brase of the Citizens’ Council for Health Freedom, which worked to stop exchanges in other 
states, similarly stated that “Mike Leavitt is an enabler of Obamacare. He has taken advantage of 
Obamacare to expand his own business, instead of helping governors resist a federal takeover of 
health care,” (Pear 2012). 
The Tea Party in Mississippi did not start playing an important role in this debate until 
mid-2012.  An official at the insurance department explained in November 2011 that the Tea 
Party did not have much influence over policymaking in Mississippi (Interview November 
2011).  No one from the Tea Party attended the early advisory board meetings.  At least if they 
did, they did not make their presence felt in any way.  This would soon change in the wake of the 
Supreme Court ruling that the ACA was upheld as constitutional. 
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4) July 2012 – October 2013 
There was uncertainty in June 2012 about what the upcoming ruling would mean for an 
exchange in Mississippi.  The advisory board worked under the assumption that the law would 
survive and that they had tight deadlines to meet in order to submit a blueprint application in 
November.  Some members wanted to continue building an exchange even if the law was struck 
down, though it is unclear that all stakeholders would have remained committed without the 
threat of a federal exchange.  This high level of uncertainty was difficult for those involved, but 
was accepted as part of this process.  As an official at the insurance department described, 
“We’re used to adversity at this point.  We’ve been doing this for a year and a half since the 
passage of the ACA.  There’s no use trying to predict tomorrow.  We know today what the law 
is.  If it’s changed or our state takes a different approach, then we’ll adapt accordingly,” 
(Interview November 2011). 
It was also unclear whether Barack Obama would be re-elected that fall and what a 
Romney presidency could mean for the fate of the ACA, though none of this affected the 
expectation in Mississippi that November 16th was the deadline for the insurance department to 
submit an exchange blueprint application.  The certainty that came with the Supreme Court’s 
decision set in motion the three major events during this time period that would determine 
whether Mississippi would have a state-run exchange: 1) local Tea Party groups seem to have 
awakened to the issue and increase the intensity of their opposition, 2) the insurance department 
submitted its application for HHS’s approval, and 3) Governor Bryant intervened and convinced 
HHS to reject the state’s proposal.  
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Tea Party Mobilizes 
 The minutes of the July 11, 2012 meeting of the exchange advisory board include one 
sentence mentioning that Richard Wilbourn of the Mississippi Tea Party was allowed to speak.  
It says simply that “Mr. Wilbourn thanked Mr. Sisk (of the Mississippi Insurance Department) 
for allowing him the opportunity to address the Advisory Board, and proceeded to urge MID and 
the Advisory Board not to continue with establishing a state-based exchange,” (MS Insurance 
Dept 2012b).  Attendees of this meeting paint a much more dramatic picture of this event and 
describe it as an important turning point Mississippi’s exchange debate.   
One board member describes noticing a particularly strong security presence in the lobby 
of the Woolfolk Building in downtown Jackson when he showed up for the July 11th meeting.  
He figured there must be another higher profile meeting happening that morning as well, but was 
surprised when he realized the crowd was there for the exchange meeting (Interview January 
2014).  Few members of the public had come to any of the previous meetings, but participants 
estimate that starting in July there were 20-30 people in attendance.  The media must have been 
tipped off that they would be coming, because TV cameras were present for the first time.   
The group presented itself as the Mississippi Tea Party and insisted they be given an 
opportunity to speak.  This is the first time anyone from the public had asked to participate and 
so the board had to develop a protocol for public comments.  It decided that one person was 
allowed to speak per organization.  Board members describe respectful conversations with the 
Tea Party members after the meeting.  One board member told them he is sympathetic to their 
arguments, but feels they are going about this the wrong.  “They tried to sound smart but ended 
up looking bad.”  Another participant reflected that “They were nice folks and we tried to 
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explain to them why we were doing this and that the consequence of their position would be 
greater federal control, but they didn’t see that” (Interviews January 2014). 
 Although participants in the advisory board describe a change in atmosphere once the 
Tea Party members started attending, there is no evidence this led to any substantive change in 
direction.  The committees and subcommittees continued to meet, the website continued to be 
built, and the Insurance Department continued to prepare the state’s blueprint application.  The 
Tea Party did not weigh in on any of the specifics of an exchange and so did not influence the 
details of its development.  There is a bigger picture, however, with attendance at these meetings 
as one part of a broader series of developments by which the Tea Party gained momentum in 
mid-2012.  The Supreme Court ruling was a galvanizing moment in which Tea Party members 
realized the ACA was likely to survive and they were running out of opportunities to block its 
implementation (Interviews January 2014).  In addition to attending more advisory board 
meetings, a core group of Tea Party leaders living near Jackson met with Governor Bryant, 
encouraging him to oppose an exchange. 
 The Mississippi Center for Public Policy (MCPP) played an important role in facilitating 
the growing Tea Party opposition.  MCPP wrote the reports and published the data that Tea Party 
members would use in their arguments.  MCPP also brought national leaders to Jackson to speak 
on why states should oppose an exchange, making a strong statement that this was the position 
conservatives should adopt.  For example, Michael Cannon of the Cato Institute spoke at the 
MCPP Liberty Luncheon on July 12, 2012, the day after the Tea Party group first attended the 
exchange advisory board meeting (MississippiPolicy 2012a).  The MCPP uploaded to 
youtube.com a brief encounter between Cannon and Insurance Commissioner Mike Chaney in 
which Cannon argued that the best way to flip votes in Congress to repeal Obamacare is for 
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enough states to resist implementation.  Chaney was put on the defensive, responding that “I 
came here today as a guest to listen to you, not to debate you.  You have TV cameras rolling so 
you can get your point out…but unless Romney is elected, everything you have said is moot to a 
certain degree,” (MississippiPolicy 2012b).     
 Another example of a national conservative leader visiting the state was Ed Haiselmier of 
the Heritage Foundation in January 2013, at the height of tension between Commissioner Chaney 
and Governor Bryant.  In addition to testifying before a legislative panel on Medicaid expansion, 
Haiselmaier did radio and TV interviews, and met personally with Governor Bryant.  He 
acknowledged that Heritage supported the concept of an exchange years earlier, but argued that 
an Obamacare exchange is something entirely different.  He further described that states will 
have to spend money on both the exchange and Medicaid expansion, but will get blamed when 
neither works (Interviews January 2014; Hess 2013).   
 By late 2012, the Mississippi Tea Party movement had the same the conditions that 
allowed their counterparts to succeed in blocking exchanges in other states, including a core of 
energized people committed to grassroots activism, a conservative organization supplying data 
and reports, and a governor willing to listen.  The major difference in Mississippi was that the 
decisions were not being made by the legislature or the governor, but by an independently 
elected insurance commissioner and an advisory board of stakeholders supporting a state-based 
exchange.  House Insurance Committee Chair Gary Chism speculated that the legislature could 
remove Chaney’s authority to run an exchange through the high risk pool or could simply vote 
down a state-based exchange, though neither idea was seriously pursued (Hess 2013).  Although 
the Tea Party was gaining momentum, it seemed to lack any levers of influence to stop the 
creation of an exchange.  An opportunity soon developed. 
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 At the July 11th advisory board meeting the Tea Party attended, Aaron Sisk of the 
Insurance Department mentioned that they were waiting to move forward on a couple particular 
issues until the Personnel Services Contract Review Board approved certain contracts with 
vendors (MS Insurance Dept 2012b).  Perhaps this mention triggered the idea among Tea Party 
leaders in attendance to investigate how such contracts were approved.  A recent report by the 
Mississippi Center for Public Policy had already mentioned the Review Board as one of the 
administrative hurdles the Insurance Department had to pass over in order to hire consultants and 
IT vendors to do the work of building an exchange (MCPP 2012).  Preventing contracts from 
being approved would make it much more difficult for the Insurance Department to move 
forward. 
 The Personnel Services Contract Review Board is a relatively obscure panel of five 
people appointed by the Governor.  Its purpose is to “set forth rules and regulations, along with 
other pertinent information, that agencies should follow in the procurement of personnel 
services” for any contract in excess of $100,000 (Mississippi State Personnel Board 2012).  The 
Review Board’s website lists the dates and times of future meetings, but provides no information 
about upcoming agenda items (Mississippi State Personnel Board 2013).  In other words, it is not 
easy for members of the public to know how to follow and attempt to influence Review Board 
decisions. 
 Jameson Taylor of the MCPP explains that the Tea Party started showing up at Review 
Board meetings and going through the exchange contracts under consideration around August 
2012.  As an example of what he describes as government over-spending, Taylor recalls one 
contract charging the state $2000 for rotating pictures in the web site’s banner, something he 
says that IT people tell him takes a half hour to complete and is virtually free (Interview January 
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2014).  A member of the exchange advisory board’s subcommittee that oversaw contracts 
describes the Tea Party presence at the state’s Review Board meeting as unprecedented and notes 
that many of the contracts were held up as a result of this scrutiny (Interview January 2014).  
Another person describes that “Once they had been to a couple meetings and saw that contracts 
were delayed, that gave them impetus to go to more meetings and see what influence they could 
have,” (Interview January 2014). 
 Even as they were succeeding in holding up contracts, the Tea Party felt that it did not 
have the power to ultimately stop the creation of an exchange.  Mike Chaney had independent 
authority through the high risk pool and the White House was highlighting Mississippi’s 
progress in national reports (White House 2012).  At this point, the most some Tea Party 
members were hoping for was that the process would be more transparent (Interviews January 
2014).  However, many people on both sides of the debate believe that Governor Bryant took 
particular notice of the Tea Party’s success in blocking the exchange’s contracts.  Bryant’s 
opposition to Obamacare and the exchanges in general were known, but it was unclear how he 
would react to Mike Chaney’s application to create an exchange.  He ultimately decided to 
oppose Chaney, triggering an inter-branch and inter-governmental feud lasting more than three 
months.      
 
Bryant Opposes Exchange, Feds Reject Application 
 Dispute the increased opposition, members of the exchange advisory board felt good 
about their progress (Interviews 2013-2014).  One person says they heard that only two or three 
other states were as far along.  Another said “We were basically ready, sitting on go. We had 
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even already done lots of the testing and had really worked through lots of the details of the site,” 
(Interviews January 2014).   The site, www.onemisssissippi.com, went live in July and an 
advertising campaign was under way by the fall.  T-shirts were printed and an informational 
booth was set up at the state fair.  Commercials featuring Mike Chaney ran on TV and on the 
jumbotrons at college football games in September.   
Mike Chaney announced Days after Barack Obama’s re-election on November 6th that 
the Insurance Department’s exchange blueprint was ready to be submitted, but that he was 
waiting until he could present the details to Governor Bryant.  Even so, he noted that as an 
independently elected commissioner of insurance, “I can submit the blueprint without the 
governor’s approval,” (Harrison 2012).  The two men bumped into each other in a restroom on 
November 11th and Chaney confronted Bryant, asking why he had not returned his phone calls.  
Bryant reportedly explained that he had been on a hunting trip out of cellphone range.  In 
Chaney’s words, “The governor asked me, ‘What authority do you have to do this?’ And I said, 
“Phil, what authority do you have to stop me?” (Epstein 2012).  Bryant invited Chaney to meet 
the next day at the Governor’s Mansion where he explained that Republican governors have 
decided to unite in opposition to the exchanges “because they will change the rules and control 
everything. You cannot trust them,” (Epstein 2012).  The Republican Governor’s Association 
had just met in Las Vegas, with much of the meeting focus on opposing the implementation of 
Obamacare (Myers 2012).  Phil Bryant was among the Republican governors writing a letter 
calling on the Obama administration to extend deadlines and revise expectations (Vestal 2012). 
 Despite these conversations with Governor Bryant, Chaney submitted the Insurance 
Department’s declaration letter even before Secretary Sebelius extended the November 16th 
deadline.   He put out a statement asserting that “As an elected official and the chief officer of 
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the Department of Insurance, I am authorized by state law to submit this Exchange Declaration 
Letter on behalf of the State of Mississippi,” (Mississippi Insurance Department 2012c).  Bryant 
immediately responded with a press release calling the exchange “a gateway to full 
implementation of ObamaCare in Mississippi,” and that “This is one more step toward the 
largest entitlement program expansions in American history,” (Bryant 2012a).  This statement 
put Bryant in line with the state’s Tea Party who had recently vowed to make opposing “the 
Chaney/Obamacare Health Insurance Exchange” a top priority in 2013 (Pender 2012). 
Bryant wrote Secretary Kathleen Sebelius eleven days later to formally register his 
opposition to Chaney’s proposal, saying that “I feel compelled to notify you of my complete 
disagreement with this move. I am disappointed with the submission of that letter, and I am 
exploring my options,” (Bryant 2012b).  On January 4th, Chaney wrote Bryant directly saying 
“Phil, there is simply no legitimate reason to impede the development of a state-based exchange 
in this point in time.”  Acknowledging Bryant’s argument that the state will not actually have 
much control over the exchange, Chaney wrote that “I am confident that this is not the correct 
view to take on the subject,” (Pettus 2013a). 
 On January 15th, Mississippi’s Attorney General Jim Hood issued a seven-page report 
stating that the Insurance Department “is vested with authority to submit the application to 
establish a health insurance exchange,” and that “Our office has found no statute which would 
allow the governor to override a decision of MID or the commissioner,” (Pettus 2013a).  Chaney 
celebrated this decision, saying “We are very encouraged. Now everything will rest with HHS. 
The ball is in HHS’ court.”  In response, Bryant’s spokesperson highlighted the fact that 
Attorney General Hood is a Democrat and stated that “Governor Bryant will continue to resist 
efforts to further implement Obamacare, including a health insurance exchange,” (AP 2013). 
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 The exchange blueprint required the governor to sign a state’s declaration letter, though 
this was a rule promulgated by HHS and not in the text of the ACA itself, so there was an 
expectation that HHS could work around a governor’s opposition.  The argument Chaney’s 
lawyers made to HHS was that as an independently elected executive branch official, Chaney’s 
signature actually satisfied this requirement (Interviews January 2014).  One board member 
described that “As far as the advisory board was concerned, they didn’t need Bryant’s signature.  
It wasn’t through his office or the legislature, so he didn’t need to sign,” (Interview January 
2014).  Another board member remembers being concerned, but figured that the Insurance 
Department must have already worked all this out with HHS (Interview January 2014).  
According to one person working with Chaney’s office, “We believe the governor doesn’t get to 
tell the commissioner what to do. We think HHS agreed. There was ongoing dialogue throughout 
2012 that led us to believe they would approve this. We also hoped the governor would come 
around,” (Interview January 2014).  The uncertainty over the disagreement with Governor 
Bryant was significant enough that the Insurance Department stopped its advertising and 
outreach activities in early January 2013 (MississippiPolicy 2013).  Around this time, former 
Governor Haley Barbour called Chaney to “just hang in there” in his efforts to establish a state-
based exchange (Epstein 2012).   
Jameson Taylor of the conservative Mississippi Center for Public Policy observed that 
because Chaney is independently elected, Bryant’s only two options at this point were to: 1) 
convince the legislature to change the high risk pool statute that Chaney is using to build an 
exchange, or 2) block an exchange withholding Medicaid funds (Epstein 2012).  The first option 
was unrealistic given that the legislative session had just begun and that HHS’s decision would 
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be released shortly.  Refusing to allow Medicaid to cooperate with the exchange seemed to be 
Bryant’s only remaining path to stopping an exchange. 
 Three days after Attorney General Hood’s report, Governor Bryant wrote another letter to 
Secretary Sebelius emphasizing that “In Mississippi, an attorney general’s opinion is merely 
persuasive authority, not controlling law.”  Bryant went further in this letter than he had at any 
point to date.  He argued that Chaney “lacks the necessary statutory and constitutional authority 
to establish and operate an exchange,” and therefore HHS should consider any activity by the 
Insurance Department “null and void as a matter of state law.”  Acting on the idea Jameson 
Taylor articulated, he went on to write that “I am instructing the Mississippi Division of 
Medicaid not to assist or cooperate” with an exchange (Bryant 2013a).  In other words, if HHS 
were to approve Chaney’s application, Mississippi’s exchange would be completely divorced 
from the state’s Medicaid program.  A lack of communication and coordination between the two 
programs would greatly complicate the establishment of a successful exchange.  Members of the 
advisory board and others participating in the process describe being surprised by the governor’s 
decision to use Medicaid this way, but still confident that their plans would move forward.   
 On February 7th, HHS informed Chaney by phone that it was rejecting his exchange 
application.  The letter from Gary Cohen of CMS that arrived the next day attributed this 
decision to “the Mississippi Governor’s stated intent to oppose implementation of a state-based 
exchange.”  The letter also explained that a state-based exchange is required to develop and 
document a coordination strategy with other agencies insurance affordability programs such as 
Medicaid.  Cohen writes that “With a lack of support from your governor and no formal 
commitment to coordinate from other State agencies, we do not see a feasible pathway to 
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conditionally approving a State-based exchange in Mississippi for 2014,” (Mississippi Insurance 
Dept 2013). 
 Chaney held a press conference the afternoon he received the phone call in which he said 
he felt betrayed by the Obama administration over this decision.  Describing the exchange 
planning process as “tap-dancing on a razor blade,” he said “we’ve been working earnestly with 
these people for years, and we haven’t waivered in anything that we’ve done.”  He went on to 
explain that “The decision came from the very top; it came from the White House. It wasn’t 
HHS’s decision, they were on our side. I think they were mortified.”  Re-emphasizing the 
betrayal he felt, he added, “They’ve told the nation they want state-based exchanges, but here 
they are turning somebody down that’s in the top three in terms of being prepared to operate an 
exchange.”  When asked why the White House turned down the application, Chaney speculated 
that they were afraid of a lawsuit challenging the Insurance Department’s authority to operate the 
exchange and decided it would be better to implement a federal exchange than continue in the 
uncertainty that would result from ongoing litigation (MississippiPolicy 2013).   
 Governor Bryant released a statement later that day saying that HHS had not yet 
officially informed his office of its decision, but that “I have said repeatedly that the health 
insurance exchanges mandated by ObamaCare are not free-market exchanges…I firmly maintain 
my position that Mississippi will not willfully implement a mechanism that will compromise our 
state’s financial stability” (Bryant 2013b).  The governor released no other statement on this 
issue after CMS’s decision was officially announced.   
Tea Party leaders responded with appreciation for Governor Bryant.  Leaders from the 
Mississippi Tea Party met with Governor Bryant in the capitol building shortly thereafter and 
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gave him a plaque honoring his “courageous and principled leadership in standing up for 
Mississippians constitutional rights” (TheMSTeaParty 2013a).   The fact that Bryant took the 
meeting indicates that the Tea Party was not a nuisance for Bryant, but an important 
constituency.  Janis Lane, President of the Central Mississippi Tea Party, put out a statement 
“applaud[ing] our Governor for his stand to protect the citizens and taxpayers of Mississippi 
against a federal government that is trying to usurp the rights of the citizens of this state.”  
Lane’s statement also attacked HHS Secretary Sebelius despite praising this decision, saying that 
“Kathleen Sebelius has revealed what many of us have known from the beginning – we cannot 
trust the federal government” (Mississippi PEP 2013). 
Mike Chaney was publicly diplomatic in his statements about Governor Bryant’s 
opposition.  In the February 7th press conference he said that “Phil and I are friends. I hope this 
will not impair our ability to work together in the future.  Reasonable people can disagree about 
an issue” (MississippiPolicy 2013a).  However, people who have spoken privately with Chaney 
say that “he has a chip on his shoulder over this.”  One person said that “Chaney is pissed off at 
Bryant. He sees the Tea Party as largely responsible for railroading this process and no longer 
trusts Bryant” (Interviews January 2014).   
Stakeholders involved in the debate over an exchange use words like shocked, 
disappointed, sad, and surprised to describe the Obama administration’s decision.  One board 
member explained that “Through all this we really thought they would find a way.  We had done 
a lot of work – A LOT of work - particularly in those final months.  We had a very good 
blueprint that was certainly worthy of approval.  Ultimately, I think HHS didn’t want to get in 
the middle of a dispute between a governor and an insurance commissioner,” (Interview January 
2014).  Even people who had been hoping for this outcome say they were surprised.  One 
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opponent of an exchange said “I was shocked when the White House rejected our application.  I 
would have assumed they would have approved the application and made the best of it and 
continue to pressure the governor to cooperate, and then fight Medicaid as a separate battle.  I 
can’t explain that.  It was definitely a surprise,” (Interview January 2014). 
Many involved in the planning process believed the advisory board experience was 
productive even though the state did not end up operating its exchange.  As one person 
described, “it had been beneficial to get all these people together” who normally do not 
communicate.  But with no state-based exchange to operate, there was no reason to continue 
meeting.  “It was like we all just shut down.  No more emails, no more meetings.  It just stopped.  
Many of the Insurance Department staff left shortly after, and so there was no continuity,” 
(Interview January 2014).   
Although the advisory board stopped meeting, the story of Mississippi’s insurance 
exchange does not end in February 2013.  The letter from CMS denying Chaney’s application for 
a state-run exchange encouraged him to apply to do an exchange in partnership with the federal 
government (MS Insurance Dept 2013).  Chaney opposed this idea, saying that such an 
arrangement was “essentially the state doing the work, basically at our expense, to implement 
federal law.  We’re not going to do that” (MississippiPolicy 2013a).  The Obama administration 
provided a new possibility over the summer of 2013 in which the state could operate the small 
business SHOP exchange while allowing the federal government to operate the exchange for the 
individual market.  Chaney took this option, using much of the work that had been done the year 
earlier as a foundation.  There was little that Governor Bryant could do to stop Chaney because 
the SHOP exchange did not require any connection with Medicaid.  “We clearly have authority 
to establish an exchange and operate a SHOP.  I don’t need his approval” (Millman 2013).  
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Chaney submitted an application in August 2013, met with federal officials on September 18th, 
and was approved on October 1st (Pettus 2013b).  Ultimately, Mississippi has the type of 
exchange Haley Barbour had pushed for six years earlier.  Barbour explains that this outcome 
“suits me fine.  Of the two, the small business exchange is far more important for Mississippi,” 
(Interview January 2014).   
The summer of 2013 was also dominated by political tension over whether the state 
should expand Medicaid.  Mississippi policymakers describe their Medicaid program as one of 
the most micro-managed in the country, effectively needing to be re-authorized on an annual 
basis (Interviews 2013-2014).  Complicating the dynamics is that a super-majority of votes is 
needed each year, meaning that Republicans could not pass these bills on their own even though 
they controlled both chambers.  Democrats attempted to force Republicans to consider the 
expansion, saying they would not support re-authorization unless an expansion bill was allowed 
to move forward.  Republicans viewed this as a bluff and let Democrats protest.  A special 
session was called in late June, with Democrats caving in the days before the July 1st deadline by 
which Medicaid would have expired.  The existing program was allowed to continue for another 
year, but not without the ACA’s expanded eligibility and federal funding (Whitaker 2013). 
The interest group breakdown was similar to that of the exchange, with historically 
powerful groups such as insurers, hospitals, providers, businesses, and consumers mostly united 
in support of both an exchange and the Tea Party and a handful of organizations opposed.  In 
both debates, one of the major groups was seen as not playing as strong a role as many thought 
they should have, though it is unlikely that they could have changed the outcome.  In both cases, 
the governor and legislative leadership ultimately sided with the Tea Party and opponents of 
implementing either component of Obamacare. 
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Early Results of Mississippi’s Exchange 
The early months of Mississippi’s federally facilitated exchange did not go very well as 
the state reported some of the very lowest enrollment figures in the nation.  In the first three 
weeks of open enrollment, only 35 Mississippians used the exchange to sign up for a plan 
(Boswell 2013).  By November 1st the number of people that had selected a private plan 
increased to 800, with another 18,000 applying for Medicaid.  This represents less than 4% of 
uninsured Mississippians (Anderson 2014).  There are at least four reasons for this initial result. 
 The first is common to each of the other states with a federal exchange, as the exchange 
website healthcare.gov was riddled with IT problems.  Second, states with a federally facilitated 
exchange were given much less money for outreach and enrollment assistance.  This is 
particularly significant in Mississippi given that so much of the state lacks access to the internet 
and the internet literacy necessary to make a meaningful choice on the exchange.  A 2013 report 
by the U.S. Census Bureau found that Mississippi had the lowest levels of connectivity in the 
nation, with 26.8% saying that have no access to an internet connection (U.S. Census Bureau 
2013). 
Third, so few insurers chose to offer plans in the exchange that not only would there be 
minimal competition, but 36 of the state’s 82 counties were to be without any coverage.  The 
state’s largest insurer, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mississippi, decided not to participate.  
Insurance Commissioner Mike Chaney worked hard to convince Humana and Magnolia Health 
Plan to expand their coverage so that at least one carrier would offer plans in each county.  
Chaney said that HHS had to bend federal deadlines to make this possible (Carter 2013).  
 182 
 
Competition between the two insurance companies is only occurring in the three counties 
surrounding Jackson and in one county in the Delta (Anderson 2014). 
 Fourth, plans sold on Mississippi’s exchange were expensive.  The average cost for a 
bronze plan in Mississippi was $342 per month, nearly $100 more than the national average of 
$249 a month (Anderson 2014).  Similarly, the estimated cost of a mid-range plan was $448 per 
month in Mississippi compared to $328 nationally.  The only states with higher premiums are 
Wyoming and Alaska.  Mike Chaney attributes the high costs to expensive health conditions, a 
high cost of health care delivery, and a lack of competition on the exchange (Carter 2013). 
 It is impossible to know whether these results would have been different had the 
Mississippi Insurance Department been allowed to operate its exchange, though Mike Chaney 
and other people involved in the planning process make a compelling case for why their 
exchange would have fared better.  Many people cite Kentucky’s early successes as the best 
parallel, saying their exchange would have been as good, if not better (Interviews January 2014).  
First, they say that the state’s IT was far along and would have been ready for open enrollment 
on October 1st (Interviews January 2014).  A member of the exchange advisory board compared 
their process to the debacle that unfolded in Oregon in which their website failed to work 
throughout the entire six month open enrollment period despite receiving nearly $300 million in 
grants and having dozens of state employees working on the exchange.  “They even had a folk 
song written. I’m scratching my head.  Here I am some yokel down in Mississippi wondering 
‘how can you not succeed with all those early adapter moneys and folk songs?’  There is a 
tendency to put the cart before the horse.  You can write yourself a bunch of folk songs for 
outreach before you make the thing work” (Interview January 2014).  He felt confident that 
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Mississippi had been appropriately prudent in focusing on the IT and that the exchange would 
have succeed as a result.   
Second, because of how the ACA is written, states running their own exchange have 
access to much larger amounts of money to support enrollment efforts than do states with a 
federally facilitated exchange.  Two organizations had to split $800,000 to conduct outreach: 
Oak Hill Missionary Baptist Church in northern Mississippi and University Medical Center 
(UMC) in Jackson.  Consumer advocates view this as inadequate, with one person saying that 
“Oak Hill has the will but lacks the capacity, and UMC has the capacity and lacks the will” to 
successfully reach people throughout the entire state (Interview January 2014).   
 Third, former advisory board members feel confident that more carriers would have 
participated in an exchange run by Mississippi.  Many describe Blue Cross Blue Shield of 
Mississippi as an active participant in the planning process and believe they would have joined, 
with smaller carriers following.  When it became clear that Mississippi would have a federal 
exchange, BCBS decided to wait and see how things develop.  Some speculate that BCBS will 
wait for a couple years and then offer plans that undercut current offerings.  Others worry that 
insurers have been scared off by healthcare.gov’s troubled rollout and will be less likely to 
participate in the future (Interviews January 2014). 
 Fourth, Chaney and others believe that plans would have been more affordable on 
Mississippi’s exchange.  Poor health conditions and the high costs of health care would still have 
driven rates up, but more plans participating in the exchange may have meant greater 
competition and lower prices (Interviews January 2014).    
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The best we can do is speculate what would have been different had Mississippi operated 
its own insurance exchange.  This is very different from the debate that played out in the summer 
of 2013 over whether to expand Medicaid.  Regardless of the state’s decision to run the exchange 
or default to the federal government, Mississippians would have an exchange and access to 
premium subsidies either way.  The state’s decision to reject the expansion meant that many 
people who could have gained coverage will remain uninsured, and the state will turn down the 
large federal match.   
 
Conclusion 
 Mississippi came closer than any other state to running a fully state-based exchange.  
The outcome may have been different if Democrats had supported one of Haley Barbour’s pre-
ACA exchange bills, if the 2011 conference committee could have reached a compromise, if 
Governor Barbour had not been term-limited out of office, if Governor Bryant had not decided to 
block the Insurance Department, and if the Obama administration had decided to approve Mike 
Chaney’s application.  A state-based exchange would not have even been an option in 
Mississippi if the insurance commissioner was appointed by the governor as in most other states 
and if the legislature had not recently expanded the scope of the state’s high risk pool. 
The case of Mississippi’s insurance exchange is a great example of the need for a poly-
theoretical approach to understanding policymaking.  Specific theories from each perspective are 
useful for explaining an element of the decision-making process, though none sufficiently 
captures the many nuances of the debate.  For example, partisanship may partially explain 
Governor Bryant’s opposition, but it obscures how close the state came to creating an exchange 
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and that the main debate was ultimately not between Democrats and Republicans, but between 
two Republicans.  In this section, I use the integrated framework from chapter two (Appendix B) 
to discuss how federalism, path dependence, institutional design, and partisanship explain the 
context in which interest groups and policymakers made decisions. 
 
Federalism Context 
 An intergovernmental irony of the Mississippi case is that its exchange application was 
denied even though it had taken the exact course of action federal carrots and sticks were 
designed to incentivize.  Stakeholders responded to the threat of federal takeover and the promise 
of money and flexibility by developing their own exchange.   
Ultimately, the intergovernmental dynamic in Mississippi was complicated by a question 
federalism theory does not adequately address – who is authorized to represent the state in 
dealing with the federal government?  This is an extremely important issue given that not 
everyone in a state agrees over how to respond to federal deadlines and incentives.  The closest 
the literature comes to dealing with this is the work on administrative or bureaucratic federalism.  
The key insight here is that that although Congress sets the terms of the intergovernmental 
relationship in statute, the negotiation continues throughout a law’s implementation as a result of 
interactions between the bureaucracies of each level of government.   
This played out differently in Mississippi than it did in other states, however, where the 
legislative process generally determined who in the state had decision-making authority.  In 
Mississippi, the legislature was largely out of the picture and the federal government had to pick 
sides within the state’s executive branch.  Governor Haley Barbour supported joining the lawsuit 
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against the ACA while independently elected Attorney General Jim Hood refused.  Similarly, 
Governor Phil Bryant and independently elected Insurance Commissioner Mike Chaney both 
argued that they had the constitutional and statutory authority to decide whether Mississippi 
would establish an exchange.  Complicating this dynamic further is that in this case, the key 
actors in the federal government were also divided over how to respond.  According to 
Commissioner Chaney, HHS wanted to approve the Insurance Department’s application, but the 
White House instructed it not to.  To some extent, the Obama administration sidestepped the 
question by deciding that even if Chaney did have authority to establish an exchange, Bryant also 
had authority to block its communication with Medicaid, and that such a situation was 
unsustainable. 
 
State Context: Path Dependence 
Although I agree with Brown’s (2010) conclusion that path dependence is too shallow to 
be false but too ambiguous to explain much, the Mississippi case highlights the importance of 
focusing on each state’s prior decisions and procedures, since “they select the groups whose 
views will be represented and they shape demands by changing the strategic environment in 
which the demands of groups are formulated” (Immergut 1992).  Decisions dating back to 
Reconstruction in the 19th century played a role in shaping the balance of power.   
Institutional design is closely related to the path dependence literature and is dealt with in 
the next section.  Here, I highlight two prior decisions that played a large role in Mississippi’s 
exchange debate.  First, the issue would have been settled long before Governor Bryant came 
into office and the Tea Party grew in prominence if any of Haley Barbour’s exchange bills had 
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passed.  Legislation came the closest in 2012, as each chamber passed its own version of an 
exchange bill, but conference committee negotiators failed to agree on a compromise.  Second, 
Mike Chaney never would have been able to submit his application had the legislature not 
decided for unrelated reasons in 2009 to expand the authority of the state’s high risk pool to 
administer a broader range of insurance programs.  
Race is another issue that has to be considered when examining policymaking in 
Mississippi.  Nearly everyone interviewed suggested that race affects how everything is said and 
done, though.  This is consistent with a literature highlighting the importance of race in 
America’s welfare state (Lieberman 2001).  Most people interviewed were hard pressed to 
identify specific ways in which it affected the exchange debate.  Mississippi Congressman 
Bennie Thompson publicly accused Governor Bryant of rejecting Obamacare “just because a 
black man created it” (Cheney 2014).  Conservatives are offended at the mention of race, 
believing it implied that the Tea Partiers who pushed Governor Bryant to oppose an exchange 
were racist, that they did not want white people’s tax dollars to be redistributed so poor black 
people could benefit (Interviews 2013-2014).  There are no clear instances of racially motivated 
decision-making, though it is striking that only one state in the deep south (Arkansas) is either 
creating an exchange or expanding Medicaid.  At the very least, it can be said that Mississippi’s 
history of racial tension has a path dependent dimension affecting how issues are framed and 
perceived.  According to some stakeholders, this means that the key to convincing policymakers 
and the public to support an exchange is to emphasize that many of the people who would 
benefit would be white (Interviews 2013-2014).  Even when this isn’t said explicitly, it is 
implied by showing maps of where in the state potential enrollees live. 
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State Context: Institutional Design 
 Three aspects of Mississippi’s institutions affected the process and outcome of its 
exchange debate.  First, Mississippi’s governor is historically weak compared to counterparts in 
other states, with the fact that the insurance commissioner is elected instead of appointed being 
one example.  Governor Barbour used his informal powers and personal background to enhance 
his effectiveness, though it was unclear whether Phil Bryant would be able to continue this trend.  
The debate between Bryant and Mike Chaney needs to be seen in this context, with Bryant trying 
to assert his authority.   
Second, the legislature was taken out of the decision largely because of a question of 
timing.  After it failed to pass the conference committee bill in the spring of 2011, the legislature 
did not meet again until January 2012.  By that point, the insurance commissioner was moving 
forward with his plans and there was little for the legislature to do.  It could have asserted its 
role, but the newly elected Republican majority was not interested in doing anything related to 
Obamacare, particularly given their hope that the upcoming Supreme Court ruling and 
presidential election would spare them from needing to address the issue.   
Another institutional design issue is that bureaucratic capacity had no effect on the final 
decision.  Mississippi is generally considered a low-capacity state, though in this case it did not 
lack resources.  However, the Department of Insurance was able to use federal grants to 
outsource planning activities to consultants and vendors with the required expertise, and 
appeared to be in a position to operate its own exchange.   
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State Context: Partisanship 
Partisanship played an important role at different points in the debate over Mississippi’s 
exchange.  One key insight from this literature is that competing electoral incentives sometimes 
cause Republicans and Democrats to oppose each other, even over issues about which they 
generally agree (Lee 2009).  For example, the state would have created an exchange as early as 
2008 except that House Democrats were unwilling to support a health reform proposal Haley 
Barbour supported and Senate Republicans passed.  On the other side, many accuse Phil Bryant 
of opposing an exchange simply because President Obama and Democrats supported the idea.  
The partisan dynamics that gave Republicans full control of the legislature for the first time since 
Reconstruction and overwhelmingly voted against Barack Obama in the 2008 and 2012 elections 
created a political climate hostile to Obamacare.   
This point relates to an insight from the federalism literature, that although Republicans 
tend to prefer local control, intergovernmental disputes sometimes have a partisan edge such that 
leaders at each level support the actions of another level of government if it is led by a member 
of their party, and oppose actions led by a member of a different party (Keiser and Soss 1998; 
Yackee and Yackee 2009; Medof et al. 2011, Nicholson-Crotty 2012).  As a result, policymakers 
on either side of the ideological spectrum and at either level of government will argue for a 
decentralized or centralized approach when it suits their policy and political goals (Barrilleaux et 
al. 2002; Nathan 2005; Conlan 2006; Adelman and Engel 2008; Shelly 2008; Doonan 2013).  
Supporters of an exchange in Mississippi thought that Republicans would participate given 
Governor Barbour’s strong support and then Lieutenant Governor and gubernatorial candidate 
Phil Bryant’s implied support.  This turned out to be true in some cases, with Insurance 
Commissioner Mike Chaney working aggressively to create a state-based exchange, but not true 
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in others, with Governor Phil Bryant working aggressively to stop him.  When asked about his 
evolution on the issue, Bryant responded that an ACA exchange is “totally different” than the 
type he had supported.  “It was a web-based system where we hoped the private market, through 
competition, would provide lower rates.  Democrats came in and said: We have a vehicle that 
came from the Republicans called an exchange, and let’s make that the central portal to expand 
Obamacare in the states, and if they don’t, they say you supported it before.  That is patently 
untrue” (Bryant 2013c). 
There are a number of limitations to using partisanship as an explanation for 
Mississippi’s exchange debate.  First, the key debate was between two Republicans, not between 
Republicans and Democrats.  Second, although polls showed that Obamacare as a whole was 
unpopular in Mississippi, there is no clear evidence of how Mississippians felt about an 
exchange.  Health reform was not a major issue during the 2011 gubernatorial campaign and so it 
is unfair to describe this election as giving Governor Bryant a clear mandate to oppose all aspects 
of Obamacare.  Members of the advisory board believed the general public would generally have 
been supportive if they understood the distinction between the exchange, Medicaid expansion, 
and the mandate (Interviews January 2014).  Haley Barbour cited this as one of the main reasons 
he suspected Governor Bryant blocked the exchange, saying that “I think the Governor was 
afraid that a lot of people couldn’t differentiate that from expanding Medicaid,” (Interview 
January 2014).   
 
 191 
 
Strategic Actors: Interest Groups 
There was an expectation that state leaders would respond to pressure from the state’s 
most powerful stakeholders, most of whom preferred that the state run the exchange.  Even 
groups such as agents and brokers who had opposed the ACA and generally opposed the concept 
of an exchange worked with the Insurance Department to build the state’s exchange.  A notable 
absence from the exchange advisory board was any presence from the business community.  
Unlike in Michigan and Idaho, small business leaders and the chambers of commerce played a 
minor role.  Even still, there is little reason to believe that the outcome would have been different 
had they been more actively involved.   
The debate over an exchange in Mississippi ultimately did not take place in the 
legislature and was not a traditional lobbying story.  Interest groups were actively involved in 
shaping policy through the exchange advisory board, but there was no need for traditional 
lobbying.  Who would they lobby?  In retrospect maybe interest groups supporting an exchange 
should have done more to try to convince the governor to support an exchange, but most 
stakeholders say they didn’t think the governor’s opinion mattered.  They believed that the 
insurance commissioner had the authority to establish the exchange and figured that any issues 
between HHS, Governor Bryant, and the Insurance Department over this question had been 
worked out.   
The Tea Party played no clear role in the early phases of the exchange debate but 
ultimately became an important influence.  Tea Party organizations had no presence during the 
2011 legislative session in which both chambers passed a bill to create an exchange.  They did 
not start showing up to advisory board meetings until July 2012, and even then there is no 
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evidence that they had any effect on specific policy decisions until they started looking into the 
contracts the Insurance Department was negotiating with vendors.  The ability to block contracts 
seemed to have emboldened Tea Party members, though even they did not expect there was 
much they could do by then to stop an exchange.  When the decision came down to Bryant vs. 
Chaney, they encouraged the governor to block the Insurance Department’s application and 
praised him for doing so.   
The Tea Party in Mississippi matches Skocpol and Williamson’s (2012) characterization 
as a movement with important bottom-up and top-down components.  On the ground are groups 
of people sharing similar frustrations and organizing organically.  In this sense there is no such 
thing as the Mississippi Tea Party; rather, it is a collection of decentralized clusters of people.  A 
small core of 10-20 people living near Jackson are the most visible to state policymakers and 
sometimes are seen as representing the entire Tea Party, even if they have no formal 
endorsement from other groups throughout the state.   
 Although there is no centralized Tea Party structure to coordinate activities, the 
conservative organization The Mississippi Center for Public Policy (MCPP) was looked to for 
guidance.  MCPP produced many of the reports that Tea Partiers would use in their advocacy.  
As an example of their close relationship, Jameson Taylor, Vice President of Policy at MCPP 
was with Tea Party leaders when they met with Governor Bryant in February 2013.  At the end 
of the meeting everyone gathered around the governor for a photo and one of the Tea Partiers 
can be heard on a Youtube video of the interaction saying “Jameson, you’re part of us too, so put 
[the camera] down and get up here” (TheMSTeaParty 2013a).  Taylor is guarded about this 
connection saying there is no formal relationship, though the chairman’s annual report to the MS 
Tea Party organization in November 2013 highlights the importance of coordinating the work of 
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Tea Party groups throughout the state, and specifically mentions that “Jameson Taylor of MCPP 
has taken up that mission of bringing them together,” (Nicholson 2013).   
 At the same time, it is important not to overstate MCPP’s influence over the Tea Party.  
The organization has existed for decades, long before the Tea Party came into being.  As Skocpol 
and Williamson (2012) describe, the arguments, reports, and coordinating activities done by 
conservative organizations such as MCPP, CATO, and Heritage would mean nothing if they 
were not tapping into a sentiment that existed independently within their target audience.  It takes 
a high level of commitment to devote oneself to attending obscure meetings of the exchange 
advisory board and the Personnel Services Contract Review Board. 
 
Strategic Actors: Policymakers 
Another factor in the Mississippi case is the possibility that two people with the same 
partisan and electoral incentives can come to different conclusions and make different choices.  
Not every Republican elected as Mississippi’s insurance commissioner would have decided to 
push so aggressively to create a state-based insurance exchange.  Similarly, not every Republican 
elected as governor would have opposed Commissioner Chaney’s application.  Governor Otter 
of Idaho and Governor Snyder of Michigan are two possible examples.  In fact, Haley Barbour 
says he would have supported Chaney’s application had he still been governor, despite Bryant’s 
policy and political reasons (Interview January 2014).  The personal judgment of individual 
actors matters.  Otherwise, Mississippi may be operating its own health insurance exchange. 
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Summary 
 Many factors came together to lead to Mississippi having a federally facilitated exchange 
despite coming so close to running its own.  Insurance commissioner Mike Chaney used his 
authority as an independently elected official and over the High Risk Pool to attempt to create an 
exchange despite indecision by the legislature and a lack of support from newly elected governor 
Phil Bryant.  Interest groups generally supported Chaney’s efforts, with representatives from 
most relevant organizations serving on the exchange advisory board.  The Tea Party and the 
conservative think tank The Mississippi Center for Public Policy were the most prominent 
critics.  The political dynamics shifted once they became more active in their opposition.  The 
pockets of legislative expertise that helped Idaho policymakers overcome Tea Party opposition 
never developed in Mississippi.  One reason is that the Republican caucus did not have any 
leading voices on health policy issues.  It would not have mattered anyway, as the decision-
making process shifted from the legislative to the executive branch.   
The defining moment in Mississippi’s exchange debate is Governor Bryant’s decision to 
oppose Commissioner Chaney’s application despite having supported (or at least not opposing) 
an exchange in the past.  Phil Bryant is the only governor in my sample to ultimately oppose an 
exchange.  Had Bryant decided differently, HHS likely would have approved Chaney’s 
application and the Insurance Department would have completed the work to have an exchange 
ready by the beginning of open enrollment on October 1, 2013.   
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Chapter 6 - Idaho 
 
Introduction 
 Idaho is the only state in the nation led by a Republican governor and a Republican 
legislature that chose to run its health insurance exchange.  Idaho is an unlikely candidate for 
such a distinction.  By most measures it is one of the most conservative states in the country.18  
The state has voted for the Republican nominee in every presidential election since 1964, 
including giving Barack Obama only 36% of the vote in 2008 and 32% in 2012.  Since 1981, 
both U.S. senators have been Republicans.  With one brief exception from 2009-2010, both of 
Idaho’s U.S. representatives have been Republicans since 1995.  State government is similarly 
dominated by Republicans.  Idahoans have not elected a Democratic governor in two decades 
and have consistently elected large Republican majorities in both chambers of the legislature.   
Most of Idaho’s leaders opposed the Affordable Care Act.  All four members of the 
state’s congressional delegation voted against the law, including Democrat Walt Minnick.  Even 
before President Obama signed the bill into law in March 2010, Idaho was the first state in the 
nation to enact legislation opposing the ACA (CBS News 2010).  Idaho was among the first 
states to sue the federal government over the constitutionality of the ACA.  The dominant 
interest groups in the state were nearly unanimous in their opposition to the ACA.   
                                                           
18
 According to Gallup State of the States (2010).  Idaho is second only to Mississippi in terms of the percentage of 
residents who describe their political views as conservative. http://www.gallup.com/poll/125066/State-States.aspx.  
See also Shor, and McCarty 2011. 
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Table 12– Idaho’s Political and Demographic Context 
Political Environment 
• 2012 presidential election: Mitt Romney (65%) 
• Governor 
o 2007-present: C.L. “Butch” Otter (R) 
o No term limits 
• Idaho House of Representatives 
o 2011-2012: Republican majority of 44 
o 2013-present: Republican majority of 44 
o No term limits 
• Idaho Senate 
o 2011-2012: Republican majority of 21 
o 2013-present: Republican majority of 23 
o No term limits 
Demographics & Health Status 
• Total population: 1,580,000 
• Distribution of Population by Federal Poverty Level 
o Under 100%: 19% 
o 100% - 138%: 10% 
o 139% - 399%: 45% 
o 400%: 27% 
• Distribution of Health Insurance Coverage 
o Employer: 47% 
o Other private: 7% 
o Medicaid: 14% 
o Medicare: 15% 
o Uninsured: 16% 
Health Reform 
• Joined lawsuit against the ACA 
• State-based exchange, relying on national website for first year 
• Not expanding Medicaid 
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Three years later, many of the same leaders who had opposed the ACA pushed for the 
state to take control over the implementation of an insurance exchange.  Why did Idaho choose 
to create its own exchange?  What happened between March 2010 when the state’s leaders were 
united against the ACA and March 2013 when Governor C.L. “Butch” Otter successfully pushed 
for the creation of a state-based insurance exchange?  There were many twists along the way, 
including the rejection of federal grants, nullification bills, a veto, and an executive order.  
Ultimately, the issue split the Republican caucus with enough joining the Democrats to support 
an exchange.  Prominent interest groups worked hard to support state control, though not without 
strong opposition from the Tea Party and conservative groups.  One of the most important 
reasons this opposition was overcome was that pockets of expertise had developed in the 
legislature in which prominent legislators with health policy experience took a leadership role in 
supporting an exchange.  Following the same outline as chapter three’s 50-state overview, this 
chapter chronicles Idaho’s decision-making process through four time periods.  I conclude by 
drawing on the theoretical lessons from Chapter two to sort through the various factors 
contributing to this decision (see Appendix E for a timeline of key events in Idaho). 
  
1) March 2010 – December 2010 
The initial months of the ACA’s implementation in Idaho were marked by sharp 
opposition to the law.  The events of this period laid the foundation for the debate that would 
follow in subsequent years, including the passage of the Idaho Health Freedom Act, the multi-
state lawsuit against the ACA’s mandates, the growth of the Tea Party, and the creation of the 
conservative think tank the Idaho Freedom Foundation.  Yet even in a period notable for hostility 
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towards the reform, the Otter Administration took steps behind the scenes to begin implementing 
an exchange. 
 
Idaho Health Freedom Act 
 The state’s response to the Affordable Care Act began before the ACA was even signed 
into law.  In his state of the state speech on January 11, 2010, Governor Otter spoke in 
opposition to “the so-called health care ‘reform’ bills being promoted by the President’s party in 
Congress.”  He warned that an expansion of Medicaid would cost the state half a billion dollars 
and thanked the Idaho congressional delegation for “fighting against this wholesale assault on 
our self-determination” (Otter 2010). 
Republicans in the legislature were similarly opposed.  On January 19th, Representatives 
Jim Clark, Raul Labrador, and Lynn Luker introduced House Bill 391, which they named the 
Idaho Health Freedom Act.  In the words of a lobbyist for a major business organization, the act 
was a pre-emptive measure “to tell the federal government that we’ll stay in charge of our health 
care and you stay out of it,” (Interview May 2013).  It so happened that the likelihood of the 
ACA’s passage was seriously jeopardized later that same day as Massachusetts Republican Scott 
Brown won the special election to fill Ted Kennedy’s seat in the U.S. Senate.  As a result, 
Democrats no longer had a filibuster-proof majority and many considered health reform dead 
(see chapter three). 
The Idaho Health Freedom Act was based on model legislation developed by the 
American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) (News on 6 2010).  HB 391 stated that the U.S. 
Constitution’s 9th and 10th amendments limit the role of the federal government in health care, 
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and established that “every person within the state of Idaho is and shall be free to choose or 
decline any mode of securing health care services without penalty or threat of penalty.”  In other 
words, the bill asserted that the individual mandate being considered by Congress is not 
constitutional and would not be in effect in Idaho.  No public official or agent of the state would 
be allowed to play any role in such a mandate.  HB 391 also directed the state’s attorney general 
to respond promptly to any federal law that challenged the state’s role as defined in this bill (ID 
HB 391 2010). 
 The Republican leadership prioritized the Idaho Health Freedom Act, moving it quickly 
through the legislative process, even as the national reform remained in limbo.  It was one of the 
first bills introduced in the session and only the second bill to receive a hearing by the House 
State Affairs Committee.  The bill had to be amended to clarify that although the government 
would not be allowed to mandate that everyone purchase insurance, it would still be legal for the 
state to require that college and university students obtain coverage.  Senator Monty Pearce, who 
ultimately voted for the Idaho Health Freedom Act, said the amended bill looks hypocritical in 
that it rails against a federal mandate but specifically protects one by the state.  Representative 
Clark, one of the bill’s sponsors, responded that mandates may be good ideas sometimes, but that 
it is the state’s right to experiment.  The committee report describing this debate contains an 
amusing typo, in which Representative Clark is quoted as saying that states like Idaho are “a 
lavoratory of ideas” (ID Senate State Affairs Committee 2010). 
The bill passed the House completely along party lines and then passed the Senate with 
all but three Republicans voting in favor.  Governor Otter signed the bill on March 17th, four 
days before the ACA passed the U.S. House and a week before it passed the U.S. Senate and was 
signed into law by President Obama.  Governor Otter felt the issue was important enough for his 
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first public bill signing ceremony of the 2010 session.  In the press conference that followed, 
Governor Otter spoke strongly against the federal health reform.  Ironically using many of the 
same arguments he would later use to defend his support of a state-based health insurance 
exchange, Governor Otter stated that HB 391 was important because it asserted the sovereignty 
of the state (Hurst 2010a). 
 The passage of the Idaho Health Freedom Act was a significant opening shot in the battle 
over the ACA’s implementation in Idaho.  Governor Otter and the legislature staked a position in 
strong opposition to the reform and in support of the joint lawsuit that Attorney General Wasden 
filed minutes after President Obama signed the ACA into law.  Interest groups had their first 
opportunity to weigh in on what the law would mean for Idaho, with the American Association 
for Retired Persons (AARP) testifying against the bill, the Idaho Farm Bureau testifying in favor, 
and the Idaho Republican Central Committee passing a parallel resolution against the ACA (ID 
Senate State Affairs Committee 2010).   
 One of the most important developments was the growing role of the Idaho Freedom 
Foundation (IFF).  Formed in 2009, the IFF is a non-profit organization led by Wayne Hoffman, 
a former journalist and staff member to Idaho politicians.  Hoffman describes the passage of the 
Idaho Health Freedom Act as one of his group’s earliest accomplishments (Russell 2010).  In just 
a few short years, the IFF would be considered one of the most influential and controversial 
groups in the state.  It would play a lead role in the debate over the ACA’s implementation in 
Idaho, making opposing the exchange and Medicaid two of its top legislative priorities. 
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2010 Elections and the Growth of the Tea Party 
 The Idaho Health Freedom Act was arguably unnecessary legislation.  Attorney General 
Wasden did not need the legislature’s permission to file a lawsuit and it would be up to the courts 
to decide whether the federal government had the authority to impose mandates, not state 
legislatures.  Deputy Attorney General Jones had admitted to the Senate State Affairs Committee 
that federal law would likely trump the Idaho legislature on this issue.  Yet, HB 391 was hugely 
important symbolically.  2010 was an election year, with the Republican primaries less than two 
months after the close of the legislative session at the end of March.  Republican incumbents and 
challengers used their support of the Idaho Health Freedom Act to validate their conservative 
credentials.   
The most prominent example is Raul Labrador Labrador who had been one of the 
sponsors of the Idaho Health Freedom Act and ran for the 1st district seat in the U.S. House on a 
platform that included repealing the ACA.  Organizations such as Idaho Chooses Life 
specifically cited his work opposing health reform as the reason for their endorsement (Hurst 
2010b).  Labrador won a surprise victory in the May 2010 Republican primary, beating Vaughn 
Ward who had been one of the top ten candidates in the National Republican Congressional 
Committee’s Young Guns recruiting program (Blake 2010).  
Labrador’s victory in the primary set up an interesting general election contest against 
Walt Minnick, who was among the most conservative Democrats in Congress and who had voted 
against the ACA (Hulse 2010).  The race was complicated by the fact that in April 2010 the 
national Tea Party Express had endorsed Walt Minnick for re-election.  This was the first 
election cycle since the inception of the Tea Party in 2009 and it was unclear what role they 
 202 
 
would play.  He was the only Democrat in the country to receive an endorsement from the Tea 
Party Express and his campaign worried it would hurt him with Democrats and moderates.  
Three months after trepidatiously accepting the endorsement in April 2010, Minnick rejected it 
in July (Stein 2010).  By the fall, the Tea Party Express endorsed Labrador and was running ads 
accusing Minnick of becoming more liberal the longer he stays in Congress.  Even though he 
voted just a few months earlier against the ACA, they lambasted him for refusing to support its 
repeal (Tea Party Express 2010).  At the end of the summer, Labrador was losing by 30 points 
and had only $69,000 in the bank compared to Minnick’s $1.1 million (Ames 2011).  With the 
support of Tea Party groups across the state, Labrador beat Democrat Walt Minnick 51%-41% in 
the general election. 
Labrador’s success was an indication of the prominent role that the Tea Party could play 
in Idaho politics.  By this point, the Tea Party was a decentralized but active network of 
organizations spread across the state.  Pam Stout, leader of the Tea Party organization in 
Sandpoint in northern Idaho was described in the New York Times as being “the hub of a rapidly 
expanding and highly viral network” (Barstow 2010).  Skocpol and Williamson’s (2012) survey 
of the Tea Party in 2011 finds that Idaho is one of only seven states to have as many as 4-6 Tea 
Party organizations per million residents but not have a single city with more than 500 registered 
members.  One online directory of Tea Party organizations lists 13 groups throughout the state 
(Tea Party 911 2013), while another lists 15 (Gem State Tea Party 2013). 
Labrador’s victory was also seen by some as an indication of how Idahoans felt about the 
health reform law.  Opposing the ACA would not be enough to prevent attacks from 
conservatives and the Tea Party.  Candidates needed to demonstrate the intensity of their dislike 
for the law, including pushing for its repeal.  Campaigning on a platform of opposing the 
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implementation of Obamacare in Idaho, Governor Otter was re-elected and Republicans retained 
large majorities in the 2010 elections, winning 80% of the seats in the Senate and 74% of the 
seats in the House.  Though the partisan margins remained similar, the legislature moved further 
to the right, with a handful of seats in Republican districts going to the most conservative 
candidate rather than a moderate.  The legislature that would be considering the ACA’s 
implementation during the crucial years of 2011 and 2012 was even more conservative than the 
legislature that passed the Idaho Health Freedom Act. 
 
Workgroups and Planning Grants 
As legislators pushed for the ACA’s repeal, work was being done behind the scenes to 
prepare for its implementation.  Two agencies played a lead role in this process: the Department 
of Insurance focused on the exchanges, while the Department of Health and Welfare focused on 
the Medicaid expansion.  An official at the Department of Insurance describes the dilemma faced 
by the department: 
All of us key decision makers in Idaho did not want the ACA passed.  There were a lot of 
credible reasons as to why it did not need to be passed.  Our congressional delegation and 
local legislators all agree that this wasn’t the right choice to make health care available to 
more people.  At the same time, we probably didn’t have a better idea, but we had a 
better idea how we could do it in Idaho, with the help of federal dollars, to get this turned 
around in Idaho (Interview May 2013). 
 
The dilemma was all the more pronounced given that Governor Otter and Insurance 
Commissioner Bill Deal had already created a health insurance exchange on a smaller scale.  
Shortly after taking office in 2007, Governor Otter had convened a task force to improve the 
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affordability and accessibility of health care in Idaho.  One of the recommendations was to 
establish a website on which consumers could compare the products of the three main insurance 
companies.  Legislation was not sought, but in subsequent months this was added to the 
Department of Insurance web site.   
An insurance department official explains that he and the Otter administration were not 
opposed to an exchange in principle, but saw Obamacare’s version as overly cumbersome 
(Interview May 2013).  Even so, their initial reaction was to explore what it would mean to build 
their own exchange so that they did not have to give up control to the federal government.  On 
September 30, 2010, the Department of Insurance was one of 48 states awarded a planning grant 
by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).  The state received $1 million to 
accomplish ten tasks, including “engage stakeholders and create strategies for continued 
engagement,” “evaluate existing government and non-government structures for opportunities to 
integrate these structures to support an exchange,” “create recommendations for governance 
structures,” and “identify needed enabling legislation and regulations” (CMS 2014). 
Although primarily focused on Medicaid, the Department of Health and Welfare played 
an important role in the planning for an exchange.  In 2009, the department had begun 
implementing a new Medicaid eligibility system for the first time in 20 years.  As one official 
described it, the new Medicaid system would have to connect with whatever exchange was 
created, whether by the state or the federal government.  “It didn’t matter which kind of 
exchange it was; we have a new friend in town we need to work with,” (Interview October 
2013).   
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Officials in both agencies describe the difficulty of preparing for the ACA’s 
implementation given the state’s political climate, particularly with a governor and legislature so 
firmly opposed to the law.  One Medicaid official explained: 
We were trying to figure out how to do this without upsetting anybody and make them 
think we’re going against anybody.  Our approach is saying that this is the law of the 
land, what do you expect us to do?  If we don’t meet the law and timelines, there are 
consequences funding-wise, especially for Medicaid.  You can’t say we don’t have a 
choice – we have to connect to an exchange (Interview October 2013). 
 
 Compounding the challenge was that leaders in the agencies felt they were not getting 
enough direction from the Obama administration.  It is not that they wanted federal involvement, 
but they feared they would have to retrace their steps once CMS issued regulations.  Another 
bureaucrat described that “We went pretty fast to try and get this moved, and I think federal 
agencies were scrambling to try and catch up and do it in a way that is meaningful to states… It 
got pretty old pretty quickly to continually be told ‘we’ll get back to you’ by CMS,” (Interview 
October 2013).   
In December 2010, Governor Otter followed through with a commitment in the state’s 
planning grant to engage stakeholders on the ACA’s implementation.  He issued an executive 
order calling for the creation of the Idaho Health Care Council, comprised of agency officials 
and stakeholders appointed by the governor.  The three workgroups that were created became an 
important forum for stakeholders to voice their opinions on the ACA.  Ultimately, the seeds for 
the creation of a state-based exchange were sown in these meetings. 
This was a delicate balancing act for the Otter administration.  The Idaho Health Freedom 
Act passed earlier in 2010 said that no state official was to play any role in implementing or 
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enforcing a federal mandate.  Some argued that bureaucrats were breaking this law by doing any 
work to prepare for the creation of an exchange and expansion of Medicaid.  Settling this 
question would be one of the primary issues of the upcoming legislative session. 
 
2) January 2011 – October 2011 
The ACA had been signed into law by President Obama just two weeks before the close 
of Idaho’s 2010 legislative session, meaning that 2011 was the first opportunity for the 
legislature to fully respond to the requirements of implementing health reform.  Governor Otter’s 
state of the state speech to open the session on January 10th struck a strong but balanced tone.  
He railed against “the exorbitant costs being imposed on us by Obamacare,” and said he was 
working aggressively to eliminate the law either through the courts or through Congress.  He 
specifically mentioned nullification as an option the state should consider.  At the same time, he 
said that “we are responsibly preparing for watershed changes that may be on the way” (Otter 
2011a).  The 2011 legislative session was marked by tension between those pushing for 
nullification and those pushing for a state role in implementing the ACA. 
 
Nullification 
 Nullification, the idea that a state can declare a particular federal law null and void within 
their borders, had some momentum as a response to the ACA.  In the closing months of 2010 and 
the opening months of 2011, nullification legislation was introduced in at least 13 states.  A bill 
was introduced in Idaho with Governor Otter’s support.  The Attorney General’s office, the same 
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office that was in the midst of suing the federal government over the ACA, responded that “there 
is no right to pick and choose which federal laws a state will follow.”  Wayne Hoffman of the 
Idaho Freedom Foundation worked with legislators on the nullification bill and the Tea Party 
mobilized large groups to committee hearings.  They used many of the arguments that would 
later be made against doing an exchange, such as that Obamacare put the country on a dangerous 
path towards socialism and that REAL ID set a precedent that the federal government would 
delay enforcement of a mandate if enough states resisted.  The House approved HB 117 mostly 
along party lines, but the bill was defeated by the Senate State Affairs Committee after a volatile 
meeting.  Audience members yelled out of turn and a Tea Party group stood outside the Senate 
auditorium calling each senator voting no a coward as they walked out of the room (AP 2011d).    
 The fight over nullification was not dead, as two more bills were introduced that session.  
One of them, House Bill 298, passed the House with similar margins as the previous bill and 
then made it through the Senate on a vote of 24-11.  The goal of this bill was not to nullify the 
ACA, but to say that nobody in the state would be allowed to do anything related to its 
implementation.  One Senate leader who voted against the original nullification bill but voted for 
HB 298 and would ultimately support a state-based exchange explained the bill this way: 
What we said to the opponents was, look, we’ll take the governor’s bill and take out the 
heavy-handed, we know it’s not going anywhere, crap.  We did not insert any new 
language, we just pulled out the obvious stuff and sent [Governor Otter] his bill, which 
was nullification-lite. It says we’re not nullifying it, it’s still law, but you can’t force us to 
do it.  The state of Idaho isn’t going to do it; you’re going to have to do it (Interview 
April 2013). 
 
Two weeks later, Governor Otter vetoed HB 298, his only veto of the 2011 legislative 
session.  The same Senator described being stunned, wanting to say to Governor Otter “What do 
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you mean we can’t do this? This is your bill! It’s your bill, less the nullification stuff!” 
(Interview April 2013).  The veto message explained that “No one has opposed Obamacare more 
vehemently than me,” before going on to reiterate his support for the previous year’s Idaho 
Health Freedom Act and the multi-state lawsuit of which Idaho was a part.  The first explanation 
he gives for his veto is that it would eliminate the possibility that Idaho would be able to create a 
health insurance exchange.  He clarifies that he does not want to implement Obamacare, but that 
he also does not want to cede control to the federal government should all the avenues of 
opposition prove fruitless.  He goes on to write that “I see value in evaluating an Idaho Health 
Insurance Exchange and have been an advocate for doing so before the concept was co-opted by 
the national government” (Otter 2011b). 
 On the same day as his veto, Governor Otter issued Executive Order 2011-03 (2011) to 
accomplish many of the same objectives as HB 298, but still preserving the option of creating an 
exchange.  State agencies were prevented from working on any aspect of implementing the ACA 
except planning for an exchange. One of Governor Otter’s advisers explained that “Our office 
felt that the legislature didn’t understand how deeply their bill would affect our state.  The ACA 
has a lot of other parts the legislature’s bill would have made too much difficult,” (Interview 
June 2011).  In addition to wanting to preserve the option of doing an exchange, Medicaid 
officials described wanting to take advantage of ACA grants to support upgrades to the state’s 
eligibility system that were being done even before the ACA entered the picture (Interview 
October 2013). 
Governor Otter was trying to walk a fine line between opposing the ACA and 
maintaining the option of state control of an exchange.  Many conservatives wished he had gone 
further in his opposition, but were pleased with his executive order.  The press release from the 
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governor’s office about the executive order included supportive quotes from people who would 
be his most ardent opponents on the exchange two years later.  Wayne Hoffman of the Idaho 
Freedom Foundation is described as having “worked closely with legislative sponsors of House 
Bill 298,” but saw the executive order as “an important step in the right direction for Idaho and 
for freedom.”  Senator Russ Fulcher, who would challenge Otter for the Republican nomination 
for governor in 2014 largely over their difference on the exchange was described as 
“welcoming” the executive order, and saying “I’m just thankful to have the Governor’s support 
on the issue” (Otter 2011c). 
  
Grant Money Rejected 
Governor Otter’s veto and executive order brought the issue of an insurance exchange to 
the forefront.  It would be another eight months before the legislature reconvened in January 
2012.  In the meantime, the executive branch tried to continue planning for the creation of a 
state-based exchange in case the legislature ultimately moved in that direction.  However, in 
addition to being restricted by the Idaho Health Freedom Act of 2010, state agencies were not 
allowed to spend any money that the legislature had not appropriated.   
A leader in the Department of Insurance explains that the timing of federal grants is 
complicated by the state’s calendar.  When the legislature is not in session, agencies are allowed 
to spend federal grant money if they have the governor’s approval.  When the legislature is back 
in session, it can refuse to appropriate this money going forward.  If the agency wants to 
continue these activities, it has to pay for it from its own budget (Interview June 2011).  State 
agencies needed approval during the 2011 session in order to spend the $1 million exchange 
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planning grant received the previous fall, as well as a $1 million grant to reform insurance rate 
review.  An advisor to Governor Otter explains the careful way in which this request was framed 
to the legislature.  “We explained why we wanted the money for planning, not really for 
implementation.” (Interview June 2011).   
The appropriations bill passed the Senate 20-15, but was not even voted on in the House 
(ID SB 1158 2011).  Opponents argued that the money was “bait” and that the state would be 
trapped into implementing the ACA if it accepted federal grants (Murphy 2011a).  Instead, the 
legislature appropriated $500,000 to support planning activities for the exchange and rate review.  
Supporters of an exchange were frustrated that not only would they only have a quarter of the 
money had they been allowed to spend the federal grants, but it would now come out of the 
state’s budget (Interviews 2013-2014).   
 This episode was also an important moment for key actors.  First, Wayne Hoffman of the 
Idaho Freedom Foundation was largely given credit for making conservatives aware of the 
opportunity to resist Obamacare by blocking the appropriation of grant money, and then 
convincing them to take this step.  This success was seen as another example of Hoffman’s 
growing influence in state politics and strengthened his statute going into subsequent sessions 
(Interviews 2011-2013). 
Second, the failure to pass the Department of Insurance budget was seen as a major blow 
to Director Bill Deal.  One member of the House explains that “After the 2011 session, Deal 
continued to be an important contact with CCIIO, but took a backseat to the governor’s office 
and the business community as far as driving this bill. I think that he didn’t want to have his 
history be a determining factor,” (Interview December 2011).  Deal had served in the House for 
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more than 25 years, having left the House after a failed bid to become speaker during the 2007 
session.  As a result, he had a complicated history with some of the people whose support he 
needed to create an exchange.  As one legislator describes, “He was then rapidly moved from the 
House and was made the director of the Department of Insurance.  This kind of protected him 
because House leaders Denney and Moyle would have had him sit on the back bench and just 
kind of play with him,” (Interview December 2011).   
With limited money and political support, there was little state bureaucrats could do to 
prepare for the creation of exchange throughout 2011.  They attempted to keep up with the 
federal timeline as much as possible, but largely shifted their focus to getting ready for the 2012 
session.  One Department of Insurance official explained that “We need legislation in place in 
the 2012 session…in order to meet the January 2013 deadline.  Our goal is to have legislation out 
there on January 2012” so that the House and Senate can move quickly to consider their bill once 
in session (Interview June 2011). 
 
3) November 2011 – June 2012 
Three important events took place in Idaho during the period between when the U.S. 
Supreme Court announced in November 2011 that it would hear the ACA case and when it ruled 
in June 2012.  The first was the 2012 legislative session in which no action was taken on an 
exchange.  Second was the coming together a coalition of interest groups supporting state control 
of an exchange.  Third were the primary elections held on May 15th.  The last two significantly 
altered the political landscape for the 2013 session in which legislation would pass to create an 
exchange. 
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2012 Session 
 In the weeks leading up to the 2012 session, many supporters of a state-based exchange 
were optimistic that enabling legislation could pass.  In the words of one House Democrat, “My 
guess is there will be two bills we’ll have to deal with this year. One will be to do the statutory 
changes necessary for the exchange to exist. The other is an appropriations bill. Both of those 
will give opportunity for the nullifiers to rant and rave, carry flags, and throw bombs, and that 
kind of stuff. My feeling now is that there is enough understanding about what a state exchange 
versus a federal exchange means to businesses in the state of Idaho that they both might pass, 
actually,” (Interview December 2011).   
However, no exchange bills were even introduced during the 2012 session, let alone 
passed.  Governor Otter told legislators he supported the concept of a state-run exchange, but he 
did little behind the scenes to push them to pass legislation.  Wayne Hoffman of the Idaho 
Freedom Foundation takes credit for this, saying that “A lot of that was our doing, putting the 
political pieces in place to stop the governor from being able to wrap his arms around that 
politically,” (Interview April 2013).  Others agree that the Idaho Freedom Foundation played an 
important role, but cite House Speaker Lawrence Denney as the most important player. 
Speaker Denney strongly opposed all aspects of the ACA, including the creation of a 
state-based insurance exchange.  He worked behind the scenes to ensure that if a bill was 
introduced, it would not receive a hearing in committee.  Interest group leaders closely watched 
to see if Representative Janice McGeachin, Chair of the House Health and Welfare Committee, 
would follow Speaker Denney or if she would let a bill to move forward.  Shortly before the start 
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of the session, she announced on an Idaho Falls radio show that she was against an exchange and 
would not allow legislation to proceed (Interviews 2012-2013).   
Supporters of an exchange pressed Speaker Denney to at least allow the bill to come up 
for a vote.  A lobbyist for one of the state’s insurance companies believes that Denney was 
nervous that an exchange bill would probably pass if he gave it a hearing.  Supporters of an 
exchange felt they had enough votes for a bill to pass the Senate and that they were close in the 
House.  This person explains a series of frustrating encounters: 
I have never beaten my head against a wall so many times because I would go see 
Lawrence Denney because he would say ‘if you can do this, come back and talk and 
we’ll see about giving it a hearing.’ I would then go do that and then he would move the 
goal post.” He asked us to assure him that the majority of Republicans in the house would 
vote for it. We went out and we did that. We went back to him again and again and 
nothing. He strung it out. He knew exactly what he was doing. He kept stringing it out 
and stringing it out until there was no time left. Nothing happened (Interview May 2013). 
 
An advisor to Governor Otter explains that it would have been futile to push against House 
leadership over an exchange, as well as detrimental to the rest of his legislative agenda 
(Interview May 2013).  Without a strong commitment from Governor Otter, there was little that 
supporters of an exchange could do to overcome opposition by Speaker Denney and 
Representative McGeachin.  Even if they had succeeded in getting a hearing, it is unclear that 
enough Republicans would have joined the Democrats to pass a bill.  Many hoped that the issue 
would go away as a result of the upcoming Supreme Court ruling and the upcoming presidential 
election (Interviews 2012-2013).  Against these odds, legislation was never introduced. 
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Industry Coalition Develops 
Interest groups began to take a two year approach to winning support for a state-based 
exchange when they realized legislation was not going to pass.  Their strategy for the end of the 
2012 session in March was to plant seeds and strengthen their coalition for next year’s session 
(Interviews 2013).  Two of Idaho’s most powerful interest groups played a central role in this 
process, the Idaho Association of Commerce and Industry (IACI) and the Boise Metro Chamber 
of Commerce.  Both organizations are influential because they represent a large number of 
Idaho’s businesses, including groups with the greatest interest in an exchange such as providers 
and small business owners. 
By 2012, both IACI and the Boise Metro Chamber had gone through a comprehensive 
internal process and determined that there was strong consensus in favor of a state-run exchange.  
Someone involved in IACI’s process describes that, “We don’t have the ability in a small state 
like Idaho to call someone up in D.C. and resolve a problem promptly.  We do have that 
opportunity in the state of Idaho.  If we have a problem we can call the Department of Insurance 
and get a resolution in a hurry.”  This person adds that “Our view was that if we’re going to do 
this, we’re better off at least having the state have some level of control in the process,” 
(Interview May 2013). 
Leaders from these groups were frustrated by the arguments made by conservative 
organizations they often align with.  As one person from the Boise Metro Chamber described: 
To be frank, I was highly disappointed in the CATO Institute and those folks…From a 
business perspective we have to do this regardless.  They said that one way to get around 
this is to de-certify the licensing of all of our insurance companies in Idaho.  That is a 
joke.  The other way is to resist paying your taxes. That’s a joke too.  If you want to stay 
in business, the IRS doesn’t give a damn what you’re doing from that perspective; if 
you’re not paying your taxes you’ll get shut down. They were offering nothing except 
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settling on a philosophical argument. We don’t have that option; we have to conform 
(Interview May 2013). 
 
Not every interest was in favor of a state-run exchange.  One of the most prominent 
opponents was the Idaho Farm Bureau (IFB).  Claiming to represent 64,000 Idahoan families in 
the agricultural industry, the Farm Bureau was one of the only groups to go on record in 2010 
supporting the Idaho Health Freedom and in 2011 supporting the nullification bills.  One of the 
organization’s leaders acknowledges the tension over maintaining state control, saying “I think it 
seems strange to people why we took this position. Generally, we are all in favor of the 
government most local doing the job.  If the county can do it, then the country should do it.  We 
don’t want the federal government involved.  It seems a little counter-intuitive that we’d be 
taking that position,” (Interview May 2013).  The organization’s position was decided at the 
2011 Annual Convention held in Coeur D’Alene.  Senators Russ Fulcher and Dean Cameron 
were invited to debate the pros and cons of a state-run insurance exchange, following which IFB 
members discussed the issue extensively and decided to “resist Obamacare in every possible 
way,” including the exchange (Interview May 2013).  The bottom-up nature of this process may 
have contributed to the Farm Bureau taking a different position than other industry groups that 
tended to have a more top-down decision-making process. 
The interest group dynamic in Idaho was largely established by the time the Supreme 
Court ruled on June 28, 2012.  Most of the traditionally powerful groups were in favor of an 
exchange.  On the other side were a handful of industry opponents, such as the Idaho Farm 
Bureau, and ideology-driven groups such as the Tea Party and the Idaho Freedom Foundation.   
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2012 Republican Primaries 
 The other major turning point during this period was the Republican Party primary 
elections held on May 15th.  Three factors made this election unique.  First, the caucus for the 
presidential campaign had already been held two months earlier.  With the next gubernatorial 
election not until 2014, there was little on the ballot besides state legislative races.  Second, this 
was the first election held since redistricting which placed a number of incumbents against each 
other, leading many to retire.  Third, this was the first time the state had a closed primary.  In the 
past there was an open primary, though Republicans accused Democrats of crossing over and 
helping elect weak candidates (Wright 2012).  More than one-third of Idaho’s residents identify 
themselves as independents, meaning that the primary would likely be dominated by the very 
most conservative people in the state (Russell 2012a). 
 These conditions created a perfect storm for infighting within the Republican Party that 
had important consequences for the debate over an exchange.  House Speaker Lawrence Denney 
and House Majority Mike Moyle worked in an unprecedented way to strengthen control over 
their caucus.  They funneled money from the House leadership political action committee (PAC) 
– the Victory Fund PAC – to a separate PAC targeting a handful of incumbent Republicans.  One 
of the people targeted was another member of the House leadership team, Representative Ken 
Roberts.  Moyle said Roberts had lied to him and threatened to defeat him.  “My goal is to make 
Ken’s life miserable because he’s making my life miserable” (Russell 2012b).  Roberts says this 
was not true, calling Denney’s and Moyle’s actions “disingenuous and highly disappointing” 
(Russell 2012c).  Ironically, as a member of the House Leadership, Roberts is the Treasurer of 
the Victory Fund that was being used to try to defeat him.  Another target was Senator Dean 
Cameron, the co-chair of the powerful Joint Finance and Appropriations Committee (JFAC) and 
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a strong supporter of a state-run exchange.  None of the candidates targeted by Denney and 
Moyle were defeated, severely weakening their leadership in the House going into the 2013 
legislative session.   
 According to Tea Party leaders, another narrative of the 2012 primaries was that insurers 
and other interest groups spent large amounts of money to support advocates of a state-based 
exchange (Interviews 2012-2013).  There is limited evidence that this was the case.  In fact, it 
was the Idaho Farm Bureau that was the largest spender in races for the House, the chamber seen 
as most important for determining the outcome of the exchange debate.  Blue Cross of Idaho was 
the 15th largest spender at an amount one-third of the Idaho Farm Bureau’s.  Select Health was 
17th and the Idaho Hospital Association was 19th.  There was a very similar dynamic in Senate 
races (Follow the Money 2012).  
One piece of evidence supporting the claim by Tea Party leaders is that IACI, a strong 
supporter of the exchange, was the third largest spender in the state in terms of independent 
expenditures.  They spent a total of $89,613 – quite a bit of money for Idaho politics – 
independently supporting candidates across the state, in addition to contributions made directly 
to each campaign.  Yet, this was approximately the same amount as IACI had spent in the 
previous election cycle, before exchanges were on the legislative agenda (Follow the Money 
2012). 
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4) July 2012 – October 2013 
It was unclear at the time what the primary election results would mean for the prospects 
of a state-run insurance exchange.  Legislation had little chance of advancing as long as 
Lawrence Denney was Speaker.  However, in the wake of the contentious primary season, there 
was talk that someone might challenge him in the upcoming session.  The Supreme Court’s 
decision in June and the national election results in November meant that the issue was still very 
much alive as legislators reconvened for the 2013 session.  Infighting within the Republican 
Party would culminate in March 2013 with the passage of HB 248 creating an insurance 
exchange.   
 
2013 Organizational Session 
 Re-elected and newly elected legislators meet every other December to select their 
leaders for the next two years.  The organizational session is often a formality in which the 
previous officers are re-elected.  Occasionally there are heated contests to fill open positions, but 
it is unprecedented for a current leader to be challenged by a member of his party.  As legislators 
met in December 2012 to prepare for the upcoming 2013 session, many Republicans were upset 
with Speaker Denney and House Majority Moyle for trying to defeat incumbents in the previous 
primary.  Many did not like Denney and Moyle’s style, describing them as vindictive, closed, 
and holding on to grudges.  Representative Scott Bedke of Oakley saw an opening and decided 
to make a run at the Speakership (Interviews 2013). 
 Bedke conducted a highly personalized campaign to win enough support within the 
Republican caucus.  Redistricting and retirements in 2012 meant that more than a third of the 
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legislature would be new in 2013.  As Denney and Moyle were making enemies of Republican 
incumbents, Bedke focused on helping Republicans running for open seats.  Many of these 
Republican freshmen explain that he personally drove out to their remote corner of the state to 
give his support (Interviews 2013).  Bedke contributed between $200 and $1,250 to the 
campaigns of all but one of the 23 newly elected House Republicans (Follow the Money 2012).  
This was not enough money to swing an election for most candidates, but it was a symbol of 
involvement and support.  Denney’s Victory Fund PAC contributed to all but five of the newly 
elected House Republicans, meaning that Bedke had contributed to four more new legislators 
than had Denney.  The vote for speaker was a closed ballot, but many interviewed say it was 
close enough that four people may have made the difference (Interviews 2013). 
 Interest groups had a lot at stake in the speaker’s race, though none got involved publicly.  
A leader of a business organization compared lobbying about the leadership race to “playing 
with fire,” (Interview May 2013).  Another industry representative explained that “There is one 
sacred area that lobbyists will not engage in, and that is the politics of leadership,” (Interview 
May 2013).  In other words, the most important moment in the 2013 legislative session had no 
direct engagement from interest groups. 
 Scott Bedke’s election as Speaker meant that the idea of creating a state-run insurance 
exchange would be allowed to progress.  It is ironic that the most important turning point in the 
debate over an exchange had nothing directly to do with the politics of health reform.  Speaker 
Bedke did not initially indicate whether he would support an exchange, but made it clear he 
would allow bills to be introduced, hearings to be held, and votes to be called on controversial 
issues.  A member of the House explained that “There was a different leadership style and 
culture, leading to a different feel in the House,” (Interview May 2013).   
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Speaker Bedke ultimately decided to support an exchange.  A Republican Senator who 
supported an exchange said that “It changed the whole dynamic.  If [an exchange] was going to 
get hung up, it would probably be in the House, which is where the opposition to that type of 
thing had been the strongest in the past,” (Interview May 2013).  Another Republican Senator 
describes Speaker Bedke’s evolution on an exchange, saying that: 
At least he wanted to give the bill an opportunity to be heard.  In fact, even to speaker 
Bedke’s credit, he spent literally hours learning about the pros and cons, and learning 
about the issues. He became very knowledgeable.  With that knowledge, he decided that 
the decision to have a state-based exchange was preferable compared to the federal 
exchange.  He became a proponent. 
 
Bedke’s support was particularly consequential because he had the power to decide which 
committee an exchange bill would be sent to, who chaired the committee, and which members 
sat on the committee.  Representative Janice McGeachin had retired the previous year, meaning 
that the position of Chair of the House Health and Welfare Committee was open.  Bedke 
appointed Fred Wood, a practicing physician who was one of the people representing the 
legislature on Governor Otter’s task force and who was a big proponent of an Idaho exchange.  
Tea Party leaders and even supporters of an exchange suggest that it appears Bedke stacked the 
Health and Welfare Committee to pass exchange legislative, noting that along with the 
Democrats, he already had enough votes to get the bill out of committee (Interviews 2013).  As 
supporters of an exchange would soon find out, this did not ensure that a bill would ultimately 
make it out of the House and be signed into law. 
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Governor Otter Deliberates 
 With Lawrence Denney no longer blocking legislation, Governor Otter was free to 
support a state-based exchange.  The only reason this was still a possibility in December 2012 
was because HHS had pushed the previous deadline of November 16th back a month.  Senate 
leadership met with Governor Otter in mid-November, shortly after the deadline extension, but 
before Scott Bedke had become the new speaker.  They were concerned with whether the 
governor had the right to create an exchange on his own in the absence of legislation.  Senate 
leaders saw this as a separation of powers issue even more important than an exchange, saying 
that “We wanted to make sure we had a pattern in place that says the legislature, as hard as it is 
to wrestle with these issues, should have to,” (Interview April 2013).  They consulted with a 
private law firm to explore their options in case the Governor acted on his own.  One person 
summarized the November meeting saying “He made us a – I don’t know if the word is a 
promise – but I certainly left that meeting confident that he was not going to issue an executive 
order to make a decision without including us,” (Interview May 2013). 
Governor Otter went through a surprisingly involved deliberation over the exchange 
considering that he had supported the concept the year before. In December, he told the 
leadership teams from both chambers that he had not yet decided what to do.  He read from a 
recent press release by Governor Chris Christie explaining why he had vetoed legislation in New 
Jersey.  Legislative leaders told him that they would not advance legislation if he was not going 
to support it.  One person in the room explains that “I honestly left that meeting thinking that 
he’s not going to do this,” (Interview April 2013).   
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Another meeting was scheduled for the following week, just days before the new HHS 
deadline to declare a state’s intention to create an exchange.  All four members of the Senate 
leadership were in attendance, but Speaker Bedke was the only leader from the House.  Governor 
Otter announced that he was going to support a state-based exchange.  Senator Majority Leader 
Bart Davis referred to this moment during the Senate debate, quoting Governor Otter as saying 
that this was the second hardest decision he has made in public office, only behind his vote in 
Congress to oppose the Patriot Act (ID Senate Debate, February 21, 2013). 
Governor Otter was under pressure from business interests supporting an exchange and 
far right Republicans who were opposed.  An adviser explains that he went to a Republican 
Governor’s Association meeting around this time and “He knew how everyone was feeling, that 
if we all don’t do it, the whole thing would fall apart,” (Interview May 2013).  Interest group 
leaders praised the governor for his support.  For example, a prominent insurance agent said 
“Otter put forth an enormous amount of courage, saying I know my party is against this and 
thinks I’m stupid, but I have to think about what’s best for the state of Idaho.  My opinion from 
talking to Otter, his staff, the Department of Insurance, the people I’ve talked to over the last two 
years, I really think he came down with the decision that the businesses and people he talked to 
didn’t think he had a choice,” (Interview May 2013).  Another industry leader added that “By 
that time, the Supreme Court had ruled and Romney had lost.  So the grand scenario for 
Republicans was not going to take place. Otter said we may not like it, but it’s the law of the law 
of the land,” (Interview My 2013). 
Having decided to support an exchange, Governor Otter now faced a number of other 
challenges, including how to meet the Obama administration’s deadline while the legislature was 
out of session for a few more weeks, how strongly to push the legislature, and what tactics to 
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employ.  This moment was widely seen as a huge test of leadership for Governor Otter (Russell 
2013a).  The first challenge was easily overcome, as leaders at HHS were more than happy to 
cooperate with a Republican governor trying to create an exchange in a solidly red state.  An 
adviser to Governor Otter explained that “It’s not that we gained a seat at the table, at this point 
we feel like we created the table.  We really have gotten a lot of concessions from them and they 
really do want us to succeed.  There are other states that don’t have that,” (Interview May 2013).  
In fact, this adviser explains that other Republican governors were asking him to advocate to 
HHS on their behalf, observing that he had a relationship they did not (Interview May 2013).   
Governor Otter decided to put the full weight of his office behind a state-based exchange.  
He spoke strongly in favor of an exchange during his state of the state speech on the first day of 
the session in January 2013 (Otter 2013).  The governor’s office took the lead in coordinating 
lobbying groups in favor of an exchange, as well as drafting legislation.  David Hensley, 
Governor Otter’s Chief of Staff, personally introduced legislation before committees in either 
chamber.  He and Tammy Perkins, the health adviser to Governor Otter, held regular breakfast 
and lunch meetings with legislators throughout the session to answer questions about an 
exchange. 
 Stakeholders on both sides of the debate stressed the importance of Governor Otter’s 
support.  One opponent said “The fact that the governor supported an exchange in Idaho was 
key.  If he hadn’t, the idea would have been dead on arrival,” (April 2013).  Others noted that the 
amount of time dedicated to this issue by Hensley and Perkins indicated how high a priority this 
was for Governor Otter (Interviews 2013).  An industry leader praised Hensley, saying that “He 
was brilliant at calmly explaining the merits of an exchange. He had an outstanding demeanor…I 
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thought he did a masterful job,” (Interview may 2013).  Tea Party leaders were angry, calling 
him a traitor (Interviews 2013).   
 
SB 1042 Introduced 
 An early strategic decision legislative leaders had to make was which chamber should 
consider the bill first.  The legislative process in some states resembles Congress’ in which 
chambers work on similar legislation in parallel and resolve differences through a conference 
committee.  By contrast, legislation in Idaho is typically considered one chamber at a time.  In 
other words, the Senate does not consider a bill until after it has been approved by the House, 
and vice versa. 
 Many Senators strongly preferred that the process begin in the House since this was 
likely to be the more difficult chamber.  They did not want to have to take a tough vote if they 
did not have to (Interviews 2013).  Much to their frustration, Senate Pro Temp Brent Hill agreed 
to start the process in the Senate, hoping that a solid victory there would generate momentum 
going into the House debate.  Also, turnover in the House was particularly high, with 30 of the 
70 representatives being brand new.  As one legislative leader explained, “This was a very hot 
and emotional issue.  Starting in the Senate gave [new legislators] more time for the learning 
curve,” (Interview May 2013). 
Senate Bill 1042 was introduced on January 30th in the Senate Commerce and Human 
Resources Committee, the Senate committee that typically handles insurance legislation.  
Senators note that unlike in the House where the Speaker has significant discretion over 
committee assignments, Senators get to select their committees according to seniority.  As a 
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result, it was not possible for Senate leaders to stack the committee in favor of an exchange.  
However, it did help that two members of the committee, Senators Dean Cameron and John 
Goedde are both insurance agents during the rest of the year the legislature is not in session.  A 
fellow Senator on the committee explains, “They had the background information to answer the 
technical questions,” and played a leadership role behind the scenes (Interview May 2013).   
Senator John Tippets anticipated a large crowd and a heated debated at the bill’s 
committee hearing on February 5th.  He would not be able to accommodate everyone that came 
to testify, but wanted to make sure everyone felt heard.  He gave each person three minutes to 
speak, except Governor Otter’s chief of staff to introduce the bill and Wayne Hoffman of the 
Idaho Freedom Foundation to oppose it, who were given ten minutes.  Testimony alternated 
between supporters and opponents, and so it was not obvious which side had more support.  
Supporters tended to be from industry, praising the advantages of local control.  Opponents 
tended to be private citizens, warning about a government takeover of health care.  One person 
testified that by supporting an exchange, the governor was accepting full ownership of the ACA, 
and that in Idaho the law would now be known as “Ottercare” (Russell 2013b). 
At the conclusion of the meeting, Senator Tippets thanked everyone for holding a civil 
debate.  He explained that the meeting would continue two days later so more people would have 
an opportunity to speak.  On February 7th, the legislative auditorium was once again packed.  
This time, Tea Party members wore bright pink pieces of duct tape on their lapels.  A senator on 
the committee explains that “Our rules are clear that people are not allowed to bring signs or 
wear pins that have a message, but they wanted the committee to know that most people in 
attendance were opposed to an exchange, and this was a creative way of doing this,” (Interview 
May 2013).  Despite a strong showing and aggressive testimony by the Tea Party, the committee 
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passed SB 1042 by a vote of 8-1.  The only no vote came from a Democrat who supported the 
concept of an exchange but wanted more legislative oversight.  Governor Otter put out a 
statement saying that he was proud of Senate Republicans for voting unanimously in favor of 
state control of the exchange (Russell 2013d). 
A few days later, SB 1042 appeared on the Senate docket for a floor debate and vote.  
Without explanation, the debate was pushed back.  As the bill came up for a debate again, the 
same thing happened.  After nearly a week of delays it was reported that the reason was that a 
group of 16 House freshmen were about to introduce their own exchange bill (Popkey 2013).   
The typical legislative process was now being turned on its head. 
 
The Freshmen 16 
 As SB 1042 made its way through the Senate, a number of House Republicans expressed 
frustration over the choice they would soon need to make.  They did not like Obamacare, but 
wanted state control of the exchange, including strong legislative oversight.  SB 1042 gave 
control of Idaho’s exchange to an independent board of directors that did not include any 
legislators or people appointed by the legislature (ID SB 1042 2013).  One freshman Republican 
explains that “I felt like a fish out of water flopping all around, because one second I’m going, 
‘ya, this part makes sense. Maybe we’ll do this and not be complicit, but then I’d think ‘no, I 
don’t want this to happen,’ and I was flip flopping all over the place. And it was not a very 
comfortable feeling,” (Interview April 2013).   
   Representative Luke Malek had similar feelings and began having informal 
conversations with fellow freshmen Republicans in the hallway.  He organized a meeting in 
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which options were discussed.  They decided to write a trailer bill to the Senate bill, meaning 
that their bill would only become law if SB 1042 also became law.  Legislation was drafted by 
the next morning and they went to Speaker Bedke and Governor Otter that afternoon.  On the 
morning of the third day, 16 freshmen Republicans held a press conference announcing their 
plans (Interviews 2013). 
 Members of the freshmen16 say the speaker and governor were very receptive because  
head counts made it clear that SB 1042 would not pass the House.  These freshmen were a 
lifeline towards winning enough support (Interviews 2013).  Not all Republicans were as 
receptive.  House Republican Brent Crane called Luke Malek to the Capital Building late one 
night. When Malek arrived, U.S. Congressman and former state legislator Raul Labrador was 
there to confront him.  Labrador reportedly made threats to try and convince him to back off on 
the exchange (Interviews 2013).  
It is interesting that Luke Malek only organized freshmen, and not all House Republicans 
supporting an exchange.  One member of the Freshmen 16 explains that none of the freshmen 
had been around for the previous fights over the Idaho Health Care Freedom Act and thus did not 
have the same entrenched positions as other legislators (Interview May 2013).  Another notes, 
“The freshmen found ourselves in a unique position as the new girl at the dance and no one is 
asking us to dance.  So we got together to watch each other’s backs.  The people we could trust 
the most were the people in our same shoes,” (Interview December 2013).   
 People on both sides of the debate over an exchange cite the press conference on 
February 13th by 16 House Freshmen as an important turning point.  An official at the 
Department of Insurance says “That group of 16 was a momentum changer without any 
 228 
 
question,” (Interview May 2013).  A leader at the Idaho Farm Bureau, one of the few industry 
groups opposed to an exchange, explains that “The odds were stacked up against us, but we felt 
we had a chance until the gang of 16…That’s what changed everything. Until that moment, we 
thought many of those freshmen were in play,” (Interview May 2013). 
 
Senate Passes SB 1042 
 It took a few days for Senate leaders to decide how to react to the freshmen 16.  SB 1042 
had already passed the Senate Commerce and Human Resources Committee but had not been 
voted on by the full body.  It was determined that the Senate would try to pass SB 1042 and then 
consider the trailer bill if it passed the House.  One Senate leader explained that House leaders 
appealed to the Senate saying “This is about trust; that you run the original bill over to us and 
we’ll send you the trailer bill.  Once you pass the trailer bill, then we’ll take up the other one,” 
(Interview April 2013). 
The Senate began debating unusually early on February 21st, with an announcement from 
leadership that they would continue until everyone said everything they wanted to say (Russell 
2013e).  The prayer by the Senate Chaplain that morning asked that Senators be “inspired with 
good visions” and “guided through each quandary” (Senate Debate February 21, 2013).  The 
debate was a marathon session lasting more than six hours.  Unlike in Congressional debates 
where statements are generally made before empty chambers, the vast majority of Idaho’s 
Senators remained for the entire debate.  Before the meeting, Senate Pro Temp Brent Hill told 
the caucus that he would be sitting in the chair presiding over the chamber and would not tolerate 
incivility (Interviews 2013).  The debate was passionate, but remarkably respectful.  One 
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opponent of an exchange who did not like the outcome expressed that “It was probably some of 
the greatest debate we have ever seen in recent memory of Idaho politics…People entered the 
chamber as friends and left as friends,” (Interview April 2013). 
 Arguments were generally framed in terms of ideology or the benefits of local control.  
Insurance agents such as Senator Cameron and Senator Goedde argued that an exchange run by 
Idaho could keep user fees low and ensure that fewer insurance mandates would be included.  
Senator Hagerdorn used a unique analogy to explain why he supported an exchange even though 
he opposed Obamacare.  “Our choice is a federal exchange or a state exchange. I can’t ride this 
pig if it’s a federal exchange. I can ride it with spurs on if it’s a state exchange. I select the one 
that I have at least the ability to spur once in a while.”  Senator Cameron and Senator Davis both 
argued that if the Obama administration is able to set up exchanges in most states, then they are 
just one push of a button away from establishing a single-payer system.  Senator Fulcher 
disagreed, saying that complying with Obamacare to any degree put the state on a path towards a 
single-payer system.  He used coded language referencing Mormon scripture that “In my heart 
and in my mind19, I know where this leads, and there is no turning back once we do it.”   
The rhetoric turned a bit more heated by the fourth hour.  Senator Rice declared the ACA 
unconstitutional, regardless of the Supreme Court’s ruling, saying that “John Roberts is a 
Supreme Court Justice and needs to act like it!”  Senator Pearce appealed to the state’s culture of 
independence and resistance, saying “Liberty is the right to choose.  Freedom is the result of a 
choice…Come on folks, this is Idaho!”  Senator McKenzie referenced a Russian author writing 
in a concentration camp during World War II.  The author was quoted as saying “We didn’t love 
                                                           
19
 More than one-third of Idaho’s legislators are Mormon and would likely have recognized this reference.  Doctrine 
and Covenants 8:2 is a verse of Mormon scripture in which Joseph Smith says the Lord explained to him how the 
Holy Ghost reveals truth.  “Behold, I will tell you in your mind and in your heart, by the Holy Ghost, which shall 
come upon you and which shall dwell in your heart.”   
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freedom enough” before then and that “we deserved what happened afterward.”  Senator 
McKenzie concluded, “I will not be complicit in the federal government taking control.  This 
echoed a comment made on Twitter earlier by Senator Sheryl Nuxoll who compared the role of 
insurance companies in an exchange to “the Jews boarding the trains to concentration camps” 
because she believed it made abortion more accessible (Russell 2013f). 
 At the end of the long debate, the Senate voted 23-12 to pass SB 1042.  Senators on both 
sides say that no one changed their minds as a result of the debate, with the final vote exactly as 
they had predicted at the outset.  However, it was not clear what would happen next, including 
whether the House would pass both SB 1042 and the trailer bill, and whether the Senate would 
then pass the trailer bill. 
 
HB 248 Introduced in the House 
 A hearing on the House freshmen’s trailer bill, HB 179, was originally scheduled for 
February 22nd, the day after the Senate debate and vote.  Without public explanation, the bill was 
removed from the agenda of the House Health and Welfare Committee.  Behind the scenes, there 
were concerns from House members about the agreement between the leaders of the two 
chambers over the trailer bill process.  The trailer bill technically could not be passed until after 
the bill it trailed had passed.  In other words, the House would first have to approve SB 1042 
before considering the trailer bill, and then would have to rely on the Senate to win enough votes 
to pass the trailer bill.  This left House freshmen vulnerable to the possibility that the bill passed 
by the Senate would become law while the changes they wanted would not.  The solution was for 
an entirely new bill to be drafted, incorporating elements from the governor’s bill as well as the 
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increased legislative oversight demanded by the 16 House freshmen.  Senate leaders agreed to 
this plan, but were frustrated that it meant they would have to debate exchange legislation once 
again (Interviews 2013). 
 Interest groups on both sides of the debate were mobilized in high gear by the time HB 
248 was introduced on March 4th.  In addition to coordinating large groups to show up at the 
legislative hearings, like when they wore pink duct tape to the Senate committee hearing, Tea 
Party leaders attacked legislators in their home districts.  The local Republican Party 
organization in some counties held votes of no confidence for their freshmen House members 
who supported an exchange.  One interest group leader describes these as “huge, awful meetings 
that were shouting matches in which the police was almost called they were so unruly.  They 
absolutely demeaned these legislators in front of all these people…It’s pretty ugly at the precinct 
level,” (Interview May 2013). 
 A Republican legislative leader tried to put the Tea Party opposition in perspective, 
comparing it to the public outcry over a bill that would have removed the sales tax exemption for 
Girl Scout cookies.  “If you take the amount of email I received in a given week on the girl 
scouts sales tax exemption, and compare it to the total number of emails I received the whole 
year on the state-based exchange, the girls scout cookies sales tax exemption was substantially 
more. What you have is a very loud, obnoxious, but small group of opponents.”   
On the other side, the industry coalition coordinated by Governor Otter’s office, known 
as The Idaho Health Exchange Alliance, now included more than 400 businesses. The Idaho 
Association of Health Plans provided money for the Alliance to hire a private public relations 
firm to do grassroots work.  The Alliance ran radio ads with Governor Otter advocating for state 
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control of the exchange.  A website called KeepitinIdaho.com was developed to showcase the 
strength of the coalition and included a long list of businesses and individuals supporting an 
exchange.   
An adviser to Governor Otter explains that “All the legislators were hearing from the far 
right; they were inundated from the far right.  If you’re only hearing from the far right you 
wonder where everyone else is and figure no one cares.  So the goal of the Alliance was to get 
other people involved and get them to speak up,” (Interview May 2013).  Describing the effects 
of the industry coalition on the debate, one legislative leader says “I think it was huge. It gave 
people courage.  I’m not saying they wouldn’t have done it anyway, but it certainly helped buoy 
up our courage.”  This person goes to explain that IACI and the Chamber Alliance were the two 
most important industry allies.  “When you have got your business groups as a whole supporting 
this, that helps.  We tout ourselves as a pro-business state.  How do you vote against something 
that the majority of your businesses support?” (Interview May 2013). 
 On Thursday March 7th, interests groups on both sides packed the legislative auditorium 
– which had been named after Abraham Lincoln since the Senate Commerce and Human 
Resources Committee held its hearing on SB 1042 a month earlier.  The hearing on HB 248 
began at 7:03 a.m. to give as much time for testimony as possible.  Governor Otter’s chief of 
staff introduced the bill followed from opposing arguments by Wayne Hoffman of the Idaho 
Freedom Foundation.  Twelve people testified in favor of HB 248, including many of the leaders 
of the industry coalition.  Twenty-six people testified against the law, including at least fifteen 
who identified themselves as member of the Tea Party or have an online presence as a member 
of the Tea Party.  Two were members of anti-abortion groups and two were leaders in their 
county Republican Party organizations.  These were very large numbers for an Idaho legislative 
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committee.  By comparison, a combined total of 13 people testified regarding one of the 16 
pieces of legislation considered at the previous five meetings of the House Health and Welfare 
Committee (Idaho House Health and Welfare 2013). 
 The main argument put forward by Tea Party leaders was that HB 248 was a false choice.  
In the words of one person who testified against the bill, “We’ve only got two choices, a state-
run or a federally run exchange.  Which do you want?  That’s a lie.  The third, fourth, and fifth 
choice is nullification.  There’s do nothing and let the 2010 Idaho Health Freedom Act prevail 
(Interview May 2013).  Another opponent told legislators that REAL ID was an example of an 
instance in which the federal government backed off of requirements because so many states 
refused to comply (Interview May 2013).  Despite such heated arguments, the committee passed 
HB 248 on a voice vote.  Only Repreentative Vander Woude asked that his opposition be 
included in the record (Idaho House Health and Welfare Committee 2013). 
 
HB 248 Passes House and Senate 
 Interest groups lobbied aggressively in the week between the House Health and Welfare 
Committee hearing on March 7th and the debate on the House floor on March 13th.  Anticipating 
that the Senate vote on HB 248 might be similar to the previous vote on SB 1042, opponents saw 
this as their last best chance to beat an exchange.  The debate was very similar to the one held 
weeks earlier in the Senate.  Most House members remained in the chamber for the duration of 
the seven hour debate.  The tone was mostly civil, though things did get heated at times.  The 
House gallery was filled with opponents of an exchange, including the state Republican Party 
Chairman who reportedly led applause when opponents spoke.  One legislator believed “This 
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was very inappropriate; very out of line; very unprofessional. He later did send an email to all the 
legislators, at least the Republicans, sort of apologizing. It was more of an ‘If I wasn’t supposed 
to do that, I’m sorry,’ but he’s not really admitting that he did anything wrong,” (Interview April 
2013). 
 The split within the Republican caucus meant the House was effectively divided into 
three factions, Republicans who supported an exchange, Republicans who opposed an exchange, 
and Democrats.  This put the Democratic caucus in the unusual position of being the deciding 
votes even though they only had 13 seats.  An interest group leader explains that although most 
people expected the Democrats to support a state-based exchange, it was not a foregone 
conclusion.  “We didn’t know until the day before what they were going to do,” (Interview May 
2013).  Some wanted to use the situation as leverage on education bills they supported.  House 
Minority Leader John Rusche reportedly talked his caucus out of using the exchange debate this 
way because the two issues were unrelated and unlinked in people’s minds.  They also did not 
want to risk being the reason a state exchange was not created.  As one member of the caucus 
explains, “very few were actually willing to shoot the hostage,” (Interview September 2013). 
 Interest group leaders and Republican supporters of an exchange praise the approach 
taken by Representative Rusche and the Democrats.  One House Republican describes that 
“They did not say one word throughout the whole debate.  They were very wise in understanding 
that this was a party-specific argument.  They knew where they were and that they wouldn’t be 
changing minds,” (Interview May 2013).  In fact, they knew that they might make it harder for 
Republicans to support an exchange if the issue was closely identified with Democrats rather 
than Governor Otter and other Republicans (Interviews 2013). 
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 When the roll call was finally taken, HB 248 passed 41-29 (Idaho House of 
Representatives 2013).  Two of the freshmen 16 ended up voting no, meaning that there were 
ultimately more Republicans (29) voting against the bill than voting for it (28).  Democrats made 
up the difference, with all 13 voting in favor.   
 The Senate then moved quickly on SB 248 so it could be passed by the end of the session 
less than three weeks away.  Senator Tippets began the hearing on March 19th by referencing the 
criticism that he erred by not disclosing a conflict of interest as a member of IACI’s board of 
directors.  He acknowledged that IACI is a primary supporter of an exchange, but explained that 
his relationship did not constitute a conflict of interest.  He also explained that the Attorney 
General’s office agreed there was no conflict (Idaho Senate Commerce and Human Resources 
Committee 2013). 
 Once again, David Hensley introduced the bill on behalf of the governor and Wayne 
Hoffman spoke first for the opponents.  Many of the same people that testified to the Senate on 
SB 1042 and to the House on HB 248 testified again. For example, Tea Party leader Chad Inman 
warned that “Lies will come out and will continue to be told.”  He added that he does not blame 
the committee “because they are under a lot of pressure from lobbyists and the governor” (Idaho 
Senate Commerce and Human Resources Committee 2013). Senator Sheryl Nuxoll, most known 
in this debate for comparing an exchange to the holocaust, took the unusual step of testifying 
against a bill before a committee in the other chamber.  She cited her Catholic faith and warned 
that an exchange would increase access to emergency contraception that was on par with 
abortion.  She was followed by Christine Tiddens of the Catholic Charities of Idaho who 
disagreed, saying that the Diocese of Idaho supported HB 248 and creating an exchange. The 
committee passed HB 248 by a vote of 8-1.  The only no vote once again came from Democrat 
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Brandon Durst even though this bill seemed to address the criticisms he raised when voting 
against SB 1042 (Idaho Senate Commerce and Human Resources Committee 2013). 
 The full Senate voted two days later to pass HB 248.  The roll call was the exact same as 
for SB 1042, with 23 in favor and 12 opposed.  Nobody expected a different outcome, but that 
hardly meant that the debate was a quick formality.  The session started with Republican Senator 
Dean Mortimer objecting to the unanimous consent to waive the full reading of the bill, meaning 
that everyone had to sit and listen as the Senate’s secretary took ten minutes to read all six pages 
of the bill (Russell 2013g).  The debate lasted more than three hours, with critics making many 
of the same attacks against the exchange and supporters giving many of the same defenses as 
during the previous debate.   
 Near the end of the debate, Senate Pro Temp Brent Hill said that “Many will criticize 
your choice here today, either way you vote, because the choices we have stink.  But the critics 
are wrong if they question what’s in your heart, and I thank you for what I see in your hearts.  
I’m proud of you.”  Though the debate was once again remarkably civil and their preferences 
prevailed, legislators privately described this as their most frustrating session and the most 
divided they had ever seen the legislature (Interviews 2013).   
 Governor Otter released a statement shortly after the vote saying “I appreciate the 
legislature’s support enabling me to do what I believe is right for our citizens.  Of course we 
share objections to Obamacare, but as responsible elected officials we are also committed to 
constructively working to the best possible outcomes for Idaho.  I’m grateful for that 
collaboration” (Hill 2013).  Governor Otter signed HB 248 into law one week later on March 
28th. 
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Post-Session 
 In the closing days of the 2013 session, House Minority Leader John Rusche introduced a 
bill to expand Medicaid.  The idea was effectively dead on arrival for two reasons.  First, 
Governor Otter indicated in his state of the state speech three months earlier that he would not 
support Medicaid expansion this year.  Without his support, legislation was not likely to proceed.  
Second, many Republican supporters of the exchange privately expressed that they were burnt 
out on discussing the Affordable Care Act.  The exchange debate had dominated the session for 
so long that there was not time to consider Medicaid.  As a result, Idaho has the distinction of 
being the only state during the ACA’s first full year of implementation (2014) to have chosen a 
state run exchange but rejected the Medicaid expansion (Jones, Singer, and Ayanian 2014). 
 However, one of the consequences of having taken so long to decide to run its exchange 
is that Idaho’s policymakers did not have enough time to develop the IT before open enrollment 
in October 2013.  Governor Otter appointed 19 people to the exchange’s board of directors on 
April 10th, just two weeks after HB 248 was signed into law.  These appointments did not need 
immediate Senate confirmation because they were made after the legislative session had 
concluded, if only by a matter of days.  The board included a wide range of people, such as 
consumer advocates, providers, insurers, agents, and legislators.   
 An agreement was struck with the federal government that the board of Idaho’s exchange 
would retain some policymaking authority, but the state would rely on the federal website 
healthcare.gov for the first year.  One state official describes Idaho not as a federal exchange or a 
fully autonomous state exchange, but a “supported state exchange,” (Interview October 2013).  
Opponents of an exchange cite this as evidence that they were right all along, that Idaho would 
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not really have that much control over its exchange.  The Wall Street Journal criticized Idaho for 
having fought so intensely for control only to give it back to the federal government (Dooren 
2013).  Wayne Hoffman says “The whole thing would be laughable if it wasn’t such a disgrace,” 
(Interview October 2013).   
This intergovernmental dynamic created confusing situations for Idahoans during the first 
weeks of open enrollment in October 2012.  One official describes that when the federal website 
did not work, consumers would phone the Idaho call center located in Boise.  The staff of 10 
people was not able to do much other than refer people to healthcare.gov and give them the 
phone number for the federal call center.  When people then called the federal call center, they 
were told that Idaho was running its own exchange and so they should call the Idaho call center 
(Interview October 2013).  If they did call back, it was to complain that one side was either 
uninformed or lying. 
 Supporters of an exchange explain that they do not regret passing HB 248.  One member 
of the board explains that “There is a big difference between using the federal government as a 
sub-contractor and having the feds run the exchange,” (Interview September 2013).  Other 
members of the board point out that the state is eligible for a lot more grant money for outreach 
than are states that defaulted to the federal government, and that Idaho’s user fee is 1.5% 
compared to 3.5% in federally facilitated exchange states.  They also point to the fact that Idaho 
has the fifth highest enrollment in the country in terms of percent of potential exchange 
population that have signed up at 38% (KFF 2014c). 
 This arrangement with the federal government may be a win-win situation for Idaho 
policymakers.  They are able to control aspects of the exchange they care about such as the level 
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of regulation, user fees, and plan management, without having to focus as much energy on the 
development of IT.  Others see it as a lose-lose situation in that state leaders have been blamed 
for the troubled rollout of healthcare.gov although they had little input on its development and no 
ability to fix its problems.  The truth is probably in the middle and will only become clear with 
time. 
 
Conclusion 
Many factors led to Idaho deciding to create an exchange.  The debate was largely driven 
by party dynamics, but is hardly explained by partisanship alone.  Instead, it is important to 
understand the important role that interest groups played, as well as the extent to which path 
dependence, institutional design, and partisanship shaped the state context, and key decisions by 
the Obama administration shaped the inter-governmental context.  In this section I examine 
Idaho’s decision to create an exchange through each of the theoretical lenses discussed in chapter 
two.   
 
Federalism Context 
 Idaho’s decision-making process most closely matched expectations federal policymakers 
had about how conservative states would respond.  Idaho Republicans voiced their opposition to 
the Affordable Care Act by passing the Idaho Health Freedom Act in 2010, a nullification bill in 
2011, and joining the lawsuit that was decided by the Supreme Court in 2012.  However, once 
these oppositional tactics had run their course, the Republican governor and Republican-led 
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legislature decided it preferred state control of the insurance exchange.  This is exactly the 
reaction the Obama administration was hoping for when it extended the deadline in June 2012 
for the Level 2 Establishment Grant and the deadlines in November and December 2012 for 
declaring intention to create an exchange.  However, Idaho was one of only three states to create 
an exchange after these deadline extensions. 
 Philosophical differences about the role of each level of government played a major role 
in the debate over an insurance exchange.  Advocates on both sides had a preference for local 
control.  However, opponents did not believe that Idaho would have much autonomy even if it 
created an exchange.  Wayne Hoffman of the Idaho Freedom Foundation described the ACA’s 
intergovernmental dynamic as “a form of phony federalism.”  He believed that the federal 
government is giving states the illusion of control, while setting the rules and guidelines 
nationally (Interview April 2013).  This is a valid argument to a certain point.  Unlike with 
Medicaid or CHIP, the state has limited discretion to shape the program and handle funds.  It 
determines the essential health benefits, but only within the constraints of HHS regulations.  It 
acts merely as an in-between for residents, insurance companies, and the federal government.  
The argument is exaggerated in that states do have significant discretion over the type of 
exchange created and how it is governed.  The strong level of support among Idaho’s industries 
suggests they believed the state would retain control in important ways. 
 Opponents argued that in addition to nullification, states could block federal law.  If 
enough states resisted the ACA, they believed the entire law would collapse under its own 
weight.  Supporters of an exchange did not agree, with one Senate leader saying that the 
difference between REAL ID and the ACA was “like comparing apples to helicopters.  This is 
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the President’s legacy bill,” (Interview April 2013).  The implication was that President Obama 
would not back down. 
 The policy-making process was also shaped by practical realities of federalism in 
practice.  Officials at HHS focused most of their energy on the executive branch, working 
particularly closely with bureaucrats at the Department of Health and Welfare and the 
Department of Insurance.  HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius met personally with Governor Otter 
on multiple occasions, saying she would do whatever she could within the law to help him 
succeed (Interviews 2012-2013).   
 Officials at the Idaho Department of Insurance describe that the relationship with HHS 
grew particularly strong after Governor decided he would push for a state-based exchange in the 
2013 session.  HHS was excited that at least one fully Republican-led state might create an 
exchange.  According to one bureaucrat, “Once Governor Otter made the decision that Idaho 
should have a state-based exchange, we began to have very good support from CCIIO.  We were 
assigned a couple of very knowledgeable helpers that are working with us today. That was a real 
change as far as I could interpret it,” (Interview May 2013).  
 By contrast, the Obama administration was limited in its ability to work with Idaho’s 
legislative branch.  Unlike state agencies which have designated people as contacts for the 
federal government, there are so many important players that it is difficult to know who to 
negotiate with in the legislature.  Each state has its own unique political culture and set of 
personalities, making it particularly difficult for the Obama administration to know how to 
intercede.  Instead, it primarily chose to rely on a state’s executive branch, while also being 
available to answer questions should state legislators reach out. 
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Wayne Hoffman regularly challenged senators and representatives to call HHS and get 
responses to his arguments, including how much control Idaho policymakers would actually 
have, how much data collection will be done, and what will happen with the data that is 
collected.  He told legislators that “If proponents are correct and there is flexibility to not do 
these nefarious things, then great…If however, I am correct that there is no flexibility and HHS 
is just going to tell you to take a flying, you know, jump off a cliff, then better. You have just 
learned that there is no point in doing an insurance exchange whatsoever,” (Interview April 
2013). 
Some legislators did call HHS directly.  One Republican leader describes hearing about 
an incident that occurred when Scott Bedke was deciding whether to support an exchange.  “He 
decided, I’m the Speaker of the Idaho House of Representatives.  I’m going to call and see if 
Secretary Sebelius will take my call.  She didn’t, but he did speak with one of her chief deputies.  
My impression of his impression is that this is a big deal to the administration,” (Interview April 
2013).  This leader describes having multiple phone calls with federal officials.  “every 
conversation that I’ve had with people at HHS is that they really wanted as many Republican-led 
states do this as possible, and they would bend over backwards,” (Interview April 2013).  
Senator John Tippets, Chair of the Senate Commerce and Human Resources Committee that 
considered exchange legislation, also spoke to HHS officials on multiple occasions.  During the 
floor debate for SB 1042 on February 21st, a question was raised that he did not know the answer 
to.  Later in the debate he explained that he called HHS during one of the breaks in the debate to 
receive clarification (Idaho Senate Debate February 21, 2013).  
 
 243 
 
State Context: Path Dependence 
 Opponents of a state-based insurance exchange tried to pro-actively create path 
dependent forces to entrench their position and make it harder for supporters to create an 
exchange later.  In 2010 they passed the Idaho Health Freedom Act in opposition to the ACA.  In 
2011 they passed nullification bills saying that the ACA was not valid in Idaho.  The strongest 
bills did not pass or were vetoed by Governor Otter, but he did sign an executive order saying 
that state agencies were not allowed to implement any part of the ACA without his prior 
approval.  Although these events did shape the political climate and the options later available to 
policymakers, none ultimately prevented Governor Otter from supporting a state-based insurance 
exchange or the House and Senate from passing enabling legislation.  
Two unrelated events made helped create conditions making it possible for the exchange 
debate to proceed.  The first was redistricting in 2010 which redrew the state’s legislative 
boundaries.  A significant number of legislators decided to retire rather than run in their new 
districts.  As a result, turnover was greater than usual in the 2012 election, leading to 41 of the 
state’s 105 legislators being new.  These freshmen were not in the legislature in 2010 and 2011, 
and thus felt less restricted by the Idaho Health Freedom Act and the attempts at nullification.  A 
group of these freshmen went on to play a particularly important role in reviving exchange 
legislation when it seemed that it could not pass the House. 
The second important event was Scott Bedke’s ousting of Lawrence Denney as the 
Speaker of the House.  Denney’s opposition made it impossible for an exchange bill to even 
receive a hearing in the House prior to 2013.  Bedke’s ascension to the speakership not only 
meant that a bill could be introduced, but that it would be considered by a committee predisposed 
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to support state control.  The new committee chair appointed by Bedke was one of the 
legislature’s leading proponents of an exchange.  Bedke’s promise of an open and non-
confrontational leadership style also made it possible for the 16 House freshmen to approach him 
with changes they would like to see to SB 1042. 
Another issue affected the exchange debate in path dependent ways, though in this case, 
the concern was that the decision could establish a precedent that constrained options in future 
debates.  In the weeks leading up to the 2013 session, legislative leaders were nervous that 
Governor Otter might try to create an exchange by executive order.  It was not the policy 
outcome that concerned them, since most supported creating an exchange.  They worried that it 
would establish a dangerous precedent in which the governor could set policy without consulting 
the legislature.  This is very similar to concern felt by legislators in New Mexico.  Except in this 
case, the governor gave assurances that he would not move forward on his own.  In some ways 
this might have been seen as giving up leverage since he no longer had the threat of executive 
order to entice the legislature to act.  However, unlike in New Mexico, the governor and the 
legislature wanted the same type of exchange and thus Governor Otter did not really have much 
leverage anyway.  In fact, promising not to act independently increased the urgency of the 
legislative debate.  This was their only chance; if they did not pass legislation, the state would 
have a federal exchange. 
 
State Context: Institutional Design 
 The design of Idaho’s institutions strengthened the governor’s ability to advance 
exchange legislation in two ways.  First, Governor Otter used his ability to have David Hensley, 
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his chief of staff, introduce the exchange legislation in each committee hearing.  This is a simple 
power not available to governors in every state.  A bill needs a floor sponsor from the House and 
Senate in order to be considered by the full body of each chamber, but can be introduced in 
committee by someone else.  The vast majority of bills are carried in committee by the same 
person who becomes the floor sponsor.  In 2013, there were 345 bills introduced in the House 
and 200 introduced in the Senate.20  The only time David Hensley introduced a bill was for the 
insurance exchange.21  Having his chief of staff introduce the bills instead sent a powerful to 
legislators that this was a high priority for Governor Otter.   
 Second, Idaho’s institutional design created ripe conditions for pockets of expertise to 
develop on health policy.  The short legislative sessions and low pay mean that most legislators 
have a profession that they return to the rest of the year.  The lack of term limits means that on 
average, the leadership of the Idaho legislature has been in office for ten years.  As a result, 
legislators have developed knowledge of the legislative process and deep relationships.  The fact 
that most legislators do not have any staff support increases the degree to which they rely on 
colleagues they believe have developed expertise on an issue. 
It so happened that many of the people in key decision-making positions worked in the 
health care industry.  Fred Wood, Chair of the House Health and Welfare Committee, is a 
physician and Medical Director at the Cassia Regional Medical Center.  House Minority Leader 
John Rusche is a retired physician who worked for many years in the health insurance industry.  
Five members of the legislature are insurance brokers, including Senator Dean Cameron, Co-
                                                           
20
 A full directory of bills introduced in 2013 is available at: 
http://legislature.idaho.gov/legislation/2013/minidata.htm  
21
 To verify this point I searched the minutes of every meeting held in 2013 of the nine standing Senate Committees, 
the 13 standing House Committees, and the Joint Finance and Appropriations Committee. Available at 
http://legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/2013/standingcommittees/committeeminutes.htm  
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Chair of the powerful Joint Finance and Appropriations Committee; Senator John Goedde, Chair 
of the Senate Education Committee; and Representative Gary Collins, Chair of the House 
Revenue and Taxation Committee.  Each of these people is a main source of information for the 
rest of the legislature on issues dealing with health insurance and became an important leader on 
the exchange. 
  
State Contest: Partisanship 
 It is hard to find a state in which the Republican opposition to the ACA was stronger than 
in Idaho.  It was the first state in the nation to pass legislation opposing the ACA.  It was one of 
the original states to join the lawsuits against the individual mandate and the Medicaid 
expansion.  The Legislature passed bills in 2011 declaring the ACA null and void within the 
borders of Idaho.  Even so, the main division over the ACA was not between Democrats and 
Republicans, but within the Republican Party.  In fact, exchange legislation passed largely 
because enough Republicans were willing to vote with Democrats.  
 Democrats faced a dilemma of how to respond.  It is not often that House Democrats 
make up the deciding votes, and many wanted the caucus to use their position as leverage for 
increased spending on education.  Instead, House Minority Leader John Rusche convinced them 
to stand back and let Republicans fight this battle amongst themselves.  People in a wide range of 
positions, including House and Senate Republicans, an advisor to Governor Otter, and officials 
in the state’s bureaucracies all describe this as a wise strategy that played an important role in 
smoothing the way for the passage of exchange legislation.   
 
 247 
 
Strategic Actors: Interest Groups 
 Interest groups played a key role on both sides of the debate over whether or not to create 
an insurance exchange in Idaho.  Most legislators and interest group leaders agreed that this 
became one of the most important issues of the session.  A House leader estimated that “In the 
2013 session, more than half, maybe three-fourths of the full-time lobbyists were working on this 
issue – mostly in favor,” (Interview May 2013).  The industry coalition was very important for 
creating conditions in which enough Republicans could support an exchange.   
Much of the work done by interest groups is reminiscent of Hall and Deardorff’s (2006) 
theory of lobbying as legislative subsidy.  They observe a phenomonen that interest groups tend 
to spend the most time with legislators who agree with them, and argue that this is because they 
are doing much of the work these legislators are too resource-poor to do.  Many legislators 
describe interest group involvement in these terms.  As one legislator said, “The value of having 
other resources is that they can do a lot of that research for you.  There was a group set up 
supporting the exchange.  They did a lot of the research and that was helpful.  Those that were 
opposed had their arguments, and the Idaho Freedom Foundation did a lot of research and 
provided that to us.  On both sides it was helpful to hear the arguments.  You could read the 
information from one side and then the other,” (Interview May 2013).   
In addition to providing research for Republican legislators opposed to an exchange, the 
Idaho Freedom Foundation was an important source of information for the Tea Party.  The 
Foundation maintained a website called The Idaho Reporter to provide “market-oriented 
coverage of state government (Idaho Reporter 2014).  Wayne Hoffman describes the Idaho 
Freedom Foundation as “ammo suppliers” for the Tea Party.  “We provide ammunition.  We 
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provide information.  We provide details and research.  It’s available to the general public of 
course, but one of the biggest consumers of this information are people in the Tea Party who 
believe in limited government as we do,” (Interview April 2013). 
Hoffman’s group also filled a leadership void in the Tea Party.  The decentralized nature 
of the Tea Party movement, combined with the size and sparseness of the state, meant that it was 
difficult for the Tea Party to organize and clearly articulate a message.  The Idaho Freedom 
Foundation became the de facto leader of the opposition, playing a lead role in the passage of the 
Idaho Health Freedom Act in 2010, the blocking of grant money and the passage of nullification 
bills in 2011, and the fact that no exchange legislation was introduced in 2012.   
 In addition to supporting allies, interest groups also did a large amount of what some 
refer to as “traditional lobbying.”  One insurance industry lobbyist said they spent much of the 
summer of 2013 meeting as many of the Republicans campaigning for open seats as possible.  
This person adds that “It paid off tremendously for me as most of them were elected and I knew 
them by the time the session started,” (Interview May 2013).  An insurance agent said that he 
went to every committee hearing dealing with an exchange, testified before both chambers, and 
emailed every legislator 3-4 times per week (Interview May 2013).   
 Many industry groups also have political action committees that get involved in elections.  
Tea Party members accuse the insurance industry of buying the exchange through their 
contributions in the previous election.  One Tea Party leader argued that “Our lawmakers are not 
rich.  When you push around a couple hundred bucks in front of their noses and say ‘let’s going 
fishing,’ or ‘let’s go to dinner,’ – loyalty is easily and cheaply bought.  1042 and 248 are 
examples of exactly how cheap,” (Interview May 2013). 
 249 
 
However, analysis of campaign finance data reveals there is no clear pattern between the 
money legislators received in 2012 and how they voted on HB 248 in 2013 (Follow the Money 
2012).  Even so, the lobbyist for one insurance company said that “We let it be known to 
legislators that the exchange was our number one issue.”  Speaking of the House freshmen who 
voted for an exchange, this person added “I have told them they have my undying loyalty and 
support for whatever it is they need for their campaign,” (Interview May 2013).  This person 
clarified that there was not a quid pro quo relationship in which votes were bought, but an 
acknowledgment that they were willing to help legislators who were being threatened.  House 
members describe these interactions in similarly soft terms, but also point out that insurance 
companies gave them campaign donations shortly after the legislative session (Interviews 2013). 
  
State Context: Policymakers 
 It is important to appreciate the extent to which individual preferences matter.  In part, 
this explains why it was important that Scott Bedke replaced Lawrence Denney as Speaker of the 
House.  Both are strong conservatives in safe seats, but they differ in leadership style and over 
whether Idaho should run its insurance exchange.   
Similarly, Butch Otter did not have to support an insurance exchange.  This was hardly 
the path of least resistance or the popular position within the national or state Republican Party.  
His support of an exchange became one of the primary campaign points used by Senator Russ 
Fulcher in an effort to defeat Governor Otter in the 2014 primaries.  Many other people in his 
position, facing the exact same incentives, likely would have decided not to push for the creation 
of an exchange. 
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Summary 
Governor Otter’s support in 2013 was a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the 
creation of an exchange.  His ability to advance exchange legislation was significantly 
strengthened by the high level of support from most industry groups.  Conservative 
organizations, such as the Idaho Freedom Foundation and the Tea Party groups, aggressively 
worked to defeat the implementation of any aspect of Obamacare.  They succeeded in 2010, 
2011, and 2012, but not in 2013 because the intergovernmental context had changed and because 
of pockets of insurance expertise in the legislature.  Key individuals in each chamber had an 
important combination of knowledge of the legislative process, a deep understanding of health 
insurance, and strong political clout.  Institutional design and path dependence both strengthened 
the development and influence of these pockets of expertise, as well as the strategic options 
available to policymakers and interest groups.   
None of this would have mattered if the Obama administration stuck to its original 
deadlines.  Although the extended deadlines meant that Idaho had enough time decide to create 
an exchange, it ironically meant that the state did not have enough time to actually create an 
exchange.  The state retained decision-making authority over some policy issues, but gave relied 
on the federal website healthcare.gov for the first year of operation.  It remains to be seen 
whether this will be a good outcome for Idaho. 
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Chapter 7 - New Mexico 
 
Introduction 
 New Mexico and Idaho were the last two states to decide to create a health insurance 
exchange.  Coincidentally, Governor Susana Martinez signed New Mexico’s legislation on the 
same day as Governor Butch Otter signed Idaho’s - March 28, 2013.  Idaho’s decision was 
surprising given that it is one of the most conservative states in the country and the only state led 
entirely by Republicans to choose this path (see chapter six).  The surprise in New Mexico was 
that it took this long and almost did not happen.  
 When the Affordable Care Act was signed into law in March 2010, the political climate 
in New Mexico seemed favorable to implementing reform.  Barack Obama was popular, having 
won 57% of the vote in 2008 against John McCain of neighboring Arizona (NM Secretary of 
State 2012).  All five members of the state’s congressional delegation were Democrats, and all 
but one voted for the ACA (U.S. Senate Vote #396 2010; U.S. House Roll Call #165 2010).   
Democrats had controlled both chambers of the legislature for more than two decades  and held 
64% of seats in each chamber (NCSL 2010b).  Democrat Bill Richardson was in his fourth and 
final year of a second term as governor largely defined by advancing health reform.  In fact, the 
state had already done similar versions of reforms included in the ACA, such as establishing a 
medical loss ratio of 85% and allowing children to stay on their parents plan until age 25.  
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Republicans had been trying for many years to create an insurance exchange for small businesses 
(Interviews 2013).   
 
Table 13 - New Mexico’s Political and Demographic Context 
Political Environment 
• 2012 presidential election: Barack Obama (53%) 
• Governor 
o 2003-2010: Bill Richardson (D) 
o 2011-present: Susana Martinez (R) 
o Yes term limits 
• New Mexico House of Representatives 
o 2011-2012: Democratic majority of 4 
o 2013-present: Democratic majority of 8 
o No term limits 
• New Mexico Senate 
o 2011-2012: Democratic majority of 12 
o 2013-present: Democratic majority of 7 
o No term limits 
Demographics & Health Status 
• Total population: 2,048,000 
• Distribution of Population by Federal Poverty Level 
o Under 100%: 27% 
o 100% - 138%: 8% 
o 139% - 399%: 36% 
o 400%: 30% 
• Distribution of Health Insurance Coverage 
o Employer: 38% 
o Other private: 5% 
o Medicaid: 21% 
o Medicare: 15% 
o Uninsured: 21% 
Health Reform 
• Did not join lawsuit against the ACA 
• State-based exchange, relying on national website for first year 
• Expanding Medicaid 
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Why did it take three years for the state to decide to create an exchange despite these 
seemingly favorable conditions?  The first part of the answer is that the state’s political climate 
shifted in the November 2010 elections.  Republican Susana Martinez was elected governor with 
54% of the vote and the Democratic majority in the New Mexico House of Representatives 
shrinking to four seats (NM Secretary of State 2012).  Governor Martinez was open to the idea of 
an exchange, but vetoed the bill passed in 2011 by Democrats in the legislature.  
The second part of the answer as to why it took so long for New Mexico to decide to 
create an exchange has to do with institutional design and timing.  The legislature only meets for 
60 calendar days every other year.  There is a 30-day session in even-numbered years, but the 
legislature is limited to passing the budget and is generally not able to create new programs.  As 
a result, the New Mexico legislature only had two 60-day windows to act during the ACA’s four-
year implementation period.  After Governor Martinez vetoed an exchange bill in March 2011, 
the legislature would not have another opportunity to weigh in until January 2013. 
The New Mexico story is largely one of internal conflict.  The federal government was a 
relatively minor player in this case.  Unlike the other states in my sample where the primary 
division was within the Republican Party, here the tension was between Republican governor 
Susana Martinez and Democrats in the legislature.   
Interest groups played a role, though with a very different dynamic than in other case 
study states.  In Idaho, Michigan, and Mississippi, consumer advocates united with insurers, 
agents, and small business organizations behind a single proposal, deciding state control of a 
weakly regulated exchange was better than defaulting to the federal government.  In New 
Mexico, there was broad consensus in favor of creating a state-based exchange, but vigorous 
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disagreement about the type of exchange to create, including the composition of the board and its 
regulatory authority.  Governor Martinez wanted to use an organization created in the 1990s as 
the foundation on which to build what her staff described as a market-oriented exchange 
reminiscent of Utah’s.  Industry leaders generally sided with Governor Martinez, aggressively 
pushing for seats on the board of directors and for a clearinghouse model in which any qualifying 
plan would be allowed to participate.  The lack of a strong Tea Party presence in New Mexico 
gave consumer groups greater latitude to push for what they saw as a more favorable model of an 
exchange.   
Democrats ultimately won the legislative fight, though ironically, the exchange that was 
created closely resembles Governor Martinez’s preferences.  This chapter traces the evolution of 
the debate in New Mexico, following the same chronological outline as the other case study 
chapters.  It concludes by drawing on the integrated framework discussed in chapter two to 
highlight key patterns (see Appendix F for a timeline of key events in New Mexico). 
 
1) March 2010 – December 2010 
Governor Bill Richardson (D) responded enthusiastically throughout 2010 to the ACA’s 
passage.  As he prepared to leave office, he laid the foundation for whoever succeeded him in 
2011 to follow through with its implementation.  Grants were sought and work groups convened, 
with particular attention paid to the creation of a state-based health insurance exchange.  This 
was largely an extension of work that had been going on for many years, as the proposal to 
create an insurance exchange in New Mexico predates the passage of the ACA.  In order to 
understand the political dynamics that would surround these efforts over the next three years, it is 
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important to place them in context of the debate over health reform in New Mexico that had 
begun at least three years earlier. 
 
Health Reform in New Mexico 
The first exchange bills were introduced in 2007 and 2008, largely at the urging of J.R. 
Damson, a radiologist from Santa Fe who was the Republican nominee for governor in 2006.  He 
explains that he did not feel his party had a plan for health care.  “After looking at the 
Massachusetts program and what the Heritage Foundation had done…I worked with the people 
from Heritage at that time, and then I introduced it to some of the legislators here” (Interview 
September 2013).  Republican support for a small business insurance exchange increased in 2008 
when House Minority Leader Tom Taylor, House Minority Whip Keith Gardner, and staff 
member Matt Kennicott visited Utah to learn about the new exchange being developed in Utah 
(Interviews September 2013).  Gardner and Kennicott would ultimately play major roles in the 
debate over an exchange as key advisors to Governor Susana Martinez.  Their vision of an ideal 
exchange was developed during this period. 
Democrats did not support the exchange bills of 2007 and 2008, not necessarily out of 
opposition to the concept of an exchange, but because they were hoping for a more 
comprehensive reform.  Governor Bill Richardson was planning on running for president and 
wanted to pass a bill leading to universal coverage.  His original proposal contained many of the 
elements that would later be included in the ACA, such as an individual mandate, an employer 
mandate, and low-cost government-subsidized insurance plans (NM Health Care Reform 
Leadership Team 2010).  Compared to Governor Richardson’s proposal, Democrats and 
 256 
 
consumer advocates saw the small business exchange as a way for Republicans to weaken more 
significant proposals.  To Democrats, an exchange was simply a way to sell insurance, doing 
very little to expand coverage (Interviews 2013-2014).  One Democratic Senator described it as 
“a glorified brokerage for insurance companies,” (Interview September 2014).   
The roots of this concern extended back even further, to the debate over health reform 
during the early years of the Clinton presidency.  The exchange bills supported by Republicans 
in 2007 were built on the governance structure of the New Mexico Health Insurance Alliance, a 
non-profit in operation since 1994 with a board of directors dominated by insurance companies 
(NM HB 1045, 2007; NM SB 976, 2007).  Just as an exchange was viewed as the Republican 
alternative to comprehensive reform, the Alliance was seen in 1994 as the conservative answer to 
“New Mexicare,” a proposal in 1993 which would have created a single-payer health care 
system.  The legislature rejected New Mexicare and instead created the Alliance in the face of 
aggressive lobbying from small businesses and the insurance industry (Ortiz y Pino 1993, Quick 
1994).  Carol Miller, a New Mexican public health expert who had served on President Clinton’s 
health reform task force described the New Mexico Health Insurance Alliance as “a total waste 
of time.  The whole point of health care reform is that we have to get the insurance companies 
out of health care, not make it more convenient for them to be in it…The five insurers 
represented on the board will write the plans and help set the rates. The small business alliance is 
an insurer’s pipe dream” (Peterson 1994). 
It is ironic then that insurers were not particularly excited in 2008 about proposals to use 
the Alliance to create an exchange.  As the head of government affairs for one of the major 
insurers describes, “There were a lot of good points to that bill and we generally supported what 
[Damron] was trying to do.  But we thought that the way it was structured was duplicative of the 
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Alliance, but also just in general of what insurance carriers are supposed to do anyway.  Anytime 
there are duplicative efforts, there are duplicative costs.  That was our take back then” (Interview 
September 2013).  Their position shifted somewhat with the passage of the ACA in 2010.  They 
were not enthusiastic about the idea of an exchange, but if one was going to be created, the 
Alliance was seen as a good model because it ensured they would play a leading role in its 
operation (Interviews 2013-2014). 
The partisan politics surrounding an exchange also shifted with the passage of the ACA.  
An advisor to Governor Martinez explained that “Some Republicans at that point were hesitant 
because they saw it as a mandate from Obama.  Those of us who had been working on it awhile 
knew it wasn’t; that this was actually a pretty decent idea” (Interview September 2013).  At the 
same time, Democrats who had been reluctant to support an exchange were now fully supportive 
(Interviews 2013-2014).  The legislature would not meet again until January 2011 when a new 
governor would take office, but stakeholders used the time until then to study options and seek 
consensus over what type of exchange bill to introduce. 
 
Exchange Planning Under Richardson 
 The task force convened by Governor Richardson issued a report on July 1, 2010 
recommending that New Mexico should opt to establish its own exchange rather than using a 
federally operated exchange, and that it should be an active purchaser.  The report stated that 
“While some states have developed exchanges that merely serve as a market organization and 
distribution center for health care plans, it is recommended that New Mexico develop a strong 
exchange that promotes competition between plans based on quality and price in a way that is 
 258 
 
transparent to consumers” (NM Health Care Reform Leadership Team 2010).  A legislative task 
force made similar recommendations later in the year (Armstrong 2010). 
 In July, Governor Richardson created the New Mexico Office of Health Care Reform 
within the Human Services Department (NM Executive Order 2010-032).  This office took the 
lead on planning activities, including receiving a $1 million grant from the federal government to 
conduct stakeholder engagement.  By the end of the year, the Office of Health Care Reform had 
commissioned 13 studies and spent $600,000 of this planning grant (Coughlin 2012).  
 Many participants describe these work groups as valuable for bringing stakeholders 
together and making positions known.  Businesses, insurers, and consumer advocates all 
participated.  Although there was disagreement over whether the exchange should be an active 
purchaser or clearinghouse, it became clear that there was consensus in favor of maintaining 
state control (Interviews 2013-2014).  Even so, not everyone agreed that these meetings were 
worthwhile.  As one insurance broker described: 
Richardson was a classic decision-maker by consensus. He didn’t like decisions being 
made in vacuums.  So he would create work groups and committees.  It was absolutely 
exhausting and absolutely worthless.  More work was done and put up on a shelf and 
never done anything with it than anything I’ve seen in my entire career…Nothing ever 
came out of any of them (Interview September 2013).   
 
These meetings and reports occurred against the backdrop of uncertainty over who would 
replace Bill Richardson as governor.  Had Democratic Lieutenant Governor Diane Denish won 
as many expected, the work group recommendations likely would have served as the foundation 
for the ACA’s implementation.  Instead, Martinez won with 53% of the vote.  Many people 
involved in the campaign say that health reform was not a major issue in the 2010 gubernatorial 
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race.  They remember Governor-Elect Martinez making generic statements opposing the ACA, 
but giving no indication of how she would approach the question of whether or not to build an 
exchange (Interviews 2013-2014).   
 On December 27, 2010, Richardson’s Office of Health Care Reform prepared a transition 
plan for the incoming Martinez administration.  One of the recommendations was to pass 
legislation in the 2011 session to create a quasi-governmental exchange with active purchaser 
powers, and with a board excluding anyone with a conflict of interest.  The plan recommended 
moving the Office of Health Care Reform to the governor’s office and hiring a director who 
reports directly to the governor (NM Office of Health Reform).  As Governor, Susana Martinez 
did neither.   
 
2) January 2011 – November 2011 
The second implementation period was dominated by two events: the 2011 legislative 
session in which Governor Martinez vetoed legislation that would have created an active 
purchaser exchange and the interim period before the next legislative session in which her office 
took steps to create a different type of exchange.   
 
2011 Legislative Session 
 Multiple exchange bills were introduced early in the 2011 session, all by Democrats and 
all with minimal input from the new governor.  Representative Danice Picraux and Senator 
Feldman introduced parallel legislation in each chamber which would have created an active 
 260 
 
purchaser exchange and a consumer-oriented board (NM HB 33, 2011; NM SB 38, 2011).  
Senator George Muñoz introduced a less prescriptive bill that provided a framework, but let the 
exchange’s board decide how it would operate (NM SB 370, 2011).    
 Two of the chief negotiators during the session were not legislators or industry leaders.  
Gail Evans of the New Mexico Center on Law and Poverty represented consumer advocates 
pushing for an active purchaser exchange and J.R. Damron was a prominent Republican pushing 
for a clearinghouse exchange.  Legislators have limited staff compared to the governor and meet 
too infrequently to develop expertise on the nuances of issues.  As a result, they found it 
advantageous to assign trusted allies to sort out the details of a policy debate.  This is a good 
example of Hall and Deardorff’s (2006) theory of lobbying as legislative subsidy.  Rather than 
devoting resources to beating or convincing opponents, these interest group leaders focused their 
energy on supporting those they agreed with.  The most important resource in this case was not 
money, but time and expertise. 
Evans initially supported Rep. Picraux’s bill, though it never made it out of the House.  
Muñoz’s bill suffered the same fate in the Senate, making it through committee but never 
receiving a vote on the floor.  The focus shifted to Senator Feldman’s bill, which one Democrat 
described as initially “a very progressive bill” that was “much less than that” when it ultimately 
passed the Senate (Interview September 2013).  The bill did not receive a vote on the Senate 
Floor until March 2nd, which is very late in the session for a bill to have a realistic chance of 
passage in a second chamber (NM 2011 Senate Roll Call #215). 
 The process in the House was even more contentious, with Republicans refusing to 
compromise.  House Democrats needed every member to fall in line since the recent election had 
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dramatically shrunk the size of their majority.  SB 38 passed the House Consumer and Public 
Affairs Committee by a party-line 3 to 2 vote on March 10th.  A week later, it passed the House 
Appropriations and Finance Committee on a 10 to 8 vote also split along party lines (NM SB 38 
2011).  Supporters of the original bill say that the only good thing left after making its way 
through two chambers was a conflict of interest provision preventing insurers, brokers, and 
doctors from serving on the board of directors.  The only reason it survived was because most 
people expected the Obama administration to include such a provision in its forthcoming 
regulations anyway (Interviews September 2013).  Ultimately such a provision was not included, 
and Democrats would lose ground on this point in 2013.  There were also concerns over how 
much an exchange would cost, but U.S. Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-NM) wrote each state 
legislator a letter attempting to re-assure them that the federal government would follow through 
with its promised share (Williams 2011).  
By the time SB 38 made it to the House floor, leadership had commitments from enough 
conservative Democrats to ensure passage if the vote could be called at the right moment 
(Interviews September 2014).  When it is in session, the New Mexico legislature technically 
meets 24 hours per day, each day of the week.  By contrast, the legislatures in Idaho, Michigan, 
and Mississippi conduct business for a few hours per day when in session, adjourning until a set 
time the next business day.  As a result, supportive interest groups played a role beyond the 
conventional lobbying work of convincing legislators, providing data to allies, and taking head 
counts – they helped the House leadership keep track of who was physically in the chamber at 
any given time (Interviews September 2013). 
Democrats sensed their opportunity late in the evening of Friday March 18th, knowing 
they had 34 votes in favor and noticing that one Democrat and one Republican were excused.  
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With three Republicans absent because they were sick or otherwise unable to make it to the 
floor, a roll call was announced.  SB 38 passed by three votes shortly after midnight on the 
morning of March 19th, the second to last day of the 2011 legislative session (NM 2011 Roll Call 
#3293).  As one supporter described, “It was amazing how [Speaker Ben Luján] managed to 
finagle it to call it up at the precise moment when there were just enough votes in the room to 
pass it” (Interview September 2013). 
 It was not clear how Governor Martinez would react.  A few weeks earlier, she said she 
was not sure she would be willing to sign any of the exchange bills introduced that session 
(Jennings 2011).  After the bill passed, she took three weeks before finally deciding to veto it.  
She argued in her veto message that the bill was premature and that “legislators ignored my 
administration’s attempts to address the concerns I had with this particular piece of legislation” 
(Martinez 2011).  The only concern she specified in this message was the cost of maintaining a 
self-sustaining exchange, though legislators say the biggest complaint they heard from her was 
over the composition of the board (Interviews 2013-2014).  Senator Feldman, the original 
sponsor of the bill that passed, explained that “It wasn’t just a question of who gets to be on the 
board, but who gets to appoint the board.  The governor wanted more power.  We weren’t really 
that far apart. It was unfortunate that she vetoed it” (Interview September 2013). 
 A number of people interviewed attribute Governor Martinez’s decision to the people 
around her.  Sometimes this explanation is given as a matter of fact disagreement over policy 
between people on different sides of the political spectrum.  Her new chief of staff, Keith 
Gardner, was a strong supporter of creating an exchange modeled after Utah and testified against 
other types of exchange bills.  He therefore encouraged Governor Martinez to veto any bill not 
resembling Utah’s.   
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Others are more cynical in their assessment.  A Democratic legislator believes “the 
insurance industry got to her,” (Interview September 2013). One person who did not support the 
bill said that Governor Martinez was completely disorganized in the early months of her 
administration and did not understand what was in front of her (Interview September 2013).  A 
supporter of the bill echoed this comment and added that the people she listened to most were 
more focused on politics than on policy (September 2013).  Others shared this view, explaining 
that “Keith Gardner was not a friend to the advocacy groups supporting an exchange.  It was 
very clear to me that it was going to get vetoed” (Interview September 2013) simply because it 
had the support of consumer groups.  Another person added that “Keith Gardner understands 
enough to be dangerous” (Interview October 2013).   
Multiple people attribute the decision to political operative Jay McCleskey, the person 
credited with “discovering” Susana Martinez and convincing her to run for governor.  
Emblematic of his power within the Martinez administration as the person running her political 
action committee SusanaPAC, McCleskey is often nicknamed “the 5th floor,” a play on the fact 
that New Mexico’s governor is regularly referred to as “the 4th floor” given its location on the 
top level of the capitol building (Interviews 2013).  He was not publicly involved in the debate 
over an exchange, but was said to be an important advocate of the veto behind the scenes 
(Interviews 2013-2014). 
 Democrats in the legislature say there was no real discussion of attempting to over-ride 
her veto.  One Representative explained, “We are wimps – and the math isn’t there,” (Interview 
September 2013).  SB 38 had barely passed the House, making it very unlikely that enough votes 
could be secured to override the veto.  There was little the legislature could do over the following 
nine months to work on implementing the ACA besides holding information-gathering interim 
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committee meetings.  If any progress was going to be made, it was up to Governor Martinez and 
her administration. 
 
Interim Session 
 Martinez was among the 29 Republican governors who signed a letter in July 2011 
calling for the full repeal of the ACA (Olson 2011).  Some of the media coverage surrounding 
Governor Martinez’s veto portrayed her as an ideologue opposed to Obamacare.  She was 
described in the same category as Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, Rick Scott of Florida, and Sam 
Brownback of Kansas who had returned federal grant dollars in protest and vowed not to 
implement the ACA.   
Yet, interviews with key players reveal a different picture.  Governor Martinez was 
taking, or at least allowing people in her administration to take, important steps towards creating 
an exchange.  One adviser describes the summer of 2011 by saying that even though she had just 
vetoed the exchange bill, “The Office of Health Reform was still working on stakeholder 
meetings and planning activities.  They were holding inter-agency meetings.  The work was very 
much moving forward on a state-based exchange, regardless of what the narrative was outside 
the administration,” (Interview September 2013). 
 One of the most important steps taken that summer was the appointment of Dan Derksen 
to lead the Office of Health Reform.  Dr. Derksen was a Republican leading the New Mexico 
Medical Society and had recently been a Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Congressional 
Fellow in the Office of U.S. Senator Jeff Bingaman in D.C.  (RWJF 2011, Jennings 2012).  
Appointed in August, Derksen moved quickly to put together an application for a level 1 
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establishment grant before the September 30th deadline.  The application requested $34 million, 
with most of it going to IT development.  Governor Martinez wrote a letter of support to 
Secretary Kathleen Sebelius, saying “I am pleased to endorse” the grant application (NM Dept of 
Human Services).  Derksen also made it known that he planned on applying for a much larger 
level 2 establishment grant by the March 2012 deadline (Interviews 2013-2014). 
 The reaction from supporters of an exchange was mixed.  They interpreted the grant 
application as evidence that planning was moving forward again.  One legislator describes that 
“When, Dr. Derksen set to work immediately and got one of the early grants, we were off and 
running.  It looked very promising,” (Interview February 2014).  A consumer advocate said they 
had expected nothing to happen, but that “When the agency got the grants, we thought ‘oh, 
maybe they are going to do an exchange.  She vetoed the bill, but now they are getting money 
and doing shit,” (Interview September 2013).   
 At the same time, advocates did not like that the application was written under the 
premise that the state’s exchange would be established within the Health Insurance Alliance.  
They argued that using the Alliance would lead to an exchange controlled by insurers and the 
governor, rather than being favorable to consumers (Coughlin 2012).  The fight during the 2011 
session had been over this very issue, and many felt frustrated that the governor was 
circumventing the legislature (Interviews 2013-2014).  But there was little they could do to 
oppose the governor.  All indications were that she would soon sign an executive order to 
formally create the exchange as part of the Alliance (Interviews 2013-2014).  The announcement 
in November 2011 that the U.S. Supreme Court would hear the case against the ACA changed 
the dynamic in ways that were at first subtle, but that would ultimately deepen the divide 
between the Republicans in the executive branch and the Democrats in the legislative branch. 
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3) November 2011 – June 2012 
The legislature met for 30 days from January 17 – February 16, 2012, but the session was 
of no consequence in the debate over an exchange.  The legislature is only allowed to consider 
two kinds of legislations in even numbered years: 1) bills reacting to a special message from the 
governor, and 2) bills directly connected to the budget.  The governor sent no such message on 
the exchange and there was no precedent for passing this type of legislation in a budget session.  
One Democratic legislator explained that “We’ve tried that in the past, but it hasn’t worked,” 
(Interview September 2013).  Some were frustrated that Governor Martinez had not made it 
possible to pass exchange legislation, but were not surprised given her administration’s position 
that it could create an exchange through the Alliance by executive order. 
 With the legislature out of the picture, the most important actions in late 2011 and early 
2012 took place behind the scenes.  Request for proposals (RFPs) were sent out so vendors could 
bid on different aspects of building the exchange IT.  Firms were chosen and contracts were 
written, waiting for the signature of Human Services Department Secretary Sidonie Squier 
(Interviews 2013-2014).  Dan Derksen of the Office of Health Reform was nearly ready to 
submit the state’s application for a level 2 establishment grant of more than $100 million to pay 
for the first year of the exchange’s operation.  CMS was consulted and indicated support for the 
grant as long as a legal framework was developed to create the exchange.  Governor Martinez’s 
office went over multiple drafts of an executive order that would have met this requirement 
(Interviews 2013-2014).  RFPs released in March 2012 indicated that the state planned on 
applying for a level two grant by July, implying the executive order would be signed by then.   
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Instead, Derksen resigned suddenly in late March, the grant application was never 
submitted, and progress stalled.  The reason for Derksen’s departure is disputed by those on 
either side of the debate.   People within the Martinez administration say they wanted more time 
to review the grant before it was submitted and that this frustrated Derksen.  The Governor’s 
office released a statement praising him for moving “this administration forward in setting up a 
framework to establish a statewide health insurance exchange in the face of great uncertainty 
from the federal government” (Jennings 2012). 
 People outside the administration saw Derksen’s departure as a worrisome sign.  As one 
advocate said, “Dan was a very serious thinker about health care reform. The Office of Health 
Care Reform was in good hands.  The fact that he left so suddenly, and it was sudden – we had a 
phone call scheduled for next week – that always raises questions” (Jennings 2012).  A 
Democratic legislator said “It was almost like the guillotine dropped in March of 2012 when 
[Derksen] was dumped.  The Governor’s office announced that he left his position, but it was 
pretty clear that he was dumped,” (Interview February 2014).   
Many identify Human Services Secretary Sidonie Squier and Martinez advisor Jay 
McCleskey as the people behind Derksen’s departure.  One person closely involved described 
their view of what happened behind the scenes.  When the executive order and the $100 million 
grant application were ready to go, “I think the light went off in Squier’s head that this was really 
going to happen.  She was doing everything she could to block it, but it was moving forward,” 
(Interview March 2014).   The same week that the Supreme Court heard oral arguments on the 
ACA’s case, Squier told Derksen to halt activity on the exchange.   Derksen immediately 
resigned, saying that Squier and McCleskey were blocking progress and that he did not want to 
be held responsible when the exchange did not work (Interviews 2013-2014). 
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 Derksen’s resignation from the Office of Health Care Reform would not be the final 
chapter in the debate over an insurance exchange, but it was an important turning point.  
Planning activities within the Martinez administration completely stopped.  The governor did not 
sign the executive order creating an exchange.  The level 2 establishment grant application was 
never submitted.  Martinez did nothing with the $34 million level 1 grant that had already been 
received.  Contracts with chosen vendors were not signed and no action was taken on the 
responses to new RFPs that had been issued.  It appeared that the state would take no action on 
the exchange until after the Supreme Court ruling (Interviews 2013-2014).   
 There is no evidence that this shift was driven by interest groups.  Many of the state’s 
industry leaders opposed the ACA and hoped the Court would overturn the law, but they 
preferred state control of the exchange and wanted the state to be ready in case the law survived 
its challenges (Interviews 2013-2014).  Instead, the most compelling explanation is partisanship.  
Martinez’s advisers did not want to be associated with any aspect of Obamacare during this 
crucial period in which the law was being considered by the Supreme Court and a major part of 
the 2012 elections. 
 
4) July 2012 – October 2013 
In July 2012 the venue for the debate over an exchange shifted to the legislature’s Interim 
Health and Human Services Committee.  Interim committees have no formal powers, but are 
where much of the legislating takes place.  The hope is that consensus on which issues to 
prioritize and which bills to support can be developed even before a session begins.  The Interim 
Health and Human Services Committee met monthly from July to December 2012, with an 
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exchange being on the agenda more often than any other issue (NM Legislative Health and 
Human Services Interim Committee 2012).    
Human Services Department Secretary Sidonie Squier testified at the July 9th meeting 
held in the city of Truth or Consequence just two weeks after the Supreme Court’s ruling.  She 
indicated that the administration was still planning on moving forward with creating an exchange 
through the Alliance and had hired Leavitt Partners to take the lead on planning efforts.  When 
asked why the Department was not spending any of the $34 million level 1 grant, particularly 
after RFPs had been sent out and contracts prepared, Squier responded that the contracts written 
by Dan Derksen were being re-written by Leavitt Partners because “the original request for 
proposals did not meet New Mexico’s needs.”  The committee pushed back on this point, 
quoting her intention to create an exchange “designed by New Mexico.”  One member observed 
that Dr. Derksen was from New Mexico, had worked in New Mexico, and had worked in 
Congress for a New Mexican Senator, but that the Department was hiring a Utah consultant 
instead to set up the exchange.  Squier replied that “Dr. Derksen had no experience working on 
an exchange and Leavitt does” (NM Legislative Health and Human Services Interim Committee 
2012).    
Another point of debate at the July meeting was whether an exchange could be 
established without legislation.  The committee complained that the legislature was being 
excluded by the Martinez administration from its planning.  Secretary Squier promised to 
communicate with legislators and conceded that legislation would probably be needed at some 
point to amend the statute governing the Alliance, even if the legal authority for the exchange 
was established by executive order (NM Legislative Health and Human Services Interim 
Committee 2012).    
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The issue came up again at the September 11th meeting held in Las Vegas, NM.  
Democrat Senator Dede Feldman asked the Attorney General’s office to address whether 
Governor Martinez had the authority to create an exchange by executive order.  Assistant 
Attorney General Mark Reynolds explained his office’s opinion that “such action is likely to be 
unconstitutional” because it would violate the separation of powers provision of the New Mexico 
Constitution (NM Legislative Health and Human Services Interim Committee 2012).     
Reynolds’ letter to the committee cited an incident from 1998 in which Governor Gary Johnson 
vetoed legislation to implement Clinton’s welfare reform, and then used an executive order to 
implement the reform a different way.  The legislature sued and the state Supreme Court found 
the Governor’s actions to be unconstitutional.  Reynolds concluded that the facts in this case “are 
analogous to the situation we would have should the Governor create a health insurance 
exchange by executive order” (Reynolds 2012).   
Democrats reacted confidently to this opinion from the Attorney General’s office.  “We 
had already passed a bill that she had vetoed, so we already had her,” said a House Democrat 
(Interview September 2013).  With the help of the Center on Law and Poverty, Democrats hired 
a private law firm to prepare a lawsuit.  One of the legislators involved in preparing the suit 
explained that “When we did that, Matt Kennicott and others [from the Martinez administration] 
reached out and said ‘let’s work together.’  So they stopped what they were doing with the 
Alliance…The lawsuit never got filed; but it was ready at the drop of a hat,” (Interview 
September 2013).  Another legislator involved noted the potential for this plan to backfire, 
observing that “We did have a little bit of a gun pointed to her head, but we had an even bigger 
gun to our head.  If we had sued it would have been delayed, and we wouldn’t have had a state-
based exchange anyway,” (Interview February 2014).  An adviser to Governor Martinez 
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described this period in more diplomatic terms, saying “The governor said she didn’t think we 
needed to have legislation, but in good faith I’m willing to talk and see what good ideas we can 
come up with.  Maybe we’ll come up with something better,” (September 2013). 
Two members of the Martinez administration spoke at the final interim committee 
meeting on November 27th in Santa Fe: Secretary Squier and Milton Sanchez, the new Director 
of the Office of Health Care Reform.  They explained that the Obama administration had 
extended a key exchange deadline to December 14th and that New Mexico would submit a 
declaration letter and blueprint plan by that date.  The committee voted to endorse an exchange 
bill, even though it would do so through the Alliance.   
  Senator Dede Feldman was the author of the bill Governor Martinez vetoed in 2011 but 
supported this new bill, saying “I thought that was good because I wanted a road to 
compromise,” (Interview September 2013).  As the chair of the interim committee and the author 
of the exchange bill vetoed by Governor Martinez in 2011, her support carried a lot of weight.  
Foreshadowing the tensions that would erupt in the coming legislative session, not everyone 
agreed with her.  A consumer advocate who wanted a strong exchange explained that this bill 
was awful, and that “now it was going to be hard for us to do anything because the Democratic 
leadership had endorsed a crappy exchange bill before the session even started,” (Interview 
September 2013).   
The fact that Senator Feldman and Representative Picraux were retiring before the start 
of the session just weeks away injected further uncertainty into the debate.  Democrats talked 
during the last interim committee meeting about who would carry the mantle in their place.  
They explain that almost by default it fell to Jerry Ortiz y Pino in the Senate and Mimi Stewart in 
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the House.  This group appointed Gail Evans of the Center on Law and Poverty as their lead 
negotiator on an exchange.  In the weeks leading up to the start of the 2013 legislative session, 
Evans met regularly with Matt Kennicott of the Human Services Department and Milton 
Sanchez of the Office of Health Care Reform (Interviews 2013-2014).  
 
2013 Legislative Session 
 While the Martinez administration was engaged in negotiations with the legislature over 
an exchange, it was also deliberating internally over whether to expand Medicaid.  In mid-
January, Governor Martinez announced support for expansion.  She explained in her State of the 
State speech on January 21, 2013 that “I wasn‘t a supporter of ObamaCare. But under its 
mandate we had a choice whether to expand Medicaid using federal funds. We chose to expand 
Medicaid because it was the right thing to do for New Mexico” (Martinez 2014).  It was also 
good politics.  A poll three months earlier found that 52% of New Mexicans supported expansion 
compared to 33% who were opposed (AP 2012).  As an incumbent governor, she was less likely 
to receive a serious primary challenge for the 2014 election.  Now having expanded Medicaid, 
she had taken away a major attack Democratic challengers were likely to make.  Expanding 
Medicaid also increased her leverage in the exchange debate, while also lowering its stakes.  
Fewer people would be affected by the exchange than by Medicaid, and Democrats would have a 
hard time portraying her as an ideologue on the exchange when she had just expanded Medicaid.  
At the same time, this did not lessen the intensity of the exchange debate.  Both sides 
aggressively pushed for their model of an exchange to be adopted. 
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Four exchange bills were introduced in the early days of the 2013 legislative session, two 
in the House and two in the Senate.  The main differences between them were whether the 
exchange would be an active purchaser or a clearinghouse, who could sit on the board of 
directors, and how many seats on the board would be appointed by the governor and the 
legislature.  Negotiations between Gail Evans and the Martinez administration continued, with 
Democratic legislators and consumer advocates optimistic it would lead to compromise.  By late 
January they believed that a deal had been reached and that the governor would support a 
compromise bill.  One advocate explained that Gail Evans and Mimi Stewart “spent hours 
working with the fourth floor [i.e., the governor’s office], just working on that bill. It got watered 
down, but they felt it was acceptable.”   
However, if there had in fact been an agreement, it would soon be off.  Another consumer 
advocate describes that “Matt [Kennicott] comes to a meeting and at the very end, when we 
thought we were done, he has changes to the bill that he now wanted that completely changed the 
entire agreement...The language that he wanted was language that Keith Garnder was insisting 
on. It was very strong no active purchaser language,” (Interview September 2013).  A House 
Democrat involved in the negotiations adds that “after working with us for three weeks, they 
killed the bill,” (Interview September 2013). 
 Representative Stewart went forward anyway with a bill reflecting what she understood 
to be the agreement with the Martinez administration.  One consumer advocate described this as 
a smart move.  “It wasn’t the perfect bill, but it was the bill we thought we could live with, 
including Matt Kennicott and all those folks we were negotiating with.  It was everything we had 
all agreed to,” (Interview September 2013).  House bill 168 narrowly made it through the House 
Health, Government, and Indian Affairs committee on a 6-5 vote (NM House Health, 
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Government & Indian Affairs Committee 2013) and then the House Judiciary Committee on a 
vote of 9-6 (NM House Judiciary Committee 2013).  The bill then faced an uphill battle on the 
House floor, though not necessarily because of politics related to health reform.  A number of 
legislators held a grudge against Representative Stewart for a role she had played the previous 
year in a fight over the education budget and refused to vote for any of her bills in 2013.  They 
approached other Democrats who supported HB 168 and explained that “it’s not your message, 
it’s your messenger,” (Interview September 2013).  The bill was defeated 30-39 (NM House Roll 
Call #3928).  It may not have mattered anyway, as the governor’s office was telling supporters of 
an exchange that Governor Martinez would veto this bill.  If they wanted New Mexico to retain 
control of its insurance exchange, the message was that they needed to defeat Stewart’s bill and 
find an alternative (Interviews 2013-2014).   
 In the meantime, two bills were making their way through the Senate.  The Governor 
indicated she would support a bill written by Senator Benny Shendo.  An adviser to Governor 
Martinez explained that “his bill wasn’t perfect, but a major selling point was that it wasn’t an 
active purchaser,” (Interview September 2013).  Some were skeptical of Senator Shendo because 
he was only a few weeks into his first term in the legislature and had no prior experience in 
health policy.  Still, his bill seemed to be the best path towards compromise with the governor.   
 A key turning point occurred in early March when Senator Jerry Ortiz y Pino merged his 
bill with Senator Shendo’s, dropping expectations of an active purchaser exchange in the 
process.  Senator Ortiz y Pino was viewed by many in the legislature as a progressive champion 
and as the standard bearer on this issue since Dede Feldman’s retirement.  His support for 
Senator Shendo’s bill split those pushing for a state-based exchange.  The Center on Law and 
Poverty, Representative Stewart, and a handful of others still wanted an active purchaser 
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exchange.  One consumer advocate explained that “Jerry’s role really doomed us. When he got 
behind a bad bill, I couldn’t get anybody’s attention because if Jerry think it’s OK – he’s like the 
most progressive guy in the building, you must just be real extreme,” (Interview September 
2013).  Senate leadership decided that “if Jerry’s OK with this, then we’re OK with this,” 
(Interview September 2013).  The Center on Law and Poverty went as far as advocating against 
Senator Shendo’s bill, saying that New Mexico would be better off with a federally run 
exchange. 
 The merger between Senator Shendo and Senator Ortiz y Pino occurred with only ten 
days left in the session, putting great pressure on the final negotiations.  One person involved 
explained that “It became clear that the governor didn’t have sticking points if the insurers would 
agree, so we knew we had to get the insurers…They had differences of opinion among them, so 
these were tedious meetings.  The lobbyists kept having to run out and call their handlers,” 
(Interview February 2014).  Insurers were united in their desire for opposing active purchaser 
language and for increasing their representation on the board.  At the same time, they worried 
about a scenario in which insurers were included in the board, but not given enough seats for 
each of the major players.  As one person described, “The thought was that we definitely want 
representation, but if it’s just one seat, it could be a bad thing because what if it is [our 
competitor]?” (Interview September 2013).  Ultimately a compromise was reached with two 
seats going to the industry, with half of the board being appointed by the governor and half 
selected by the legislature.  This was not as many seats as insurers wanted, but they decided it 
was better than having an active purchaser exchange or giving up control to the federal 
government.  The insurance industry united behind SB 221 (Interviews September 2013). 
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 The bill was then rushed through the Senate, passing the Corporations and Transportation 
Committee 8-2 on Friday March 8th, amended on the Senate floor Sunday March 10th, and passed 
36-5 on Monday March 11th (NM Senate Corporations and Transportation Committee 2013, NM 
SB 221).  House Democrats were divided over how to respond at this point.  There were only 
five days left in the session, leading some to conclude that “We have to get something.  It’s late 
in the session, so you have to get something on her desk or she’s going to do this by executive 
order or blame the Democrats” for a federal exchange (Interview September 2013).  Even so, 
with House Republicans united behind Senator Shendo’s bill, it was clear it could pass if 
leadership could navigate the bill through the process on time.  The bill was sent to a committee 
chaired by someone from the same city as Senator Shendo where it passed 11-0 on Thursday 
March 14th (NM House Health, Government & Indian Affairs Committee 2013). The bill was 
then approved by the full House by a vote of 61-7 on Friday March 15th, the next to last day of 
the session (NM Senate Roll Call #4237)  The only “no” votes came from Democrats who 
supported the concept of an exchange but did not think this bill went far enough. 
 There was no serious talk within Governor Martinez’s office of vetoing SB 221.  An 
adviser to Governor Martinez confirmed this point, comparing the legislative process in 2013 to 
the debate in 2011 when the key bill needed to be voted on after midnight to ensure passage.  
Referring to 2013, this adviser said that “Towards the end, surprisingly, I didn’t notice any 
political games being played.  By the time we were done with this, everyone had given up so 
much, and everyone knew that everyone had given up so much, there were really no games.  It 
was sort of, we need to get this done,” (Interview September 2013).  And with that, New Mexico 
had decided to create its own health insurance exchange. 
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Early Results of the New Mexico Exchange 
 As the dust settled on a contentious three-year debate over whether New Mexico would 
run an insurance exchange and who would be put in charge, policymakers went to work to meet 
tight deadlines ahead of the beginning of open enrollment on October 1st.  J.R. Damron, the 2006 
Republican nominee for governor and the man largely credited with being the first to push for an 
exchange, was named Chair of the Board of Directors.  Governor Martinez used her five 
appointments to select leaders from the insurance industry, small businesses, hospitals, and 
providers.  Republican leadership in the House and Senate had one appointment each, which they 
used to select hospital leaders.   
Supporters of a strong exchange feel that Democratic leadership in each chamber 
squandered their appointments, selecting people too closely aligned with insurers and hospitals 
(Interviews 2013-2014).  One Democrat who supported the final compromise legislation said 
that “The irony was that one of the things we didn’t back down on was that the legislative leaders 
needed to appoint people – but they basically just appointed twins to who the governor 
appointed…We blew our appointments on hospitals,” (Interview February 2014).  Another 
referenced Representative Mimi’s Stewart’s frustration with SB 221, saying “Mimi was very 
angry, saying it would have been better to have no bill at all.  Now, looking at the composition of 
our exchange, I think she might have been right,” (Interview September 2013). 
The disappointment was compounded by the fact that one of the first decisions the board 
made was to give up control to the federal government.  Jon Kingsdale spoke at the first board 
meeting on April 29th about the challenges the board would face in building an exchange on 
time.  Kingsdale is a Boston-based consultant who was one of the architects of the Massachusetts 
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exchange in 2006 and was working with many other states in establishing an exchange.  He 
explained that the state would likely be ready to run the exchange by 2015, but it was too late to 
be ready for 2014’s open enrollment just five months away (Warwick 2013). 
Instead of trying to build both the individual and small-business exchange in such a short 
period of time, the Board decided to focus on the SHOP exchange and rely on the federal 
exchange for the individual market.  One board member explained that the state already had 
significant experience with the small business market from nearly 20 years of running the 
Alliance, and so it made sense to focus energies there (Interview September 2013).  The board of 
directors is trying to redirect money received as part of the initial level 1 grant and has since 
received two more level 1 grants totaling more than $88 million dollars.  A major focus for this 
money is building the IT so the state can take over from the federal government in 2015.  
Another major focus is enhancing outreach and enrollment activities to increase the number of 
people who sign up in the meantime (CMS 2014).   
Supporters of a robust New Mexico exchange describe it as frustratingly ironic that the 
outcome of years of debate so closely matches what they had opposed from the beginning.  They 
pushed aggressively and won a legislative fight for state control, but still defaulted to the federal 
government.  New Mexico’s exchange would at least initially be focused on small businesses 
and based on the Alliance, exactly as Keith Gardner and others within the Martinez 
administration had originally wanted.  Progressive Democrats fought hard for control over who 
would serve on the board but were disappointed when their leadership mostly used this power to 
appoint industry representatives.  Stakeholders interviewed after October 1st also express deep 
frustration over the many problems surrounding the rollout of the federal website healthcare.gov.  
 279 
 
They lament that New Mexicans would not have been affected by the website’s problems had 
state leaders acted sooner (Interviews 2013-2014).   
Early results indicate that the first four months of New Mexico’s exchange did not go well.  New 
Mexico finished the first open enrollment period 41st in the nation in terms of enrollment in the 
exchange as a share of the potentially eligible population, at 17% (KFF 2014c).  It is impossible 
to know what would have been different had Governor Martinez not vetoed enabling legislation 
in 2011 or Democrats in the legislature let her establish an exchange by executive order in 2012.  
Either path may have given state leaders enough time to build the individual market exchange.  
The troubled startup of an exchange in states such as Oregon and Maryland is a reminder that 
choosing to create an exchange would not have ensured success.  However, the generally 
positive results in other states suggest that a successful exchange would have been possible.   
 
Conclusion 
Along with Idaho, New Mexico was the last state in the country to decide to build a 
health insurance exchange.  Policymakers debated for nearly three years which path New Mexico 
should choose.  However, also like Idaho, the state made the decision so late that it was 
impossible to develop the IT necessary to actually create an exchange in time for open 
enrollment on October 1, 2013.   
The key elements leading to this outcome were Governor Martinez’s continued support, 
the absence of a strong Tea Party, pockets of expertise within the legislature and strong support 
from the insurance industry.  In this section, I draw on the multiple theoretical perspectives of the 
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integrated framework introduced in chapter two to highlight the factors that influenced each of 
these elements. 
 
Federalism Context 
 Theories of intergovernmental relations discuss the carrots and sticks the federal 
government uses to incentivize state behavior.  In the case of health insurance exchanges, the 
Obama administration promised flexibility and money to participating states, and threatened to 
take over control in resistant states.  This proved to be an effective approach in New Mexico 
where no prominent interest group or leader on either side of the partisan aisle advocated 
resisting implementation and defaulting to the federal government.  However, support for a 
broad goal does not by itself make legislation or an executive order politically feasible. 
Before enacting legislation in March 2013, the state came close on two occasions to 
establishing legal authority to run an exchange.  Had either of these attempts at creating an 
exchange succeeded, New Mexico likely would have been on track to establishing their 
individual exchange on time.  The federalism context played a role in hampering progress in both 
instances.  First, in March 2011 the legislature passed a bill that would have created an active 
purchaser exchange with a conflict of interest provision preventing insurers and other industry 
representatives from serving on the board.  At this point, the exchange had not yet become the 
national partisan issue that it would later become, and so it would be a mistake to attribute 
Governor Martinez’s veto simply to partisan polarization.  She cited as two of her reasons that 
the Obama administration had not yet released regulations spelling out state-run exchange should 
operate and that the multi-state lawsuit challenging the ACA’s constitutionality had not yet run 
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its course.  She argued that creating an exchange in this context was premature.  Whether or not 
this is true is debatable, but either way, the intergovernmental context gave her an argument for 
waiting. 
The Martinez administration was in a tricky position in early 2012.  Governor Martinez 
supported creating a market-oriented exchange and was on the verge of signing an executive 
order to do so using the Alliance.  This would have given her and her advisers the type of 
exchange they wanted.  By this point, national partisan polarization seems to have factored into 
her decision.  She had not joined the lawsuit against the ACA, but was one of the Republican 
governors who signed a letter calling for its repeal.  National conservative groups and national 
Republican Party leaders were putting greater pressure on governors and state legislators to resist 
implementing any component of the ACA.  With the Supreme Court about to hear oral 
arguments in the ACA case in March 2012, Governor Martinez’s advisers pushed for a more 
resistant stance.  Dan Derksen was forced out of the Office of Health Care Reform and plans to 
sign an executive order and submit a level 2 planning grant were stalled.   
The March 2012 episode is a good example of a phenomenon described in the literature 
in which leaders of one party oppose each other for political reasons, even over issues in which 
they generally agree (Keiser and Soss 1998; Lee 2009; Yackee and Yackee 2009; Medof et al. 
2011, Nicholson-Crotty 2012), and even if it contradicts their usual preferences on federalism 
(Barrilleaux et al. 2002; Nathan 2005; Conlan 2006; Adelman and Engel 2008; Shelly 2008; 
Doonan 2013).  The Martinez administration wanted to maintain control over the exchange, but 
was willing to set this preference aside for partisan reasons.  What is interesting about New 
Mexico compared to other states, though, is that this period of inter-governmental partisanship 
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did not last long or persist as intensely.  After the Supreme Court upheld the law and President 
Obama won re-election, the Martinez administration resumed work on creating an exchange.   
Since no prominent voices in New Mexico were arguing against maintaining state 
control, the question was what type of exchange would be set up.  The trajectory and outcome of 
this debate was shaped by the intra-state context resulting from path dependence, institutional 
design, and partisanship. 
 
State Context: Path Dependence 
 Path dependent forces played an important role in the debate over an exchange in New 
Mexico, though not in deterministic ways.  In other words, prior policy decisions significantly 
affected the range of options available to policymakers but did not pre-determine a particular 
outcome.  Similarly, there is no evidence of path dependent policy feedback cycles in which 
prior decisions created new constituencies advocating for particular proposals.     
The creation of the Health Insurance Alliance in 1994 was a particularly important event 
affecting the options available to policymakers twenty years later.  The Alliance was established 
as a non-profit entity focused on small businesses and led by a board of directors comprised 
mostly of insurers and brokers.  This closely matched the type of exchange the Martinez 
administration wanted to establish, giving it powerful leverage in negotiations with progressive 
legislators and consumer advocates.  When they passed a bill creating an active purchaser 
exchange with a conflict of interest provision, Governor Martinez vetoed it, believing she could 
sign an executive order to build the exchange as part of the Alliance.  That threat was still on the 
table in 2013 when most Democrats and consumer groups decided to support enabling legislation 
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even though they considered it to be dramatically watered-down.  The state’s history with the 
Alliance also enabled New Mexico’s policymakers to maintain control over the small business 
exchange despite not having enough time to create the exchange for the individual market.   
 Interestingly, Governor Martinez’s leverage was limited in path dependent ways.  The 
New Mexico Supreme Court had decided in two separate cases in the 1990s that governors could 
not create policy after having vetoed legislation dealing with similar issues.  These previous 
rulings gave credibility to threats from Democrats that they would sue if she created an exchange 
by executive order.  Had Democrats followed through with their threatened lawsuit, the delays 
would have prevented the legislature from considering the issue and the state would have by 
default ceded control to the federal government.  This was not the outcome Democrats were 
hoping for, but this threat was enough to convince Governor Martinez to resume negotiations.   
 
State Context: Institutional Design 
 New Mexico’s institutional design played a role in shaping the state’s decision to create 
an insurance exchange in four ways.  First, the infrequency of legislative sessions and the 
minimal legislative staff elevated the prominence of individual legislators with greater 
experience in health policy.  The political science literature describes such legislators as pockets 
of expertise, noting that they get this status either because of their personal and professional 
experiences or because they have devoted significant time to the issue over the years (Burns et 
al. 2008).  Most legislators in New Mexico know little about health policy and do not have the 
option of relying on staff to support them.  Instead, they turn to other legislators who have 
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developed a reputation in this area.  The lack of term limits in New Mexico meant that a handful 
of legislators had been in office and worked on health policy for many years.   
Democratic Senator Mimi Feldman was seen as the leading authority on health reform 
until her retirement in December 2012 (Interviews 2013-2014).  She was the lead author of the 
bill that the legislature passed in 2011 and played a major role in the run up to the 2013 session.  
Senator Jerry Ortiz y Pino is generally considered to have taken her place.  His support of SB 
221 to create a clearinghouse exchange killed any hope for active purchaser bills.   
Similarly, the general lack of expertise in the legislature besides these pockets gave 
certain interest groups a greater role than they might have had otherwise.  It is striking that the 
chief negotiator for the legislature throughout many of these three years was Gail Evans of the 
Center on Law and Poverty, not one of the legislators.  The major reason for this is not 
necessarily the amount of staff support legislators receive in and of itself, or even the capacity of 
the state bureaucracy, but the difference in staff support available to legislators and the governor.  
Governor Martinez had a point person, Matt Kennicott, coordinating the work being done by 
many people within the governor’s office, multiple state agencies, and in the Office of Health 
Care Reform.  Each of these people worked full-time and year-round.  By contrast, legislators 
had minimal support and were in session only a few months per year.  Consumer groups like the 
Center on Law and Poverty helped legislators make up the gap in expertise and attention.  
Interest groups aligned with the governor, such as the insurance industry, did not need to play the 
same role because the same need did not exist.   
 Third, the contours of the debate were dramatically shaped by the timing of the 
legislative sessions.  The legislature only had two 60-day windows to act between the ACA’s 
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passage in March 2010 and the beginning of open enrollment in October 2013.  The first of 
these, in January through March 2011 was so early that the full inter-governmental context was 
not yet clear.  This session also came immediately after Governor Martinez took office and 
before many people felt that she had her legs under her (Interviews 2013-2014).  Had legislators 
been able to negotiate with her more fully before the start of the session, they might have chosen 
to advance a more modest bill that would have won her approval.  After Governor Martinez’s 
veto of SB 38 in 2011, the legislature did not have a serious opportunity to weigh in until the 
run-up to the 2013 session.  Until then, the Martinez administration was in full control of the 
process.   
 Fourth, the fact that New Mexico’s legislative sessions run for 24 hours per day and 
seven per week gave House Democrats an opportunity to pass SB 38 in 2011 when it was 
unclear they had enough votes.  They got around this by calling a roll call close to midnight on 
one of the last days of the session, at a moment when they knew exactly enough Republicans 
were absent that the bill would pass.  This is more than just a quirky anecdote in the story of 
New Mexico’s insurance exchange, but a key moment with path dependence implications.  Had 
this bill not passed and then been vetoed by Governor Martinez, Democrats would have had no 
grounds on which to threaten a lawsuit nearly two years later.  This would have freed the 
Martinez administration in 2012 to use an executive order to create an exchange through the 
Alliance as it wanted.  In this scenario, an exchange may have been created in time that the state 
would not have had to rely on the federal web site for the first year. 
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Intra-State Context: Partisanship 
 New Mexico is an example of a state whose decision on an insurance exchange exactly 
matches predictions based on partisan control.  We would expect that a state led by a Democratic 
legislature, electing a mostly Democratic congressional delegation, and twice electing Barack 
Obama would decide to comply with the ACA.  We would also expect that the type of exchange 
created would be a compromise given that in 2010 Republicans won control of the executive 
branch and reduced Democratic majorities in the legislature.  This is exactly what happened.   
 There were two times when it seemed that the Martinez administration might outright 
oppose an exchange for partisan reasons.  Her veto in 2011 was often described in these terms by 
the national media.  But she maintained that an exchange was still a good idea and took 
important steps throughout the year to make progress.  In March 2012, her office halted planning 
activities for what appear to be partisan reasons.  However, this was more driven by the 
increasingly polarized inter-governmental context than growing Republican opposition within 
the state.   
 There were no loud Republican voices within New Mexico calling for Governor Martinez 
to outright oppose an exchange, despite Republican gains in the 2010 elections.  Democratic 
leadership had to use sneaky procedural tactics to pass a bill in 2011, but Republicans mostly 
stayed out of the fight.  Republicans who did weigh in, such as former gubernatorial nominee 
J.R. Damron, continued to advocate for state control of the exchange.  They wanted a different 
model than most Democrats supported, but not because of strident partisan polarization.  Unlike 
Republicans in many other states, they remained consistent to the positions they had supported 
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years earlier before the ACA passed and President Obama became closely identified with the 
issue.   
 The partisan dynamics of the debate over Medicaid expansion paralleled and affected the 
debate over an exchange in interesting ways.  New Mexico is the only state in my sample to both 
expand Medicaid and create an insurance exchange.  Complying with the ACA seems like the 
safest political path for a Republican governor in a blue state that supports Medicaid expansion 
and re-elected President Obama by ten percentage points.  The difference is that on the 
exchange, Governor Martinez negotiated for a compromise bill that more closely resembled a 
model conservatives favored.  If a compromise position had been available on Medicaid, it is 
likely that she would have pushed for it.   
 
Strategic Actors: Interest Groups 
 The New Mexico case provides mixed evidence for the importance of interest groups in 
state policymaking.  On one hand, interest groups played a large role in the debate over an 
insurance exchange.  Their initial opportunities to influence the process were the task forces 
convened by Governor Richardson.  The result of these meetings was a clear consensus that most 
groups wanted to maintain control of the state’s exchange.  This high level of agreement 
contributed to momentum in the early days of the Martinez administration so that the debate was 
about what type of exchange to adopt, not whether or not to do an exchange at all. 
After Governor Martinez’s veto of SB 38 in 2011, interest groups played a prominent 
role in pushing for an active purchaser exchange.  As described earlier, the role of consumer 
groups was enhanced by the lack of professionalization in the legislature.  The Martinez 
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administration did not need the same kind of help from its allies, but had increased leverage 
because of support from the insurance industry.  Insurers were actively involved because they 
felt they would have much more influence over the exchange’s governance and operation if it 
was run in Santa Fe instead of Washington D.C.  A simple example is that they would were able 
to get seats on the board of directors.  Their support was seen as crucial to winning Governor 
Martinez’s final approval of the bill that passed in 2013. 
 On the other hand, there is evidence that interest groups had limited influence.  The 
Center on Law and Poverty, the most prominent consumer advocacy organization in the state, 
ended up on the losing side of the debate.  It had been the chief negotiator for legislative 
Democrats and one of the drivers of the lawsuit that forced Governor Martinez to the table, yet 
ultimately opposed the bill that Democrats supported and the governor signed.  Insurance 
companies were closely involved in the process, but leaders of other industries were not.  Small 
business associations were notably missing from the debate, as were providers and hospitals.   
 The most striking absence was the lack of Tea Party mobilization.  Skocpol and 
Williamson (2012) list New Mexico as one of the fifteen states in the nation with more than 4-6 
Tea Party organizations per million people.  However, the Tea Party played almost no role in the 
debate over whether or not to create an exchange in New Mexico.  They did not show up to 
legislative meetings at anywhere near the levels seen in other states in my sample, nor were they 
active online.  Nobody interviewed cited the Tea Party as a major force in the debate, with most 
people emphasizing that the Tea Party is not very strong in New Mexico politics (Interviews 
2013-2014).  The Tea Party is seen as having some strength in the southern part of the state, such 
as having multiple seats on the Rio Rancho City Council.  However, population in this part of the 
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state is extremely sparse, making it difficult for groups to organize.  Most people live too far 
from the capitol in Santa Fe to consistently influence the legislative process. 
 Further evidence of the Tea Party’s weakness, or perhaps a contributing factor, is the lack 
of a strong conservative think tank organization.  There is the Rio Grande Foundation led by 
Paul Gessing, but it does not have nearly the same level of influence in state politics as the Idaho 
Freedom Foundation, Michigan’s Mackinac Center for Public Policy, and the Mississippi Center 
for Public Policy.  It did not take an active role in arguing against an exchange.  For example, the 
Rio Grande Foundation did not publish a single report or blog post during the 2013 legislative 
relevant to the exchange debate.  This left a leadership and an information void weakening any 
attempt at Tea Party mobilization against an exchange.   
 
Strategic Actors: Policymakers 
 Individual judgment, independent of partisanship and interest group influence, should not 
be discounted.  There were a number of points in New Mexico’s debate at which people with 
similar incentives and constraints may have made different decisions had they been in power.  
For example, a different Republican governor may have decided to sign SB 38 in 2011 rather 
than veto the bill, may have signed an executive order to create an exchange through the 
Alliance, or may have decided to concede and support an active purchaser exchange in 2013.   
Similarly, a different Speaker of the House may have decided not to call the vote on SB 
38 at midnight when he knew enough opponents were home sick that the bill would pass.  As 
mentioned earlier, if he had not done this and Governor Martinez not vetoed the bill, the 
Democrats would not have had grounds on which to threaten a lawsuit in late 2012.  This would 
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have limited the legislature’s leverage and Governor Martinez likely would have bypassed them 
to create an exchange through the Alliance. 
 Senator Ortiz y Pino’s support for Senator Shendo’s bill in 2013 is another example of 
individual judgment affecting the outcome of the debate.  The compromise bill may not have 
passed had Senator Ortiz y Pino joined Representative Stewart’s opposition.  In that case, 
Governor Martinez may have negotiated further and agreed to a bill with greater restrictions on 
who could serve on the board.  Of course, it also may have meant that no bill gets enacted. 
 
Summary 
New Mexico is the only state in my sample in which a Republican governor worked with 
a Democratic legislature.  The result of the state’s debate to create a clearinghouse exchange is 
consistent with expectations based on partisanship.  Democrats wanted to implement the ACA 
and Republicans supported creating an exchange, especially one that they could tailor to local 
preferences.  Had a strong Tea Party presence emerged in New Mexico, Governor Martinez may 
have been forced to reconsider her support for an exchange.  There were signs in March 2012 
that people within her administration, most notably senior advisor Jay McCleskey and Human 
Services Secretary Sidonie Squier, wanted to move in this direction.  By the end of the year, 
Governor Martinez re-affirmed her commitment to creating an exchange.  Ironically, a limited 
Tea Party presence amplified the partisan nature of the debate in New Mexico, especially 
compared to other states where the primary division was within the Republican Party.  This 
changed the nature of the debate so it was not just about whether or not to do an exchange, but 
what type of exchange to create. 
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Partisanship is an incomplete explanation for how and why the state arrived at this 
decision.  With pockets of expertise in the legislature and strong support from the insurance 
industry, policymakers reached a compromise and enacted legislation to create an exchange.  
Path dependence and institutional design played an important role in shaping the process that 
determined the specific type of exchange.  Timing was one of the most important factors cutting 
across each of these dimensions.  The inter-governmental implementation calendar conflicted 
with the state’s legislative calendar, giving legislators only two short windows to consider bills.  
Similarly, the relative power of policymakers and interest groups was not static, but ebbed and 
flowed at different points in the legislative cycle.  The irony is that years of fighting over who 
was empowered to decide and what type of exchange New Mexico would operate meant that the 
choice was made so late that the state had to give up control of its exchange anyway.   
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Chapter 8 - Conclusion 
  
What the ACA accomplishes is remarkably unsettled after four years of implementation.  
Political discord over the law’s enactment was fierce and has intensified over time.  Republicans 
running for federal and state-level offices made repealing the ACA one of the major issues of the 
three election cycles since its passage.  Leaders in more than half the states fought the individual 
mandate and the Medicaid expansion all the way to the Supreme Court.  Many states considered 
constitutional amendments or legislation to nullify the ACA in their state and the U.S. House of 
Representatives voted more than 40 times to repeal the law.  The ACA is becoming increasingly 
entrenched as more of it becomes implemented, but it remains vulnerable to changes in control 
of Congress and the presidency. 
Health insurance exchanges were an element of the law expected to win bi-partisan 
support, especially after the Senate version of reform became law and states would be 
empowered to run their own exchanges.  The threat of a federal takeover was seen as a strong 
enough deterrent to incentivize most states to want to retain control.  Yet,  when open enrollment 
began on October 1, 2013, only 17 had chosen to operate their own exchange, with 27 states 
defaulting to a federally run exchange, and six choosing a federal-state partnership.  Why did so 
few states decide to maintain control of their exchange, especially when the Obama 
administration was giving out large amounts of money and repeatedly extending deadlines?   
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Partisanship is one of the most common explanations for how states reacted, suggesting 
that Republicans opposed an exchange simply because it was proposed by President Obama and 
other Democrats.  There are indeed clear partisan patterns to state responses, as only one state led 
entirely by Republicans (Idaho) decided to create an exchange.  Of the 30 Republican governors 
in office when open enrollment began in October 2013, only three (10%) presided over the 
creation of a state-based exchange, compared to 13 of the 20 Democratic governors (65%).   
 Yet, partisanship is an incomplete explanation.  I show that in many cases the primary 
division was within the Republican Party, not between Democrats and Republicans.  By the time 
the Supreme Court announced in November 2011 that it would consider the lawsuits against the 
ACA, 23 states had taken significant steps towards creating an exchange.  Republicans 
controlled at least one legislative chamber or the governor’s office in all but two of these states, 
including nine that were led entirely by Republicans (Table 1).  All but one received an average 
of $24.1 million in federal exchange grants (Table 2).  The other state, Virginia, passed a bill 
declaring its intention to create a state-based exchange.   
The more focused question I address is why only five of these 23 states decided to create 
an exchange.  That two of these five did so by executive order of their governor (Kentucky and 
New York) suggests that part of understanding why states made their decision requires focusing 
on how states made their decisions.  I use comparative case study analysis to examine the 
decision-making process in the two states that came closest to creating an exchange but did not 
(Michigan and Mississippi) and two of the very last two states to choose to create an exchange 
(Idaho and New Mexico).   
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Appendix A contains a summary of findings.  Appendix B contains a summary of the 
theoretical framework guiding this analysis.  Appendix C-F contains a timeline of key events in 
each state.  Before discussing these findings in more depth, it will be helpful to briefly review the 
key moments in each state’s debate.   
 
Michigan 
 Many of Michigan’s policymakers were confident in late 2011 that their state would soon 
become the first state led entirely by Republicans to create an exchange.  Advocates for an 
exchange had much in their favor.  Governor Snyder supported a state-based exchange and 
devoted his office’s resources to the issue.  An unprecedented set of interest groups were aligned 
in favor of an exchange, including insurers, hospitals, providers, small businesses, and 
consumers.  Legislation creating an exchange passed the Senate with bi-partisan support.  The 
Obama administration was supportive of the state’s plans, awarding the Department of Licensing 
and Regulatory Affairs (LARA) a $9.9 million level 1 planning grant.   
 The greatest opposition to creating an exchange came in the House.  Shortly before the 
2011 Christmas recess, the House blocked LARA from spending its grant.  A month later, the 
House Health Policy Committee held a marathon hearing lasting more than three hours in which 
31 members of the public testified.  This meeting was the culmination of a mobilizing effort by 
Tea Party leaders and the Mackinac Center for Public Policy to oppose the exchange.  
Committee Chairwoman Gail Haines did not call a vote, making it clear that she would wait until 
after the Supreme Court released its ruling.  When the law was upheld a few months later in 
 295 
 
June, House Speaker Jase Bolger momentarily expressed support for an exchange but then 
clarified that he supported waiting until after the presidential election before holding a vote.   
 Speaker Bolger and Rep. Haines publicly supported an exchange for the first time shortly 
after Barack Obama was re-elected president on November 6, 2012.  The legislature would not 
have had time to vote on a bill except that on November 15th HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius 
extended the deadline by which states needed to decide.  The House Health Policy Committee 
defeated Senate Bill 693 two weeks later by a vote of 9-5.  The bill might have passed had it not 
been connected to an abortion bill at the last minute.  Two Democrats abstained from voting over 
the abortion issue; two other Democrats did not show up for reasons that are unclear.  If they had 
all shown up and voted with their party in favor of SB 693, the outcome would have been 
determined by Republican Wayne Schmidt, who was present at the meeting but did not vote.  He 
had expressed support for an exchange in the past but was under intense pressure from 
conservative groups over the issue.  He did not need to cast this tough vote since the outcome 
was decided, but it is unclear how he would have responded if the committee had been split 9-9. 
 The Snyder administration reacted to SB 693’s defeat by moving forward with plans to 
create a partnership exchange.  HHS awarded the state a $31 million level 1 establishment grant 
in January 2013 and approved Michigan’s partnership blueprint application in March.  Once 
again, the legislature blocked LARA from being allowed to spend the federal grant it had 
received for exchange planning.  Ironically, this time it was the House that approved the 
supplemental funding and the Senate that was opposed.  There was little the Snyder 
administration could do without access to this money, and the state defaulted to the federal 
exchange. 
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Mississippi 
 Mississippi is the only state to have an exchange application rejected by the Obama 
administration.  This is a stunning outcome given that there was considerable consensus for 
many years among state leaders in favor of maintaining control.  Republican Governor Haley 
Barbour first introduced the idea in 2007 and the Senate passed exchange legislation three times 
during Barbour’s last term in office (2007-2011).   
The House was controlled in 2008 and 2009 by Democrats that refused to bring the bills 
up or a vote.  House Democrats became supportive after the ACA was passed in March 2010 and 
included health insurance exchanges.  Legislation passed both chambers in the 2011 session, 
though with differing governance structures for the exchange.  Democrats wanted to keep 
insurers off the board of directors, whereas Republicans wanted them to be included.  A 
conference committee could not agree on a compromise and the legislation died. 
 Insurance Commissioner Mike Chaney responded to the legislature’s inaction with plans 
to create an exchange as part of the Mississippi Comprehensive Health Insurance Risk Pool 
Association (MCHIRPA).  He felt this option was available for two reasons: first, an unrelated 
change to MCHIRPA’s statute in 2009 gave him broad authority over any state and federal 
program which helped people obtain insurance.  Second, as an independently elected executive 
branch official, he felt empowered to act on behalf of the state. 
 Governor Barbour supported creating the exchange through the high risk pool, though he 
was term-limited from running again in the 2011 election.  Newly elected governor Phil Bryant 
(R) did not focus on the ACA during the campaign, but indicated he would continue to support 
an exchange.  The Insurance Department convened an advisory board of a wide range of 
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stakeholders that met monthly throughout 2012 to provide input on exchange planning.  The 
Mississippi Tea Party became more active on the issue after the U.S. Supreme Court announced 
its ruling upholding the ACA, including attending meetings of the exchange advisory board and 
of the Personnel Review Board.  Tea Party activists were able to successfully block the insurance 
department’s contracts with exchange vendors.   
 Chaney responded to President Obama’s re-election by announcing he would be 
submitting the state’s application once he discussed it with Governor Bryant.  He did not hear 
back from Governor Bryant until the two bumped into each other in the men’s room at a Jackson 
Hotel a week later.  Bryant explained that he was going to oppose the application and Chaney 
responded that the governor’s approval was not required and he would submit it anyway.  The 
two leaders sent HHS competing letters over the subsequent two months arguing their respective 
cases.  Mississippi Attorney General Jim Hood (D) issued a report siding with Commissioner 
Chaney, to which Governor Bryant responded that he would not allow the state’s Medicaid 
division to cooperate with Chaney’s exchange in any way.  HHS was reportedly willing to move 
forward but was blocked by the White House.  The Obama administration wanted to support a 
Mississippi-run exchange but was not willing to test whether Bryant was bluffing, and therefore 
rejected Chaney’s application. 
 HHS subsequently encouraged the Insurance Department to build a partnership exchange.  
Chaney did not like this idea, saying that it would amount to Mississippi doing most of the work 
but giving up most of the control.  HHS subsequently created an option in which the state could 
retain authority over its small business exchange even while defaulting to the federal exchange 
for the individual market.  Chaney took this approach and received approval on October 1, 2013.  
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The SHOP exchange did not need to connect with Medicaid, and so there was little Governor 
Bryant could do to stop these plans.   
 
Idaho 
 Idaho is by many measures one of the most conservative states in the country.  
Opposition to the ACA has been fierce.  It was the first state to pass legislation opposing the law, 
with Governor Otter signing the Idaho Health Freedom Act before the ACA’s enactment.  
Attorney General Wasden was among the first to join the lawsuit challenging the ACA’s 
constitutionality.  Despite this opposition, Idaho was the only state led entirely by Republicans 
that chose to create an exchange.   
 Governor Otter strongly opposed the ACA but supported the concept of an insurance 
exchange and preferred that Idaho retain control.  He remained non-committal until after the 
Supreme Court’s ruling and President Obama’s re-election in 2012, but allowed his Department 
of Insurance to apply for planning grants before then.  The 2011 legislative session was 
particularly dramatic, with the legislature passed nullification bills declaring the ACA null and 
void in Idaho.  Governor Otter had indicated support for the nullification bill but then vetoed it 
after the legislature was out of session.  He signed an executive order which had a similar effect - 
banning state officials from working on the ACA’s implementation.  However, he added an 
exception saying that he could grant approval on a case by case basis.  He specifically cited 
exchange planning as something he would continue to allow. 
  One of the most important turning points in the creation of an exchange had nothing 
specifically to do with health reform.  In December 2012, Scott Bedke ousted Lawrence Denney 
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as Speaker of the House.  House Republicans were angry at Denney for using money from his 
leadership PAC to campaign against incumbent Republicans in that year’s primary.  Denney was 
an ardent opponent of the ACA and a state-based exchange, refusing to allow legislation to even 
come up for a hearing in previous years.  Bedke was elected Speaker on a platform of openness, 
vowing to allow issues like an exchange to move forward if the votes are there. 
 With Denney no longer standing in the way, Governor Otter threw his full support behind 
a state-based exchange in the 2013 legislative session.  His office coordinated a large coalition of 
interest groups who supported an exchange.  His Chief of Staff introduced the exchange bills at 
each of the committee hearings.  On the other side, the Tea Party mobilized large groups to 
oppose legislation and the conservative think tank The Idaho Freedom Foundation used its 
growing influence to lobby aggressively against an exchange. 
 Legislation passed the Senate Commerce and Human Resources Committee in February 
2013 with all Republicans voting in favor.  Shortly before the bill was to be debated in the 
Senate, 16 Republican House freshmen announced that they would not support the Senate’s bill 
but would support an exchange bill with more legislative oversight.  Without their votes, 
legislation would be defeated when it moved to the House.  A process was agreed to in which the 
Senate would pass its original legislation while the House passed a trailer bill, and then each 
chamber would approve the other’s bill.  The Senate voted 23-12 to pass the original bill after a 
remarkably civil, but intense seven hour debate. 
 By the time the Senate passed its bill, House leaders decided they did not want to trust the 
Senate to also pass the trailer bill.  Parliamentarians also questioned whether the House could 
pass a trailer bill before passing the bill it trailed.  Leaders on both sides agreed that a new bill 
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would be drafted, first passed by the House, and then by the Senate.  The debate was intense on 
both sides, but both chambers followed through with this plan and legislation enacted on March 
28th. 
 Governor Otter appointed the 19 member board of directors two weeks later, not needing 
Senate confirmation because the legislative session had already ended for the year.  One of the 
first decisions made by the board was for Idaho to use the federal website for the first year of 
operation.  The board would retain control over many aspects of the exchange but did not have 
time to develop its own IT.  This led to significant confusion in the early days of open 
enrollment, though Idaho ultimately had one of the highest levels of enrollment in the nation by 
the time the first open enrollment period closed in March 2014.22 
 
New Mexico  
 New Mexico seemed likely to choose to run its own exchange.  The state voted for 
Barack Obama in 2008 and was led by a Democratic governor who had been working on similar 
types of health reform for many years.  The political climate changed in November 2010 when 
Republican Susana Martinez was elected governor. 
 Governor Martinez took office in January 2011 and was immediately plunged into a 
debate over an exchange.  Health reform had not been a major part of her campaign and many 
felt she was out of her element on the issue.  The legislature sent a bill to her desk in March 2011 
under somewhat dubious circumstances, making it through the House thanks to Speaker Luján’s 
                                                           
22
 In terms of percentage of the eligible population that signed up during the open enrollment period between 
October 1, 2013 and March 31, 2014 (KFF 2014c). 
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maneuvering to call the vote after midnight at the precise moment when there were just enough 
supporters in the chamber to ensure passage.  The bill would have created an active purchaser 
exchange.  This is different than the more conservative model her advisers favored, and she 
vetoed the bill. 
 With the legislature unable to act on its own for the next two years, it appeared little 
would happen to create an exchange.  Supporters had hope in August 2011 when Dan Derksen 
was appointed to lead the New Mexico Office of Health Care Reform.  He immediately received 
Governor Martinez’s approval to apply for a level 1 establishment grant, as well as announced 
plans to apply for a level 2 grant by the following March.  This implied that formal authority to 
operate the exchange would be in place by then, most likely through an executive order.  Draft 
language for an executive order was prepared and the level 2 application was close to.  However, 
Derksen suddenly resigned in March 2012.  A reason was not given publicly, but insiders 
attribute it to frustration over increased scrutiny by Governor Martinez’s advisers who did not 
want to approve the executive order or the grant application just as the Supreme Court was about 
to decide and Mitt Romney might be elected president..   
 Planning stalled after Derksen left.  The governor’s office suggested they would still 
create an exchange by executive order, doing so through an entity known as the Health Insurance 
Alliance.  Democrats and consumer groups strongly opposed this plan, believing it was too 
favorable to the insurance industry.  Assistant Attorney General Mark Reynolds issued an 
opinion in September 2012 saying that Governor Martinez does not have authority to create an 
exchange by executive order since she vetoed similar legislation in the past.  Democrats 
threatened to sue if she proceeded anyway and she backed down. 
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 Four exchange bills were introduced during the 2013 session.  Democrats and consumer 
groups believed they had reached a compromise with Governor Martinez’s office in mid-
February.  That deal fell through, but another compromise was ultimately reached when two 
Senate Democrats merged their bills.  The new bill created a clearinghouse exchange allowing 
insurers to serve on the board, but gave the legislature power to appoint board members as well.  
The bill was rushed through multiple committees and multiple chambers in the last week of the 
session, ultimately being signed by Governor Martinez on March 28th.   
 The board of directors was appointed in April, with liberal legislators being frustrated 
that their leaders used their appointments on people favorable to industry rather than consumers.  
They were also frustrated when the board decided almost immediately that there was not enough 
time to create an exchange.  HHS gave approval in July for the state to retain control of its small 
business exchange while allowing the federal government to operate the individual exchange for 
the first year. 
 
Findings 
My central theoretical argument is that no single variable or perspective adequately 
explains each state’s decision.  I developed an integrated framework in chapter two as a way to 
examine the multiple factors affecting state decision-making.  The framework is not meant as an 
explanation per se, but as an organizing tool for considering the relationship between multiple 
theoretical perspectives within political science. 
The framework consists of three nested layers, with the strategic actors attempting to 
influence policymaking at the center.  This includes interest groups, as well as a broad definition 
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of policymakers, such as governors, legislators, staff members, and bureaucrats.  The framework 
acknowledges that the policy and strategy options available to these actors is defined by their 
state’s context, including how institutions are designed, prior policy decisions, and partisan 
dynamics.  It is also important to appreciate that each state is affected by the broader national and 
inter-governmental context.   
 
Table 14 – Influence of Key Actors on Health Insurance Exchange Decision 
Gov 
Support 
2011 
Strong 
Tea 
Party 
Gov 
Maintains 
Support 
2012/2013 
Strong 
Industry 
Coalition 
Pockets 
of 
expertise Exchange 
Michigan x x x x     
Mississippi x x   x     
Idaho x x x x x x 
New 
Mexico x   x x x x 
Source: Interviews 
 
Table 14 summarizes the patterns of support among various strategic actors and whether 
the state chose to create a health insurance exchange.  The states are listed chronologically in the 
order in which they decided.  Michigan rejected an exchange in November 2012, Mississippi’s 
application was rejected in February 2013, Idaho and New Mexico enacted legislation in March 
2013.  All four Republican governors began by supporting an exchange.  The only state that did 
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not have a strong Tea Party presence, New Mexico, went on to create an exchange, including 
with continued support from the governor and strong industry support.  Of the three states with a 
strong Tea Party presence, Phil Bryant was the only governor to rescind his support of an 
exchange.  As a result, Mississippi defaulted to a federal exchange (at least for the individual 
market).  Both remaining states with a strong Tea Party but continued gubernatorial support 
(Idaho and Michigan) had a strong coalition of industry and consumer groups supporting a state 
based exchange.  The difference between the two is that Idaho had pockets of expertise in the 
legislature and went to choose a state-based exchange, whereas Michigan did not have pockets of 
expertise and went on to reject an exchange.   
I discuss each of these elements in more depth below.  I first cover the decisions made by 
policymakers and interest groups.  I then discuss the state and federalism contexts that affected 
whether pockets of expertise developed and otherwise shaped the strategic environment, 
including institutional design, path dependence, and partisanship.   
 
Strategic Actors: Policymakers 
 The governor was the most important actor in each state.  Their support was a necessary 
condition for the creation of an exchange.  Mississippi is the extreme case, demonstrating that 
HHS would not approve an application that did not include the governor’s signature.  Insurance 
Commissioner Mike Chaney tried to push this boundary but was unsuccessful.  Governor 
Martinez of New Mexico was willing to veto exchange legislation that did not align with her 
goals, making it clear that an exchange would not be created without her.  Legislators in Idaho 
say they would not have moved forward with exchange legislation if Governor Otter had not 
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given strong support.  His aggressive use of informal powers, including having his Chief of Staff 
introduce the bills in committee, coordinating a large coalition of interest groups, and regularly 
meeting with legislators was crucial to winning support from enough Republicans in the House.  
Rick Snyder’s failure in Michigan shows that although necessary, a governor’s support was not 
sufficient.   
 Another critical factor was whether pockets of expertise had developed around health 
insurance in the legislature.  This refers to legislators who have developed a reputation as a trust-
worthy source of information on an issue.  They are particularly influential within their own 
party and are most important when counter-pressure from interest groups is strong.  One of the 
reasons an exchange was defeated in Michigan is that there were not legislators expert in health 
policy and the legislative process to shepherd bills along.  There were strong advocates for an 
exchange, but nobody with sufficient expertise or clout to validate the idea of a state-run 
exchange for enough Republicans. 
Idaho is a good example of the importance of pockets of expertise.  Even with strong 
support from Governor Otter, exchange legislation likely would not have received enough 
Republican votes if particular legislators with a deep knowledge of health insurance had not 
stepped up.  It helped that a number of the most prominent members of the legislature also 
happened to be insurance brokers or former insurance executives.  They were in powerful 
positions and had many years of relationships and experience with the legislative process.  They 
strongly supported state control of the exchange and were able to answer even the most technical 
questions posed by critics.  New Mexico had similar pockets, though they were less critical to an 
exchange’s passage since they were members of the Democratic Party which controlled the 
legislature and mostly all supported an exchange.  Still, it helped that the legislators negotiating 
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most closely with Governor Martinez had a reputation as knowledgeable about health reform.  
There were no prominent experts in the Mississippi legislature, though it did not matter once the 
exchange debate shifted venues in 2011 to the executive branch.   
Not every legislator supporting an exchange can be described as an expert.  Even some 
highly influential legislators were relatively new to health policy issues.  Many of the 16 
Republican freshmen in the Idaho legislature had never worked in this area.  Benny Shendo, the 
New Mexican Senator who sponsored the exchange bill that ultimately passed, was new to the 
legislature and had not worked directly on health.  Yet, it is unlikely legislation would have 
moved to the point that these non-experts could be influential without the work of legislators 
regarded as experts. 
Implied in this analysis is the idea that the judgment, preferences, and experiences of 
individual people are also important.  Yes, incentives change in response to pressure from 
interest groups, and actors are empowered differently as a result of the state and 
intergovernmental context.  But it should also be recognized that within all these constraints are 
people making decisions.  In other words, different individuals placed in similar circumstances 
might come to different conclusions about which path to take.  The distinction I am making is 
not that people are fallible and have imperfect judgment, but that people come to different 
conclusions about which outcome is ideal.  For example, many other Republicans in Butch 
Otter’s position would have resisted a state-based exchange.  Even with the institutional features 
empowering Mississippi’s insurance commissioner, other people likely would not have pushed 
so aggressively for state control.  Other people in Governor Bryant’s position may have let 
Commissioner Chaney move forward with an exchange through the high risk pool.  Former 
Governor Haley Barbour said he would have.  Other Republican insurance commissioners may 
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not have pressed so hard.  Similarly, for pockets of expertise to develop over time, individuals 
need to consistently work on related issues.  Lobbyists may influence what some people focus 
on, but state legislators have significant discretion to decide which issues they will pursue.   
 
Strategic Actors: Interest Groups 
 Many of the most powerful interest groups worked together in each state to support a 
state-based exchange, including insurers, insurance agents, small businesses, hospitals, 
providers, and consumers.  Nobody interviewed could identify another issue on which all of 
these groups were so closely aligned.  Informants were similarly hard pressed to name a time 
when some combination of these groups united on an issue and were not successful, because 
these are the historically powerful groups in these states.   
 Insurance companies played a particularly large role in Idaho, Michigan, and New 
Mexico.  New Mexico was the only case where insurers and consumers competed rather than 
worked together, but even here, their mutual backing of a state-based exchange sent a powerful 
message to policymakers.  The level of support provided by insurers in Idaho and Michigan was 
similar, though there is some evidence it was stronger in Idaho.  The major insurers in Idaho 
were careful not to promise a quid pro quo for support of an exchange, but made it clear that the 
exchange was their priority issue that session and that they would offer “undying loyalty and 
support” (Interview May 2013) in the upcoming primary for legislators with a favorable voting 
record.  By contrast, insurers in Michigan describe no such promise, instead saying that although 
they preferred state control of the exchange, they would be prepared either way.  Many speculate 
that Blue Cross Blue Shield has such a large market share in Michigan that they were not 
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worried about losing ground if the exchange was run by the federal government instead of the 
state. 
 Industry leaders did not lobby as aggressively for a health insurance exchange in 
Mississippi as in other states, largely because they thought they did not have to.  After the 
legislature failed to act in 2011 and Commissioner Chaney invited them to participate in an 
advisory board to create an exchange through the high risk pool, they thought the matter was 
decided.  They did not see the need to lobby because they assumed that an agreement had been 
reached between Chaney, Governor Bryant, and the Obama administration.   
Tea Party strength was a major factor affecting whether a state decided to create its own 
exchange.  The Tea Party may be better conceived of as a social movement (Nownes 2013), but 
succeeded in these states using many of the same lobbying tactics employed by traditional 
interest groups.  They made phone calls, sent emails, and visited legislative offices.  They used 
social media and the internet to turn out large numbers to committee hearings.  But they acted 
differently than most groups.  They used inflammatory rhetoric in their testimonies, insisted on 
speaking even in meetings where the public does not usually attend, clapped loudly even when it 
was against decorum, and stood outside of meetings taunting legislators whose votes they did not 
like.   
The Tea Party is also different in that it is not a private interest with a hierarchal 
structure; there is no such thing as THE Tea Party.  Instead, it is a collection of decentralized 
groups of activists.  Their influence is largely through local politics, taking over county and 
precinct party organizations, regularly attending coffee hours and open houses held by local 
legislators.  Those living close to the state’s capital city have greater influence as they are able to 
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regularly attend legislative meetings and develop relationships with legislators outside their 
districts. 
External organizations played an important role in fueling the Tea Party’s momentum and 
influence.  Conservative think tanks in Idaho (the Idaho Freedom Foundation), Michigan (the 
Mackinac Center for Public Policy), and Mississippi (the Mississippi Center for Public Policy) 
served as de facto leaders of the Tea Party.  They did not lead meetings, but they educated citizen 
activists on the legislative process and provided the data and reports for them to use when 
contacting legislators or writing blog posts.  National groups such as the CATO Institute, ALEC, 
the Heritage Foundation, and Americans for Prosperity played a similarly important role, 
providing expertise – and in some cases money.  New Mexico is the only state in my sample 
where the Tea Party is not strong and there is not a prominent conservative organization.  The 
political climate for an exchange was much more favorable as a result, with no prominent groups 
calling for the state to reject an exchange. 
Idaho decided to create a state-based exchange despite aggressive opposition from a 
strong Tea Party supported by a strong conservative think tank.  As described above, a major 
difference was the pockets of expertise that had developed in the Idaho legislature.  Each state’s 
institutional design played an important role in shaping whether pockets of expertise developed.  
Path dependence and partisanship also played a significant role in shaping the state context and 
affecting both the process by which the decision was made, as well as the debate’s outcome. 
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State Context: Institutional Design 
 Pockets of expertise, at least with respect to health insurance, were ironically more 
common in states with shorter legislative sessions and limited staff support.  We might have 
expected that expertise would be greater in states that spent more time in session or that had 
more staff to conduct research.  Idaho legislators have almost no staff support and are only in 
session three months per year.  As a result, those who had worked in the insurance industry were 
particularly influential.  Other legislators could not rely on a staff for information and so would 
turn to their colleagues for guidance. 
 The Michigan legislature was in session longer than the other three states, and as a result 
had considerably more time for deliberation and hearings.  The Michigan House Health Policy 
Committee held more than a dozen hearings on an exchange compared to one or two hearings in 
the relevant committees in each other state.  Rather than create expertise, this gave interest 
groups more opportunities to pressure legislators.   
 The effect of long sessions in Michigan was compounded by term limits, which removes 
legislators before they can accumulate expertise.  A legislator in a state with long sessions could 
theoretically develop significant expertise if they were allowed to remain in the legislature over 
time.  The effects of term limits are most clear when compared to Idaho.  More than one-third of 
the Idaho legislature was new in 2013 as a result of redistricting and retirements the previous 
year.  This is comparable to the high level of turnover in Michigan as a result of term limits.  The 
major difference is that leadership was constantly turning over in Michigan as well, particularly 
in the House which is often a stepping stone to serving in the Senate.  The top four leaders in the 
Michigan House had an average of two years of legislative experience.  By comparison, House 
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leaders in Idaho had served an average of ten years.  Representative Fred Wood was a newly 
appointed Chairman of the Idaho House Health and Welfare Committee in January 2013, but had 
served on that committee since 2006.  In Michigan, he would have been term-limited from 
running in the House by that point.23  The key committees in Michigan experienced nearly 100% 
turnover the year the exchange bill was debated.  Most legislators on both sides of the debate, 
including the leaders, had no experience with health policy and a limited knowledge of the 
legislative process. 
It is important to note that Tea Party activists and other opponents of an exchange might 
draw different conclusions from these same data.  They might argue that Michigan’s ability to 
reject a state-run exchange is a success story for term limits because the will of the people beat 
out the will of powerful interest groups.  However, I would respond that legislators were still 
responding to pressure from interests, but in this case it was ideologically based and legislators 
with less expertise – individually and collectively – had less ability to sort through the policy and 
political issues. 
  
State Context: Path Dependence 
 Prior decisions affected the options available to policymakers and interest groups.  One of 
the most dramatic examples is that alternative paths to creating an exchange were possible in 
states that had previously created insurance programs governed by a loose statute.  When the 
legislature failed to act in Mississippi, Insurance Commissioner Mike Chaney was able to move 
forward with planning because the high risk pool gave him broad authority.   
                                                           
23
 New York is an extreme example, where Richard Gottfried has been the Chair of the Assembly’s Health 
Committee since 1987.   
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Similarly, Governor Susana Martinez and her advisers regularly discussed creating an 
exchange through the New Mexico Insurance Alliance.  The Martinez administration never 
followed through with these threats, but the Alliance provided significant leverage in debates 
with Democratic legislators over the governance structure of New Mexico’s exchange.  At the 
same time, Martinez was limited by path dependent forces, as there was a legal precedent in the 
state that a governor is not allowed to use an executive order to make policy on an issue that the 
legislature has considered and the governor has vetoed.   
The selection of Scott Bedke as Idaho’s House Speaker is another example of a previous 
decision changing the range of subsequent options.  This change had a domino effect in which 
supportive committee leaders and members were selected in the House, and in which Governor 
Otter felt he could put his full support behind exchange legislation.  Exchange legislation likely 
would not have passed had Lawrence Denney still been speaker. 
 Strategic actors on both sides tried to create path dependent forces which they hoped 
would work to their advantage down the road.  For example, each state created workgroups and 
task forces shortly after the ACA was passed.  The recommendations made as a result of these 
meetings were non-binding, yet were taken very seriously by participants because they hoped to 
create momentum behind their positions.  The same was true of the interim legislative meetings 
in New Mexico in 2012 and the exchange advisory board in Mississippi.  Opponents of the 
exchange used the same strategy, hoping to limit their opponents down the road.  The Idaho 
Health Freedom Act of 2010 is a clear example of this, as are the nullification bills which were 
intended to prevent state officials from doing anything to implement the ACA.  These attempts 
did not work in most cases.  Policymakers mostly made their decision without regard to previous 
support or opposition.  
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State Context: Partisanship 
 There are three clear partisan patterns to how states made their decisions over an 
exchange.  One is that the vast majority of Democrats supported creating an exchange.  This may 
seem uninteresting given that the ACA was written and passed by Democrats at the national 
level.  But it is surprising that most Democrats remained supportive in these four Republican-led 
states, even as it became clear that the type of exchange that might be created in differed from 
the type they favored.  Democrats generally preferred an active purchaser model and preventing 
insurers from serving on the board of directors, but were willing to support other forms of an 
exchange if it meant their state retained control.   
The choice for Democrats in Idaho and Michigan became supporting a state-based 
clearinghouse exchange run by a Republican administration and a board of directors that 
included insurers on the board, or a national exchange run by the Obama administration, and 
therefore did not empower local insurers.  In these states, exchange bills made it to the floor of 
both chambers in Idaho and in the Michigan Senate.  All but one Democrat in these two states 
voted in favor of a state-based exchange.  Democrats on the Michigan House Health Policy 
Committee all supported the governor’s exchange bill, but did not vote for it once it became tie-
barred to an abortion bill.   
Prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling and the 2012 elections, Democrats in Republican-led 
states supported an exchange in part to entrench key aspects of the law in case the law was 
defeated or repealed.  Yet, Democrats remained supportive of state control after the law became 
more secure, even if it meant accepting a more conservative model.  When asked about this 
tension, they explained that they genuinely thought state control would be better.  Their votes 
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were crucial to the passage of legislation.  Republicans controlled both chambers in the Idaho 
and Michigan legislatures, but Democratic votes made the difference in Idaho and nearly made 
the difference in Michigan.   
 The partisan tension was a little different in Mississippi and New Mexico where the two 
parties were agreed over creating an exchange but were divided over what type of exchange to 
create.  In Mississippi, this compromise could not be reached in the 2011 conference committee 
and the debate shifted from the legislative to the executive branch, making partisan conflict less 
of a factor.  In New Mexico, Democrats controlled both chambers of the legislature and were in a 
much better negotiating position.  As a result, this is the only state in my sample where the 
ongoing debate was not about whether to do an exchange, but what type of exchange to establish.  
As the end of the session neared in 2013 and compromise still had not been reached, some 
Democrats relented and agreed to support a more conservative model of an exchange.  They 
allowed insurers to serve on the board and accepted a clearinghouse exchange.  Some prominent 
Democrats voted against this compromise bill, but it still had support from 84% of Democratic 
legislators (Table 8).  
 The second partisan pattern is that most opponents of an exchange were Republican.  
However, the third pattern makes it clear that this is not the same as saying that all Republicans 
opposed an exchange: Republicans were sharply divided over the issue.  There does not appear 
to be a consistent linear trend in the magnitude of Republican opposition over time.  It seems to 
have increased in Mississippi, with Phil Bryant allowing exchange legislation to pass the Senate 
three times between 2008-2011 when he presided as Lieutenant Governor and exchange planning 
to proceed throughout all of 2012.  It was not until late in 2012 that the Tea Party became active 
on this issue and he made it clear he would block the exchange.  Republican opposition 
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intensified over time in other places as well, but diminished sharply after President Obama was 
re-elected.  Republican leaders in the Michigan House did not allow a vote on the exchange bill 
until November 2012.  It was not until this point that Governors Otter and Martinez fully 
engaged in the debate over an exchange in Idaho and New Mexico. 
 
Federalism Context 
 The strategic environment in each state was also shaped to a significant degree by the 
intergovernmental context.  The timing of each state’s planning process was determined by the 
deadlines established by the federal government.  This affected states differently due to 
differences in the legislative calendar.  States could apply for grants each quarter, though the 
final deadline for the level 2 grant was June 29, 2012.  This was the major grant that would 
provide states large amounts of money to fund operations until their exchange was self-
sustaining.  States needed formal authority (i.e. legislation or an executive order) to operate an 
exchange in order to receive this money, making this the de facto deadline by which states 
needed to decide whether to create an exchange (Jones 2012).   
 This timing of the deadline is revealing about the level of opposition the Obama 
administration anticipated.  Most states would have two legislative sessions to pass legislation 
creating an exchange by June 2012, and most were expected to have decided by then.  However, 
opponents challenged the law and the Supreme Court’s ruling on the ACA’s constitutionality 
was not released until June 28th.  Immediately after the ruling, the Obama administration 
extended the level 2 grant deadline by two years in order to accommodate the states that had 
stalled.  This deadline extension helped very few states in the short-term because of the timing of 
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state legislative sessions.  Figure 3 shows how each state’s length of session conflicted with two 
major federal deadlines, with only 11 states still in session in July.   
 The same thing happened in November 2012 when HHS extended the blueprint deadline.  
Michigan is the only of my four states that was still in session and thus in a position to hold a 
vote immediately.  Yet, the extension fueled the argument made by opponents that the Obama 
administration lacked the will and the capacity to follow through with threats to takeover in non-
compliant states.  The extension did not matter to Mississippi, as Commissioner Chaney’s 
application was ready to be submitted.  If anything, the extension gave more time for Governor 
Bryant’s position to harden and his opposition to intensify.  The extensions did help in Idaho and 
New Mexico, making it possible for these states to consider and pass legislation in the 2013 
session.  Of course, it was too late by then for them to develop the IT to run an exchange, and so 
both defaulted to the federal exchange. 
 In addition to the challenge of timing, the Obama administration struggled to negotiate 
with all the various players in state government.  Regular channels were developed for constant 
communication with the governor’s office and/or a designated agency in each state.  In Idaho and 
Mississippi this was the Department of Insurance.  In Michigan this was the Department of 
Licensing and Regulatory Affairs.  In New Mexico this was the Department of Health.  With the 
exception of Mississippi, the decision of whether to create an exchange was made by each state’s 
legislative, not executive branch.  HHS took phone calls from legislators, but did not seem to 
have a strategy to reach out to legislators.  This reinforced the asymmetry in expertise between 
bureaucrats and most legislators, putting pressure on agency officials to “educate” legislators.24  
                                                           
24
 In most cases, it seemed that when bureaucrats talked about “educating” legislators, they were really describing 
themselves as lobbying. 
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This may be appropriate, as governors and state bureaucrats would likely consider any such 
attempts to be meddling.  At the same, it increased the division between the Obama 
administration and the decision-makers.  Given these constraints, there is little the Obama 
administration could have done differently to incentive more states to create an exchange.   
 In the wake of the troubled rollout of the federal exchange in the fall of 2013, the 
Washington Post published a memo Harvard economist David Cutler (2010) had written three 
years earlier warning that the ACA’s implementation was off track.  He argued that HHS was a 
deeply flawed organization and that a separate entity should be created to bring together 
government and industry leaders to oversee implementation.  Doonan (2013) similarly called for 
the creation of a “Center for State-Based Health Exchanges” to work closely with a wide variety 
of stakeholders to “foster collaboration, align incentives, share information, and document and 
publicize successes.”  These proposals likely would have made the Obama administration’s 
oversight more efficient and improved planning of the federal exchange, potentially avoiding the 
political fallout that came from the early days of open enrollment.  But it is unclear how this 
would have influenced more states to decide to create their own exchange given the state-specific 
factors of institutional design, path dependence, partisanship, and interest group dynamics I have 
highlighted.  
 
Does It Matter? 
 After four years of intense battles over the creation of insurance exchanges, it is worth 
taking a step back and revisiting whether this debate matters.  Another way to frame this 
question is to consider whether states really have much control by deciding to operate an 
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exchange.  The creation of state-based insurance exchanges is very different from the Medicaid 
expansion in that implementation money does not really flow to state budgets but simply helps 
cover the expense of hiring consultants or additional staff to do work under terms dictated by 
HHS.  In some cases the consultants were in-state (such as Public Sector Consultants in 
Michigan), but often these were large firms such as Leavitt Partners, Wakely, or Deloitte 
operating in multiple states.  By contrast, states choosing to expand Medicaid have flexibility 
over how to spend money they receive from a generous federal match.   
 Similarly, residents in every state will have access to an exchange regardless of how their 
state decided, whereas residents in states that do not expand Medicaid will fall into a coverage 
gap.  A wrinkle in this comparison is an ongoing lawsuit filed by the state of Oklahoma 
challenging HHS’s interpretation of the ACA that it has the authority to provide tax credits to 
help lower income people purchase coverage on a federally run exchange.  The language in the 
ACA refers to subsidies in state exchanges, but HHS argues it clearly meant subsidies in any 
exchange.  A decision by the courts against the Obama administration would significantly raise 
the stakes for the exchange debate.  It would mean that only people in the 17 states that have 
created their own exchange would receive federal help.  Many currently resistant states would 
likely respond by creating their own exchange, though many likely would not.   
The early results of the first open enrollment period shed some light on the question of 
whether it matters whether states create their own exchange.  By far the most successful state 
was Vermont, signing up 85% of the potential population eligible to participate in the exchange.  
Two other states that moved quickly to establish their own exchange – California and Rhode 
Island – are next at 43% and 41%.  However, some of the most resistant states are also in the top, 
with Florida at 4th and North Carolina at 9th.  Idaho and Michigan took divergent paths on the 
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question of whether or not to create an exchange, yet signed up the exact same proportion of 
eligible residents (37.7% in Idaho vs. 37.6% in Michigan).  Oregon and Maryland were seen as 
leaders in the development of an exchange but had disastrous rollouts.  Oregon never managed to 
get its website online during open enrollment and ultimately decided to give up and use the 
federal exchange.  The most stunning disappointment is Massachusetts which should have had 
the easiest time given that it was the first to operate an exchange.  Instead, it finished the 2014 
open enrollment period with the 49th worst enrollment figures (all statistics come from KFF 
2014c). 
As of May 2014, the federal government had given out a total of $4 billion dollars in 
grants to help states create an exchange.  This included $940 million to states that decided to 
reject state control (2014b).  Not all of this money was spent, as states rejected grants at the same 
time that they rejected autonomy.  Even so, this begs the question of whether it was redundant to 
require 50 states and the District of Columbia to spend years of their agency time and money to 
work in parallel to create comparable entities.  A single national exchange likely would have 
been more efficient, notwithstanding the trouble HHS had with healthcare.gov in the fall of 
2013.  It is also unlikely the Obama administration would have failed so dramatically at 
launching the website if it did not have to spend so much time coaxing states to act. 
It is important to note that state control is about more than just money.  Many 
policymakers have strong feelings about the type of exchange they prefer for their state, with 
some favoring a more heavily regulated active purchaser model and others preferring a less 
restrictive clearinghouse model.  State-level interest groups have strong feelings about how their 
exchange should be governed and anticipate greater opportunities for involvement if their state is 
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in charge.  Maintaining state control gives these groups greater say in how their exchange 
operates. 
Finally, it is important to remember that the motivation behind having state-based 
exchanges was not theoretical but was political and even accidental.  Above all, Congressional 
Democrats wanted a health reform bill that would pass.  As described in chapter three, this is 
why Senator Ted Kennedy did not put up much of a fight over creating a national exchange in 
the Senate bill.  It is also why President Obama and House Democrats were able to accept the 
Senate bill during the reconciliation process after Senator Kennedy died and Democrats lost their 
filibuster-proof majority in the Senate.  Exchanges were seen as a non-partisan compromise 
issue, and the expectation was that Republican governors and legislators would welcome federal 
money and flexibility.  They were right about the bill passing but wrong about what followed. 
It is too early to determine the long-term implications of choosing to maintain or reject 
control over an exchange, but this will be an important question going forward.  The 
intergovernmental battle over the creation of health insurance exchanges is a fascinating example 
that the policymaking process does not end with a bill signing ceremony.  Politics are just as 
intense, if not more so, after a bill becomes law.  This is uncharted territory for health policy 
scholars who for decades have written about why health reform fails.  The passage of the ACA 
was certainly a major achievement, but what the reform actually accomplishes is still very much 
up for grabs.  Many important health policy problems remain unsolved, opening the door for 
more intense debates in Washington D.C. and in the states. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A - Summary of Findings 
1. Overall – No one variable explains each state’s decision on an exchange.  Instead, it is 
helpful to focus on a combination of variables, with the most important being governors, 
the Tea Party, and pockets of expertise in the legislature.   
2. Strategic Actors: 
a. Governors - A governor’s support was a necessary but not sufficient condition.  
No state exchange was created without a governor’s endorsement.  Mississippi 
came the closest, with the independently elected insurance commissioner trying to 
do so on his own.  At the same time, a governor’s support did not ensure success.  
The most notable example is Gov. Snyder’s (MI) inability to convince the 
legislature to pass a bill.  
b. Tea Party vs. industry – The Tea Party was an amazingly successful counter-
weight to the traditionally powerful groups. 
c. Legislative pockets of expertise – Tea Party influence could be overcome if there 
was strong industry support and “pockets of expertise” in the legislature.  These 
are legislators who have amassed particular clout and knowledge of health policy.   
d. Policymakers – The preferences and judgment of individuals matter 
3. State context – The relative level of influence between each set of actors depended on a 
state’s context, including prior policy decisions, institutional design, and partisanship.  
a. Institutional design - Pockets of expertise were ironically more common in the 
states with short sessions and limited staff support (ID and NM).  Many 
legislators had jobs during the rest of the year the legislature was in session, 
including people in key positions who were insurance agents, doctors, and former 
insurance executives.  Term limits and long sessions in MI meant that legislators 
had little experience making policy, but were full-time politicians with limited 
expertise in a particularly subject. 
b. Path dependence - Alternative paths towards creating an exchange were possible 
if the state had already established a similar type of an exchange (The Alliance in 
NM and the High Risk Pool in MS).  The viability of this alternative path in MS 
also depended on there being an independently elected insurance commissioner. 
c. Partisanship - The Tea Party was strong in each of the three states with a 
Republican controlled legislature.  As a result, the main division in these states 
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was within the Republican Party, not between Democrats and Republicans.  This 
shifted the debate from being over which type of exchange to create to being over 
whether to create a conservative exchange or none at all.  
4. Federalism context –Federal deadlines conflicted with state legislative calendars. Could 
influence governors but limited in ability to negotiate with legislators and interest groups. 
Severely limited by state context. Extending deadlines made an exchange possible in 
Idaho, but overall weakened leverage with conservative policymakers and interest 
groups. 
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Appendix B – Summary of Theoretical Frameworks Explaining State Implementation of 
Federal Law 
Intergovernmental context 
• Federalism 
o Core argument: The balance of power between levels of government is dynamic 
rather than static. Actors at each level are regularly contesting boundaries. 
o Key insights 
 The federal government uses a variety of carrots and sticks to define a 
favorable relationship with states. 
 States rely on a variety of safeguards to protect against federal 
encroachment. 
 Although the terms of intergovernmental negotiations are set by Congress 
in statute, the negotiation continues throughout a law’s implementation as 
a result of interactions between the bureaucracies of each level of 
government. 
Intra-state context 
• Path dependence 
o Core argument: Prior policy decisions affect the menu of options available to 
strategic actors. 
o Key insights: 
 “New policies create a new politics,” (Schattschneider 1935) 
 The substance of the policy itself shapes the debate over its enactment and 
implementation 
• Institutional design 
o Core argument: Institutions and procedures shape the strategic environment in 
which decisions are made. 
o Key insights: 
 State legislatures vary dramatically in size, affecting the likelihood that 
policy entrepreneurs and pockets of expertise emerge on a given issue. 
 States legislatures vary dramatically in length of session, affecting when 
they make decisions and who can serve. 
 Term limits alters the balance of power between strategic actors, including 
governors, legislators, and interest groups. 
 States vary dramatically in the amount of staff support provided to each 
legislator, affecting the relationship between legislators and other strategic 
actors. 
 The power of governors to advance their agenda varies with their formal 
and informal powers. 
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 Bureaucrats play an important role in state decision-making, but their 
specific role varies by state and by policy. 
• Partisanship 
o Core argument: Elected officials are focused on winning elections. Policy debates 
affect elections and elections affect policy debates. 
o Key insights: 
 Republicans and Democrats have a tendency to oppose each other, even 
over issues about which they generally agree.  
 Partisanship sometimes trumps preferences for local or national control 
such that leaders at each level of government support the actions of 
another level if it is led by a member of their party, and oppose actions led 
by a member of a different party. 
Strategic Actors 
• Interest groups 
o Core argument: Private interests play a prominent role in shaping policy 
decisions. 
o Key insights: 
 A large number of organizations attempt to influence health policy at the 
federal and state levels. 
 Some interest groups are empowered when policy debates shift to the state 
level, whereas others are disadvantaged. 
 To the extent that interest groups exert influence on the development of 
policy, it is because they can mobilize resources in a way that the general 
public cannot. These include policy information, political intelligence, 
manpower, and money. 
 Lobbyists spend most of their resources supporting allies rather than 
blocking likely opponents. 
 It is easier to block a policy proposal than to successfully adopt one. 
• Policymakers 
o Core argument: Different people sometimes arrive at different conclusions, even 
under similar circumstances and facing similar incentives.  
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Appendix C – Timeline of Key Events in Michigan 
 
2010 
• March 23: ACA signed into law by President Obama.  MI Attorney General Mike Cox 
(R) joins multi-state lawsuit challenging the law’s constitutionality. 
• March 31: Governor Jennifer Granholm (D) creates The Health Insurance Reform 
Coordinating Council to oversee the ACA’s implementation.  
• September 30: The Department of Community Health (DCH) is awarded $1 million by 
the federal government for exchange planning. 
• November 2: Rick Snyder (R) elected governor.  Republicans win control of the House 
and won seats in the Senate.  Republicans won their largest majorities since the early 
1950s. 
• December 2: The Coordinating Council releases its reporting recommending the state run 
its own exchange. 
 
2011 
• January 1: Rick Snyder (R) sworn in as Governor.   
• February – June: Public Sector Consultants tasked with leading work groups to solicit 
input from stakeholders.  The final report was released June 17th and recommends 
Michigan develop its own clearinghouse exchange as a quasi-governmental organization.  
• September 14: Governor Snyder releases a “special message on health” calling for the 
legislature to pass legislation creating an exchange by Thanksgiving. 
• November 10: Senate passes SB 693 to create an exchange by a vote of 25-12.   
• November 14: U.S. Supreme Court announces it will consider the cases challenging the 
ACA’s constitutionality. 
• November 29: Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs (LARA) awarded $9.9 
million level 1 establishment grant.   
• December 13: House passes supplemental funding bill without authorizing LARA to 
spend its grant. 
 
2012 
• January 19: House Health Policy Committee holds its 10th hearing on the exchange 
without taking a vote.  Thirty-one people testified at this meeting lasting more than three 
hours. 
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• June 28: U.S. Supreme Court announces ruling upholding the ACA but making the 
Medicaid expansion optional; House Speaker Jase Bolger (R) and Committee Chair Gail 
Haines (R) continue to resist exchange. 
• November 6: Barack Obama re-elected President.  Republican majority in the House 
reduced; House Speaker Jase Bolger (R) and Committee Chair Gail Haines (R) publicly 
support an exchange for the first time. 
• November 15: Obama administration extends the deadline by which states need to 
decide. 
• November 29: House Health Policy Committee vote 9-5 against an exchange bill that was 
tie-barred to an abortion bill.  Four Democrats abstained or did not show up.  One 
Republican did not vote.  
 
2013 
• January 17: LARA awarded $31 million level 1 establishment grant.  
• January 22: Governor Snyder submits letter to HHS declaring plans to create a 
partnership exchange. 
• February 28: House votes 78-31 to approve supplemental funding bill authorizing LARA 
to spend the $31 million level 1 establishment grant.   
• March 5: HHS gives conditional approval of Michigan’s partnership blueprint. The 
Senate never took a vote on the supplemental funding bill, effectively blocking the grant 
and preventing the state from doing the work required to operate a partnership exchange. 
• September 16: Governor Snyder signs legislation expanding Medicaid. 
• October 1: Open enrollment begins, Michigan is part of the federal exchange. 
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Appendix D – Timeline of Key Events in Mississippi 
 
Pre-ACA 
• 2007: Governor Haley Barbour (R) publicly supports creating an exchange. 
• 2008: Two bills to create an exchange were introduced in the Senate, one by Democrat 
Hob Bryan and one by Republican Eugene Clark.  Clark’s bill passed the Senate 
unanimously but was never voted on in the House. 
• 2009: Governor Barbour mentions the exchange in his state of the state speech.  Once 
again, a Republican bill passed with bi-partisan support in the Senate but did not receive 
a vote in the House. 
• 2009: The legislature amends the statute governing the Mississippi Comprehensive 
Health Insurance Risk Pool Association (MCHIRPA) to expand the insurance 
commissioner’s authority over other state and federal insurance programs. 
 
2010 
• March 23: ACA is signed into law by President Obama. 
• September 30: Insurance Department receives a $1 million planning grant. 
• November: Mississippi is one of the few states that does not hold legislative elections in 
even numbered years. However, by the start of the next legislative session, enough Senate 
Democrats switched parties to give Republicans control of the chamber. 
 
2011 
• January - March: Four exchange bills were introduced, three in the House and one in the 
Senate.  Each chamber approved a bill, though a conference committee could not agree 
on a compromise and no legislation was enacted. 
• August 12: HHS awards the Insurance Department with a $20 million level 1 
establishment grant.  The application outlined plans to use MCHIRPA to create an 
exchange without legislative approval. 
• November 8: Phil Bryant (R) is elected governor.  Republicans won full control of both 
chambers for the first time since Reconstruction in the 19th century.  Bryant did not focus 
on the ACA on the campaign trail, but indicated he would continue to support an 
exchange. 
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2012 
• January: Insurance Department begins holding meetings of an exchange advisory board 
comprised of industry leaders and other stakeholders. 
• June 28: The U.S. Supreme Court announces its ruling upholding the ACA and making 
the Medicaid expansion optional.   
• July 11: Tea Party leaders speak for the first time at a meeting of the exchange advisory 
board.  The Tea Party continued to mobilize, subsequently attending meetings of the 
Personnel Review Board and blocking contracts with exchange vendors. 
• November 6: Barack Obama is re-elected president.  Insurance Commissioner Mike 
Chaney responds by saying he is ready to submit the state’s blueprint once he discusses it 
with the governor. 
• November 12: Governor Bryant and Commissioner Chaney meet at the Governor’s 
Mansion, with Bryant saying he will oppose the application and Chaney saying he will 
submit it anyway. As an independently elected official himself, Chaney believed he did 
not need the governor’s approval. 
• November 26: Governor Bryant writes HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius to oppose the 
application submitted by Commissioner Chaney. 
 
2013 
• January 15: MS Attorney General Jim Hood (D) issues a report agreeing with 
Commissioner Chaney that Governor Bryant’s approval is not needed. 
• January 18: Governor Bryant writes Secretary Sebelius another letter, this time criticizing 
Attorney General Hood’s report and saying that he would instruct the Mississippi 
Division of Medicaid not to cooperate with an exchange established by Commissioner 
Chaney. 
• February 7: HHS rejects the Insurance Department’s exchange application.   
• July 1: Deadline by which Medicaid needed to be renewed.  Democrats tried to use this 
moment as leverage to push Republicans to support expansion.  A special session was 
called in which Medicaid was renewed but not expanded. 
• October 1: On the same day that open enrollment begins, HHS approves a plan submitted 
by Commissioner Chaney for the state to run the small business exchange while the 
federal government retains control of the individual exchange.  
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Appendix E – Timeline of Key Events in Idaho 
 
2010 
• March 17: Governor Otter signs the Idaho Health Freedom Act, banning public officials 
from playing any role in enforcing federal insurance mandates. 
• March 23: ACA passes and Idaho Attorney General Lawrence Wasden joins the lawsuit. 
• September 30: The Department of Insurance receives $1 million exchange planning 
grant. 
• November 2: Governor Otter re-elected and Republican majorities strengthened in both 
chambers. 
• December: Governor Otter creates the Idaho Health Care Council to solicit stakeholder 
input. 
 
2011 
• February 16: Nullification bill HB 117 passed by the House 49-20. 
• February 25: HB 117 defeated by the Senate State Affairs Committee on a voice vote. 
• March 16: Senate approves funding of the exchange grant by a vote of 20-15. The House 
never voted, effectively blocking this grant from being spent. 
• April 20: Governor Otter vetoes another nullification bill which had been passed by the 
House (50-17) and the Senate (24-11). On the same day as this veto, Governor Otter 
signs an executive order blocking state agencies from implementing the ACA, with the 
only exception being exchange planning. 
 
2012 
• January – March: No exchange legislation introduce in the 2012 legislative session. 
• May 15: Republican primary elections reveal divisions within the House Republican 
caucus.  House Speaker Lawrence Denney takes the unprecedented step of using his PAC 
money against incumbent Republicans.   
• November 6: Barack Obama is re-elected president.  More than one-third of the 
legislature would be new in 2013 as a result of redistricting and retirements. 
• November 15: HHS extends exchange deadline, giving Idaho a chance to reconsider. 
• December 5: Scott Bedke becomes House Speaker after a summer-long campaign to oust 
Denney. 
• December: Governor Otter announces support for a state-based exchange. 
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2013 
• February 7: Exchange legislation (SB 1142) passes the Senate Commerce and Human 
Resources Committee 8-1 after two days of intense meetings. 
• February 13: 16 House Freshmen announce support for an exchange if more oversight is 
given to the legislature. 
• February 21: Senate passes the original exchange bill 23-12 after a seven-hour debate. 
• March 6:  An alternative exchange bill (HB 248) passes the House Health and Welfare 
Committee on a voice vote. 
• March 13: HB 248 passes 41-29 on the House floor. 
• March 19: Senate Commerce and Human Resources Committees approves HB 248. 
• March 21: Senate passes HB 248 by a vote of 23-12. 
• March 28: Governor Otter signs the legislation creating a state-based exchange. 
• April 10: Governor Otter appoints the 19 member board of directors without needing 
Senate confirmation because the legislative session had ended for the year. One of the 
first decisions made by the board was for Idaho to use the federal website for its 
exchange for in 2014. 
• October 1: Open enrollment begins. Many Idahoans are confused about whether their 
state is operating its own exchange. 
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Appendix F – Timeline of Key Events in New Mexico 
 
Pre-ACA 
• 2007-2008: The first exchange bills were introduced, largely at the urging of J.R. 
Damron, a radiologist who had been the Republican nominee for governor in 2006. 
Neither bill advanced as Democrats controlling the legislature hoped for a more 
comprehensive reform. 
 
2010 
• July 1: Task force convened by Governor Richardson recommends New Mexico retain 
control of its exchange. Richardson creates the New Mexico Office of Health Care 
Reform to oversee implementation. 
• November 2: Republican Susana Martinez is elected governor. 
• December 27: Richardson’s Office of Health Care Reform prepares a transition plan for 
the incoming Martinez administration.  It includes a recommendation to pass legislation 
in the 2011 session to create a quasi-governmental exchange with active purchaser 
powers. 
 
2011 
• March 2: SB 38, one of the four exchange bills introduced that session, passes the Senate. 
• March 19: SB 38 passes the House. The vote was very close, with Speaker Ben Luján 
calling the vote after midnight at the precise moment when there were just enough 
supporters in the chamber to ensure passage. 
• April 8: Governor Martinez vetoes SB 38. She is not opposed to creating an exchange but 
would prefer a clearinghouse model in which insurers are allowed on the board.  Her 
office creating an exchange by executive order within the Health Insurance Alliance.   
• August: Dan Derksen is appointed to lead the Office of Health Care Reform. He 
immediately announces plans to apply for a level 1 establishment grant before the 
September 30th deadline, as well as to apply for a level 2 grant by the following March. 
This implies formal authority would be received by then, most likely by executive order. 
• September 30: Derksen submits a level 1 grant application requesting $34 million, 
including a letter from Governor Martinez saying she is “pleased to endorse” the proposal 
which would create an exchange through the Alliance. 
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2012 
• January – February: No exchange bills are considered during the legislative session 
because in even numbered years, the legislature is only allowed to consider bills reacting 
to a special message from the governor or relating directly to the budget.   
• March: Dan Derksen suddenly resigns due to opposition from Governor Martinez’s 
advisers.  The level 2 grant application was nearly ready but is never submitted. 
• July 9: The legislature’s Interim Health and Human Services Committee begins holding 
monthly meetings and discusses the exchange more than any other issue.  
• September 11: Assistant Attorney General Mark Reynolds issues an opinion that 
Governor Martinez does not have authority to create an exchange by executive order 
since she vetoed similar legislation in the past.  Her office backed down after Democrats 
threatened to sue. 
• November 27: The Interim Committee endorses legislation create a clearinghouse 
exchange through the Alliance.   
 
2013 
• January: Governor Martinez announces support for expanding Medicaid. Four exchange 
bills are introduced, with regular negotiations between the governor’s office and 
consumer advocates working with legislative Democrats. 
• February 28: A bill to create an active purchaser exchange is defeated in the House, 30-
39. 
• March 15: A bill to create a clearinghouse exchange allowing insurers to serve on the 
board passes through multiple committees and both chambers in a single week once 
compromise was reached. 
• March 28: Governor Martinez signs exchange legislation. 
• April 29: The board of directors holds its first meeting, realizing there is not enough time 
to create an exchange before open enrollment begins.  
• July: HHS grants conditional approval for New Mexico to run the SHOP exchange while 
still giving up control of the individual exchange for the first year. 
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